Hood's Tennessee Campaign

[cw1865]

Originally Posted by samgrant

Looks like a good spot in this long thread, to introduce my question.

As Jeff Davis' hand-picked commander after sacking Johnston, what did president Davis think about Hood's plan to forsake battling Sherman and to instead move toward Nashville?

Was there any correspndence between Hood and Davis which might show Davis' opinion on Hood's plan? Any evidence of agreement or disagreement?

I guess I could research this, but I'd rather have someone who knows tell me about it.

-

Well, Davis and Hood meet for a council of war on September 25th-September 27th. Atlanta has already fallen and Hood has the plan to go north and cut Sherman's supply line. Of course, they boh expect Sherman to follow and they discuss the various 'what could bes and what should bes'

Hood does tear up some track and Sherman realizes that Hood wants no open battle with him and also realizes that he can't catch Hood either. It is here that Hood really puts his plan to strike north into action. This is the part where I think Hood is a certifiabel lunatic.

"His plan, he said, was to cross the TN river...and move prompty on Nashville, smashing Thomas....possessing [Nashville]...thicken his ranks with volutneers, ad move on through KY to OH, where he would be in position to threaten Cincinatti and receive still more recruits from the Bluegrass. If Sherman followed, as expected, Hood would then be strong enough to whip him; AFTER WHICH he would either send reinforcement to beleaguered Richmond OR else take his whole command across the Cumberlands to come up in the rear of the blue host outside Petersburg."

If Sherman didn't follow, he would combine with Lee to defeat Grant, march on Washington, turn around and whip Sherman.

WOW!@! And here's a further wow, "Old Bory was amazed, partly by the bold sweep of the plan, which seemed to him as practicable as it was entrancing..."

These two are smoking some serious crack.

And then to top it off, Beauregard tells Hood he can go, but he has to leave Wheeler behind! (He does get Forrest though)

I'm not sure of what Davis' EXACT thoughts on Hood's psuh into TN was, but I can say that Hood definitely lets him know by telegram, 'You may rely upon my striking the enemy whenever a suitable opportunity presents itself, and that I will spare no effort to make that opportunity.'

Ostensibly Davis had every opportunity to object.

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by samgrant

Looks like a good spot in this long thread, to introduce my question.

As Jeff Davis' hand-picked commander after sacking Johnston, what did president Davis think about Hood's plan to forsake battling Sherman and to instead move toward Nashville?

Was there any correspndence between Hood and Davis which might show Davis' opinion on Hood's plan? Any evidence of agreement or disagreement?

I guess I could research this, but I'd rather have someone who knows tell me about it.

-

Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard was Davis' pawn in that communication. Pierre, a full blown general, had been sent west to keep him out of Davis' sight. The western theatre after the lost of Atlanta was a stepchild. Hood and Davis were tight socially during the war. Hood was a 'gentleman' with a few bucks and was a West Pointer. Hood and Davis were from the same general area of west central Kentucky. That's what got him his loftly rank and the command of the AOT from Joe Johnston. Hood had a knack for sending men into battle. Alas, a few thousand of them suffered dearly for his hasty orders.

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by larry_cockerham

Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard was Davis' pawn in that communication. Pierre, a full blown general, had been sent west to keep him out of Davis' sight. The western theatre after the lost of Atlanta was a stepchild. Hood and Davis were tight socially during the war. Hood was a 'gentleman' with a few bucks and was a West Pointer. Hood and Davis were from the same general area of west central Kentucky. That's what got him his loftly rank and the command of the AOT from Joe Johnston. Hood had a knack for sending men into battle. Alas, a few thousand of them suffered dearly for his hasty orders.

That doesn't really answer my question, but suggests that it was Beauregard's, not Hoods, decision to move toward Nashville rather than re-engage with Sherman???

[cw1865]

It was Hood's plan, Beauregard signed off on it. Davis and Hood had met to discuss going after Sherman's supply line which Davis specifically endorses, the plan is to lure Sherman back out of Atlanta of course. Sherman doesn't bite and Hood goes north, BUT he does send a telegram to Davis. Foote doesn't mention if Davis made a response, so we don't know specifically what Davis thinks of Hood's push, but we do know that when Davis went west he specifically ordered a strategic location of one division from Bragg to Pemberton.

At the very least you have a tacit endorsement, I'm assuming, and I could be way off, but considering Hood/Davis' relationship, he probably wrote back wishing him godspeed.

[EricJacobson]

Cute comments about smoking crack and Hood being a lunatic. But to try and answer the question posed by samgrant:

This much is for certain. When Davis visited the Army of Tennessee in late September he followed by making several speeches in nearby Georgia cities, Macon in particular. Several newspapers printed the speeches and they all related how Davis said the army would soon be moving into Tennessee. That alone is evidence that Hood and Davis had spoken about an invasion in late September. It seems both men wanted to try and draw Sherman away from Atlanta and into battle, but if that failed, it was on to Tennessee. Davis tried to distance himself from the fact later on, but his own words speak volumes. As far as correspondence during the campign between Davis and Hood there was little, but what there was Davis said nothing about stopping.

Funny how some today get quite a chuckle about Hood's Tennessee Campaign and just ramble on about how foolish it was. When it was happening, even after the horror at Franklin, many Confederate soldiers believed they were succeeding. They were driving the Yankees north, pushing them out of Middle Tennessee. Even Gen. A. P. Stewart, AFTER the campaign, said it the best plan available at the time. So did Gen. S. D. Lee. Yankee soldiers to a man talked about how close it really was, how worried they were that the Rebel offensive might succeed.

One last thing. Ol' Bobbie Lee in Virginia had gotten himself in a chokehold around Petersburg. Any chance the Confederacy had of even continuing to exist rested on the Army of Tennessee and John Bell Hood.

[cw1865]

Originally Posted by EricJacobson

One last thing. Ol' Bobbie Lee in Virginia had gotten himself in a chokehold around Petersburg. Any chance the Confederacy had of even continuing to exist rested on the Army of Tennessee and John Bell Hood.

...to make Northern voters put McClellan in the White House. The reason why I get a serious chuckle out of Hood's offensive goals is because they are so far beyond his means that its ludicrous.

While Davis is in Georgia speaking to Hood (I am not looking at the text of the speeches), the strategy still ties Hood to the goings of Sherman. There IS talk of TN, but its all tied to Sherman. 'Hood would still pursue [Sherman]; either northward across the Tennessee...or south or east, through Selma or Montgomery to the Gulf or through Macon or Augusta to the Atlantic.

On September 27th, Davis does speak to some soldeirs from TN 'their faces would soon turn homeward.'

The distinction is that Davis fully envisions that Hood will compel Sherman to leave and to go back into TN (back up his supply route).

When Hood decides to make his plunge to the north, the difference is that he is now detaching from Sherman's movements and this plan Davis had not agreed to in September; nor could he, Hood didn't conceive of it.

Foote doesn't really mention what Davis says, but he does note that Davis gets a telegram. Under the circumstances, I would say its highly probable that Davis approved the plan.

[larry_cockerham]

Whether Davis, Beauregard, Hood or some other Confederate notable 'approved' the plan perhaps matters not. The fact is it happened. Perhaps 10-15 thousand men lost their lives and several thousands suffered enough physical and mental wounds to last far more than a lifetime. Was this Divine providence? Perhaps, perhaps not. As Eric has guided us, the scheme almost worked, at least as far as capturing Nashville was concerned. Where they would have progressed from there and whether Sherman would have gone to the trouble to drop his shrimp in Savannah and return is still speculative to say the least. Sherman was seeking a link with Grant and an end to the war. It's an intriguing story.

[EricJacobson]

Well said Larry. Very well said.

[gunny]

I don't know that I would call the invasion of Tennessee ludicrous, but a total failure nonetheless. Every move made by Hood on the campaign failed - by his or someone else's means. I can't agree with you Larry on your comment that the scheme almost worked. If that statement is in reference to Spring Hill, that is truly the closest they got, and although they got close to siezing the pike at Spring Hill, I find it hard to believe that, even under the distressing circumstances, the Federal army would have been crushed there.

I think it more likely that Wagner's Division in Spring Hill would have been forced northward by the COnfederates before dark - seperating his division from the rest of the Federal army, but leaving the remaining four divisions cohesive. The Feds would have been too nervous to bring on a night engagement as well, and would have probably spent much of the night trying to skirt Spring Hill.

Regardless, if Hood blocks the road, and gets ahead of Schofield's force he would then find himself between three sizeable forces. The 4th and 23rd Corps in his rear, the garrision of Murfreesboro and that of Nashville.

Hood could accomplish nothing without completely destroying Schofield's force, and he at no time ever came even close to doing that.

Jamie

[larry_cockerham]

It was in the timing, Jamie. Bad timing and poor execution. Two weeks earlier before Thomas readied the defense at Nashville and a bit closer collaboration with his generals, Hood could have had a fighting chance as could his men. It was not to be.