Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
Johnston's strategy (whatever it was) did not obviously, conform to what his superiors deemed necessary to further the cause of southern independence. Johnston was marching to a different drummer than Lee and, more importantly, his Commander in Chief (and that was the fault of Johnston and his strategy)
The major stumbling block with Johnston and his superiors, in my opinion - might have simply been that with the rigidity of the Upper command structure, Johnston may have felt they wanted a hard concrete plan and just do it.
I believe Johnston KNEW that war was a fluid and rapidly changing enviornment and was reluctant to give precise answers as he knew that the situation may call for something else by the time the telegrams got to Richmond - literally.
In the earlier messages that he rec'd and sent he reveals his intentions, but not a specific plan. His intentions should have been enough - but they weren't.
An excellent observation, Jamie! I'll enthusiastically use that if I'm ever called on to defend JEJ. It also brings up a questionable mind set: Was he too dense to read the handwriting on the wall? Or was he too bull-headed to comply with what ought to have been obvious; that is, he simply would not feed the boss a crock and continue doing what he thought was best?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
The major stumbling block with Johnston and his superiors, in my opinion - might have simply been that with the rigidity of the Upper command structure, Johnston may have felt they wanted a hard concrete plan and just do it.
I believe Johnston KNEW that war was a fluid and rapidly changing enviornment and was reluctant to give precise answers as he knew that the situation may call for something else by the time the telegrams got to Richmond - literally.
In the earlier messages that he rec'd and sent he reveals his intentions, but not a specific plan. His intentions should have been enough - but they weren't.
The main thing Davis and the rest seem to have wanted out of Johnston was a declaration that he regarded Atlanta as vital and intended to fight for it. This was a clear-cut statement that Johnston avoided.
There is also the Johnston-Davis history playing into this. In 1861, the argument over seniority in the Confederate Army (where Davis looks bad and Johnston worse). In 1862, Johnston appears to have followed the same methods he used at Atlanta, not responding to inquiries about his intentions, leaving superiors in the dark, etc. In 1863, appointed to what should have been a tremendous opportunity (command of everything between the Mississippi and the mountains), Johnston considered his command impossible and seems to have felt Davis was setting him up for failure. That in turn leads to the 1864 assignment.
Davis, suspicious that Johnston was acting in front of Atlanta the way he had looked at Richmond in 1862, wanted a clear statement. Johnston, associated with Davis' opponents in politics and at odds with Davis personally, afraid of leaks above him, was not going to commit himself and find he'd been bushwacked politically.
All of that, of course, stinks. It stinks for Johnston. It stinks for Davis. Neither one comes off looking good here -- but Davis had a right to be kept informed, and Johnston was the one failing to fullfill his duty to his commander-in-chief.
Beyond that, Bragg comes off looking like a man on a vendetta against old AoT enemies. He did Johnston no favors, and actively caused problems.
Hood, of course, played his part. Whether he was actually intriguing against Johnston or not, his actions had that effect. And there was the unfortunately normal AoT intriguing going on, although perhaps less under Johnston than at other times.
It should be noted that the AoT was the AoP of the South. The only difference beting that the AoP was close enough to the Federal power base in Washington, that Lincoln and the War Dept. could keep a closer eye on its operations and could exercise more direct control on its operations than Davis was able to do with the AoT.
For those who might think that this was not necessarily an advantage for the Union, it should also be noted that even with it's very real dysfunctions, Lincoln was able to forge the AoP into the instrument of final victory of the Union. While the equally dysfunctional AoT led the Confederacy to ultimate defeat. Due in no small measure to the inability of Davis and his War Dept. to gain and exercise sufficient control of it's Western Armies to successfully contribute to the souths' win the war.
It should be noted that the AoT was the AoP of the South. The only difference beting that the AoP was close enough to the Federal power base in Washington, that Lincoln and the War Dept. could keep a closer eye on its operations and could exercise more direct control on its operations than Davis was able to do with the AoT.
For those who might think that this was not necessarily an advantage for the Union, it should also be noted that even with it's very real dysfunctions, Lincoln was able to forge the AoP into the instrument of final victory of the Union. While the equally dysfunctional AoT led the Confederacy to ultimate defeat. Due in no small measure to the inability of Davis and his War Dept. to gain and exercise sufficient control of it's Western Armies to successfully contribute to the souths' win the war.
It should be noted that the AoT was the AoP of the South. The only difference beting that the AoP was close enough to the Federal power base in Washington, that Lincoln and the War Dept. could keep a closer eye on its operations and could exercise more direct control on its operations than Davis was able to do with the AoT.
For those who might think that this was not necessarily an advantage for the Union, it should also be noted that even with it's very real dysfunctions, Lincoln was able to forge the AoP into the instrument of final victory of the Union. While the equally dysfunctional AoT led the Confederacy to ultimate defeat. Due in no small measure to the inability of Davis and his War Dept. to gain and exercise sufficient control of it's Western Armies to successfully contribute to the souths' win the war.
It should be noted that the AoT was the AoP of the South. The only difference beting that the AoP was close enough to the Federal power base in Washington, that Lincoln and the War Dept. could keep a closer eye on its operations and could exercise more direct control on its operations than Davis was able to do with the AoT.
For those who might think that this was not necessarily an advantage for the Union, it should also be noted that even with it's very real dysfunctions, Lincoln was able to forge the AoP into the instrument of final victory of the Union. While the equally dysfunctional AoT led the Confederacy to ultimate defeat. Due in no small measure to the inability of Davis and his War Dept. to gain and exercise sufficient control of it's Western Armies to successfully contribute to the souths' win the war.
Davis kept trying, though. We might thinks his ideas and choices were wrong, but he certainly made an effort.
Consider the people he did put in positions out West, in the land between the Mississippi and the mountains: A. S. Johnston, Beauregard, Hardee, Polk, Van Dorn, Bragg, E. Kirby Smith, Loring, Pemberton, J. E. Johnston, and finally Hood.
All were highly respected and/or successful men when appointed. All represented real attempts to strengthen the Western defenses. Davis may have been interfering and a micro-manager, but he did appoint a long series of supposedly capable men to deal with the problems.
Davis may have been interfering and a micro-manager, but he did appoint a long series of supposedly capable men to deal with the problems.
You are, of course, including the good bishop in that long series?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Formulas: Lee vs Johnston...... 
Linear Mode
