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We have mentioned Snake Creek Gap a number of times here recently in discussing the generalship of Joe Johnston. Here is a link to an interesting (at least to me) investigation of that issue:
WHY WAS SNAKE CREEK GAP LEFT UNGUARDED?
An Episode in the Retreat of the Confederate Army
of Tennessee from Dalton, Georgia, May, 1864
By Wilbur G. Kurtz
Kurtz was a professional illustrator and engraver who married the daughter of a Civil War veteran and studied Atlanta intensely. He was an advisor on Gone With the Wind, Song of the South, and The Great Locamotive Chase. He also helped construct the diorama at the Battle of Atlanta Cyclorama, repairing parts of the painting. Later, he wrote the text for most of the Atlanta Campaign markers the state of Georgia put up in the 1950s.
Here's a contemporary Civil War comment on the disaster at Snake Creek Gap. See the link for more.
"How this gap which opened upon our rear and line of communications, from which it was distant at Resaca only five miles, was neglected I cannot imagine. General Mackall, Johnston's Chief-of-Staff, told me it was the result of a flagrant disobedience of orders, by whom he did not say. Certainly the commanding general never could have failed to appreciate its importance. Its loss exposed us at the outset of the campaign to a terrible danger and on the left forced us to retreat from a position where, if he adhered to his attack, we might have detained the enemy for months, destroying vast numbers of men, perhaps prolonged the campaign." Confederate Major General Patrick Cleburne, August 16, 1864
Everything i looked in said that Johnston could only explain himself after the fact.
He blamed the calvary for losing touch with Sherman's advance and of course Polk didn't see the need to send all his men to Rome when commanded by Johnston to do so. There seemed to be so much in-fighting at this point among the command that they just couldn't pull together. They were still arguing with Richmond over each other's plans as Sherman advanced!
I'd say the problem was no real leader - J. Davis had no business trying to micro manage the Western Theater.
General Mackall, Johnston's Chief-of-Staff, told me it was the result of a flagrant disobedience of orders, by whom he did not say.
Mackall, general`s Johnston greatest defender .
Before campaign, general Mackall has recorded in early March his predicition that the Yankees "would try and go past Dalton." What JJ has done? He has sent cpt. F.R.R.Smith to survey and map an area well to Johnston`s right flank, fully ten miles east of his position along Rocky Facr. Smith was captured during his work on April 13th by Union soldiers.
On his other flank, Johnston had good maps as well! Maps showing the area from Red Clay, on the TN border, to Tilton, well south of Dalton were made by BG Henry D.Clayton. Ridges, gaps, roads, and streams were well marked on those charts, one in particular shows the course of Snake Creek (though unnamed) through Rocky Face, ten miles southwest of Dalton. Johnston therefore knew of the ridge gaps beyond his left flank.
from S.Davis, Atlanta Will Fall
Johnston should has ordered to cover this gap. Should has checked if his orders were carried out (if he has ordered). Because of him, Confederates probably lost one of the best defensive line. Only thanks to McPherson cautioness, AoT was not cut from Atlanta immediatly after campaign has started!
Mistakes were made by all the armies and all the generals. At this stage of the war, the Confederacy was going to pay severely for their mistakes.
The Confederacy may have thought that the Union army was at a distinct disadvantage, since it was in enemy territory and it would be unfamilar with all the gaps and mountain passes.
The Army of the Potomac paid severely early in the war, because they were unaware of all the gaps in Virginia. Stonewall Jackson took great advantage by using gaps, unknown to the enemy.
Sometimes these gaps made the Confederate generals look better than they really were.
By 1863, the AoP knew the gaps in northern Virginia. Mosby and Stuart thought that Stuart could easily move through one of the gaps in the Bull Run Mountains, on his way to Pennsylvania. Big mistake. The AoP had the gaps blocked by cavalry and infantry. Stuart was forced around and to the east, seriously delaying his move to Pennsylvania , by at least several days.
Perhaps in Georgia, someone assumed that the gap was too unknown to the Union Army, so it need not be protected by troops, needed more critically elsewhere.
I thought that Kennesaw Mountain was an overhyped Confederate defensive position. Kennesaw Mountain was formidable, but had no depth. There were no interlocking chains to the Confederate rear. Once Sherman flanked, the Confederates had to retreat to the relative flat lands to their rear. If Sherman thought he knew northwest Georgia, he never showed it at Kennesaw Mountain.
[quote=whitworth]
The Confederacy may have thought that the Union army was at a distinct disadvantage, since it was in enemy territory and it would be unfamilar with all the gaps and mountain passes.
OOPS! The US Army wasn't in such "enemy territory". For years this hallowed ground was, you'll remember, part of the United States. Many US soldiers were southern boys, fighting on ground just as familar to them as it was to their cousins and brothers wearing gray and butternut. Yes, there were a few hundred thousand yanks in the US Army, but even they weren't all that lost.
Yes, there were a few hundred thousand yanks in the US Army, but even they weren't all that lost.
And Sherman's policy was to learn as much about the country as he could in the time available. And he expected his lieutenants to do the same. The map he distributed to his Army and Corps Commanders for Dalton and Resaca was quite accurate.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
In the more narrow sense, I would consider territory held by the Confederate army as "enemy territory." And of course, Dalton and Resaca were considered otherwise by the Confederates, from that of the Union army.
As for the gap, I've found information that it wasn't the gap itself that posed the problem for McPherson.
I just researched a few OR's and found that it wasn't finding Snake Creek that was the problem for McPherson. Sherman said it was finding a road from there to the railroad in Resaca, and that McPherson "fell back and took a strong position near the east end of Snake Creek Gap".
Sherman said what saved Johnston was the impracticable nature of the country made passage across the valley almost impossible, and gives credit to Johnston for having prepared a good road, for passage of his army from Dalton to Resaca.
I just researched a few OR's and found that it wasn't finding Snake Creek that was the problem for McPherson. Sherman said it was finding a road from there to the railroad in Resaca, and that McPherson "fell back and took a strong position near the east end of Snake Creek Gap".
SCG empties into Sugar Valley. There'd be only farm lanes from there to Resaca. If my maps are right, McP would have had to march to the Ooostanoola and follow the roads along it to Resaca.
However, Sherman didn't say to break the RR at Resaca. He said to break it between Resaca and Tipton (it was Tipton?), which is a small station between Resaca and Dalton.
Sounds like the ORs you were reading were after the fact, when Sherman was apologizing for McP's disappointing inability to end things then and there.
Would much appreciate a location of where you were reading. I haven't gotten that far and would like to check it out. You'll be saving me quite a bit of fumbling around.
Thanks
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Perhaps in Georgia, someone assumed that the gap was too unknown to the Union Army, so it need not be protected by troops, needed more critically elsewhere.
This someone was J.Johnston. And was that a big problem to cover this gap? One, uno, jeden, eine brigade could cover this gap, even some weak brigade. That would be enough! Giving them time to dig in, prepeare covers, trenches during spring of 1864, they could held Union troops for long time!
Such defensive, passive general like JJ (which had obsession about turning his flanks) should do this.
And Sherman's policy was to learn as much about the country as he could in the time available. And he expected his lieutenants to do the same. The map he distributed to his Army and Corps Commanders for Dalton and Resaca was quite accurate.
Ole
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Snake Creek Gap 
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brigade could cover this gap, even some weak brigade. That would be enough! Giving them time to dig in, prepeare covers, trenches during spring of 1864, they could held Union troops for long time!
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