Forrest at Columbia Nov 1864

[larry_cockerham]

This is an excerpt from a series of articles written by Judge Frank H. Smith and published in the Columbia Herald on the weekends April and May 1904:


Gen. Forrest had a son, a mere boy who was wounded that afternoon in the calf of his leg by a minie ball, and who had been sent to Capt. Thompsons for surgical attention. But Forrest himself had pressed on north with his cavalry and had crossed the pike, burning several wagons and loads of supplies on the pike and at Thompsons Station a few miles further north.


About midnight Forrest came back to Capt. Thompsons to see how seriously his boy was wounded and how he was getting on. As he rode up he seemed astounded at the drinking and carousing going on among the higher officers, and at once asked for Gen. Hood, who with Governor Isham G. Harris, had retired. On being shown to the room by Mr. Gregory, Forrest told Hood that the Yankees were getting through on the pike, and suggested and urged in his emphatic way that a force of infantry be thrown forward immediately and cut the retreating column on the Columbia Pike. He told him of his burning the wagons and the stampede of the teamsters and guards, a few miles up the pike near the Duck River Ridge, and of his success at Thompsons Station a few hours previously. Gregory says that Hood was not at all excited nor had been that evening when the skirmish was going on, and he heard him remark to Forrest in his calm, unmoved way, that hed find the Yankees in the morning. After this interview with Hood, Forrest went out to where his wounded boy was laying, muttering to himself such a rush of expletives that might show what a task it was for his preacher-colonel the Rev. David C. Kelley to convert him into the utmost Christian he finally became.

[ole]

Great find, Larry! Kinda paints a dismal picture of the AoT's command. Forrest must have been furious! Here was a chance to destroy at least a brigade (assume he was pursuing Capron's troopers), and Hood just wants to go back to sleep. Grrrrrr.
Ole

[larry_cockerham]

Had they been competent enough to corral Schofield, it might have saved the lives of several thousand men.

[richard]

Going back to the last of September when Forrest made his distructive raid on the rail line from Athens north, and taking in consideration that Hood would have had a better and faster line of march than he did, could he have avoided the Franklin engagement all together. This would have ment that the time line to Nashville would have been pushed back or much earlier than it actually was. Also considering that Forrest had not distroyed the rail line when he did.

[samgrant]

This seems to conflict with accounts that Hood didn't know about that move till the next morning, and that then he was supposedly furious about it. (Maybe he was stoned during Forrest's visit????)

[larry_cockerham]

In his 1982 biography of John Bell Hood, Richard M. McMurry wrote:

"At 8 pm Stewart, accompanied by Forrest, came again to Hood's headquarters to report that he had located his new position but that, when he put his corps into line on Brown's right, both his line and Brown's faced to the northwest, and it was impossible for his right to reach the road. Apparently at this moment Hood first learned that his orders had not been obeyed, that Cheatham had deployed with Bate and Cleburne facing west while Brown faced northwest, and that the Confederates were not in possession of the road. The Texan seems still not to have been aware of any large-scale movement of Federals in the Spring Hill area. Faced with collapse of his command authority, Hood reacted weakly. He asked Stewart to send a brigade to block the road. When Stewart replied that his men were tired and hungry, Hood told him to camp for the night and march toward Franklin in the morning. The Texan then turned to Forrest and asked for a cavalry brigade to seize the pike. Forrest reported that only one of his three divisions had ammunition - a small quantity captured from the enemy - nevertheless, he would try to block the road. It was about 11 pm when this much had been decided. After Forrest left, Hood, tired (he had been up for at least twenty hours) and possibly pained by his wounds, sought rest. He was soon awakened by Bate who came to report that at 5 pm, when Cheatham had halted the westward movement of his division and had swumg it back to the northeast to form on Cleburne's left, the Federals had been marching northward on the turnpike. This seems to be the first that Hood had learned of the large-scale presence of the enemy at Spring Hill. Bate's report, however, was of events hours old and there had been no corroborating information. Hood took no action and went back to sleep."

This was Mr. McMurry's conclusion about Hood - simply not always paying attention to crucial detail. An incompetent general officer.

[EricJacobson]

Originally Posted by larry_cockerham

This is an excerpt from a series of articles written by Judge Frank H. Smith and published in the Columbia Herald on the weekends April and May 1904:


Gen. Forrest had a son, a mere boy who was wounded that afternoon in the calf of his leg by a minie ball, and who had been sent to Capt. Thompsons for surgical attention. But Forrest himself had pressed on north with his cavalry and had crossed the pike, burning several wagons and loads of supplies on the pike and at Thompsons Station a few miles further north.


About midnight Forrest came back to Capt. Thompsons to see how seriously his boy was wounded and how he was getting on. As he rode up he seemed astounded at the drinking and carousing going on among the higher officers, and at once asked for Gen. Hood, who with Governor Isham G. Harris, had retired. On being shown to the room by Mr. Gregory, Forrest told Hood that the Yankees were getting through on the pike, and suggested and urged in his emphatic way that a force of infantry be thrown forward immediately and cut the retreating column on the Columbia Pike. He told him of his burning the wagons and the stampede of the teamsters and guards, a few miles up the pike near the Duck River Ridge, and of his success at Thompsons Station a few hours previously. Gregory says that Hood was not at all excited nor had been that evening when the skirmish was going on, and he heard him remark to Forrest in his calm, unmoved way, that hed find the Yankees in the morning. After this interview with Hood, Forrest went out to where his wounded boy was laying, muttering to himself such a rush of expletives that might show what a task it was for his preacher-colonel the Rev. David C. Kelley to convert him into the utmost Christian he finally became.

Hello again everyone,

Looks like a good place for me to jump in head first. This story about drinking is totally without ANY foundation. Gregory's account also accused Cleburne and Granbury of being at Oaklawn drinking, too. Well there is no evidence either of them were either there on Nov 29th and Cleburne was a teetotaler.

Plus Frank H. Smith (with all due respect) was the first person to start with the laudanum stories. Interestingly enough, Frank provides no sources for his articles. Kind of like some of today's media. Just write what sounds good (at least in my opinion).

Also, Forrest was never at Thompson's Station that night. Some of his cavalry was, under Lawrence Ross, but Forrest never was.

[samgrant]

OK, but did Hood know about that Union march through his lines that night (and if he did, who allerted him, Forrest?), or not until the next morning? And if he knew that night, what did he do about it then? (Go back to sleep?)

[EricJacobson]

Originally Posted by larry_cockerham

This was Mr. McMurry's conclusion about Hood - simply not always paying attention to crucial detail. An incompetent general officer.

Did McMurry ever call Hood incompetent? Frankly, McMurry was pretty balanced when writing about Hood.

Incompetent is a pretty strong word. Look at Hood's record. Gaines Mill (his Texans leading the way); Second Manassas (his Texans helping to roll up the Yankees); Antietam (his Texans are ordered to virtual sacrifice just to save Jackson's Corps); Gettysburg (he urged AGAINST Lee's decision to attack Little Round Top frontally); and Chickamauga (he helps rip a hole in the Federal line).

Should Hood have been army commander in mid-1864? Probably not. But Johnston was not getting the job done and Davis had few options. Even so, Hood actions around Atlanta are not the crazy, reckless efforts some believe them to be. Peachtree Creek was a series of en echelon attacks which did not work out well at all. Atlanta (or Decatur) was Chancellorsville on paper, but again things did not work out. **** good luck on the Yankees' part helped save their butts that day. Ezra Church was a fiasco and Hood can be held responsible. But maybe S. D. Lee shouldn't have been throwing his men into a meat grinder, which was not at all what Hood desired.

Columbia and Spring Hill are both places where Hood attempted flanking maneuvers. Franklin was, of course, a bloody failure, and God knows what Hood thought he could accomplish at Nashville, especially after Franklin.

But incompetent? If that is true, I can list about 90% of Civil War generals who might be called the same.

[samgrant]

Might not Beauregard (nevermind his relationship with Davis) have done better?