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To support the notion, one must be convinced that Lincoln would have lost the election without Atlanta. That is not, nor can it be, conclusively determined. The war is already all but lost. Hood took the only choice open to him after Sherman left him for Thomas to take care of. That it appears reckless is understandable, but if he had another choice, I can't come up with it.
You don't need to be convinced that Lincoln would've lost the election. All I believe we need to agree on is that the war cannot be won militarily, ie. the Confederates cannot win a battle and dictate terms, which is absolutely clear at the time.
As such, the only strategy that SHOULD be employed should be directed at achieving a military victory, ie. get the Federals to give it up. Now whether it was going to happen or not is of course speculative. I would even say there is strong evidence that the Federals weren't going to give up the fight; nevertheless in September 1864, the election IS pending, the Confederate strategy should be to fight to get McClellan in the White House and frankly I think Hood's strategy is completely at odds with that.
[quote=cw1865]As such, the only strategy that SHOULD be employed should be directed at achieving a military victory, ie. get the Federals to give it up.[quote]
I meant to write political...sorry for the confusion. Ole - I also bolded a portion of your post and usually I write 'emphasis supplied' when I do so, the emphasis I placed on that clause is mine, not ole's....
This is a fairly popular notion, but before that election, there were several other striking victories that pumped up Union visions of an approaching end to the war under Lincoln. (Mobile comes to mind, and it wasn't the only one.)
To support the notion, one must be convinced that Lincoln would have lost the election without Atlanta. That is not, nor can it be, conclusively determined.
The war is already all but lost. Hood took the only choice open to him after Sherman left him for Thomas to take care of. That it appears reckless is understandable, but if he had another choice, I can't come up with it.
"The" march was initially viewed as reckless. In hindsight, it was exactly the right thing to do--the coup d'main. But Sherman had options. Hood did not. As Hood had no options that I can see, I'm reluctant to call his desperate move "reckless" or "idiotic."
ole
Hood was almost 'bluffing' when he knew he had a very weak hand. He was throwing chips (human lives) into the pile when he could least afford the effort. A victory at Nashville gives the Confederates control of a no-longer needed Federal supply depot, little else. Sherman was backing his butt over the goal line on the way to North Carolina. Could Hood have just quit? Of course, not; however several thousand Southern and Union men would have faired much the better. War is like dog manure; very difficult to avoid once contact has been made.
__________________ Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
Could Hood have just quit? Of course, not; however several thousand Southern and Union men would have faired much the better.
Hood was certainly not a genius, but he was a soldier. Without orders to stand down, he would not, make that could not, stand down.
Had he been able to start from Tuscumbia earlier, he had a chance to nab Schofield and get to Nashville before Thomas was ready for him. Someone should have called off the invasion when the everything that could go wrong, did. That wasn't going to be Hood. He was a soldier.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Thought I would add a little something to the thread - a contemporary account which indicates what at least one Federal authority was thinking, not what some 143 years later may believe:
City Point, VA., October 11, 1864 - 11 a.m.
Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman,
"Your dispatch of Otcober 10 received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men, little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that; but I must trust to your own judgment...I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going north."
U. S. Grant
Anyone can read into this however they could like, but it does seem that Grant would prefer Hood to be dealt with rather than have Sherman marching across Georgia. In fact, Grant doesn't even want Hood north of the Tennessee River. Other letters written by Grant also display his lukewarm support for Sherman's march. Also interesting is that Grant supposes precisely what Hood thought - that more damage might be done to the Federal effort by moving into Tennessee than anything Sherman could do in Georgia.
You have two events, prior to Franklin, and prior to Nashville.
Prior to Franklin, the Feds could've turned Sherman around and they would've done so if they felt that Hood was a threat.
Maybe I wasn't clear enough!
The Battle of Franklin was on November 30, 1864.
On November 30, 1864, Sherman was approaching Waynesboro, GA which is about 408 miles from Nashville.
First of all, how do the Federals(?) get the message to Sherman to turn around and hot foot it back to Franklin to help Schofield.
The way I see's it, if Sherman, no Stonewall Jackson, marched at the accepted Infantry daily average of 20 miles per day, assuming the message was received and obeyed, would have taken 20.4 days (December 20th, 1864) to reach Nashville. Obviously too late to help Schofield at Franklin, but maybe in time to aid in clearing the Nashville battlefield of wounded, dead and debris.
I know I write 'prior to Franklin' - I am referring to the events of September 1864 when Hood makes his move into Alabama. This is the initial plan and his plan is to lure Sherman out of GA into AL and to have Sherman attack him on ground of his choosing. This is also the plan that Davis explicity agrees to during his trip to GA.
The point that I am trying to make is that if Hood's movement into AL was perceived as a vital threat Sherman indeed would've been turned around and sent to deal with it because from AL Hood could obviously go into TN.
Its only AFTER Hood realizes that Sherman isn't coming that he devises his plan to go north. He does this in a meeting with Beauregard on October 21st. In my book its Foote, Petersburg to Savannah, pg. 192-193 and if your book is paginated differently you can find it in the index.
Foote describes Sherman as 'breathing fire and threatening random slaughter'
The election is quite literally pending. So, while the final stake is being put into the Confederate in GA, Hood decided to go to TN and to expound on my point, apparently on a mission which clearly won't be felt until AFTER the election; no appreciation for the balance between military means and political objectives.
Foote notes, in page 200 of the same book, 'any favorable reference to McClellan [by Davis] would cost the Pennsylvanian votes he ould ill afford now that Atlanta's fall and Fremont's withdrawal had transformed him, from odds-on favorite to underdog in the presidential race.'
I'm not saying Hood could've beaten Sherman, just that GA is where he needs to be.
"Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur?
Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south.
If there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that; but I must trust to your own judgment...I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going north."
On October 11th, Hood is somewhere between Rome and Resaca, Sherman can definitely still get to him. Like yourself, I do read the last portion to indicate at the very least a preference on Grant's part that he would prefer for Sherman to deal with Hood right there and then. (Sherman, of course does in fact have more men than Thomas)
It shows that Hood's movement is actualy perceived by Grant before Hood brings it up to Beauregard on the 21st.
Although you point to Grant's telegram on the 11th, please take note of his follow up message on the 12th of October. On the 12th, Hood is at Resaca, again Sherman can get to him still.
"On reflection I think better of your proposition [march to the sea]," he wired back. "It will be much better to go south than to be forced to come north." - this telegram actually doesn't give permission for Sherman to undertake the March.
On Nov. 1st, Grant writes back "If you see a chance of destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make your other move secondary."
Sherman argues again with Grant essentially arguing that he can't catch Hood anyway (true?) and that the purpose of his entire campaign would be lost and on November 2nd, Grant assents stating "[Thomas] would would be able to take care of Hood and destroy him."
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