Forrest at Columbia Nov 1864

[larry_cockerham]

Eric and Sam, I don't believe McMurry used the term incompetent. I did. Notice that I wrote incompetent general officer. In the long detailed biography Hood is, as Eric wrote, treated honestly and fairly. The distinction was made several times that there was a huge gap in Hood's ability to lead men in battle (he gained his fame from his work leading Texas troops in battle) versus his ability to operate and army. His attention to logistical detail and communication was apparently less than par. I consider him a quite competent soldier and leader of men in combat. His ability to command an army is another quite different consideration. There are records of enough orders given by him during the Tennessee campaign to convince me that he was quite lucid. I think the screw-ups were more of a peter principle thing or perhaps just his attitude. His wounds, as well described in the biography, were a couple years past the point of constant discomfort. He was able to ride all day without extraordinary rest. My arthritis in my butt and shoulder still attack me when the weather cools. I can imagine he did indeed have some extra pain in that harsh weather of 1864-65, but he was awake and functioning.

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by richard

Going back to the last of September when Forrest made his distructive raid on the rail line from Athens north, and taking in consideration that Hood would have had a better and faster line of march than he did, could he have avoided the Franklin engagement all together. This would have ment that the time line to Nashville would have been pushed back or much earlier than it actually was. Also considering that Forrest had not distroyed the rail line when he did.

Richard, I too have often wondered about this railroad, the north terminal of which is still setting adjacent to Ft. Negley in south Nashville. Aside from Forrest's alterations, the main problem must have been a lack of available locomotives and Federal control of the line back to the east. I got the impression that there was a void in the rail link west from Tuscumbia as well. The crossing of the Tennessee River was a major concern. Hatch's US Cavalry was patrolling the north bank of the river as well from October until the AOT made it's way north from Florence. Yes, the railroad route from Decatur to Nashville would have been far more direct, aside from a little US Army opposition. Even the route from Florence brought out the resistance from Schofield and Hatch. This is another example of the Confederacy being half a step and several dollars short of the mark.

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by richard

Going back to the last of September when Forrest made his distructive raid on the rail line from Athens north, and taking in consideration that Hood would have had a better and faster line of march than he did, could he have avoided the Franklin engagement all together. This would have ment that the time line to Nashville would have been pushed back or much earlier than it actually was. Also considering that Forrest had not distroyed the rail line when he did.

Richard, I too have often wondered about this railroad, the north terminal of which is still sitting adjacent to Ft. Negley in south Nashville. Aside from Forrest's alterations, the main problem must have been a lack of available locomotives and Federal control of the line back to the east. I got the impression that there was also a void in the rail link west from Tuscumbia. The crossing of the Tennessee River was a major concern. Hatch's US Cavalry was patroling the north bank of the river from October until the AOT made it's way north from Florence. Yes, the railroad route from Decatur to Nashville would have been far more direct, aside from a little US Army opposition. Even the route from Florence brought out the resistance of Schofield and Hatch. This is another example of the Confederacy being half a step and several dollars short of the mark.

[trice]

Originally Posted by richard

Going back to the last of September when Forrest made his distructive raid on the rail line from Athens north, and taking in consideration that Hood would have had a better and faster line of march than he did, could he have avoided the Franklin engagement all together. This would have ment that the time line to Nashville would have been pushed back or much earlier than it actually was. Also considering that Forrest had not distroyed the rail line when he did.

Interesting thought, but it probably didn't matter. The biggest problem was getting across the river, not Forrests' late Sept.-early Oct. destruction of the track. Bad weather, Yankees, and Hood's strategic meandering were what prevented a crossing at Decatur or to the East of there (several places were planned on, but Hood kept changing his mind and moving West -- much to the frustration of Beauregard, who was trying to arrange the logistics and being left in the dark by Hood).

The biggest X factor is probably the arrival of Smith's XVI Corps with 10,000 veteran troops. They arrived in Nashville on the day after the battle of Franklin (2 divisions that day, 1 the next), and probably could have been there at least two weeks earlier if not for the intransigence of Rosecrans out in Missouri (who refused to let them go as ordered, and dragged his feet over the task when he finally did).

At the time, Nashville was probably the 2nd most heavily fortified city in the nation (certainly the 2nd most Union one). As long as there was any sufficient quantity of reliable troops in it, Nashville would be safe from any conceivable assault by Hood. Particularly with Union gunboats on the river to prevent a Rebel crossing.

If Hood had smashed Schofield's force at Spring Hill (where he should have) or at Franklin (where he almost certainly should not have), he would still have had to rush to reach Nashville ahead of Smith. If Schofield's force arrives as anything other than a shattered and broken rout, Hood will not be able to take the city, IMHO. Give Thomas 10,000 fresh veteran reinforcements, the men he had in place, and a force he can rally -- I think he would have held anyway.

Hood was a brilliant brigade and division commander; a questionable Corps commander; and a frightening Army commander. He could make troops move rapidly in operations; had a very quick tactical eye on the battlefield; was poor on logistics and strategic vision; seems to have put "will" ahead of bullets and numbers in his concept of how to fight a war. It is interesting to note that Hood's term as commander of the AoT was effectively his only independent command of a large force: he had done quite well when firmly directed by others, and did poorly when left to make all the decisions.

Regards,
Tim

[richard]

Thanks for the replys. It must have been a very wet fall there in '64 for the reports of Col. George Spalding about the action on the 25th of September at Sulphur Trestle indicated that the Elk river was up and would be hard for Forrest to get across if US troops would distroy it before he got there.

[richard]

Thanks for the replys. It must have been a very wet fall there in '64 for the reports of Col. George Spalding about the action on the 25th of September at Sulphur Trestle indicated that the Elk river was up and would be hard for Forrest to get across if US troops would distroy it before he got there. I had also forgotten that the rail road was rebuilt by General Granville Dodge and may not have been the same gage as the ones elsewhere.

[EricJacobson]

Originally Posted by samgrant

OK, but did Hood know about that Union march through his lines that night (and if he did, who allerted him, Forrest?), or not until the next morning? And if he knew that night, what did he do about it then? (Go back to sleep?)

It is my assertion, and I believe backed up by facts, that Hood was unaware the entire Yankee army was moving past Spring Hill and toward Franklin at any time during the night. Only at dawn was the truth understood. There were accounts about Yankee troops on the road, but no one, including Forrest, ever reported to Hood that Schofield was getting away. The closest report like this was from the well known barefoot private. But here's how that final visit of the night worked out. The private was taken to Gen. Cheatham's with orders from Hood to at least get some men, perhaps even a regiment, onto the road and disrupt any passing Yankee troops. So Cheatham tells a staff officer, Joseph Bostick, to order Gen. Edward Johnson's Division to the task. Bostick finds Johnson who proceeds to complain about darkness, unfamiliarity with the ground, etc and then, to top things off, he complains about being "loaned out..." Remember, Johnson was actually part of S. D. Lee's Corps.

So Johnson agrees to ready his men, and in the meantime he and Bostick ride toward the road. They find it empty. I believe they just missed the trailing end of the last Yankee division. So if word about this was ever sent back to Hood, he was under the impression everything was okay.

In the end, Hood, nor any of his commanders for that matter, even really understood what the Yankee army was up to. Even Forrest didn't seem to know. In his official report he stated, "Chalmers...reported to me that the enemy had passed unmolested on the main pike during the night." His own words specify that he didn't grtasp the situation until dawn.

[larry_cockerham]

Alas, John Bell Hood was the ranking officer in charge. The blame, if any, would fall at his foot. McMurry, our old friend with the biographical book, makes the point several times that Hood was often slack in following up on detail or communicating throughly with his subordinates. Therein was probably much of the problem with this army's lack of success. The strategy for attacking Nashville was not wholly Bell's idea, but he seemed to accept it as a ploy to regain favor with Davis and for reasons far beyond my comprehension, he thought freezing in Tennessee would somehow entice Sherman back from South Carolina. It was a shot in the dark at best.

[trice]

Originally Posted by larry_cockerham

Alas, John Bell Hood was the ranking officer in charge. The blame, if any, would fall at his foot. McMurry, our old friend with the biographical book, makes the point several times that Hood was often slack in following up on detail or communicating throughly with his subordinates. Therein was probably much of the problem with this army's lack of success. The strategy for attacking Nashville was not wholly Bell's idea, but he seemed to accept it as a ploy to regain favor with Davis and for reasons far beyond my comprehension, he thought freezing in Tennessee would somehow entice Sherman back from South Carolina. It was a shot in the dark at best.

Larry,

The idea made a little sense in October, when Hood started this move. Sherman did try to catch him as Hood sought to strike at the RR line from Chattanooga. We can't exactly blame Hood for not knowing that Sherman would totally abandon his LOC and march for Savannah from Atlanta, but the odds of that grow a bit when Hood evades Sherman by moving to the Alabama side in October.

Once Sherman does move and Hood finally gets news of it, there isn't the slightest chance in the world Hood can catch him. His plan to draw Sherman into TN by an invasion/raid is now a non-starter. Sherman is already well to the East of Atlanta and marching further East every day. Hood has not even crossed the Tennessee River yet (well, I think he has a beachhead on the North side, but he is still encamped, trying to gather troops and supplies).

Atlanta is abandoned, Thomas is in charge in TN, Sherman is far, far away. Nothing Hood can do will affect Sherman's March to the Sea at that point.

Regards,
Tim

[richard]

So in other words, Hood got out of the frying pan and jumped into the meat grinder.