Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
Joe Johnston was good at a lot of things, really bad at a couple.
One is being totally unprepared for things like retreats.
Whenever Sherman flanked the defensive lines (almost exclusively around Johnston's left flank), Johnston would retreat to another prepared position.
snipped
- In 1864, despite having months to prepare for the coming campaign, he is taken by surprise by a move that could have been expected. Then he once again has to destroy supplies and weapons to retreat
Johnston was not aware of Garrard's force, but Kilpatrick and Sweeny's troops were a clear threat in themselves. Johnston decided to withdraw, and set up a meeting that night to give his corps commanders orders for the withdrawal. The Confederates pulled out of Resaca during the night, using a pavement of cornstalks to muffle the sounds of horses and wagons, while pickets kept up a racket with aimless rifle fire. The next morning, 16 May, the entrenchments around the town were empty. The rebels had taken everything with them, except for the four pieces captured the previous afternoon, much to the embarrassment of Hood.
-- and fails to blow up/destroy the RR tunnel before he withdraws from Rocky Face.
Couldn’t do the impossible! Dynamite was not invented until 1866 and black powder, then available wouldn’t do the job.
Black powder, on the other hand, is a low explosive. If ignited, it burns, turning a mixture of three chemicals into hot gases at a very much faster rate than anything that can happen with smokeless powder. The rate of burning can be accelerated by containing the hot gases to increase the pressure, but when burned in the open, or in a normal metal can or cardboard canister, there is no explosion. There is just a "Whuff!!" As the black powder burns, with great rapidity, but without explosive force.
No officer or soldier who ever served under me will question the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston. His retreats were timely, in good order, and he left nothing behind.-- Maj. Gen. Willam T. Sherman, 1864.
Johnston was unflappable in a crisis, a strong point in his favor. He seems to have been no good at working ahead of time to prevent or minimize the crisis, which is a serious complaint about a professional soldier.
The above seems to substantially mitigate those comments!
While Thomas's army moved south along the Western & Atlantic, his soldiers had running skirmishes with troops of Hardee's corps in the rearguard of Johnston's army. However, the rebels did little to slow down the march, and by the morning of 19 May, all three of Sherman's columns were converging on Kingston, where Sherman thought Johnston intended to make a stand.
* Sherman was wrong. Johnston was too canny to sit idly and wait to be trapped by a superior army, and had shifted his other two corps under Polk and Hood to Cassville, five miles (eight kilometers) to the east in hopes of springing an ambush. Hardee's "rearguard" action was actually nothing of the sort. He was on his own and stringing the Yankees along towards Kingston, encouraging them to believe that they were really hot on the trail of the entire Confederate Army of the Tennessee.
Johnston also was defending in a narrow front, in good defensive terrain. A different soldier would have stopped Sherman well to the North, IMHO, or at least delayed him another month. Moving through those mountains in 2-3 months is an outstanding accomplishment for Sherman. Sherman could not range far from his single RR (3 days haulage by wagons) while he was in them, and his avenues of approach were very limited.
Johnston had been looking for the opportunity for a counterthrust for the last several days, encouraged by news from the west that Forrest would begin his hoped-for raid into middle Tennessee within a few days. The landscape that Johnston had been marching through after his withdrawal from Resaca was open and not well suited to defense, but he correctly decided that Sherman would split up his forces.
That General Johnston conducted his retreat in a masterly fashion is now generally admitted. He had made the most of the advantages to the defensive afforded by the rugged region across which he had been steadily driven, and had missed no good opportunity to strike a damaging blow.
Lee, OTOH, had to worry about maneuvers from the Chesapeake to the Shenandoah. Lee was probably at a greater disadvantage in numbers, and he actually held Richmond-Petersburg for 11 months. Johnston and Hood lost Atlanta in 4 months.
Regards,
Tim
Using your definition you could have claimed Lee held Richmond-Petersburg during the entire war.
Nor can you claim Johnston lost Atlanta. Hood managed that all by himself. Johnston still held Atlanta on July 17, 1864. Hood lost it on September 3, 1864.
Excellent debate, gentlemen. Am enjoying it thoroughly. Thanks.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Grant sat on his rear end in front of Richmond and Petersburg for nine months until Lee left in April. The war in the West was ended in the middle of December.
Grant's activity had little to do with it. Had not the subsistance from the west been cut-off Lee would still be holding Richmond.
Nor can you claim Johnston lost Atlanta. Hood managed that all by himself. Johnston still held Atlanta on July 17, 1864. Hood lost it on September 3, 1864.
Hood managed to hold that city forty-six days, whereas, Johnston has managed to abandoned in sixty-six days one hundred miles of territory, which was far better to defend then area around Atlanta.
Grant was not 'sitting' in front of Petersberg, the AoP was constantly probing Lee's left flank, seeking a way around Lee's lines. The last direct RR link to Richmond from the South was being menaced, Lee himself admitted that without reinforcements and supplies, the Petersberg Lines and Richmond were bound to fall.
Without assistance from the South (thru Sherman) or the West (thru Thomas) the AoNV, Richmond and the Confederacy was doomed.
The failure of commanders in the West, sealed the fate of Lee and the Confederacy. But at least Bragg and Hood tried to remedy the situation by defeating the main army of the North and freeing up the main army of the Confederate West for further duty in assisting the Main Confederate Army in the East. Where the war was going to be lost, if such assistance was not rapidly produced.
Johnston's strategy guaranteed that no significant help would be forthcoming from the West any time soon, as far as the needs of the AoNV was concerned.
The fact that Bragg, Hood failed is not proof that their strategy was faulty, merely that the job was beyond their resources (tactical, materiale and/or personal).
All the above is, of course, based on 21st Century knowledge, but even at the time, Bragg, Hood and Davis feared that the war was going to be lost without the war in the West being revitalized and strategic retreats was not The answer to the growing and increasingly desperate needs of the Confederacy, neither in the West nor in the East.
Grant was not 'sitting' in front of Petersberg, the AoP was constantly probing Lee's left flank, seeking a way around Lee's lines. The last direct RR link to Richmond from the South was being menaced, Lee himself admitted that without reinforcements and supplies, the Petersberg Lines and Richmond were bound to fall.
It took nine months to threaten?
Without assistance from the South (thru Sherman) or the West (thru Thomas) the AoNV, Richmond and the Confederacy was doomed.
While Sherman’s holiday down in the sunny south contributed nothing to Grant’s predicament, Thomas had in fact, in December, eliminated one of the two functioning Rebel armies. It took Grant until April, when Lee decided it was time to leave, to get off his rear end and do something.
The failure of commanders in the West, sealed the fate of Lee and the Confederacy. But at least Bragg and Hood tried to remedy the situation by defeating the main army of the North and freeing up the main army of the Confederate West for further duty in assisting the Main Confederate Army in the East. Where the war was going to be lost, if such assistance was not rapidly produced.
Grant was constantly moving around Lee's Right, it took a little time, after all he was facing Lee not Johnston.
The problems presented to Grant by Sherman's advance into Ga. were significantly outweighed by the advantages accrucing to Grant by keeping Western men and supplies from Lee (who desperately needed them) rather than Johnston keeping men and supplies from Grant (who did Not need them in the end).
Again, Lee was facing Grant not Sherman, what he might have tried against the latter, he could not do against the former, it took time and as Lee was well aware (but not, apparently, Johnston) time was the enemy of the South not its friend.
Look at a map, follow Grants track from his entering the war until its end. He moved from the Mississippi thru Tn. to Va. He captured two armies and soundly defeated the remaining Confederate army in the West, the war continued. In the East, Grant defeated only one army but it ended the war. The survival of the Confederacy depended on the survival of the AoNV and the survival of the AoNV had devolved on the help that the AoT could or could not bring to the aid of Lee and his army.
I have stated in other threads and boards that, IMO neither strategy (Lee's or Johnston's) were really viable, because both were beyond the means of the South in combatting. But, the correct strategy (whether viable or not) was Lee's.
Using your definition you could have claimed Lee held Richmond-Petersburg during the entire war.
Yes, and it would be true for the period from when Lee took over in June of 1862 until Lee abandoned the defenses in April of 1865. Do you have some difficulty in agreeing with that?
As to holding it against Grant, that started in early May of 1864 and continued to early April of 1865. That is 11 months. Do you have some difficulty agreeing with that?
If you view the 1864 Confederate objective as holding the key cities while bleeding the Union armies white and encouraging the peace movement in the North in order to ensure Lincoln's defeat, then Lee did a better job by far than Johnston/Hood did.
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
Nor can you claim Johnston lost Atlanta. Hood managed that all by himself. Johnston still held Atlanta on July 17, 1864. Hood lost it on September 3, 1864.
While I think Hood and the AoT didn't do as well as they might have done in July, I also see no clear reason to expect them to blitz through Sherman/Thomas/Schofield/McPherson and their men as if they were not going to fight back. Atlanta is already in great danger on July 17, and Johnston was the man who let that situation develop so swiftly.
Johnston was relieved on July 17 because he had given up so much ground so rapidly, the city was in grave danger, and he either could not or would not enunciate clearly what he was going to do about it. If he could not, that was a very severe personal shortcoming. If he would not, that is also his responsibility.
Johnston did a very nice job, very proper. Sherman did noting exceptional in a tactical sense to hurry him on his way, although his operational and overall strategical choices were very good. What you are looking at in north Georgia is two good professionals working at their jobs, much like watching two boxers trying to win rounds on points in the early rounds of a championship fight. Neither is going for a knockout blow -- which is why you don't have any major do-or-die battles. They'd take a shot if one presented itself, but neither was going out on a limb if they could help it.
Now if Johnston had been still in charge after July 17, I believe you would see a fight, much like you saw one on the Peninsula at Seven Pines in 1862. But Johnston's effort there does not fill me with confidence that his attack outside Atlanta would be overwhelmingly successful, while you seem to be assuming Johnston would have won a great victory. Why?
I also assume that Johnston would not have thrown his men away in futile attacks, so there may not have been two attacks after Peachtree Creek and perhaps none. Other than that, the scenario probably plays out in similar fashion, with Sherman still needing to make a major move towards September 1 after building up his base and the Confederate with a few thousand more defenders. Quite possibly, Atlanta still falls at the same time.
But in any case, Johnston/Hood still lost the city of Atlanta in four months. Lee still held Richmond/Petersburg 11 months. That is merely fact.
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Johnston 
Linear Mode
