Hood's Tennessee Campaign

[larry_cockerham]

Thanks Ole. All I know is what I read or stumble upon. There was a considerable ditch there and a relatively obvious place to construct. Apparently some fences and building parts were commandeered as well. Unfortunately the bodies of the Confederate dead became a considerable barrier.

[gunny]

As far as I am aware - and I cannot cite the sources right now - but early in the war the Confederate threats came from due south - the Columbia Pike and Lewisburg Pike - form SPring Hill and Thompson's Station.

These recollections I have - are from primary sources at the Carter House archives.

Most of the rifle pits and defenses were actually located to the south and east of the village to cover the approaches from these two roads. The permanence of these works can be questioned - but there were some works that had already been erected to the south-southeast of the village prior to Schofield's arrival in Franklin.

Jamie

[EricJacobson]

Two quick additions to the discussion:

McGavock's and Hughes Fords are two separate crossing points. Hughes Ford is further south of McGavock's.

The earthworks left behind from 1863 were not terribly substantial and were located only along what became the Union left on November 30, 1864. There were no earthworks south of the Carter House when Schofield's army arrived. Basically everything erected along the Union center and extending to the right was built on November 30. Even the works on the left were increased so substantially you can't even really compare the two. One interesting facet is that Union soldiers who were there is that they said practically nothing about existing works.

[EricJacobson]

I see Jamie and I were typing at the same time. He is right about the threats in '63 coming from the southeast, along Lewisburg Pike. The works which remained in '64 for the most part straddled that road.

[cw1865]

Ostensibly Hood is going into TN to cut off Sherman. Sherman goes foraging his way to the sea and won't follow Hood. Frankly, I don't care if Hood marches unopposed all the way to Nashville, Chattanooga, Frankfort or Cincinatti. Bottom line is that Hood, in 1864, was unable to destroy the Federal armies facing him nor was he going to destroy their ability to make war. Hood's 'defense' of Atlanta and subsequent assault on Sherman's supply line was ill conceived. Hood just did not understand that this was a defender's war.

[gary]

Hood didn't think Sherman would resort to foraging his way to Atlanta. It was almost unconceivable then that an army would detach itself from its line of supply.

[larry_cockerham]

Remember that the railroad from Nashville remained in Union hands the remainder of the war after Atlanta, so Sherman still had supply capabilities from Nashville. The railroad was interrupted only for a brief period thanks to Forrest's destruction between Nashville and Murfreesboro in December 1864. Forrest was not able to remain as we all know. Repairs to the line were done in short order.

[OpnDownfall]

Johnston fought a defensive war all the way to Atlanta and as far as Davis could learn from the Gamecock, he was not through retreating, if he had been relieved of command.
Hood took the war back to Tn. Spring Hill, could have been a significant victory, if not for the ever present balkiness and inattention to detail that plagued the AoT long before Hood ever got there. If Spring Hill, had succeeded there would have been no Battle of Franklin and Thomas would have lost the core of his rebuiling army.
The odds were stacked against Hood and the AoT, no matter what decision was made. I do not think one can reasonably argue that trailing after Sherman would have led to a 'less' decisive defeat than invading Tn.
As I have already posted, IF saving southern soldiers for rehabilitating a defeated south was the plan, Davis or Beauregard should have informed Hood of that fact.

[larry_cockerham]

Hood wasn't much for paying attention as you have aptly observed. I've read that Johnston was somewhat focused in his defensive manuevers on stalling long enough to force Lincoln into an election when the south could exercise some leverage. Just didn't pan out. I, too, would lay that on on Davis.

[OpnDownfall]

My reference to 'balkiness' and 'inattention to detail' was meant to be descriptive of the AoT (or at least, it's senior commanders). The AoT was a 'hard luck outfit' (mcuh like the Army of the Potomac) capable of great sacrifice and effort, only to see them wasted by the inadequacies of thier leaders.
Hood, arrived on the scene when it was already too late, when all the good opportunities had already been lost or neglected. When only the 'best' of bad choices were left.