Who's worse: Bragg or Hood?

[EricJacobson]

Paul and Elektratig,

I will try to respond to both posts at once. McPherson is basing his statement solely on the book Five Tragic Hours by James McDonough and Thomas Connelly, a book that I might add lists no sources. I am not going to say McPherson is patently incorrect, but a Pulitzer Prize winning author should at least, I think, use some more contemporary sources.

Next point. As the author of For Cause & For Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin I have spent a fair bit of time evaluating what all the facts indicate, not just a select few. Wiley Sword is the greatest cherry picker I have ever read, at least as far as Franklin is concerned. No doubt that Hood's memoirs did him great damage, but James Longstreet's did as well. Bitterness over failure(s) manifests itseld in many different ways. But I will add two contemporary accounts that you might find interesting. They give clear reasons why Hood attacked at Franklin and are much different than the old stories about anger, punishment, etc. The first comes from John Brown, a division commander at Franklin who wrote that Hood said:

"The country around Franklin for many miles is open and exposed to the full view of the Federal army, and I cannot mask the movements of my troops so as to turn either flank of the enemy, and if attempt it he will withdraw and precede me to Nashville."

Hood wrote, also in his memoirs:

"I hereupon decided, before the enemy would be able to reach his stronghold at Nashville, to make that same afternoon another and final effort to overtake and rout him, and drive him in the Big Harpeth river at Franklin, since I could no longer hope to get between him and Nashville, by reason of the short distance from Franklin to that city, and the advantage which the Federals enjoyed in the posession of the direct road."

Additionally, A. P. Stewart wrote in a post-war letter to Samuel French, both of whom commanded troops at Franklin, that Hood had spoken to Stewart when he (Hood) first arrived at Franklin asking if Stewart could move troops across the Harpeth as part of a flanking movement. Obviously Hood did not choose that option, but just as clearly he at least thought about it. Stewart's statement surely doesn't make it sound like Hood was hell bent on punishing his troops.

In the end, my position is not to be a Hood defender, but rather to give balance to the situation as it existed on November 30. As someone who lives in Middle Tennessee the Battle of Franklin has, in my opinion, been so overlooked and forgotten because many have chalked it all up to Hood's anger, alleged laudanum abuse, or something else. The facts, at least I think, are clear. No matter what else Hood may have been thinking, his primary objective was to destroy Schofield before he could get away. For right or wrong, Hood felt his best option to accomplish that was to launch a frontal assault.

Thanks for your time.

Eric

[ole]

Well said, Eric.

On an aside, "Who's worse; Bragg or Hood" overlooks the real barrel scraping: Polk.

[larry_cockerham]

I recently visited Fort Grainger in Franklin with an undisclosed yankee companion. It is obvious from the mound which constituted the fort in 1864 that all movements of the Confederate army after they crossed the ridge between Breezy Hill and Winstead Hill were in full view of a pair of K-Mart field glasses or the naked eye of a young man. There were few secrets at Franklin, and Eric's rationale for Hood's actions has always seemed quite plausible to me. I recently learned more about the location of Wlson's cavalry on the north side of the Harpeth. An eastern flank movement would have resulted in less than favorable Confederate results. Forrest did test the waters, but wisely did not pursue a full attack.

[SpartanGSG]

Seems like a toss up, think Hood was dropped into history at the wrong place, wrong time. His smash mouth offensive tactics were probabably more suited to ordering British frontal assaults at the Somme or the Marne and not blinking at the manpower drain. But alas, perhaps its time to freshen up my reading on Hood and re-evaluate previous notions of Gen Hood.
Regards,
Spartan

[ole]

Well said, Spartan. (Good to see you back aboard, by the way.)

Hood had a style and that was stand-up knock-down brawl. No finesse. Just whang on them till they fold. Lemme see...was there a Union equivalent? Hmmmmm.

ole

[samgrant]

WWPD

What would Patrick do?

(Cleburne)

[larry_cockerham]

Actually Cleburne was too close the action at Franklin for his own good. A nice memorial stands at the area where he fell.

[PINCKNEYUSMCRET]

I have to say, I find Hood interesting. Especially all the speculation about what others would have done. They weren't picked. Some protested his plan, so did Longstreet with Lee at Gettysburg and was later villified for it. Not as much an expert as others on this board, but Hood was a General who believed in offense, and he was put in charge of a bunch of Generals who for the most part had been practicing the strategic retreat. As far as the soldiers themselves. I would say that each one of them would have fit right in with Chesty Pullers Marines at the Chosin Resevoir. Hood was the one that was there and in command. It looks like the one aw s--------t wiped out a bunch of attaboys.

[custersluck13]

PickneyUSMCret

OOrah, brother...I completely agree with your idea that those southern boys would have fit in well with Chesty. As you know, the Marines remain largely southern to this day.
I tend to go with Gen Lee on this one, tho...he told Jefferson this position was well outta Hoods paygrade. Tactically, in command of a division or maybe a Corps, under the guidence of a Gen Lee, Hood could be outstanding. Left on his own to command a entire army, just wasnt gonna happen. As Marines, you and I tend to love the aggressive, offensive minded Generals, and with good reason. I dont believe the Army of TN was need of such at the time or place Hood took over. Probably the man for the job, if it was even possible to actually make much happen for the good by that time, I think would have been Longstreet. Outstanding in such situations, but he wasnt going permanently west, for sure. Kind of a wild choice, but I would have either sought out Forrest or Clebourne for such matters. For if any two had the military werewithall to save the day, it just may have been one of them. But no doubt, Bragg had to go, and I understand the thinking behind the choice of Hood. I think Hood probably had a lot of personal issues going on as well, and it also may have impaired his ability to make sound command judgements, but that cant be proven, can it? Semper Fi!...Custersluck13

[milhistbuff1]

They were about equal, Bragg failed miserably in his goal of protecting Nashville (1/3 of total CSA industry) or of preventing the CSA from being chopped in two (Vicksburg).Tying up the main western CSA army in TN when it was needed in Missisippi cost them the strength necessary to prevent the mess that culminated at Atlanta.

Hood destroyed whatever Johnston was able to salvage and was grossly insubordinate at Cassville. Hood refused to attack citing federal troops in overwhelming strength, turned out to be cavalry. Thus Johnston lost the one chance to do serious damage to Sherman's forces. Franklin and Spring hill were icing.