Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
This is a tough one. While Hood had a fair amount of success as a brigade and division commander, I think that is about as far as his talent extended. As an army commander, his performance record is deplorable. He made many bad command decisions and ended up wasting the lives of many men because of it.
Bragg was also pretty bad. He got lucky a few times, but I wouldn't give the credit to him, but to his subordinates and the men who fought for him. It doesn't matter that he cared for his men and was disturbed by the sight of so many dead and wounded on Missionary Ridge or any other battlefield for that matter. George McClellan was almost the same way; he cared so much about his men that he wouldn't fight them, and the sight of so many dead and maimed men sickened him. And he was one of the worst generals to command an army in the field for the Union. Bragg was, to say the least, a deplorable general. For me, I would have to declare it a tie.
Hood, had an almost impossible task. Thus, the one(s) who who made the task impossible is/are more responsible for the results of trying to do the impossible. I vote, Brang (and/or Johnston and Davis.)
We actually we don't all follow your train of thought about Hood attacking at Franklin to "soothe his anger..." If you truly believe that Hood attacked at Franklin and then went to Nashville just because he was peeved about Spring Hill you have not read much beyond some of the things that Wiley Sword and James McDonough, for example, wrote in years past. The problem is with that train of thought is that it is based upon PURE speculation and/or conjecture. I guess Lee attacked the center of the Union on July 3, 1863 because he was trying to "soothe" his anger about the first two days of the battle. Hey, on second thought, James Longstreet actually did say just about that very thing.
In closing, I would be careful about following the old train of thought that is rapidly being dispelled. The truth is often much starker - a general making the decision with a clear mind and an objective, for right or wrong, in mind. Hood likely falls into that place and frankly, so does Lee. And Burnside. And Sherman. And Grant. Frontal assaults were the nature of the Civil War beast.
Eric: I know anger is not the real reason for Hood's oredered frontal assault at Franklin. I do not have any of my references near me, I am at work. In the OR Series I, Volume XLV, Part I, Hood states in his report that Major General Cheatham was responsible for the missed opportunity at Spring Hill and that Cheatham supposedly admited same. Hood had to have been angry, but it is not the only reason he ordered the frontal assualt.
I understand that you have written two books on Franklin. Can you pass along the titles? I would like to read what you wrote.
BTW I do not make statements based on speculation or conjecture. When I make a statement based on my opinion I state that it is my opinion.
I hold strong to the belief, based on evidence, that Hood was not angry at Franklin. Frustrated likely by Schofield's escape at Pulaski, Columbia, and Spring Hill, but there is a fundamental difference between that emotion and anger.
As for books, I have written two. One about the battles at Spring Hill and Franklin and one about the McGavock Confederate Cemetery. Feel free to visit www.battleoffranklin.org for more info.
After reading T.Connelly book about AoT, S.Woodworth`s book about Confederate Command Crisis in the West, Beauregard`s biography and many books about Atlanta campaign I am far from choosing Bragg or Hood as the worse AoT commanders. They were not the best, but far from being the worst.
Bragg is blamed for everything before Atlanta, and Hood is blamed for everything after Chattanooga, there is no greater injustice for those generals. If You read deeply about Bragg You will find how he and the army, were destroyed by Polk and Hardee. The first one is responsible for almost every failure in the west. Who has violated Kentucky neutrality, who was denying eingineers to Fort Henry and Donelson ignoring A.S.Johnston orders(!), who has been undermining Bragg`s position when he was in command of AoT (along with the Hardee), who has failed to execute any Bragg`s order during Chickamauga campaign (along with Hindman and D.H.Hill). Lee could rely on Longstreet and Jackson, but Bragg could not rely on anyone. Yet, he is blamed. If Bragg had received such support from his subordinates like Lee had, his weakness would not been so visible.
Hood on the other hand was given impossible task at Atalnta, yet he has done what was possible. Peachtreecreek was a good plan and if Hardee fought like Stewart it could be a victory for Confederacy. At Atlanta again Hardee failed to coordinate his corps during an attack. It is true that Hood demanded too much from his army, but if they wanted to stop Sherman they had to risk.
Hardee is often called 'old reliable', but examining his conduct during Atlanta we can easily call him 'old unreliable'. At Ezra Church it was S.D.Lee who has ignored his orders at made faulty attack. Why Hood is blamed for his subordinates, he couldn`t replaced them exactly like Bragg couldn`t replaced Polk.
__________________ Nico, Maréchal d'Empire
Last edited by Nico_Davout; 06-28-2007 at 08:07 AM.
What is frustrating is that both men have ability, but were not army commanders. Bragg would have been a good number two man, chief of staff, and Hood was an excellent division commander. The command arrangements in the West is something the CSA never really solved. Unlike Lee in the East, the "man and the hour" never really met.
I`d say that Hood would be great corps commander under Lee in 1864 instead of medicore Hill and Ewell and Bragg would be great chief-of-staff of Beauregard`s army or commander of his corps. The most important thing in the army is the 'trust'. Bragg and Beauregard did cooperate effectivly in opposite to Bragg and Hardee & Polk.
Some Confederate soldiers on Hood at the Chattahoochee River
"Co. Aytch"
Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment
or, A Side Show of the Big Show
Author: Sam R. Watkins
It was like the end of the Southern Confederacy. Things that were, were not. It was the end. The soldier of the relief guard who brought us the news while picketing on the banks of the Chattahoochee, remarked, by way of imparting gently the information--
"Boys, we've fought all the war for nothing. There is nothing for us in store now."
"What's the matter now?"
"General Joe Johnston is relieved, Generals Hardee and Kirby Smith has resigned, and General Hood is appointed to take command of the Army of Tennessee."
"My God! is that so?"
"It is certainly a fact."
"Then I'll never fire another gun. Any news or letters that you wish carried home? I've quit, and am going home. Please tender my resignation to Jeff Davis as a private soldier in the C. S. Army."
Five men of that picket--there were just five--as rapidly as they could, took off their cartridge-boxes, after throwing down their guns, and then their canteens and haversacks, taking out of their pockets their gun-wipers, wrench and gun-stoppers, and saying they would have no more use for "them things." They marched off, and it was the last we ever saw of them. In ten minutes they were across the river, and no doubt had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States government. Such was
the sentiment of the Army of Tennessee at that time.
That is only an extreme example what was happening in AoT, nothing else. Desertion was high during Johnston`s command due to his retreating strategy. Soldiers which repeatedly retreat without any serious battle loss their will to fight.
Hood and Bragg had their fine points. Hood was a very, very good division commander, and I think he would have made a fine corps commander. Bragg also had his good points as well. But as army commanders, they just didn't have what it takes. A good army commander is able to command the respect of his men and his unit commanders. Hood did have this to an extent when it came to his men in the AoNV. But he had been in charge of a part of all of that division up until Gettysburg. But when he got to command of the AoT, he did not have the respect of his men, and nothing he did, if anything (I don't know if he tried; have to do some reading up on that) could command the respect of his men. And Bragg, as much as he cared for his men, was the same. He could not command the respect of his men. Both of these men were good generals, but not in the capacity that they were given with the AoT.
__________________ "The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize." George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796
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