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Is it possible that Johnston actually had the best formula for winning the war?
The south was unquestionably outmanned. They lacked the industrial might of the north, the shipping, the arms and ability to field an army in the same time and of the same strength that the north could.
Let's not forget, that Lee's own strategy from June 1864 till the end of the war was a static defense. Occupy key terrain and cause the enemy to act without losing the initiative.
This is the same strategy that Johnston had adopted in June 1864 without the benefit of months of work on defensive lines, except at Atlanta.
Johnston recognized that the superiority of the enemy was so vast that only a mostly defensive posture could gain success on the enemy by allowing him to take chances or make movements that he could then capitalize on.
Lee in turn fought, prior to June '64, several offensive actions with some success - but resulted in blows that were as staggering to his own forces as those of the enemy. These actions, even the most successful, would still result in the same outcome with more losses than might have been - had a more defensive posture been assumed.
Either way - which formulas for success made more sense? Would taking the offensive and winning a major battle such as Gettysburg, on northern soil, actually result in foriegn recognition? Or would the defeat of a northern army on southern south have the same effect?
Niether had that affect in the end - and it is likely without emancipation, no country would have recognized the C.S.A..
Now pput aside your opinions of these two men, and you decide. Which formula - under the circumstances - seems to have made more sense?
Is it possible that Johnston actually had the best formula for winning the war?
The south was unquestionably outmanned. They lacked the industrial might of the north, the shipping, the arms and ability to field an army in the same time and of the same strength that the north could.
Let's not forget, that Lee's own strategy from June 1864 till the end of the war was a static defense. Occupy key terrain and cause the enemy to act without losing the initiative.
This is the same strategy that Johnston had adopted in June 1864 without the benefit of months of work on defensive lines, except at Atlanta.
Johnston recognized that the superiority of the enemy was so vast that only a mostly defensive posture could gain success on the enemy by allowing him to take chances or make movements that he could then capitalize on.
Lee in turn fought, prior to June '64, several offensive actions with some success - but resulted in blows that were as staggering to his own forces as those of the enemy. These actions, even the most successful, would still result in the same outcome with more losses than might have been - had a more defensive posture been assumed.
Either way - which formulas for success made more sense? Would taking the offensive and winning a major battle such as Gettysburg, on northern soil, actually result in foriegn recognition? Or would the defeat of a northern army on southern south have the same effect?
Niether had that affect in the end - and it is likely without emancipation, no country would have recognized the C.S.A..
Now pput aside your opinions of these two men, and you decide. Which formula - under the circumstances - seems to have made more sense?
Looking at the war, I cannot think of any purely defensive land campaign by the Confederacy that was a success -- unless it was commanded by Lee.
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Back East:
1st Bull Run: strategic defensive-offensive with success based on Johnston's transfer & counterattack
Valley Campaign: Brilliant manaeuver and attack by Jackson.
Peninsular Campaign: Richmond on the verge of falling under Johnston, rescued by Lee's counterattack in the Seven Days.
2nd Manassas: offensive campaign by Lee.
Antietam: Offensive failure by Lee.
Fredricksburg: Lee again. Johnston felt he'd never be lucky enough to have the Yankees attack him in such a position.
Chancellorsville: Brilliant counterattack by Lee.
Gettysburg: Lee's offensive failure
Mine Run: Lee succeeds again
The Overland Campaign: Lee again
Petersburg Siege: Lee, really. A nice day or two by Beauregard early, but otherwise Lee.
Even on smaller operations, like the Shenandoah (Breckenridge & Early) or saving the RR below Richmond against Butler, it took offensive operations.
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Out West:
Henry & Donelson: Grant's offensive triumph, Confederate defensive disaster.
Shiloh: Confederate offensive failure leading to
Corinth: Brilliant retreat out of a defensive disaster
Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky: brilliant strategic offensive that recovers a crumbling disaster in Tennessee for the Confederates. Unfortunately, Bragg (poorly served by Smith/Polk/Hardee) has no idea how to handle the resulting situation in KY and is thrown back quickly.
Corinth/Iuka: offensive failure by Price & Van Dorn. Might have been crushed decisively if Grant had better performance from Rosecrans.
Murfreesboro: Defensive campaign by Bragg. Counterattack came close to smashing Rosecrans army -- but failed. Bragg's poor performance and decisions once the battle is joined leads to excessive casualties and retreat.
Vicksburg Campaigns: Some good moments for the Confederacy early, but in the end humiliating and disastrous defeat for the Rebels.
Port Hudson: see Vicksburg
Red River: Confederate triumph, but a defensive-offensive struggle. Also Union handicapped by Banks.
Tullahoma Campaign: Bragg, badly outnumbered, outthought, and surprised in a prepared position is hustled back 100 miles to Chattanooga. If the weather had been better, Bragg might have been decimated.
Chickamauga: Bragg's finest hour. Confederate strategic counterattack succeeds, but details are bungled, leaving only the ashes of what might have been.
Chattanooga: Horrible defensive operation. Bragg smashed and relieved, AoC rescued.
Knoxville: Misguided offensive operation, accomplishes nothing, helps Union smash Bragg at Chattanooga.
Atlanta Campaign, Johnston: Shows lots of unflappable-in-a-crisis Johnston skill, but also shows his failure to prepare. In the final analysis, Johsnton driven back 100 miles and forced into the Atlanta defenses.
Atlanta Campaign, Hood: three quick, bloody tactcial offensives that all failed miserably, followed by being outmaneuvered and thrown into broken retreat. Sherman lets him go; Grant would have hounded and mauled him.
Hood's Franklin & Nashville Campaign: An absolute disaster.
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That's pretty much the list of major operations in the war, except for those along the coast. I can see no particular reason to believe any of the defensive operations worked out for the Confederacy.
Not to mix up offensive and defensive strategies - but to point out that although some of the Confederate actions were offensively natured, the more successful ones were realistically... Raids.
These raids or sorties, combined with strong defensive positions or making use of manuever in defensible terrain would at least have led to fewer casualties and greater assets later in the war for the Confederacy.
For instance - I find it unlikely that had a defensive/offensive formula been applied at Ft.s Henry and Donelson, that the Confederate army would have been captured.
Point is - is that Confederate operations should have never been conducted to sieze and occupy terrain. They didn't have the assets to do such like the Federals did, but more to apply some offensive actions to a defensive strategy - such as Jackson's raid, the Kentucky campaign (although outwitted), Chancellorsville, etc.
Most of the Confederate success' were taking advantage of Federal mistakes while already in a defensive posture.
So not to say the Confederates across the board were more successful in defensive operations, but to say their total failure in large offensive operations that involved the movement of whole armies was more detrimental to their overall success - than had they operated in a more fluid, defensive manner.
Commanders of course are going to make failures regardless - due to lack of intell, manpower, or just poor planning and excecution, but perhaps all considered, Lee himself may have finally come to this same conclusion by June '64 - as his operations reflected the same sort of strategy as Johnston by that time.
Lee believed in decesive battle (as Napoleon). In long war Union would win anyway so South had to win fast, so they needed decesive battle. That is way Lee was attacking whenever it was possible.
Lee`s strategy in late 1864 (even at North Anna River he wanted to "Strike them a blow") was static cause he has run out of soldiers, but he has known that if Grant gets himself near Richmond - "(...) it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time."
He has used static defense to keep Grant for many moths at bay, but he has known that this would only give CSA few months of live more...but it would not win the war.
The only chance for Lee in 1864 was to hit whenever it was possible and force Grant to retire. What would happen if isolated Hancocks corps had been hit at North Anna River...but there was no Jackson, no Longstreet and Lee was sick.
Johnston strategy was that he had NO strategy. He was only retreating, finding excuses not to fight, almost like McCllelan (and Grant in 1863 and Sherman in 1864). If he was in command in June/July 1862 Richmond could fall. He was probably the worst Confederate general.
Jefferson Davis maybe is not the best source, but his letter about J.E.Johnston is worth reading.
Jefferson Davis's letter to Congress on the matter of General Joseph E. Johnston Civil War Official Records, Vol 47, Part 2 pages 1304-1311
And one quote, just to 'hit' J.E.Johnston even more :P.
"One Northern correspondent wrote after the Seven Days: "The shell . . . which wounded . . . General Johnston, although it confused the Rebels, was the saddest shot fired during the war. It changed the entire Rebel tactics. It took away incompetence, indecision and dissatisfaction and gave skilful generalship, excellent plans and good discipline. . . . Before the battle of Fair Oaks, Rebel troops were sickly, half fed and clothed, and had no hearts for their work. . . . [After Lee took command], the troops improved in appearance. Cadaverous looks became rare among prisoners. The discipline became better; they went into battles with shouts, and without being urged, and, when in, fought like tigers. . . . A more marked change for the better never was made in any body of men than that wrought in his army by the sensible actions of General Lee."
I had always understood that the Confederacy's grand strategy was to protect itself and to wait until Union ardor cooled. (Was this ever written anywhere? Or was it fanciful interpretation?) Theoretically, that ought to have worked. Realistically, you have to rely heavily on your opponent's cooperation which, in this case, wasn't always forthcoming.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
It appears that you definitely dissaprove of Johnston, but it makes me wonder if you ever read any of his reports or books in defense of him. Your arguments are far too slanted to have much knowledge on the man.
Johnston faced an opponent that was superior 2 to 1, in an enviorment that did not favor the defensive as Virginia did, and had subordinates that operated at a level substandard to those in Virgiania - primarily due to Bragg's instillation of military discipline and quirkiness.
Johnston makes it very clear what his strategy was, and in fact was a day away from conducting the battle at Peach Tree creek when he was relieved. Hood conducted Johnston's plan, only he did not execute it in the manner Johnston would have - as an experienced, veteran army commander.
Of course a war correspondent will write something of that nature. Correspondents don't know their *ss from a hole in the ground.
It is apparent that from your statements Lee did in fact adopt Johnston's strategy as the war turned in the east. It had long since turned in the west - before Johnston ever saw command of the AoT.
I had always understood that the Confederacy's grand strategy was to protect itself and to wait until Union ardor cooled. (Was this ever written anywhere? Or was it fanciful interpretation?) Theoretically, that ought to have worked. Realistically, you have to rely heavily on your opponent's cooperation which, in this case, wasn't always forthcoming.
Generally, Davis micromanaged Confederate strategy. He believed in what you are describing, a cordon defense. It is much more of a description of the late war period than the first year or so.
It appears that you definitely dissaprove of Johnston, but it makes me wonder if you ever read any of his reports or books in defense of him. Your arguments are far too slanted to have much knowledge on the man.
No I haven`t read any of his report or books in defense of him. Just general information from old, general books, which all was saying the same: general Johnston was wise, general Hood was stupid. However reading A.Castel, D.Coffey and S.Davis has opened my eyes .
However I`d be greatfull if You could recommend me any book about Atlanta & Johnston?
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Johnston faced an opponent that was superior 2 to 1, in an enviorment that did not favor the defensive as Virginia did, and had subordinates that operated at a level substandard to those in Virgiania - primarily due to Bragg's instillation of military discipline and quirkiness.
Lee was facing almost everytime opponent that was superior to him 2 to 1. Northern Georgia with its rivers and mountains is a very good terrain for defence, but even with such great terrain he has left Snake Gap unprotected which almost ended in cutting AoT from Tennessee in first week of campaign!! In 1864 J.E.Johnston had subordinates equal to those Lee had. Ewell (Early), Hill, Longstreet (Anderson) vs Hood, Polk (Stewart) and Hardee. From may to june none of Johnston`s subordinates failed.
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Johnston makes it very clear what his strategy was, and in fact was a day away from conducting the battle at Peach Tree creek when he was relieved. Hood conducted Johnston's plan,
Hood did not conduct Johnston`s plan. "Hood`s plan differs markedly from the one Johnston states he intended to implement. That was to attack Federals WHILE they were crossing Peachtree, whereas Hood`s calls for attacking them AFTER they had crossed it." - A.Castel
And I repreat, Johnston STATED that he had a plan. His memories are full of lies against general J.B.Hood, so we can or we can not believe him. Johnston had 100 miles of Georgia with better terrain to show what he could do. He could only retreat. R.E.Lee was retreating, but at last he was inflicting losses - in his one battle in Wilderness he has inflicted more losses to Grant then Johnston did in his whole campaign!
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only he did not execute it in the manner Johnston would have - as an experienced, veteran army commander.
"Following the example of Robert E.Lee, Hood outlined the objective and issued the orders but entrusted his corps commanders with their executions."
In other words Hood execute it in the manner an experienced, veteran army commander.
Stewart prooved to be very good corps commander, but "Old Reliable" who was supposed (and he was) to be a good corps commander (as experienced as Longstreet), failed. Who could think about that? Exactly like Jackson during 7th days battle.
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It is apparent that from your statements Lee did in fact adopt Johnston's strategy as the war turned in the east.
Johnston strategy? I think it was Lee to give first battle from trenches at Spotsylvania ?
If Johnston had not been wounded, It would have been interesting to see how Johnston would have reacted to McDowell's expanded Corps coming down overland onto his left flank.
Although McClellan and McDowell were the opponents, they did have overpowering numbers which, apparently, was all that mattered to Johnston.
No I haven`t read any of his report or books in defense of him. Just general information from old, general books, which all was saying the same: general Johnston was wise, general Hood was stupid. However reading A.Castel, D.Coffey and S.Davis has opened my eyes .
However I`d be greatfull if You could recommend me any book about Atlanta & Johnston?
You can gain much deeper and more valuable insight by reading the reports of the time. I recommend "Journal of B. L. Ridley, Lieut. Gen. A. P. Stewart's Staff" by B. L. Ridley. He includes nearly all of the reports of the top commanders during the Atlanta Campaign.
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Lee was facing almost everytime opponent that was superior to him 2 to 1. Northern Georgia with its rivers and mountains is a very good terrain for defence, but even with such great terrain he has left Snake Gap unprotected which almost ended in cutting AoT from Tennessee in first week of campaign!! In 1864 J.E.Johnston had subordinates equal to those Lee had. Ewell (Early), Hill, Longstreet (Anderson) vs Hood, Polk (Stewart) and Hardee. From may to june none of Johnston`s subordinates failed.
At the commencement of the campaign Johnston states he had about 43,000 and faced - according to Sherman - 99,000 Federal troops. Anumber that Sherman contends maintained itself throughout the campaign owing to new units, returning sick and wounded and furloghed troops.
Lee at the Wilderness faced 115,000 Fed troops against his 60,000 Confederate troops. The troop disparity was 56,000 for Johnston and 55,000 for Lee. But those numbers are skewed as well, for Johnston's force made up only about 40% of the force confronting him, while Lee's force made up about 55% of the force confronting himself.
There is no question that Johnston's corps commanders were competent - but could not excell as did the commanders in the east due to Bragg's old school of thought. Put the same eastern commanders under Bragg and they would likely have been hesitant to act on their own accord as well.
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Hood did not conduct Johnston`s plan. "Hood`s plan differs markedly from the one Johnston states he intended to implement. That was to attack Federals WHILE they were crossing Peachtree, whereas Hood`s calls for attacking them AFTER they had crossed it." - A.Castel
And I repreat, Johnston STATED that he had a plan. His memories are full of lies against general J.B.Hood, so we can or we can not believe him. Johnston had 100 miles of Georgia with better terrain to show what he could do. He could only retreat. R.E.Lee was retreating, but at last he was inflicting losses - in his one battle in Wilderness he has inflicted more losses to Grant then Johnston did in his whole campaign!
This is the sort of interpretation you get from an author without reading the original reports for yourself. Johnston's report, dated Oct. 20th, 1864 in fact states that he wanted to attack the enemy as they crossed the creek, but "The chief engineer was instructed to devote his attention first to the works between Decatur and Marietta roads; to put them in such position that they might be held by the State troops so that the army might attack the enemy in flank when he approached the town. This in the event we should be unsuccessful in attacking the Federal army in its passage of Peach Tree Creek."
The battlefield is fluid and rapidly changing - and circumstances had already changed by the time the AoT was put in motion to attack them durin the crossing, thus plan B - attacking them in flank was untilized by Hood after Johnston informed him of the intent of the movement.
Again this report written on Oct. 20th states, "In transferring command to General Hood I explained my plans to him; First to attack the Federal Army while crossing Peach Tree Creek. If we were successful great results might be hoped for as the enemy would have both the creek and the river to intercept his retreat. Second, if unsuccessful to keep back the enemy by intrenching to give time for the assembling of the state troops promiised by Governor Brown; to garrison Atlanta with those troops and when the Federal army approached the town attack it on its most exposed flank with all the Confedrate troops."
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"Following the example of Robert E.Lee, Hood outlined the objective and issued the orders but entrusted his corps commanders with their executions."
In other words Hood execute it in the manner an experienced, veteran army commander.
Stewart prooved to be very good corps commander, but "Old Reliable" who was supposed (and he was) to be a good corps commander (as experienced as Longstreet), failed. Who could think about that? Exactly like Jackson during 7th days battle.
An experienced commander should no doubt do that as he knows the inner workings and thought patterns of his subordinate generals, but a newly appointed commander might take actions to work closely with his new found subordinates and ensure that his orders are followed to a "T".
Thats one of Hood's biggest failures - his lack of supervision. If he felt he had been let down after the first battle, why not be more of a participant in the second, third or fourth engagement to ensure success?!!
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Johnston strategy? I think it was Lee to give first battle from trenches at Spotsylvania ?
Perhaps Lee was first by about 25 days to use heavily fortified positions to repulse an assualt, but thats only because Grant got impatient before Sherman did at Kennesaw Mountain.
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