Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
Adequate is stretching the term with Hood at least as far as his actions are concerned between Nov 20 - Dec 15 1864. Nashville still contains the remnant of Fort Negley which is a huge stone edifice designed and overseen during construction by Army engineers. There were at least six other installations, though not as grand as Ft. Negley, but just as effect as a defense. Negley's foot soldiers and Wilson's Cavalry were more than ready for the Confederate advance and that should have been obvious to Hood as was the case at Franklin. Something about Hood and Lee makes me conclude they were both very weary of war and trying to get it over with. Gettysburg and Franklin had a lot in common in that regard. Had both succeeded militarily there were more steps to be taken, namely Louisville (never figured that one out except for some strange notion that Sherman would be drawn to move west) and Washington to bring some 'pressure' on the federal government. Both rather far-fetched notions. Lots of young men paid the price for these decisions.
Would Hood's being recognized as, at least, an adequate Army Commander really reflect that badly on Lee?
I can't see where anything Hood did or did not do affects Lee at all. I'm not one to paint Hood as thoroughly bad just because his appointment to command turned out to be ill-advised. "It" happens.
The same applies to Burnside. He was not the worst general by any stretch of the imagination, although he did demonstrate a critical weakness at Fredericksburg. Both Burnside and Hood were well-qualified to command. Both made singularly glaring errors at one or two points in their careers. Neither should be judged solely on those errors (although they may be remembered for them). After all, what commander -- Lee, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Longstreet, (your choice here) -- never made a mistake?
Even Bragg deserves a bit of charitable thought, although his errors make a longer list than most other commanders.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
To err is human. To send ten thousand plus men to their deaths is something far more serious. Part of that blame must rest on the folks who gave the commander his position in the first place and on the soldiers who followed some obviously not too well thought out orders. I know there's a thin line between self perservation and disregarding an order. These men under Hood never had a chance for their day in court.
The soldiers of any army in history seldom have had their day in court.
Hood wrecked his army approximate 4 mo's before Lee wrecked his. As a result Hood lost the war in the West and Lee lost the war for Southern Independence.
Well I wouldn't compare Hood in any way to Lee. Hood failed in all of his large battles, when he was in command.
Lee at Gettysburg was in unfriendly territory. Hood in Tennessee surely had many supporters in the Franklin area who could have provided much information on Franklin's defenses.
Franklin, unlike Gettysburg, had prepared defenses for artillery and infantry. The Union army had occupied Franklin long before Hood came to Tennessee.
Hood might have been on an insane mission, but he might have bypassed Franklin, forcing the Union forces to withdraw to Nashville. Attacking Franklin, then Nashville, two fortified defenses, made no sense.
My question would be: how good did Thomas' army have to be? Originally considered indefensible, Nashville could have been, at the time, considered impregnable. Apparently, somewhere in there, a skilled engineer laid out lines of formidable defense and, so, Nashville would have been a tough nut with only armed citizens behind its breastworks.I don't see better results, sitting here -- today. Perhaps Hood hoped for the card to fill his straight. Maybe he saw a real chance. Maybe. Maybe. I simply can't get into his head. I'm resigned to never understand why he figured he could take Nashville under the circumstances. Indomitable spirit? Stupid?
Ole,
The Battle of Franklin was fought on November 30. On that day, 2 of the 3 divisions in A, J. Smith's Corps arrived in Nashville and debarked. The third division debarked on December 1. That is a bit over 9000 tough veteran troops added to the defenders. The race to Nashville is already won, and only a disaster to Schofield's force before it gets there offers any hope for the South.
By this point in 1864, Nashville was regarded as the 2nd most heavily fortified city in America (after Washington). With any reasonable defensive force in it, the city could be held for quite some time.
As to the battle of Nashville itself, Hood chose to stand and fight in a position where both his flanks could be turned while he was outnumbered by about 2 to 1 (or more). He was lucky any of his army got away at all.
Hood had no time to talk to citizens in Franklin about anything, even if he could have rounded any up. The strength of the enemy position was obvious, even to Hood. The problem was time. The objective of the campaign had been to recapture Nashville and following Spring Hill the Federals were barely 15 miles from safety at Nashville. Additionally, the sun sets at 4:35 p.m. on November 30. A flanking maneuver, in my opinion, is NOT a viable option. The Yankee cavalry was largely east of Harpeth and nearly 5,000 Yankee infantry were north of the river blocking the road leading to Nashville. Additionally, the four guns in Ft Granger and the ten positioned on high ground behind the Union left flank and just west of the river could have pivoted and swept the ground east of the river where Forrest (and any supporting infantry) would have attempted a flanking movement. Hell, Schofield could have sacrificed all his cavalry and all 5,000 infantry north of the river just to get the rest of army out of Franklin. Hood was practically in a lose lose situation. Launch the frontal assault and possibly suffer grievous losses or try a flanking maneuver that had no chance of success. So he tried the former and we all know how that turned out.
Also, the defenses at Franklin were not prepared. The Federal left improved the old existing works from 1863, but the line stretching thru the center (where the Carter House is) was new as of November 30, 1864. So was the line stretching all the way to the Union right.
Lastly, if Hood bypasses Franklin what good does that do? The Federal army pulls out and skedaddles to Nashville. Nashville would have tough enough without Schofield's entire army running up there to lessen any chances of victory.
Now as far as the Battle of Nashville goes, well, Hood has no defense in my mind. Franklin was his last chance to turn the tables. He failed and going to Nashville was just asking for utter destruction.
In closing I will say this. None of Hood's contemporaries were ever as critical of Hood as twentieth and twenty-first century folks have been and are. Franklin is the ultimate battle to Monday morning quarterback. But to judge it properly I think you need to try to put yourself in the shoes of men who were there on November 30. They had not deserted or run away, even after the fall of Atlanta. They had continued to fight on, through conditions those of us today can only imagine. They believed in what they believed and many were willing to die for the cause, whatever that cause was to them. Consider Patrick Cleburne. A month before Franklin he had spoken to many of his men, telling them that if the cause was to die he hoped to fall with it. The ferocity of the fighting at Franklin speaks volumes I think about the mindset of the Confederate soldiers in the West. It was their chance to destroy the Yankees and perhaps save Middle Tennessee. Their valor proved they were incredible soldiers who were willing to give their lives for what they held dear. Undoubtedly Hood understood this. Unfortunately for all involved on the Southern side it was a desperate gamble. But defeat is not an easy pill to swallow, and armies who are beaten usually do not give up until they have literally been shredded to the bone. Men and officers alike.
Eric, your eloquence has not left you. The intriguing continuation of your last post is that these same men moved on the Bentonville and put up a convincing last fight against Sherman. The Confederate spirit was alive and well to and beyond the end. Sometimes I can still feel it floating around Nashville. That spirit is why we continue to "fight" this war, in an attempt to preserve the knowledge of the efforts of these brave men, both gray and blue.
I doubt the war was unavoidable. The South could see that they were losing the power in the Congress and the Executive Office. And with the loss of power comes loss of control; loss of exactly what and where a slaveholder can have rights.
In the Cooper Union speech, Lincoln so much stated that he was in favor of banning slavery in the U.S. territories, for which the Congress and the President, had constitutional power. Such a ban would have been devastating to slave interests and result in a decrease in slave value.
Lincoln meant it when he said the nation could not endure half slave and half free. Lincoln threw down the glove and the Confederates picked it up.
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