Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
Grant was constantly moving around Lee's Right, it took a little time, after all he was facing Lee not Johnston.
The problems presented to Grant by Sherman's advance into Ga. were significantly outweighed by the advantages accrucing to Grant by keeping Western men and supplies from Lee (who desperately needed them) rather than Johnston keeping men and supplies from Grant (who did Not need them in the end).
Again, Lee was facing Grant not Sherman, what he might have tried against the latter, he could not do against the former, it took time and as Lee was well aware (but not, apparently, Johnston) time was the enemy of the South not its friend.
Look at a map, follow Grants track from his entering the war until its end. He moved from the Mississippi thru Tn. to Va. He captured two armies and soundly defeated the remaining Confederate army in the West, the war continued. In the East, Grant defeated only one army but it ended the war. The survival of the Confederacy depended on the survival of the AoNV and the survival of the AoNV had devolved on the help that the AoT could or could not bring to the aid of Lee and his army.
I have stated in other threads and boards that, IMO neither strategy (Lee's or Johnston's) were really viable, because both were beyond the means of the South in combatting. But, the correct strategy (whether viable or not) was Lee's.
In message #37 you had Grant moving around lee's left. In this message #39 you have him going around Lee's right.
****! That Grant was good. Whoever said he was a plodder?
Whenever Sherman flanked the defensive lines (almost exclusively around Johnston's left flank), Johnston would retreat to another prepared position.
Throughout the war, Joe Johnston had a long record of abandoning positions and having to destroy precious equipment and supplies that could not be removed. This is true in his retreats in Virginia from Manassas and the Peninsula. It is true in his retreats in Georgia. It is simply how his record reads.
If you can find a copy or have JSTOR access, look for Destroyer of the Iron Horse: General Joseph E. Johnston and Confederate Rail Transport, 1861-1865. by Jeffrey N. Lash in Journal of Southern History, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Nov., 1992), pp. 729-730. That might give you a start on what I mean.
He is clearly unprepared for the start of the 1864 campaign. If he were, he would not have been taken so unaware by the Snake Creek Gap move, would have had a better intel network among the people, would have had better maps of his rear areas, etc.
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Originally Posted by oneplez
Johnston was not aware of Garrard's force, but Kilpatrick and Sweeny's troops were a clear threat in themselves. Johnston decided to withdraw, and set up a meeting that night to give his corps commanders orders for the withdrawal. The Confederates pulled out of Resaca during the night, using a pavement of cornstalks to muffle the sounds of horses and wagons, while pickets kept up a racket with aimless rifle fire. The next morning, 16 May, the entrenchments around the town were empty. The rebels had taken everything with them, except for the four pieces captured the previous afternoon, much to the embarrassment of Hood.
And how did he get in this position in the first place? He has been sitting in north Georgia for several months with the opportunity to prepare for any Union move he foresaw. How did Snake Creek Gap happen?
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Originally Posted by oneplez
Couldn’t do the impossible! Dynamite was not invented until 1866 and black powder, then available wouldn’t do the job.
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Originally Posted by oneplez
Black powder, on the other hand, is a low explosive. If ignited, it burns, turning a mixture of three chemicals into hot gases at a very much faster rate than anything that can happen with smokeless powder. The rate of burning can be accelerated by containing the hot gases to increase the pressure, but when burned in the open, or in a normal metal can or cardboard canister, there is no explosion. There is just a "Whuff!!" As the black powder burns, with great rapidity, but without explosive force.
So you are telling me that with four months to prepare for demolition, there is no way Johnston could have destroyed the crucial tunnel on the RR?
Personally, I'd suggest you study what Morgan's cavalry raiders were able to do to the RR tunnel north of Nashville in the Summer of 1862, and why Rosecrans could not get it reopened until December of that year. If Morgan can do that while in the middle of a raid, why can't Johnston (himself a trained Engineer officer, and with other West Point officers available to him) make preparations to do something similar when he has months to make ready? For that matter, why can't Joe Wheeler (the man ordered to do the job by Johnston at the last minute) get done what Morgan could?
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Originally Posted by oneplez
No officer or soldier who ever served under me will question the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston. His retreats were timely, in good order, and he left nothing behind.-- Maj. Gen. Willam T. Sherman, 1864.
Yes, but Sherman is a man who often made statements that were bolder than needed, overblown, and not suited to his later actions. He and Grant both thought well of Joe Johnston -- but he and Grant both thought well of Union officers who do not seem to live up to the high opinion as well, such as McPherson and "Baldy" Smith. It is very clear that Johnston and Lee were the two best Army commanders the South had -- but not so clear that Johnston was the sort of soldier to dominate a battlefield and win great victories.
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Originally Posted by trice
Johnston was unflappable in a crisis, a strong point in his favor. He seems to have been no good at working ahead of time to prevent or minimize the crisis, which is a serious complaint about a professional soldier.
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Originally Posted by oneplez
The above seems to substantially mitigate those comments!
The idea is to be objective. Joe Johnston was a good commander. But at no point did he show himself as the man to fight and win a great offensive victory. He had good points and bad points, but he is not George Washington, Benedict Arnold, Winfield Scott, Lee, Grant, Sheridan, Pershing, MacArthur, Patton, etc. on the battlefield. IMHO, he was a talented man who assumed that when the crisis came up, he could handle it.
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Originally Posted by oneplez
While Thomas's army moved south along the Western & Atlantic, his soldiers had running skirmishes with troops of Hardee's corps in the rearguard of Johnston's army. However, the rebels did little to slow down the march, and by the morning of 19 May, all three of Sherman's columns were converging on Kingston, where Sherman thought Johnston intended to make a stand.
* Sherman was wrong.
Nothing unusual here. Sherman was often wrong about his appreciation of tactical situations. He overcame it because he was superior on other aspects of warfare and had an army that could overcome his mistakes.
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Originally Posted by oneplez
Johnston was too canny to sit idly and wait to be trapped by a superior army, and had shifted his other two corps under Polk and Hood to Cassville, five miles (eight kilometers) to the east in hopes of springing an ambush. Hardee's "rearguard" action was actually nothing of the sort. He was on his own and stringing the Yankees along towards Kingston, encouraging them to believe that they were really hot on the trail of the entire Confederate Army of the Tennessee.
Yes, and the entire thing fell apart because a relatively small force of Yankees wandered in on Hood's rear unannounced. Somebody goofed up with the flank guard. We can play the Hood/Johnston blame game, or we can simply say Johnston was in command and he should have made sure the right flank was covered sufficiently.
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Originally Posted by oneplez
Johnston had been looking for the opportunity for a counterthrust for the last several days, encouraged by news from the west that Forrest would begin his hoped-for raid into middle Tennessee within a few days. The landscape that Johnston had been marching through after his withdrawal from Resaca was open and not well suited to defense, but he correctly decided that Sherman would split up his forces.
If so, why is it that Johnston was taken by surprise, flanked out of that terrain above Resaca so easily, has to bug out of his prepared positions in a hurry, etc. If you want to evaluate his actions as a commender, you have to look at all of them, the good and the bad.
But in general, the further north, the fewer people, the fewer roads, the rougher the terrain, and the easier to defend.
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Originally Posted by oneplez
That General Johnston conducted his retreat in a masterly fashion is now generally admitted. He had made the most of the advantages to the defensive afforded by the rugged region across which he had been steadily driven, and had missed no good opportunity to strike a damaging blow.
While there was some hard fighting along the way, where exactly is it that you think Johnston struck a damaging blow?
OOOPS!!! My mistake Oneplez, but You Do Know which was the correct statement, without my prompting, don't you????
Johnston's formula had potential to prolong the war (winning the war, is a different matter), IF properly planned (civil and military) and executed And Northern Commanders did not learn from experience.
The history of the Civil War was that the offensive won battles, particulary campaigns, more often than not.
I am new to this group but have been reading these forums for a while. Ya'll (can you tell where I'm from?) are so knowledgable that I'm a little intimidated to share my opinion but here goes...
It's true that Johnston cut and run as a strategy but I've read that also saved Confederates to fight another day. Johnston may have done this several times but I did want to point out that Sherman's only attempt to win a straight forward battle with Johnston was on Kennesaw Mountain and he failed. Sherman in his own words "At all Points the enemy met us with determined courage and great force...by 11:30 the assault was over and had failed..." (Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman)
Johnston kept checking Shermans movements trying to delay Sherman from taking Atlanta until he was relieved by Hood on July17. According to Craig Symond, Johnston's motive was to allow the democrats to win the presidential election. Not too sure that was the whole story though. Maybe Johnston was just trying to delay the inevitable!
The school history books are nearly unanimous that Johnston's Atlanta Campaign Strategy, was to delay the taking of Atlanta, until after the Nov. elections in the North. Is that True?
There is only one real problem with your thread #10.
You are stating that the Johnston/Hood strategy held the line only 4 months as opposed to Lee holding his line 11 months.
The point is - what would have happened under the Johnston strategy standing alone?
Up to his dismissal from army command, Johnston had done a good job of keeping the Feds at bay while he slowly withdrew to the heavy entrenchments around Atlanta that mirrored the type of defences of the Richmond - Petersburg line.
Both of the lines had long term preparation and were considerable works. Owing to the fact that Johnston was replaced and Lee wasn't - we can't truely compare the end results.
Is ist possible that Johnston could have held Atlanta a considerable amount of time longer? Or is it Probable?
I tend to think that with Johnston's type of fluid battlefield thinking, that he may have been able to hold that place - even with the superior number of troops confronting him - a considerable amount of time longer. He was a master of defensive manuever - and I don't think he would have considered himself "holed up" in his defensive positions.
He would have utilized the vast and expansive defensive positions to march his men in much shorter directions to get to threatened portions of his lines, while the larger, but not large enough, opponent had circuitous route to gain favorable positions - wearing on the men physically and mentally - confronting a foe that reacted so quickly to their moves that once reaching the enviorns of Atlanta - it could play a telling effect on the morale of the attackers.
Whenever Sherman flanked the defensive lines (almost exclusively around Johnston's left flank), Johnston would retreat to another prepared position.
Throughout the war, Joe Johnston had a long record of abandoning positions and having to destroy precious equipment and supplies that could not be removed. This is true in his retreats in Virginia from Manassas and the Peninsula. It is true in his retreats in Georgia. It is simply how his record reads.
Not true! Not what I’ve read. What are these records? His track record in the west is 100% reversed from your statement. Sherman himself attests to that. In the east, you attach all the fault for the loss of stores etc. on Johnston when in fact most of it falls on Davis, the lack of control of the Rebel Railroads, and the irresponsibility of the Commissary General’s disregarding Johnston’s requests to limit storage of rations beyond 15 days in Manassas, then building a meat packing plant there in an exposed location. Several states contributed to the problem and gathered stocks and provisions for their troops in the Manassas area. The stores were so great and the railroad so disorganized and unavailable that only some could be moved.
If you can find a copy or have JSTOR access, look for Destroyer of the Iron Horse: General Joseph E. Johnston and Confederate Rail Transport, 1861-1865. by Jeffrey N. Lash in Journal of Southern History, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Nov., 1992), pp. 729-730. That might give you a start on what I mean.
I have no access to JSTOR nor do I need it to look at a two or less, page article defining a five year period of Confederate Railroad history. A much better source is Chapter 7 of Govan & Livingwoods book on Johnston outlining the Rebel problems. Davis’ bumbling and idiotic beliefs are rationally explained and Ewell ‘s testimony, incompletely reported by Davis, in his “Rise and Fall” is presented more fully. The testimony shows that though Johnston tried mightily to move the material, he was hampered by the civilian control of the Railroads and other difficulties. Richard Taylor said: “the movement (of the stores) was executed with the quiet precision characteristic of Johnston, unrivaled as a master of logistics.” In addition, E. P. Alexander, who thought the loss of stores was not too great stated, “ When all is considered the movement (of the stores) was eminently successful as it was judicious.”
He is clearly unprepared for the start of the 1864 campaign. If he were, he would not have been taken so unaware by the Snake Creek Gap move, would have had a better intel network among the people, would have had better maps of his rear areas, etc.
“Unprepared” is a bit strong. There were too many approaches to Johnston’s position for him to cover adequately. However, preparations were made by damming the river at Buzzard’s Roost Pass and creating a lake that made it impossible for the Yankee’s to ford. Troops were posted at other approaches to prevent the Yanks access. Geary’s Division ordered to force Dug Gap was unable to do so. Wheeler covered the Northern approaches. With the arrival of Polk’s cavalry Resaca was covered. So, as far as I’m aware the normal defenses were prepared. Except for Snake Creek Gap. No one has adequately described why Johnston did not cover it’s access. Mackall seems to blame Wheeler for sloppiness in scouting and covering that point. Recent research has uncovered a Confederate map that shows the Gap. The map may or may not have been available to Johnston. Of a certainty, while he claimed to know of the Gap, he did not cover it adequately. Why, seems to be an insoluble mystery. Being in command, he is responsible.
The rationale, that Johnston would have fought differently and/or more successfully from the defensive works at Atlanta than Lee did at Petersberg is difficult to follow. As noted before, while Sherman was no Grant, neither was Johnston a Lee.
If it was accepted by Lee and Davis that Grant could not be driven away from the siege of Petersberg without reinforcements and more materiale, could Johnston have, really, felt confident that, on his own, he could raise Sherman's seige of Atlanta?
He is clearly unprepared for the start of the 1864 campaign. If he were, he would not have been taken so unaware by the Snake Creek Gap move, would have had a better intel network among the people, would have had better maps of his rear areas, etc.
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Originally Posted by oneplez
“Unprepared” is a bit strong. There were too many approaches to Johnston’s position for him to cover adequately. However, preparations were made by damming the river at Buzzard’s Roost Pass and creating a lake that made it impossible for the Yankee’s to ford. Troops were posted at other approaches to prevent the Yanks access. Geary’s Division ordered to force Dug Gap was unable to do so. Wheeler covered the Northern approaches. With the arrival of Polk’s cavalry Resaca was covered. So, as far as I’m aware the normal defenses were prepared. Except for Snake Creek Gap. No one has adequately described why Johnston did not cover it’s access. Mackall seems to blame Wheeler for sloppiness in scouting and covering that point. Recent research has uncovered a Confederate map that shows the Gap. The map may or may not have been available to Johnston. Of a certainty, while he claimed to know of the Gap, he did not cover it adequately. Why, seems to be an insoluble mystery. Being in command, he is responsible.
The man had 4 months to prepare for eventualities. Almost undoubtedly, the biggest single risk he faced was a flanking move to his South, which would have cut the RR (his only LOC with Atlanta). Specifically, the loss of Resaca would be the greatest risk he faced in the position he was defending. If he loses it, either a), his entire army will be destroyed or b) he will be retreating East through the mountains. In either case, Atlanta is lost quickly and Sherman will march unopposed wherever he wishes.
Johnston was no dummy, and he would have known this. Anyone with the slightest knowledge of military operations would have understood it. The problem is that the Johnston at Rocky Face is aligned facing West when the campaign is going to move on a North-South axis. Flanking Johnston to the North causes him a minor problem. Flanking him to the South threatens to destroy him, and blocks all of his available reinforcements.
The danger to Johnston is so great that McPherson would have been fully justified in taking very heavy casualties to take Resaca and/or cutting that RR effectively (which means more than ripping up a couple of tracks and retreating-- he needed to fight here). The greatest criticism of McPherson is that he didn't do so when presented with a golden opportunity, either because he didn't recognize it, or because he was more nervous about what might happen to his command than determined to destroy the enemy.
As a result, it was Johnston's responsibility to determine what risks might lie undiscovered or overlooked to his west and south. He had four months to do this while preparing for the new campaign. Two or three good officers with a couple of small patrols could have determined this in an information vacumn by simply going to look. Even easier, a few decent intelligence spe******ts could have discovered the routes by talking to locals -- and I would guess there were a few Georgia troops in his army who could have told him about it.
I think what you need to accept is that this is Johnston's fault, whether or not his staff and subordinates did their job. Anyone looking at a map can point and ask the question: Is there a way for the Yankees to get through here? If your staff gives you blank looks or bland assurances or changes the subject or says they don't know, any commander worth a darn needs to start ordering people to find out for sure, right now! What all this finger-pointing and blame-game about subordinates means is Joe Johnston did not do his job. If he had done even a minimally acceptable job on this point, Johnston would have known all about Snake Creek Gap two or three months before McPherson marched through it.
This is the sort of thing Johnston was lax about. This is the sort of thing you need to integrate into your vision of the man to understand him. No military analyst could study the actions here without criticizing Johnston for it.
With the number of troops at Sherman's disposal it could not have been anything like a siege.
Sherman lacked the manpower to surround more than half of Atlanta in real force, which would have left his own troops in a precarious situation had they tried to envelop all of Atlanta, allowing for sorties to be launched against his (Sherman's) lightly defended works.
In turn, Johnton would have had a consolidation of his forces, allowing himself to strike when and where he chose without making much of a signature as to his intent.
The same problems confronted Grant.
Thats why Sherman was so pleased when he learned of Hood's assumption of command for the Army Of Tennessee.
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