Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
As for Bragg he could not get respect of Polk and Hardee, which in the end turned that he couldnt get respect of their division commanders. Soldiers generally liked him, it was those two corps commanders (especially Polk), which mutined men against him.
If Bragg get rid off Polk after Kentucky this army could look completly different (better) later. Lee had a power to get rid of those he didnt wanted. He worked with those which he liked. Bragg did not has this luxury.
__________________ Nico, Maréchal d'Empire
Last edited by Nico_Davout; 06-28-2007 at 03:06 PM.
Real good question. Neither seemed to competently grasp, and evaluate a given situation, at least in strategic terms. Lee tried to advise Davis from appointing ol Sam Hood, I know. Because Davis, for whatever reasons, just thought the world of Bragg, the entire Western Campaign was essentially run without the benefit of anything approaching a Lee, Jackson, or even a Longstreet. I believe it was the main reason the war was lost for the south. But if I have to run with this ball, I guess you gotta go with Hood. He was just in, way above his abilities, and of course, how much effect lost loves and limbs preyed upon his mindset is certainly open to debate.
Regardless of Hood's abilities: you've got to admire a guy who loses the use of his left arm - but returns to active duty. Then he loses his right leg - and does the same. Shades of Admiral Nelson! They just don't make men like that any more.
By the one: one of Gen. Hood's descendants is now the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Confederate Museum here in New Orleans.
Actually, Capt C, they do. Due esp. to recent advances in medical technology, I was recently reading a article (sorry, I forget..US News and World Report, maybe...) of the numbers of wounded military personel returning to active service, minus foot, part of a leg or arm...several actually returning to combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. I believe men, such as the gallant Hood, are very much still among us. Semper Fi!
If I may avoid the precise question -- comparing one to the other -- I continue to think that Bragg was not the disaster he's generally assumed to have been. Steven Woodworth in particular has defended Bragg and fingered Leonidas Polk as an utterly incompetent and malevolent force who, abetted by Hardee, fomented discontent. There is an excellent thread on this topic here, entitled "Was Braxton Bragg Really That Bad?"
Before I have too many brickbats aimed at my head, I am not claiming that Bragg was Napoleon. As a poster on the earlier thread pointed out, Bragg seems to have become befuddled in the middle of battle -- for example, he couldn't figure out what to do after the first day of Stones River, and he was at sea and sort of threw up his hands after the first day of Chickamauga (although as usual the clueless Polk was the core of the problem there). That said, I'd give Bragg a C, not an F.
In assessing Hood in the Army of Tennessee, I think you have to draw some distinctions. On the one hand, before he replaced Joe Johnston, he was a duplicitous slimeball, covertly badmouthing Joe for lack of aggressiveness to Jefferson Davis when it was Hood who had become spooked at Cassville (and I say this as no lover of Joe J). After he replaced Joe J, he had some good ideas around Atlanta, but he was unrealistic to expect that his troops could carry them out without the friction of war coming into play. Finally, there is the post-Spring Hill Hood, who seems to have become consumed with rage and destroyed his army and murdered his men to sate his anger. The first and third Hoods are contemptible; the second Hood showed some promise, he just didn't have the luxury of making beginner's mistakes.
Actually, Capt C, they do. Due esp. to recent advances in medical technology, I was recently reading a article (sorry, I forget..US News and World Report, maybe...) of the numbers of wounded military personel returning to active service, minus foot, part of a leg or arm...several actually returning to combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. I believe men, such as the gallant Hood, are very much still among us. Semper Fi!
All of them far better men than I! I tip my hat to them all!
I dont quite believe that, either Capt C...if you were put into that position, there is no telling what a man will do. Everything I gather from personal experience in combat and all of reading Ive done..from any war you can pick...the song remains the same (to quote Zep!)...your unit becomes your home...the men become closer than your own blood...and it is that, never a flag or a cause. that keeps men, then as now, doing what they do. What else could have held, say the Army of TN together as it did following defat after defeat? I think the bottom line is, neither Bragg nor Hood were up to the task, monumental as it was, and political interference probably kept some better men from the post. (maybe Cleborne or Breckenridge, perhaps?)
I dont quite believe that, either Capt C...if you were put into that position, there is no telling what a man will do. Everything I gather from personal experience in combat and all of reading Ive done..from any war you can pick...the song remains the same (to quote Zep!)...your unit becomes your home...the men become closer than your own blood...and it is that, never a flag or a cause. that keeps men, then as now, doing what they do.
I believe that you have hit the nail on the proverbial head, Custer.
We actually we don't all follow your train of thought about Hood attacking at Franklin to "soothe his anger..." If you truly believe that Hood attacked at Franklin and then went to Nashville just because he was peeved about Spring Hill you have not read much beyond some of the things that Wiley Sword and James McDonough, for example, wrote in years past. The problem is with that train of thought is that it is based upon PURE speculation and/or conjecture. I guess Lee attacked the center of the Union on July 3, 1863 because he was trying to "soothe" his anger about the first two days of the battle. Hey, on second thought, James Longstreet actually did say just about that very thing.
In closing, I would be careful about following the old train of thought that is rapidly being dispelled. The truth is often much starker - a general making the decision with a clear mind and an objective, for right or wrong, in mind. Hood likely falls into that place and frankly, so does Lee. And Burnside. And Sherman. And Grant. Frontal assaults were the nature of the Civil War beast.
Eric: Sorry it has taken me so long to respond. I had surgery and it took longer to recover than I anticipated. Still not fully recovered.
I am not going to argue with you about Hood's anger, but to let you know I DO NOT use speculation and conjecture when I make a statement.
"During the night of November 29-30 Schofield pulled his whole force back and entrenched a line covering the crossings of the Harpeth River at Franklin....An angry Hood blamed his subordinates and even his predecessor Joe Johnston for the failure at Spring Hill. Since taking over the army..., Hood had frequently complained of its defensive mentality instilled, he believed, by Johnston. On November 30 he followed Schofield to Franklin and ordered his infantry to make a head-on assault, almost as if by such punishment to purge them of their supposed timidity. Hood's corps commanders protested this order....Their protests confirmed Hood's suspicions of the army's elan and his determinationto force it to fight..." Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era by James M. McPherson page 812.
There are other sources that I could quote, but the point is that I back up any statements I make.
Paul
We actually we don't all follow your train of thought about Hood attacking at Franklin to "soothe his anger..." If you truly believe that Hood attacked at Franklin and then went to Nashville just because he was peeved about Spring Hill you have not read much beyond some of the things that Wiley Sword and James McDonough, for example, wrote in years past. The problem is with that train of thought is that it is based upon PURE speculation and/or conjecture. I guess Lee attacked the center of the Union on July 3, 1863 because he was trying to "soothe" his anger about the first two days of the battle. Hey, on second thought, James Longstreet actually did say just about that very thing.
In closing, I would be careful about following the old train of thought that is rapidly being dispelled. The truth is often much starker - a general making the decision with a clear mind and an objective, for right or wrong, in mind. Hood likely falls into that place and frankly, so does Lee. And Burnside. And Sherman. And Grant. Frontal assaults were the nature of the Civil War beast.
Eric,
OK, I'll bite. You've told us why Hood did not attack. Can I get a hint as to why he did attack?
I would add that it ill behooves you merely to castigate others here who rely on Sword or McDonough without explaining why they are wrong. If I disagree with someone here, I try to lay out the reasons. Condemnation without at least some explanation serves no purpose.
Sword and McDonough may be wrong -- I don't know -- but it's hardly fair to say that their accounts are based on pure conjecture. The inference is hardly unreasonable on its face.
I picked up my Sword (as it were!) and immediately found this supporting quote from Hood's Advance and Retreat:
"The discovery that the army . . . was still, seemingly, unwilling to accept battle unless under the protection of breastworks, caused me to experience grave concern. In my inmost heart, I questioned whether or not I would ever succeed in eradicating this evil. It seemed to me I had exhausted every means in the power of one man to remove this stumbling block to the Army of Tennessee."
I understand that generals on both sides were disturbed from time to time that their soldiers desired to fight "under the protection of breastworks," but Hood's use of the phrase "eradicating this evil" suggests that even many years later he viewed it as a central moral failing that deeply angered him. Particularly given then-recent events, it does not seem unreasonable to infer that at the time he was determined to teach the army a lesson, even if the cost was great.
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