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Civil War History - The South & Western Theaters Check this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.

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  #1  
Old 11-01-2006, 07:55 PM
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Default Hood's Tennessee Campaign

Just wanted to pose a question and see what everyone thinks.

I'm guessing everyone is aware that the Army of Tennessee was delayed in the Florence, Alabama area for nearly three weeks before the invasion of Tennessee began. What do you think might have happened had Hood been able to get his army moving north before November 10, when the only troops standing between him and Nashville were some scattered Union cavalry commands and the Fourth Corps? This is one of those "what ifs" but might be interesting to toss about.
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Old 11-01-2006, 08:15 PM
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Another part of your question could also include the "what if" Forrest, Roddy, and Wheeler had not distroyed the rail line north from Athens to Spring Hill, just over a month before. That would have given Hood a much faster direct route to Nashville.
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Old 11-01-2006, 09:00 PM
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Interesting thought. However, Hood could not get his troops across the river at Decatur and the Fourth Corps was in and around Pulaski, the latter town right on the rail line. The railroad was not a wide open path to Nashville.
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Old 11-01-2006, 09:07 PM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by EricJacobson
Just wanted to pose a question and see what everyone thinks.

I'm guessing everyone is aware that the Army of Tennessee was delayed in the Florence, Alabama area for nearly three weeks before the invasion of Tennessee began. What do you think might have happened had Hood been able to get his army moving north before November 10, when the only troops standing between him and Nashville were some scattered Union cavalry commands and the Fourth Corps? This is one of those "what ifs" but might be interesting to toss about.
One of the issues with this is that it was Hood who kept upsetting the plans for logistical support and river-crossing. He drifted constantly west without notifying Beauregard, officially his commander, who was in charge of making the arrangements.

Regards,
Tim
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  #5  
Old 11-01-2006, 11:00 PM
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Back to the part about the railroad? The Nashville-Decatur line was repairable? and was in place in late 1864. Remember that the AOT had no rail cars. The line west from Tuscumbia into Mississippi was missing a few rails and not a lot of cars or locomotives. The railroad system was still in it's infancy. The Nashville-Chattanooga through Cowan and Stevenson was in Federal hands, hence not an AOT option. The problems, aside from a dumb idea, in December 1864 were high water and freezing temperatures. Hood, in a sense, was much like the heralded Jamacan bobsled team; in weather he couldn't control or survive. On the last phase of the war beginning in January 1865, the AOT utilized still much un-completed rail line across Alabama on the way to North Carolina. For the southern cause, this silly war began 50 years to soon. The support structure for a good fight, no disrepect to the Southern soldier, just wasn't there.

Last edited by larry_cockerham; 11-01-2006 at 11:04 PM.
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Old 11-02-2006, 01:12 AM
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Quote:
The support structure for a good fight, no disrepect to the Southern soldier, just wasn't there.
You never fail to come up with a good line, Larry! I'll drink to that.
Ole
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  #7  
Old 11-02-2006, 10:19 AM
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Default Hood's Tennessee........

I agree that the delay was fatal, because even with that delay Thomas was still trying to concentrate his army, Hood still almost managed a significant victory at Springhill and still had a chance to destroy what 'arguably' would later be the core of Thomas' still nascent army, at Franklin.
A 3 wk earlier start of his campaign, might, indeed have yielded Hood more significant advantages, they certainly would not have not been less.
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Old 11-02-2006, 10:46 AM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
I agree that the delay was fatal, because even with that delay Thomas was still trying to concentrate his army, Hood still almost managed a significant victory at Springhill and still had a chance to destroy what 'arguably' would later be the core of Thomas' still nascent army, at Franklin.
A 3 wk earlier start of his campaign, might, indeed have yielded Hood more significant advantages, they certainly would not have not been less.
Probably true. However, it is also possible to argue that A. J. Smith's Corps should have arrived three weeks earlier (or six months earlier for that matter), thus altering the situation drastically by giving George Thomas another 10,000 veteran troops.

The delay in Hood's advance is largely caused by Hood's own decisions and actions. The only way he could have shortened it would have been to:
a) plan and communicate his plans better. This was within his control, so any blame for it is his. Even then, I doubt he could have crossed more than a week earlier.
b) follow his original plan and cross to the East. He abandoned this without informing Beauregard, who was managing the supply issue for him. Once again, Hood is responsible for this.

Regards,
Tim
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  #9  
Old 11-03-2006, 07:53 PM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by trice
One of the issues with this is that it was Hood who kept upsetting the plans for logistical support and river-crossing. He drifted constantly west without notifying Beauregard, officially his commander, who was in charge of making the arrangements.

Regards,
Tim
I believe Hood and Beauregard conferred at Tuscumbia prior to the Tennessee campaign. Beau just didn't go along for the 'ride'.
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  #10  
Old 11-04-2006, 08:14 AM
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Default Hood's Winter Campaign

First, Hood was not supplied by rail in his campaign into Tennessee. Hood no longer had a logistical base in Atlanta, to draw supplies. Hood was conducting a winter campaign, which never worked very well with wagons, horses and mules.
Hood at best, was conducting a raid. He did not have the logistical supply to take territory and hold it for long. The great deficit for a large Civil War army was supplying forage for the horses and mules, needed to transport the artillery, the ammunition wagons, and other essential supplies. Run out of forage and you run out of an army.

A winter campaign by Hood in Tennessee was the desperate campaign of the Confederate government. Even with some success, which it basically did not have, it was a doomed venture. Hood was facing a well supplied battle hardened army.
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