Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
The description of the road used by Schofields retreat to Frankline being clogged with abandoned equipment and burning equipment and supplies, could lead an aggressive commander like Hood (or Lee) that these were signs of panic and what was needed was to press the pursuit. The AoT was right on the heels of Schofield and although the defenses were strong and commander knows the defenses are are only as good as the men defending them.
The situation at Franklin bears a striking resemblence to Malvern Hill, where the Commanding General decides that the enemy is on the brink of total defeat and one more push will finish the job, decides (based on his professional experience and his own naturally aggressive instincts) to deliver that final push. In both events their assumptions and aggressiveness were false predictors of success.
Given the appearances at Franklin at that time, (without hindsight) with Lee in Hoods position, it is more than likely that Lee would have made the same decision as Hood.
Somehow I suspect that had Gen. R. E. Lee had the same advice from Cleburne, Forrest and others that Hood is reported to have received, he (Lee) would have had the good sense to make other arrangements?
Once I thought Longstreet was right at Gettysburg. But in recent years, after studying logistics in more detail, I think Lee was working on a higher plain.
Longstreet saw tactics and a move away from Gettysburg, towards Washington.
Lee saw the logistical shortages of his army, the price of having fought for two days at Gettysburg, and the unreality of continuing a campaign that would last a week.
Lee, I believe, truly saw defeat; defeat for the Confederacy by 1863. And I believe he saw that some kind of important victory had to come on July 3rd. That the Confederacy did not have a lot of July 3rd's to win the war.
Hood I believe saw the end of the war and was prepare to sacrifice his whole army for a nation, whose economy was already ruined. Hood would kill his army before he surrendered. Hood had no business on a winter campaign into Tennessee, from any military standpoint. Hood was in a place where it was either victory or total destruction.
Lee needed reinforcements, supplies, materiale if the AoNV was to survive. Where in the East was any of those necessities? Where in the West? The only credible source of reinforcements was the AoT, But Sherman or Thomas had to be eliminated, if Lee was to be sustained from the West.
Wandering around Ga. Ala. awaiting Thomas at his leisure or tagging along behind the devasted track of Sherman thru Ga., would not be helping Lee in Va.
In Dec. the Confederacy had only 4 mo's to live. If the Confederacy was to survive, Lee needed help then, not in April.
It is easy, now, to see that the war was over soon after Gettysburg or even the capture of Atlanta, but does anyone here care to guess what Hoods AND Lees answer would have been.
The choices made by Lee and Hood was essentially the same, the difference in results of their decisions (if, there are any) are really too fine to blame one for doing essentially what one would have done in the others place.
Downfall:
A very thoughtful and sympathetic analysis. Thank you. There remain contrasts between Lee's investment in a desperate charge and Hood's -- not that much difference in motivation, but a considerable gap in judgement.
If Lee won with that charge on the 3rd day, he had a very good chance of returning to Virginia. If Hood succeeded at Franklin (smashed up Schofield), he would still face another serious confrontation. Dashing your army against the rocks, knowing that you have another big fight coming, strikes me as a judgemental error. Even if he had busted up a good-sized piece of the anticipated opposition in Nashville, he could not hope to do it without crippling himself.
If he had simply gone back to Alabama, the result would have been the same -- not disrupting Union control of Tennessee. But he would likely have been cashiered, but his legacy would have been favored with a viable army available for dashing against rocks elsewhere.
The "second-effort" has much practical value, but it's value seldom incorporates such a massive investment of lives for no gain.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Good points also, and the answer to"after Franklin, what?" dependes on the status of Thomas' army at the time of Franklin. It is my understanding that the varied parts of his assigned army was still being assembled. How many troops did he have with Schofield eliminated and how battle worthy?
As pointed out in another thread, the Confederacy had roughly 4 mo's more of existence. Desperate times demand desperate solutions, if surrender is ruled out.
Admittedly, after the failure at Franklin, the AoT's and Hoods fate was, to all intents and purpose's,sealed (not to mention that of Lee , the AoNV and the Confederacy). But, that is 21st century hindsight, as pointed out above what was the alternative, that offered Better results than not trying to finish the campaign, whatever the odds?
P.S. I am no particular fan of Hood's, but I cannot see the fine distinction that some how quantifies almost the same actions of Lee's as superior or better than those of Hoods. The difference (IF any) seems to be a matter of scale rather than kind, their results seem to have been the same.
Good points also, and the answer to"after Franklin, what?" dependes on the status of Thomas' army at the time of Franklin. It is my understanding that the varied parts of his assigned army was still being assembled. How many troops did he have with Schofield eliminated and how battle worthy?
My question would be: how good did Thomas' army have to be? Originally considered indefensible, Nashville could have been, at the time, considered impregnable. Apparently, somewhere in there, a skilled engineer laid out lines of formidable defense and, so, Nashville would have been a tough nut with only armed citizens behind its breastworks.
Quote:
But, that is 21st century hindsight, as pointed out above what was the alternative, that offered Better results than not trying to finish the campaign, whatever the odds?
I don't see better results, sitting here -- today. Perhaps Hood hoped for the card to fill his straight. Maybe he saw a real chance. Maybe. Maybe. I simply can't get into his head. I'm resigned to never understand why he figured he could take Nashville under the circumstances. Indomitable spirit? Stupid?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
The point is, those sentiments can legitimately be used concerning Lee, after Gettysburg and certainly after he entered the Petersburg Lines. Yet Lee is a 'great' Gen. and Hood was a bad one?
As stated, the distinctions between the two men's generalship is much finer than most seem willing to admit. Would Hood's being recognized as, at least, an adequate Army Commander really reflect that badly on Lee?
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Battle of Franklin: Short First Hand Account 
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