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How do they get to him to give the order? The only contact they (the ‘Federals’) had was when Rebel newspapers occasionally reported his supposed depredations.
You have two events, prior to Franklin, and prior to Nashville.
Prior to Franklin, the Feds could've turned Sherman around and they would've done so if they felt that Hood was a threat.
Prior to Nashville, Sherman is obviously at the end of his March to the Sea, so turning him around would not get him there in time.
Nevertheless, Hood's presence in front of Nashville poses no real threat to the Federals. Lincoln's was whining that Thomas wasn't attacking but the biggest threat Hood posed in Nashville was to his own men.
Wikipedia describes Hood was 'recklessly aggressive.' This is an apt description of Hood; he shows it when he's fighting Sherman in GA and he shows it again in TN.
The Civil War generally favors the defender. If you do not realize this by 1864, you have your head in the sand. The military and political situation clearly dictate that Hood should be adopting defensive tactics; his army is simply not large enough to be doing what he is doing.
Wikipedia is not a source I would go to the bank with. But I digress.....
Other than Franklin (and don't try to include Nashville because Hood didn't attack there) give me an example of where Hood was "recklessly aggressive."
If you will annoint R. E. Lee with the same "reckless" banner for his FRONTAL attacks at Gaines Mill and at Gettysburg on July 3, 1863 we will at least have some agreement. Otherwise you need to pull YOUR head out of the sand.
And if you think that on November 21, for example, when Hood crossed the Tennessee River, that Sherman, who by that point was days east of Atlanta, could have turned around to try and stop Hood you are ignoring simple mileage. Oh by the way, did you know that Nashville was only garrisoned by 8,000 troops? Had Hood been able to bag Schofield, and granted that is one of those what ifs, what do you think those 8,000 troops would have been able to do with Hood's 28,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. Maybe that's why the Federal authorities, Lincoln, Thomas, Grant, et al. were so worried??? Sherman was out of reach. He had already sent back the 4th Corps and 23rd Corps. No more help was on the way. Those two corps had to stop Hood or get to Nashville without being defeated.
Lastly, read some Federal soldiers' accounts. They might shed some light on what the real situation was, or at least what they thought it was.
Wikipedia is not a source I would go to the bank with. But I digress.....
I pointed to wikipedia because its an easy online reference, my source is Foote, but if I point to a specific page in my book, it may not match up with your book. But you can read Foote's narrative of the events just as well by going into the index of the appropriate book and looking up either Jefferson Davis, Hood which limits the number of pages you have to look at.
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Originally Posted by EricJacobson
Other than Franklin (and don't try to include Nashville because Hood didn't attack there) give me an example of where Hood was "recklessly aggressive."
The very fact that he is being aggresive at all is reckless, but also look at his defense of Atlanta which is no real defense, but rather an attempt, as usual, to defeat portions of Sherman's army 'in detail' but which are never carried off.
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Originally Posted by EricJacobson
If you will annoint R. E. Lee with the same "reckless" banner for his FRONTAL attacks at Gaines Mill and at Gettysburg on July 3, 1863 we will at least have some agreement. Otherwise you need to pull YOUR head out of the sand.
We're not discussing Lee's actions here, we're focusing on Hood's actions; if you want to argue that Lee's actions are suspect, that really is another thread.
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Originally Posted by EricJacobson
And if you think that on November 21, for example, when Hood crossed the Tennessee River, that Sherman, who by that point was days east of Atlanta, could have turned around to try and stop Hood you are ignoring simple mileage.
Actually I wasn't ignoring the mileage, in my previous post I quite clearly make a distinction between the situation in September and December. While you're pointing to Nov. 21st, it is clear by that date that Sherman is too far away. You have to remember that the INITIAL plan of the Confederates, was for Hood to go into AL and threaten Sherman's supply line, pulling Sherman out of GA to attack Hood on ground of Hood's choosing. Sherman obviously does not take the bait; my point is that if Hood seriously posed a threat, Sherman would have 'taken the bait' and regressed into AL to deal with Hood first before the 'March' - After Sherman opts not to pursue Hood; this is when Hood decides to make a plunge northward into TN.
This is the entire basis of why I say Hood is being reckless; the Confederates absolutely need to be countering Sherman; it is Sherman that is quite literally putting the Confederacy into its death throes (its obviously beginning to teeter by that point. IF YOU DO NOT COUNTER SHERMAN, or if you fail to do so, YOU LOSE THE WAR. Remember, its Sherman's successes in Georgia that ensures that Lincoln wins the White House in Nov. 1864.
In September 1864, the Confederacy CANNOT fight to achieve a military victory; its only hope by that point is a political victory, ie. McClellan in the White House.
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Originally Posted by EricJacobson
Oh by the way, did you know that Nashville was only garrisoned by 8,000 troops? Had Hood been able to bag Schofield, and granted that is one of those what ifs, what do you think those 8,000 troops would have been able to do with Hood's 28,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. Maybe that's why the Federal authorities, Lincoln, Thomas, Grant, et al. were so worried??? Sherman was out of reach. He had already sent back the 4th Corps and 23rd Corps. No more help was on the way. Those two corps had to stop Hood or get to Nashville without being defeated. .
My reading leads me to believe that Schofeld has 34K, Thomas has 25K to Hood's 39K (his 39K obviously being severely reduced at Franklin). When you point to the fact that the Federal authorities are 'worried' my reading suggests that Lincoln is simply anxious to ensure that Thomas actually ATTACKS Hood in front of Nashville. Lincoln, Thomas, Schofield have to address the situation because Hood IS where he IS, and it is the 2nd largest Confederate force in the field at the time.
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Originally Posted by EricJacobson
Lastly, read some Federal soldiers' accounts. They might shed some light on what the real situation was, or at least what they thought it was.
OK, and actually it might be useful to see what Wheeler's thoughts were as he was trying to parry Sherman in GA.
With all deference to the great Shelby Foote, using his book as a true source is questionable. Foote himself never listed sources, so what is the basis for some of what he wrote??
So apparently in your mind being aggressive is being reckless, at least in late 1864. And of course you took a pass on Lee. My point in asking the question is that those who take their shots at Hood rarely put his actions during the Tennessee Campaign in context. They act like Hood was the only one foolish enough to ever launch a frontal assault.
I think somehow you are missing something important. Hood had 28,000 infantry + 5,000 cavalry when he moved toward Tennessee - check the Official Records. Sherman had him incredibly outnumbered - at least 3 to 1. Chasing Sherman across Georgia will do no good because there is little that could be done to stop him. So Hood draws Sherman away from the Atlanta area, but of course this soon ends because Sherman is fixated on marching toward the Atlantic. However, the Federal authorities understood that Hood posed a real threat so Sherman had to dispatch nearly 25,000 of his own men, Schofield's 23rd Corps and Stanley's 4th Corps, to deal with the Rebel army. Thomas of course is put in overall command. Why do you think Sherman sent those troops and Thomas to Tennessee? Maybe because they were the best troops in his army and he knew the Tennessee situation could be in no better hands than Thomas. Sherman's own letters pretty much indicate exactly that.
With all due respect, I think perhaps you might read my book about Spring Hill and Franklin to get a better understanding of the true numbers involved in Tennessee during November 1864. The numbers you mentioned are all far too high - Thomas surely didn't have 25,000 in Nashville.
I'll just add one thing. Contemporary sources are critical and both Confederate and Federal, especially the latter, overwhelmingly state the importance of the Tennessee Campaign and how close Hood came to pulling off a 4th and 15 to go, if you will. We may disagree about whether chasing Sherman was a good idea, but the opportunity to take Nashville was there and the Army of Tennessee came a great deal closer than many believe.
Even at Nashville there was concern originating in Washington, D. C. that Hood might jump the Cumberland and move into Kentucky. It doesn't matter whether Hood could have accomplished much or not, but a Rebel force of even 20,000 ranging deep in Union terriotory was a serious problem. Perception is 9/10 of reality and Hood was a perceived threat.
Remember, its Sherman's successes in Georgia that ensures that Lincoln wins the White House in Nov. 1864.
This is a fairly popular notion, but before that election, there were several other striking victories that pumped up Union visions of an approaching end to the war under Lincoln. (Mobile comes to mind, and it wasn't the only one.)
To support the notion, one must be convinced that Lincoln would have lost the election without Atlanta. That is not, nor can it be, conclusively determined.
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This is the entire basis of why I say Hood is being reckless; the Confederates absolutely need to be countering Sherman; it is Sherman that is quite literally putting the Confederacy into its death throes (its obviously beginning to teeter by that point. IF YOU DO NOT COUNTER SHERMAN, or if you fail to do so, YOU LOSE THE WAR.
The war is already all but lost. Hood took the only choice open to him after Sherman left him for Thomas to take care of. That it appears reckless is understandable, but if he had another choice, I can't come up with it.
"The" march was initially viewed as reckless. In hindsight, it was exactly the right thing to do--the coup d'main. But Sherman had options. Hood did not. As Hood had no options that I can see, I'm reluctant to call his desperate move "reckless" or "idiotic."
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Thomas of course is put in overall command. Why do you think Sherman sent those troops and Thomas to Tennessee? Maybe because they were the best troops in his army and he knew the Tennessee situation could be in no better hands than Thomas. Sherman's own letters pretty much indicate exactly that.
Very much agree that Sherman was confidant that Thomas could handle Hood. (Might be that his desire to visit a bit of distruction in Georgia had some influence on his oft-stated confidence.) However, I had understood that the troops sent to Thomas were the ones left after Sherman had hand-picked the best to take with him; i.e., leftovers.
I'll agree that Hood lost crucial time before launching his invasion--time that Thomas needed to amass and prepare his defense. But it would be worthwhile to look at Nashville to determine what Thomas had, and when.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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