what if Zach Taylor had not died in office?

[elektratig]

UnionBlue,

On the theory that every coin has two, or possibly three, sides, I offer the following.

In The Presidencies of Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore (a volume in the University Press of Kansas American Presidency Series), the author, Elbert Smith, suggests that, if Taylor had lived, the Senate would likely have resolved the crisis by breaking up the Omnibus Bill into pieces and arriving at a resolution of the Texas-New Mexico border issue, much as it ultimately did. As to the latter issue, "Regardless of who was president, the Texas bondholders would have been present . . .to help persuade senators and congressmen to preserve a viable New Mexico in return for the $10 million awarded to Texas."

More generally, Professor Smith opines:

"In 1850 the Southern people were not ready to secede against a president who owned 145 slaves, and the overwhelming evidence of mass public support in both sections for a compromise would probably have dictated the passage of the compromise measures not significantly different from those that were enacted. And finally, there is no reason to believe that Taylor would have vetoed any such acts. Even before Taylor's death, the radical Southern convention at Nashville had died with only a mild whimper, and only a formal passage of the Wilmot Proviso, which an overwhelming majority in Congress opposed, or a war between Texas and New Mexico could have revived it."

Indeed, the author goes on speculate that Taylor's continued existence might well have resulted in avoiding, or at least delaying, the onset of the War. After explaining why Taylor would likely have been reelected in 1852, Professor Smith reasons:

"A Whig victory or even a strong showing in the South in 1852 would have preserved the party for at least another election. Certainly, with Taylor in the White House, there would have been no repeal of the Missouri Compromise or a 'Bleeding Kansas' to induce a great many Northern Democrats to coalesce with the rudderless Northern Whigs into a new, entirely Northern Republican party. In 1852, the Free Soil party received less than 5 percent of the total presidential vote, but with Northern Whigs forced to choose between Republicans and Know-Nothings and with the life-giving blood transfusion provided by the conflict in Kansas, the Republicans had become a major party by 1856."

Fascinating stuff.

[unionblue]

Elektratig,

I agree, endlessly fascinating stuff, a true, 'what if' in American history. Thanks for the above.

Unionblue

[elektratig]

UnionBlue,

I've just finished William Freehling's "The Road to Disunion." A brilliant book, as you said, although the good professor should be slapped silly for his writing style. You may be interested to know that I ran across a suggestion on the internet (of course, I've lost the reference) that Volume II may be published later this year.

As to the issue at hand -- basically, would some or all of the slave states have seceded if the the Compromise of 1850 had not been enacted? -- Freehling's analysis leaves me uncertain. On the one hand, Freehling emphasizes the disunity of the southern states, the thinness of sentiment (outside of South Carolina) for disunion, and the paltry attendance at the Nashville Conference even before the Compromise was enacted.

On the other hand, I wonder whether failure to enact the Compromise would have led to an increase in rhetoric on both sides, leading in turn to secession by at least some states, say South Carolina, Georgia and Mississippi. If President Taylor then called out the troops, as Lincoln later did, the remaining Southern states would have had to choose sides. Would there not then have been a second wave of seceding states, as there was in 1861? This seems to have been the scenario hoped for by some of the South Carolina ultras even after the passage of the Compromise, until Georgia and Mississippi backed away.

What other books dealing with the pre-War period do you recommend?

[unionblue]

Elektratig,

Congratulations on finishing Freehling's Road to Disunion and yes, the good professor should be severly slapped for his writing style! If it wasn't for his huge amount of background and resource material with extensive footnotes, I would send him hate mail. I am very much waiting with much anticipation for his Vol. II, so thanks for that update.

I very much agree with your observations above, that the South was not unified during that period as some have been led to believe. Other sources have convinced me that many in the Southern states banded together to defeat efforts of secessionists during that time.

But I too, wonder if just the threat of Taylor's use of federal troops might have been enough to discourage Southern radicals efforts at disunion, even if no compromise had been offered. After all, Jackson is remembered primarily for his threat to send troops into South Carolina during the 1830's nullification crisis and while some will say he compromised too by reducing the offending tariff, that is really not the case. As you saw in Freehling's work, when Clay meet with Calhoun to adjust the offending tariff, Calhoun and the South came off the worse for it, getting nothing of the compromises they desired.

You might be interested in reading the book, The Approaching Fury, Voices of the Storm, 1820 - 1861, by Stephen B. Oates. I found it very enjoyable to read this first-person style rendering of history. Also The Impending Crisis, 1848 - 1861, by David M. Potter, is an excellent work. And lastly, I would say one of the most commented on events and yet the least read should be studied. The book The Lincoln-Douglas Debates, by Harold Holzer should also be a book you should seriously look at. Far too often those debates are misquoted or are taken far, FAR out of context too many times.

I very much have enjoyed our time here. I hope we can continue to inform and assist one another with our research on the war in the future.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

[ewc]

Gentemen, fascinating discussion. President Taylor's death I'd have to say did the country no good in the long run. Having a slave owning Southern and Unionist president at the time of these threats to national unity would have served to quell the disturbance I am sure before bloodshed would have occurred. Some states might have attempted to secede or even done so, but there was no way the disaffected element could have taken enough control of affairs in the Southern States to make an effective resistance. The concessions gained would likely have been greater than Calhoun could wheedle from Jackson in the Nullification Crisis, but the states would have remained isolated and weak and still largely unionist. Fillmore's, Clay's, and Douglas's compromises finally got through after Taylor's death (he, as you say, would have derailed them,) only after great struggles at the party, state, and national levels. And yet, the crises were only put off, addressed but not tackled. And things would but go downhill from there.

But it is still a decade till the taking up of arms. This decade is critical in developing the slavery-protecting, sectional, secessionist movement in the South. If as overawing a statesman as Calhoun could not mount a united effort in '32, who of sufficient stature did the unmollified Southerners have in '50? Indeed, as has been pointed out, with the defusing of the crisis in '50, (thanks to the compromise) the hardline element went into a decline, eclipsed by the conciliatory element. The South was just not ready to bolt in 1850, and as was stated, was not going to against a Southern slaveholding man athwart the President's chair. Doesn't mean the Southerners were very happy with Taylor, that he was poisoned by this crowd was widely and logically so believed.

But it would require another decade of sectional strife, the hardening of attitudes, and constantly perceived threats to allow a fire-eating class to gain ground and help fan the unease and loss of equilibrium to make matters unnegotiable. And still by 1860, unionist feeling throughout the South was very strong. It was only the advent of an active driving group of disunionists who by then could push things just enough for the sectional crisis to lead to a southern Confederacy. It would not have happened in 1850, or anyway not as powerfully as it happened ten years later.

Had secession happened then in the few states it could have, it would have been snuffed out. Maybe that would have killed the secessionist spirit. Wouldn't things have worked out far differently then? Maybe no dreadful conflagration like the Civil War? Just maybe...

[unionblue]

EWC,

I have very much the same sentiments as you do concerning the idea that if secession HAD occured, there was a good chance that in South Carolina and the very few other Southern states that may have seceded, secession would have failed from lack of popular support in the face of strong federal action.

But again, I am nagged by the idea of how many Southern states would have joined their seceding sister states when threatened by a Federal confrontation, just like what happened to Lincoln in 1861 when he called for volunteers?

Interesting, no?

Unionblue

[ewc]

Yes interesting. So how many? I would wager none of the Upper South had enough of a disloyal sentiment to risk abandoning the Union, not that there wouldn't have been a furor about 'coercion.' But these states as states would not have lifted a hand to prevent Federal action. South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi as I see it, as most likely carrying out a secession threat. Texas would have been held too firmly by Sam Houston to lose their prized connection to the Union of States. Louisiana had such strong economic ties to the North that I can't see her putting her self- interest at such a risk. Alabama, North Carolina, and Georgia proved in 1860 that their Unionist beliefs ran deep and strong. I do not believe a divided Virginia would have put themselves in harm's way- most certainly would not the Mountaineers. Though a political and populous minority in the state, even with a dominant Tidewater class, their united face to the planters would have held this state in check. So any piddling effects of this small group of 'independent' states would have been balky and halting. They would be entirely unable to coordinate action and, unable to hang together, would have 'hanged separately.'

The South, the Deep South even, despite words, was just not ready and able to act so revolutionarily in 1850. I really do believe that it took all the doings and hatreds engendered in the decade of the '50s to finally convince enough Southerners to foment revolution. Particularly sowing the field for an active secessionist movement, without which, no action could be taken.

An interesting thought has come to me- maybe a mimi revolution of states in 1850, though put down by Taylor, would have bred an even more virulent outbreak later on, or made the Southern patricians more willing to revolt again, especially if anything like a 'Bleeding Kansas' or 'John Brown's Raid' took place. It could be they would have learned some valuable lessons in the art of throwing off the yoke. Hmmmm...

[unionblue]

ewc,

I even doubt if Mississippi would have participated in a secession movement in the 1850s.

Would a mini-revolution put down by a still living Taylor have bred a more violent outbreak later on? Or would it have finally just killed the idea that secession was a bankrupt idea, preventing greater bloodshed later on? I mean, first Jackson, then Taylor, both SOUTHERNERS, for goodness sake!

Or would it just have to be that three attempts would be the 'charm?'

Sincerely,
Unionblue

[elektratig]

As an aside, I've been doing some more reading about Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore, and it's remarkable what fine men they both were. Fillmore in particular bears no resemblance to the current caricature of him. If people know his name at all, it's usually because late night tv hosts make fun of him, probably because his name is odd and because the few photos make him look like a stuffed shirt.

In fact, he was raised in grinding poverty in western New York (his father was a tenant farmer). Young Millard apprenticed in a mill, constantly reading to improve his minimal skills. His father's landlord recognized Millard's abilities and arranged for him to be apprenticed to become a lawyer. He ultimately became an outstanding lawyer and leading citizen of Buffalo, served at various times in the State legislator and in Congress, always with distinction, and was the leading member of the Whig party in Western New York, where he was uniformly respected and admired for his civic-mindedness.

One of the few who disliked Fillmore was Albany editor and powerbroker Thurlow Weed, who perceived Fillmore to be a threat to Weed's favorite, William Seward. Weed turned out to be more correct than he anticipated. Fillmore was unexpectedly nominated as Vice President on the Whig ticket in 1848, balancing the southern Taylor.

During the campaign, Fillmore's good sense and ability may well have saved Taylor from defeat. When Taylor accepted the nomination of the South Carolina Democratic Party, Weed called a meeting of New York Whigs to repudiate Taylor and nominate another candidate. With great difficulty, Fillmore persuaded Weed to delay the meeting, giving Taylor the opportunity to issue a letter explaining why he had accepted the nomination, which placated the Whig ranks.

Indeed, in a number of respects Fillmore's backround strikes me as similar to Lincoln's. From humble beginnings, he was driven by the desire for self-improvement and ambition (in the best sense of the term). Through hard work he became a lawyer and intermittent legislator and was highly respected by his local community and those who knew him. He became a Whig who believed (and stated, even during the campaign) that slavery was evil and that it should not be extended to the Territories, while affirming that slavery in the southern States was a matter for those States alone.

One author sums him up as follows:

"[Fillmore was] a kind, gentle and generous husband and father; an orthodox Unitarian; a citizen immersed in his community's efforts at self-improvement; and an ardent and effective advocate of the best interests of his constituents."

"With an impeccable reputation, many friends, and virtually no enemies except for jealous rivals within his own party, Fillmore went to the Whig convention of 1848. His nomination for vice-president surprised him as much as it did Thurlow Weed."

"The bare facts of Fillmore's political career in New York only scratch the surface of the intelligence, character, determination, and hard work that it had required."

"Fillmore would have been a better star [than Seward] for Weed's ambitions, but he was in fact much too conscientious for Weed's taste. . . . Fillmore's emergence as vice-president was a tribute to his record and talents, as well as something of a vindication of the American political system."

Elbert Smith, The Presidencies of Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore (U. Kansas 1988), pp. 45, 46, 47.

It's small discoveries such as this -- the discovery of a truly decent, admirable and in some ways remarkable and important man who has unjustly faded into obscurity except as a caricature -- that can make the study of history such a pleasure.

[elektratig]

I figured I'd use this thread to record the vote of another respected scholar. In "The Dred Scott Case", Don Fehrenbacher opines that Zachary Taylor's death may have averted civil war in 1850:

"That the crisis of 1850 was truly a secession crisis can scarcely be doubted. Even after the great Compromise had been engineered, disunion efforts continued in more than one southern state. If Taylor had lived to pursue his own territorial plan with all the executive power at his command, the disaffection in the South would have been widespread and probably decisive."

Then, in a footnote he adds:

"Whether it would have been better to have the showdown in 1850, rather than in 1860, is a different question. Most historians believe that the North profited from the ten-year reprieve, but Holman Hamilton had doubts about it."

The Dred Scott Case, p. 159.

Unfortunately, Fehrenbacher does not spell out in any further detail the reasons for his views -- understandably in view of the fact that the comment is basically an aside in the context of book. I'd add that Fehrebacher's views are probably not unexpected given that he was a disciple of David Potter and the posthumous editor of Potter's book "The Impending Crisis", whose views I previously discussed.

I wish Fehrenbacher had provided more detail on the point, because his scholarship in the book is astounding and he obviously knows the period intimately. However, at present I am not convinced. Elbert Smith, in "The Presidencies of Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore" (discussed above), repeatedly quotes Taylor as making clear that he (Taylor) believed the executive role to be extremely limited -- for example, he would not veto legislation unless it were plainly unconstitutional. Taylor might not have affirmatively endorsed the proposed compromise (as Fillmore did), but he would not have stood in its way if Congress passed it.

Moreover, Fehrebacher himself mentions a fact that would seem to undercut his argument:

"[Despite the failure of the Omnibus Bill, i]n several respects the chances of success had improved [as of late July]. The Nashville Convention in early June proved less militant than expected, merely advocating extension of the Missouri Compromise line in preference to the Clay plan."

The Dred Scott Case, p. 161.