Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
You have good company on this board. I don't happen to be one, but there are quite a few. Enjoy!
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
As we have discussed, Johnston checked Sherman's moves every which way after Kennesaw. In Grant and Sherman, Flood relays that a man in Sherman's 104th Ill., frustrated by seeing the smoke of the factories of Atlanta in the distance from day to day, shouted across to an enemy outpost, "Hello. Johnny, how far is it to Atlanta?" and recieved the answer, "So **** far you'll never get there!"
As early as May Johnston had begged the Confederacy to send Calvary from Lee's Dept of Alabama and Mississippi to tear up Sherman's rail. He never thought he would have to retreat to Atlanta because he planned to hold Sherman South of the Chattahoochee.
Or maybe he just thought with the Calvary he could hold off Sherman for about two more months but everything hinged on this help from the calvary - he should have known he would'nt get help from Davis ....
General W.W. Mackall, Johnston'scheif of staff wrote to his wife "It is unjust to put a man at the head of an army and then try to destroy his capacity for usefulness by expressing fear and distrust."
So...on the 16th the enemy was at the gates of Atlanta but Johnston thought he could hold Atlanta under siege.
Erroneously, I know - but he really thought he could manage it - Maybe he thought his experience at Vicksburg would hold him in good stead. He certainly did know what to expect.
One of the reasons, Davis was reluctamt to reinforce Johnston too much, may have been his expectation that they would only be caught up in Another of Johnstons Grand Strategic Retreats. As stated before by others, including Davis, the President had no assurances, whatsoever, that Johnston was actually planning on defending Atlanta.
The government's strategy for winning the war aside - strictly comparing the strategy that both Johnston and Lee used in the field - as eividence to support their formulas -
Which formula was more effective toward possibly winning the war?
As I see it - Lee's was more OFFENSIVE/defensive. Looking to strike the enemy hard blows while willing to sustain the losses he would encrue during such actions. Never necessarily looking to gain and hold terrain permanently - but to strike hard and fast - knowing that he may well have to surrender the fruits of his only temporary victory later. This strategy was no doubt very aggressive and could inflict heavy damage to his opponent, but lacked the forethought of war duration.
Johnston's strategy was more DEFENSIVE/offensive. Placing much more emphasis on the defense but on the look out for opportunities the enemy could afford him to strike decisive blows - or allow the enemy to make tactical mistakes on their own - while his troops maintained fluidity - so that they may react to - or act when the situation arose. At the same time preserving man power and flexibility. This strategy was more passive and much would depend on the enemy's actions - but anticipated long term duration of the war.
It is apparent that Hood followed the tactics and strategy that his mentor instilled in him - as well as Hardee probably would have by his mentor - Johnston.
Now, we will never be able to answer the qestions of what would have happened had Johnston retained command at Atlanta - nor what would have happened had Lee not marched into Penn. and lost the strength of the ANV there or at Antietam, but we do have the benefit of hiindsight - and using that, what do you think?
Personally - I think Lee's army would have been much stronger and larger had he fought a more Defensive style, and Johnston's strategy was more atune to the times - understanding the limitations of the Confederacy.
IF, one can imagine Lee actually leaving Va., with his army (I can't), then it is indeed likely that as many casualties would be saved for the North as well as the South and would certainly have prolonged McClellans career.
Lee would always be outnumbered and Good Luck on getting McClellan to attack any time soon.
The war would probably have moved into the Carolinas, with the Flanks of the Confederate Army threatened by Northern sea power, while Lee and Johnston slowly retreated towards each other (IF Johnston decided to cooperate) between at least Three Union Armies each superior in numbers to any one of the Confederate forces.
Sooo,
The government's strategy for winning the war aside - strictly comparing the strategy that both Johnston and Lee used in the field - as eividence to support their formulas -
Which formula was more effective toward possibly winning the war?
As I see it - Lee's was more OFFENSIVE/defensive. Looking to strike the enemy hard blows while willing to sustain the losses he would accrue during such actions. Never necessarily looking to gain and hold terrain permanently - but to strike hard and fast - knowing that he may well have to surrender the fruits of his only temporary victory later. This strategy was no doubt very aggressive and could inflict heavy damage to his opponent, but lacked the forethought of war duration.
Johnston's strategy was more DEFENSIVE/offensive. Placing much more emphasis on the defense but on the look out for opportunities the enemy could afford him to strike decisive blows - or allow the enemy to make tactical mistakes on their own - while his troops maintained fluidity - so that they may react to - or act when the situation arose. At the same time preserving man power and flexibility. This strategy was more passive and much would depend on the enemy's actions - but anticipated long term duration of the war.
Jamie
I'll agree with your definition of Lee - because I don't have a better one. Have not read much of the eastern campaign.
Just finished reading McMurray's "Great Rebel Armies." While brief, it talks about the disparities between the ANV and AOT. First, he points out that the AOT had ten times the area to defend (due to Davis idiotic idea that he had to defend every bit of Confederat territory). Something like 22,000 square miles for Lee and 225,000 square miles for Johnston, Bragg, Johnston, Hood and ect. He defines the territory as being more amenable to Lee rather than the Yanks in the East and vice versa in the West. He points out that the ANV had Lee buiding and training it almost from the start, while the AOT had Gideon Pillow performing the same job ON the AOT. He explains how the ANV was fed and subsisted from the west at the AOT's expense, and so on.
With all that going against him I doubt whether even Lee could have done much more with the AOT. I believe Johnston's strategy was the only one available. And while he committed several errors, didn't they all? After all, wasn't the last perfect man hung on a cross?
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