Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
If you can find a copy or have JSTOR access, look for Destroyer of the Iron Horse: General Joseph E. Johnston and Confederate Rail Transport, 1861-1865. by Jeffrey N. Lash in Journal of Southern History, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Nov., 1992), pp. 729-730. That might give you a start on what I mean.
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
I have no access to JSTOR nor do I need it to look at a two or less, page article defining a five year period of Confederate Railroad history. A much better source is Chapter 7 of Govan & Livingwoods book on Johnston outlining the Rebel problems. Davis’ bumbling and idiotic beliefs are rationally explained and Ewell ‘s testimony, incompletely reported by Davis, in his “Rise and Fall” is presented more fully. The testimony shows that though Johnston tried mightily to move the material, he was hampered by the civilian control of the Railroads and other difficulties. Richard Taylor said: “the movement (of the stores) was executed with the quiet precision characteristic of Johnston, unrivaled as a master of logistics.” In addition, E. P. Alexander, who thought the loss of stores was not too great stated, “ When all is considered the movement (of the stores) was eminently successful as it was judicious.”
I'm sorry. I pointed you to the review of the Lash book because I thought it would be easier for you. If the problem is you dislike a 2-page review, you can always read the entire 238 page book: Lash, Jeffrey N. DESTROYER OF THE IRON HORSE: GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON AND CONFEDERATE RAIL TRANSPORT, 1861-1865. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991. Lash's theories about Johnston might be accurate or not (this was also the subject of his PhD thesis, I think), but you should take a look before dismissing them.
There really aren't a lot of books on ACW railroad operations (at least not in comparison to other Civil War topics ). Whether you agree with it or not, this is one of the major ones to look at in study of the ACW RRs. It is one of the 5 books on ACW RRs that made it into David Eicher's The Civil War in Books: An Analytical Bibliography, an attempt to put the "most significant" books in a reading list for the Civil War, which contains 1100 titles in all with short reviews. The selection committee included Eicher; Gary W. Gallagher; James M. McPherson; Mark E. Neely, Jr.; Ralph G. Newman; and James I. Robertson, Jr.
The men of the AoT were displeased with Jefferson's assignation of Hood. They felt that Fightin Joe cared about them and would not sacrifice them unnecessarily - this from thier letters home and Thomas Connely's Autumn of Glory.
Sherman Saves Lincoln's Campaign is the name of a chapter by Charles Flood in Grant and Sherman. Flood tells us that during the defensive manuvers up until July 17 he never indicated in anyway (Johnston) about delaying for the Elections but did so after the war was over and that is where the November election idea came from. I think Joe was just trying to use military delay - his troops certainly knew that was what they were doing.
Grant said that Johnston was "a most careful, brave, wise soldier but that Hood would dash out and fight every time we raised aa flag before him..."
That would be why Sherman (and Grant) were pleased!
Larry Daniel's book Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee does an effective countering the long held claim(s) that soldiers were upset with Johnston's removal and Hood's promotion. Daniel points out, based on contemporary letters, that many soldiers were simply sick of the war by mid-1864 and the change of command was to them just more upheaval and change of direction. Daniel effectively points out that the general opinion of the soldiers writing home regarding Johnston was one of deterioration. A quote from a man in the 63rd Georgia stating "the men is all out of heart and Georgia will soon have to go under" says a great deal. Another said if Johnston could "be flanked out of every position from Dalton here I do not see why he cannot be flanked out of Atlanta." It is Daniel's conclusion that "those who claim Johnston's retreats did not adversely affect morale do so in the face of significant evidence to the contrary." Hood may have well taken over an army that was not in the best of spirits. Pro-Johnston folks can spin things any way possible I guess, but if I were a Confederate private who had retreated from Dalton to within 10 miles of Atlanta I would have been wondering just when the retreating was going to stop.
Hood definitely jockeyed for army command, but he was handed a difficult situation at best. Lee had saved Richmond with McClellan knocking at its doors, but Hood was no Lee and Sherman was DEFINITELY no McClellan.
What is the problem here? I gave you a reference to something I thought you might find useful, and you seemed put out that it was only a review 2 pages long, so I gave you a reference to the actual book.
I thought it might be interesting to see what the Union view on the situation at Atlanta immediately before Johnston was relieved were. Here is US Grant, writing to Halleck, from City Point, VA on July 15, 1864 -- only days before Johnston was relieved and Hood took the command:
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... To supply Sherman, all the rolling-stock that can possibly be got to him should be sent. An effort ought to be made to transfer a large portion of stores now at Nashville to Chattanooga. This might be facilitated by withdrawing for awhile the rolling-stock from the Nashville and Reynolds-burg Railroad, and a large part of the stock upon the Kentucky roads. There is every indication now, judging from the tone of the Southern press, that, unless Johnston is re-enforced, Atlanta will not be defended. They seem to calculate largely upon driving Sherman out by keeping his lines of communication cut. If he can supply himself once with ordnance and quartermaster's stores, and partially with subsistence, he will find no difficulty in staying until a permanent line can be opened with the south coast. The road from Chattanooga to Atlanta will be much more easily defended than that north of the Tennessee. With the supplies above indicated at Chattanooga, with, say, sixty days' provisions there, I think there will be no doubt but that the country will supply the balance. Sherman will, once in Atlanta, devote himself to collecting the resources of the country. He will take everything the people have, and will then issue from the stores so collected to rich and poor alike. As he will take all their stock, they will have no use for grain further than is necessary for bread. If the enemy do not detach from here against Sherman, they will, in case Atlanta falls, bring most of Johnston's army here with the expectation of driving us out, and then unite against Sherman. They will fail if they attempt this programme. My greatest fear is of their sending troops to Johnston first. Sherman ought to be notified of the possibility of a corps going from here, and should be prepared to take up a good defensive position in case one is sent--one which he could hole against such increase. ...
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
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Grant seems confident that Sherman can and will take Atlanta from Johnston unless Johnston is substantially reinforced. Grant also lays out in a few words a solid method for preventing Confederate raids in Tennessee from causing Sherman grave supply difficulties.
Now, all the "if only" scenarios about Johnston being left in command assume he would somehow hold Atlanta into November, and maybe counterattack to drive Sherman north in a rout. Grant clearly did not think that would be the case at this point, having confidence in Sherman.
IMHO, there is no particular reason to believe that Joe Johnston would have held the city beyond September. I believe he would have done better than Hood did (I think Hood was already straining at his limit as a Corps commander, and way over it as an Army commander), but I can find no reason to conclude that Johnston would have definitely held the city or beaten Sherman. My own assumption would be that with Johnston the city would probably fall but without the disastrous troop handling that left Hardee exposed to disaster. In particular, I doubt Johnston would have dispatched Wheeler on his useless cavalry raid just before Sherman struck in late August.
A quote from a man in the 63rd Georgia stating "the men is all out of heart and Georgia will soon have to go under" says a great deal. Another said if Johnston could "be flanked out of every position from Dalton here I do not see why he cannot be flanked out of Atlanta."
It was said by Celathiel Helms of the 63rd Georgia. He said even more: "the men are going to the Yankees by the tens and twenties and hundreds almost every night."
Other soldier: "Everything indicating" notes orderly William Trask in his diary for July 10, "the giving up of Atlanta".
Because of Johnston`s retreats there was beginning of some demoraliztion in the army. Many good soldiers were lost due to desertion and they could be used better in the battles.
Although it cannot be carried too far, it is possible to extrapolate from what happened in the war to gain some insight as to the viability of the two formulas.
As I have stated, IMO the two formulas were tried during the war and both failed, further the formulas were used by their best proponents, Lee and Johnston.
The History of the war seems to indicate, that the south was a little too small and a little too disorganized to push either formula through to a successful conclusion i.e., Southern Independence. This does not mean either or one could Not have succeeded under certain, specialized circumstances or chance, merely that objectively, the needed requisites of man power, materiale, transportation, cohesiveness of the civil population, etc, etc, were simply not present in sufficient quantities or quality that could lead one to conclude that the chances of the south establishing its independence were prohibitively high. This is of course, more clear, now than at the time. But this same view back does seem to indicate that success from either formula was just not really in the cards.
That being said, IMO Lee was correct, the war had to won swiftly, if the South was to win at all. Strategic retreat, precludes the idea of a quick war. So, IF, a quick war was the 'real' solution to winning the war, then Lee's formula was the more correct.
Just before he was relieved, Joe Johnston received an inquiry into his plans from President Jefferson Davis. Here is Davis' telegram and Johnston's reply:
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RICHMOND, July 16, 1864.
General J. E. JOHNSTON:
A telegram from Atlanta of yesterday announces that the enemy is extending intrenchments from river toward railroad to Augusta. I wish to hear from you as to present situation, and your plan of operations so specifically as will enable me to anticipate events.
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
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NEAR ATLANTA, July 16, 1864.
His Excellency the PRESIDENT,
Richmond:
Your dispatch of to-day received. The slight change in the enemy's dispositions made since my dispatch of the 14th to General Cooper was reported to General Bragg yesterday. It was a report from General Wheeler that Schofield's corps had advanced eastwardly about three miles from Isham's Ford and intrenched. As the enemy has double our number, we must be on the defensive. My plan of operations must, therefore, depend upon that of the enemy. It is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. We are trying to put Atlanta in condition to be held for a day or two by the Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider.
J. E. JOHNSTON.
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Now Johnston is basically saying "Well, I have no specific plan other than to do something based on what the enemy does, and hope an opportunity shows up."
Davis, based on Johnston's continual reticence and the complaints/reports he was receiving, was unsure of Johnston and had already sent Bragg to report back. Bragg had delivered a report that would frustrate and alarm any superior:
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ATLANTA, July 15, 1864.
His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,
Richmond:
I have made General Johnston two visits, and been received courteously and kindly. He has not sought my advice, and it was not volunteered. I cannot learn that he has any more plan for the future than he has had in the past. It is expected that he will await the enemy on a line some three miles from here, and the impression prevails that he is now more inclined to fight. The enemy is very cautious, and intrenches immediately on taking a new position. His force, like our own, is greatly reduced by the hard campaign. His infantry now very little over 60,000. The morale of our army is still reported good.
BRAXTON BRAGG.
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One obvious problem here is that Joe Johnston -- whatever his reasoning -- was doing a terrible job of communicating with his superior. His very actions make it likely he would be removed, no matter what his name was.
If Johnston actually had a plan beyond reacting to what Sherman might do, he never expressed it to Bragg or to Davis or anyone else out of Richmond. As a result, the most logical assumption to make is that Johnston had no detailed plan and was simply looking for a target of opportunity. His later statements about his plans either refer to something he kept very close to his vest, or they mean only intentions/general concepts (i.e., not the sort of detailed plan people seem to assume he meant).
The struggle for Atlanta had become a mega trauma for both the North and the South. I doubt that the lose of Atlanta had to be the mortal end it was portrayed to be at that time. Nashville had been siezed without stopping the Confedracy and so we do have to wonder why the Confed did not shift fighting back to the West or South.
I am a fan of Johnston but I don't know why he chose the siege of Atlanta over protecting the outlaying munition foundries and supply areas.
At this point it seems the Confederacy was low on strategy, undermanned, and just trying to "dig in" - as someone said just waiting for the right opportunity. Soemwhere in all of this (can't remember the source - maybe periodical Civil War Times?) Johnston did admit to Lee that he was tired and physically ill, and just a little angry at J. Davis.
But can't just blame that on Johnston or his strategies!
Has anyone read COnfederate Tide Risingby Joseph Harsh?
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). Whether you agree with it or not, this is one of the major ones to look at in study of the ACW RRs. It is one of the 5 books on ACW RRs that made it into David Eicher's The Civil War in Books: An Analytical Bibliography, an attempt to put the "most significant" books in a reading list for the Civil War, which contains 1100 titles in all with short reviews. The selection committee included Eicher; Gary W. Gallagher; James M. McPherson; Mark E. Neely, Jr.; Ralph G. Newman; and James I. Robertson, Jr.
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