Aot - 1865

[larry_cockerham]

February 14, 1865

Jeff Weaver wrote:

Palmer's Brigade reached Columbia, South Carolina by February 14, burning bridges behind them. Calvin Livesay told of seeing "a sea of blue on the south bank." General Johnston was disappointed to find no reinforcements at Charleston, and was distressed to give up another state capital.

[larry_cockerham]

February 15, 1865

Cheatham’s Corps left Augusta toward Baushetts Mills. Apparently the AOT was scattered over a few hundred square miles making them somewhat ineffective as far as actually challenging Sherman was concerned. A lack of completed or well-maintained railroads was a major deterrent to travel. Union occupation of much of the area with better fed and more rested troops was also a major obstacle.

[larry_cockerham]

February 16, 1865 2:30 p.m.

Enemy commenced shelling city this morning. He is apparently moving up Saluda River. Our forces occupy south bank of that stream and Congaree. –

G.T. Beaugregard, Gen.


Feb 16, 1865 6:00 p.m.

Enemy has forced a passage across the Saluda River above Columbia. I will endeavor to prevent him from crossing the Broad, but my forces here are so small it is doubtful whether I can prevent it. Columbia will soon have to be evacuated.

G.T. Beaugregard, Gen.


From Jeff Weaver in the regimental history of the 58th North Carolina:

Palmer's Brigade had the "honor" of acting as a rear guard to hold the south bank of the Congaree River until February 16. Palmer's command then withdrew and burned the bridge behind it. Johnston was operating a delaying action so that Columbia could be evacuated.

[larry_cockerham]

February 17, 1865

The Army of Tennessee began its march north on February 17. (as per Jeff Weaver in the regimental history of the 58th North Carolina) They no longer had the forces, equipment nor energy to defend Columbia against Sherman's rapidly advancing troops.

[EricJacobson]

Larry,

I know I have stated this before, but there is no way Forrest or Cleburne were ever going to command the army. Hood, Johnston, Taylor, Beauregard, even Stewart as commanders maybe, but not a cavalry commander or a man who had never even been a corps commander.

Also, there were not 10,000 - 15,000 deaths during the Tennessee Campaign. The Confederate death total was no more than 2,500. The former number includes wounded, prisoners, and deserters.

[PINCKNEYUSMCRET]

I got to buy your book

Pinckney

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by EricJacobson

Larry,

I know I have stated this before, but there is no way Forrest or Cleburne were ever going to command the army. Hood, Johnston, Taylor, Beauregard, even Stewart as commanders maybe, but not a cavalry commander or a man who had never even been a corps commander.

Also, there were not 10,000 - 15,000 deaths during the Tennessee Campaign. The Confederate death total was no more than 2,500. The former number includes wounded, prisoners, and deserters.

I've never meant to imply that Cleburne or Forrest had any business in command of the complexities of the Army of Tennessee. Only two points were that Cleburne had a level head on his shoulders and enough sense to see that the attack on Franklin in the poor light was a tad risky. Forrest, having been born only thirty-odd miles away at least knew the territory and of course he had led men through Franklin and Brentwood on more than one previous occasion. The point being, he knew the terrain and knew were he was and had a good bit of judgment about his capabilites. As I wrote, Hood did not impress me by ignoring the advice of those two fine officers. (I doubt he was trying to impress me, but hopefully you'll see my point?) I stand corrected on the death terminology. (My old fingers get carried away and most of these guys know better than to believe most of what I write.)
The wounded and simply exhausted and disheartened Confederates might as well have perished. There was no fight left until the opportunity to rest in Mississippi. Furloughs weren't much help for the majority of the men too far from home.

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by PINCKNEYUSMCRET

I got to buy your book

Pinckney

There's not enough there to sell at the moment. I'll be happy to share the drafts with you if you'll send me your e-mail address. lcoc@bellsouth.net
I still need much information on the period from January 1, 1865 to war's end for the 63rd Virginia. Eventually I'd like to use this information as a fund raiser to support our SCV camp's continued efforts to maintain Winstead Hill. Folks such as Eric and yourself have been a big help in focusing my straying thoughts and of course spoting mis-statements. I'd certainly appreciate your review. I'm still quite interested in the battlefield and battle at Sugar Creek Dec 26, 1864. Hopefully there is much more there to learn. Discovering that I had an ancestor on each side of that field at the same moment has had a strange impact on me, to say the least. They were both at, or rather near, Franklin on November 30, 1864 as well. I suspect I'm a lucky man.

[EricJacobson]

Larry,

I understand about Cleburne and Forrest. No doubt Cleburne questioned whether the attack at Franklin was necessary and Forrest certainly wanted to try the flanking maneuever. Interesting is that A. P. Stewart, in a letter to Samuel French after the war, stated unequivocally that Hood at least considered a flanking maneuver when he first arrived at Franklin. The problem is Hood knew daylight was running out. Stewart's letter shows that Hood did not so much think a flanking maneuver was a bad idea, but rather he didn't think he had time to pull it off. Even John Brown, a division commander at Franklin, said Hood told him any flanking maneuvers could be seen fully by the enemy because the ground was so open and largely flat.

That said, if anyone could have pulled off a flanking maneuver it was Forrest. But Hood did allow him to take two divisions of cavalry across the Harpeth to work in concert with the infantry assault and Wilson's 5,000 cavalry pretty much shoved Forrest right back across the river. So if Hood gave Forrest a division of infantry all he does is weaken the infantry thrust with no guarantee the flanking movement will be successful.

I can tell you this. I wouldn't have wanted to be Hood on November 30, 1864. But then I wouldn't have wanted to be Lee at Gettysburg on July 3, 1863. Having to make a decision when most everyone is questioning its correctness is difficult. But a decision had to be made.

[PINCKNEYUSMCRET]

I think that is why they call it Command. You get the credit and the critisim.
I agree hard decisions.

Pinckney