Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
You are, of course, including the good bishop in that long series?
Ole
I don't think Polk was a good choice -- but he was an enormously popular and respected one. He was a West Point graduate (even if he had never served after graduation, resigning to enter the ministry) and well-known throughout the area as a result of his activities as a Bishop. Even as the war went on, you do not see the hue and cry to remove him that you did over Bragg, Loring, Pemberton, and others.
In that long list, we can with hindsight see that most or all of these men were nowhere near as competent/successful/brilliant as supposed. But before May of 1863, Pemberton was well-respected, having turned back one effort after another to capture Vicksburg. Before New Orleans fell, Loring was well-regarded. Before Perryville, the irrascible Bragg was a war hero famed for Mexico and Shiloh and hailed for the invasion of Kentucky. Before Henry & Donelson, A. S. Johnston was regarded as a great commander. When appointed to command in East Tennessee, E. Kirby Smith was thought of as a hero of Manasas destined for great things. The pedantic Hardee was a famed name, a hard-hitting fighter, with soldiers North and South studying his Tactics -- yet it is hard to see where he did anything particularly outstanding during the war.Van Dorn was an early star who never lived up to his repuation. Beauregard, hero of Manassas and Ft. Sumter, did little to show himself a great commander out there.
Amongst them all, Joe Johnston posted perhaps the best record -- and still it is hard to look at his performance from December of 1862 to May of 1863 with anything other than puzzlement and dismay. Assigned to command two of the three major armies of the Confederacy on a front ranging from the Mississippi to the mountains, he seems to have exercised little control and felt that the entire command was designed to show him in a bad light. It may have been too big for one man; it may have been poorly organized and designed. But Joe Johnston doesn't seem to have done much to make it function better.
My only point is that Davis seems to have attempted to put talented, well-regarded officers in positions of authority in this theater. They flopped for the most part. That had a variety of causes (shortages of equipment being one). Davis can be justly criticized for interference from above. But Davis interfered in Virginia as well -- Lee just dealt with it better. Continual failure and recalcitrant commanders in the west who managed their relationship with Richmond poorly no doubt exacerbated the problems between them and Richmond. But this is a two-way street and to a certain extent the Johnstons and Bragg and the rest brought their own problems down on their heads.
On this thread, we are discussing two opposing formulas supposedly available to the Confederacy, in its fight for independence. In fact, there was no such choice.
Johnston, merely substituted his formula for that of Davis' (and his War Dept). because his formula better suited his personal characteristics and thus was more comfortable implementing it rather than the more aggressive mandate from his Commander-in-Chief.
It is true that neither Johnston nor Davis comes out of the Wester imbroglio with much credit, but Davis was the President And Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate Armies.
Although unlike McClellan, who was, in fact, disloyal to Lincoln And his administration, Johnston's disloyalty was borderline and directed only at Davis, but it was still reason enough to remove Johnston from Command of the AoT, whatever his military capacity might or might not have been.
Beauregard, hero of Manassas and Ft. Sumter, did little to show himself a great commander out there.
I disagree with that. He was not great, but he was probably the best general (after Forrest) who was in the west.
He with Bragg, in reality, created AoT at Corinth in 1862, after fall of F.Donelson and prepeared it for Shiloh battle. He along with Bragg were the most 'energetic' generals at those 'dark times' for the Confederacy in spring of 1862. While A.S.Johnston, who was their formal commander, was doing almost nothing.
Wow! This thread has got me wondering how the Confederacy managed four years.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Lee changes his perspective during the Seven Days Campaign
When Lee (and Davis) started (1861) they planned an offensive/defensive strategy because they did not want to simply maintain territory but achieve independence which included the union of all slave states (Maryland) and Southern border territories.
This did not really require troop concentration to the extent that Joe Johnston needed in the Western theater and had repeatedly asked for - he was ignored by the Confederacy Govt.
In 1862 during the Seven Day's Campaign Lee suddenly realizes that concentration of troops was the only way to win and so he used all his influence with Davis, to collect the largest army the Confederacy ever put into the field.
In 1862 during the Seven Day's Campaign Lee suddenly realizes that concentration of troops was the only way to win and so he used all his influence with Davis, to collect the largest army the Confederacy ever put into the field.
In spring 1862 when McClellan has landed in Fort Monroe it was J.Johnston who asked to concentrate ALL forces at Richmond (from Shenandoah Valley, troops under his command, Norfolk and North Carolina). But BOTH Lee and Davis were in favour in slowing McClellan at Yorktown and all the way to Richmond (rather then immedietly retreat to Richmond wha JJ wanted to do) to give time for concentration and not to leave large parts territories of VA and NC deensless to Federal troops so fast.
When Lee took command he has already most troops at hand and the only he has called were Jackson troops, but only after they have beaten Union forces in Shenanodah Valley.
I should have said in the month prior to the actual Seven Days Campaign(June 25th through July 2), Lee and Davis worked to build the biggest concentration of troops...Something Johnston had repeatedly asked for...
So, in about a month Lee and Davis gathered 112,220 in 215 regiments. IMHO this was also his Achilles heel as the troops he had gathered were largely untried and the leadership inexperienced.
They couldn't deliver the tactical edge he needed.
Shoot, he wasn't suspicious...he knew Davis wasn't about to chance REL's odds after giving Lee command.
I still think that if Davis had given Johnston the respect he gave Lee, things could have been different for the AoT. The bottom line is familiarity bred contempt in Johnston and Davis' relationship. Too bad.
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