Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
Your movement would be hindered by lack of light. By the time the divisions get in place, you have only about 15 minutes of good daylight. The attack is asuccess though, and the Feds are routed from their works, but only to the western fringes of town, and it is too dark to continue the attack with any cohesiveness.
The Feds send Opdycke to the west and they occupy a peremeter on the western fringe of town. The units that push the Fed center find themselves halted by darkness and heavy cannonading.
Results:
The Feds follow their withdrawal plans and retire to Nashville bloodied, but unbowed.
Casualties: Federal - 3,500+ Confederate - 2,000+
You arrive in front of Nashville in much better shape, but the numerical superiority of the Feds will still overwhelm you in the end.
Your attempt to sieze and cross at the fords is successful, but oeing to Wilson's cavalry and darkness quickly approaching, you are unsuccessful in engaging the main body that night. The plans seem to blend as though they had the night before, however, you are present - awake and try to make things happen.
The enemy makes it to Nashville, but the Feds are behind their works. Now the only problem is the arrival of A. J. Smith's 16th Corps.
You lack the man-power to block all the sites you thought you could. The Federal forces out number you about 3 to 1 and you can only dig in and wait for their assault. The results is what historically happened - a total rout - unless you do something drastically different.
Assuming as in your scenerio, we fail to engage them next morning ( I never planned to engage them that night*, other than to force the crossing) on the flank, I would carry through with my previous plan. Circling (not encircling) Nashville. Destroying the railroad, both to Louisville and Memphis, sinking shipping and by doing so accomplish several things. My troops stay busy. I diminish supplies for Nashville and by making spoiling raids around the city, they should have little idea where my main body will set up defensive positions.
But unlike history, I have several advantages. First, the spirit of my army is not crushed by the time I get to Nashville. I still have my best generals in charge and I'm not in a rush to get it over with.
For me, spring would be soon enough. Perhaps I'd fall back to the basin surrounding Nashville to the west. A defensive high ground. Maybe even attack Clarksville instead.
*Although knowing I was constantly outnumbered, I'd have had trained my troops for night fighting. Especially my horse-infantry.
This one doesn't stop the Federal withdrawal, and they make it to Nashville, but like you stated, your army is intact. You conduct your operations like you stated, and taking up positions far enough outside of Nashville might frustrate Federal plans to engage you in the winter if you utilize key terrain and obstacles well enough.
Grant ends up coming from the east to take charge assuming Thomas won't act. Your attempts to hamper the R.R. north of Nashville is only partially successful however, due to the large presence of Federal cavalry by mid Dec.
Your biggest problem will be maintaining a good supply line to your own logistical bases. The longer you stay here, the deeper the Fed cavalry penetrates, eventually threatening Columbia, Pulaski and Lawrenceburg - your main route of supply.
You manage to even recruit a few thousand more men throughout the month of December, but these are mostly children and lame old men - like me. There is a break in the weather later in early Jan. and the Feds start to press your position.
With only a sprinkling of supplies coming in for your army you can withdraw or fight.
There were several more fords not far from Franklin on the west side - only problem is they are further downstream and the water is even higher there. Forrest crossing on the western side leads me to believe that there might have been some serious hampering of the Federal wagon trains withdrawing. If he couldn't hit them in the vicinity of Franklin, at least Forrest knew the area from 1863 and perhaps might advance up the Hillsborogh Pike to cross east in the vicinity of Brentwood and strike from the west.
This would hit the wagon train about midsection or better I would assume. However, we have to remember that Forrest's troopers have been in the saddle at this point since noon Nov. 28. Thats close to 60 hours with alot of fighting and very little rest. I'm not sure even his troopers would be up to the task.
If he could reach there, he might be able to stop the Fed withdrawal and if you followed him quickly with infantry the following morning up the Nashville pike from Franklin - who knows? Smith's corps was just arriving that day, and only garrison troops could have come to Schofield's relief!
I'm inclined to believe that Forrest's men would once again run low or out of ammo though, and it would result in another near miss. The infantry that crossed would not have been able to keep up with his march and not arrive at Brentwood till the rear of the Feds were passing there.
Burying Hood on Winstead Hill was not an option. Some of his descendants were recently denied permission to install a monument there in his honor. Ain't much positive sentiment for Mr. Hood in Middle Tennessee. Besides, Winstead Hill is a might rocky place. Perhaps they could have rolled him down the hill towards the Little Harpeth. The notion that Nashville could have been taken with the troops at hand is also much of a fantasy. Nashville was HEAVILY fortified and well staffed, all waiting to see who if anyone showed up.
As to supplies, Forrest had, only weeks before Franklin, destroyed an enormous amount of supplies at Johnsonville. With more troops at his disposal, he could have made spoiling raids all along the river, all along the railroad, Clarksville etc. Gathering supplies rather than destroying them. Cumberland Furnace had other materiels that could be garnered as well. My main concern would be lack of horses. By this late date the union had stolen just about every type of four footed critter in middle Tennessee. Either way, this time when Forrest recruited, I'd let him keep them.
Larry is correct in that Nashville would be too hard a nut to crack. Much the same Petersburg was hard. I'd never even considered attacking it. As stupid as Franklin was, Hood's move on to Nashville was surely opium induced.
I believe I'd take the heights above the Harpeth. Let Grant, if he actually was in charge by then, have another Cold Harbor. I do not see him being imaginative enough to change his tactics. But either way, I could have some very nasty surprises waiting for him from the high ground. The river would help me disengage if things went badly. Failing that, it is only 20 miles to my home. I could just come home and have a cuppa instead.
Aphillbilly; you are discounting that: A. Thomas was competant, B. Union Cav was well equipped and well led by this point in the War, C. that if Forrest was going to gather supplies he would need wagons, teams and men to both guard those trains and drive the wagons... something he didn't have. When second guessing the leaders of the past it is rather important to realize that their opponets might have reacted to different actions.
What Forrest accomplished w/ what he had is truly impressive and suggesting he could have done more or that he didn't do enough... he did the best he could w/ what he had.
Gunny if I was Hood... I think I might have cut orders placing either Cleburne or Forrest in command; placed a Colt pistol to my head and pulled the trigger. That's all I can see saving the AoT from Thomas. He had campaigned all year w/ Sherman and seen the effectiveness of flanking manuevers and the folly of poorly planed frontal assaults. While slow and plodding he was careful, methodical and effective. Grant had others on the way to replace Thomas if necessary and those he had sent in that direction were quite competant.
If Grant had arrived to take command... Hood would have been in even worse trouble. Hood was no Bobby Lee.
__________________ Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
SUVCW Camp Abernethy# 48
Lifetime NRA member
3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
Realistically, we can easily see now that Nashville was a pipe dream, but think of the desperation of the Confederacy at this point. Hood had done well in other positions of command, and although he really should have been replaced after the fall of Atlanta, he isn't.
When he moved into Northern Ala. only the 4th and 23rd Corps confronted him. They were fewer in number than his own troops and only the garrison units and convalescents occupied Nashville. That, more than likely, didn't number more than 10,000 troops. Over the next few weeks middle Tennessee and outlying garrisons were gathered at Nashville and by the time of the battle with the addition of Smith's 16th corps, they numbered nearly 70,000; BUT, had Hood commenced his invasion a week earlier, things may have been different.
Smith's troops didn't arrive in Nashville till Dec. 1.
That would mean that only Schofield's 4th and 23rd Corps were the only large force in his front from Nov. 14 - Dec. 1.
It is possible, that had his plans at Spring Hill or Frankin been successful, he could have marched on Nashville with a Superior for and threatening the city from several different approaches - strictly from the south, forced a breakthrough.
Needless to say that didn't happen - but could have had he commenced just a day earlier.
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