Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
You can gain much deeper and more valuable insight by reading the reports of the time. I recommend "Journal of B. L. Ridley, Lieut. Gen. A. P. Stewart's Staff" by B. L. Ridley. He includes nearly all of the reports of the top commanders during the Atlanta Campaign.
Thankes. I have added this position to my list of - books I must buy in next shopping .
Quote:
At the commencement of the campaign Johnston states he had about 43,000 and faced - according to Sherman - 99,000 Federal troops.
And he was almost immediatly reinforced by Army of the Mississippi about 18,000 (14,000 infantry). Of course numbers can be somewhat different, depending from source. I have taken J.B.H. and the Struggle for Atlanta from the shelf this time.
Quote:
There is no question that Johnston's corps commanders were competent - but could not excell as did the commanders in the east due to Bragg's old school of thought. Put the same eastern commanders under Bragg and they would likely have been hesitant to act on their own accord as well.
Good point. But Confederates were believing that holding Atlanta will help to elect McClellan in november elections. So they have to do everything what was possible, they have to be better then any time before. They were weaker in number, they had command problems, but they had to stop Sherman at all cost. What other choice did they have. No other choice. Fight or retreat and lost. Johnston was retreating, so he had to be replaced.
Quote:
Johnston's report, dated Oct. 20th, 1864 in fact states that he wanted to attack the enemy as they crossed the creek
Like You have said. Johnston`s report. So if we believe in Johnston`s reports we can also believe in Hood`s reports:
"As Hood reported, Johnston (..)'without a word of explanation or apology, left that evening for Macon, Georgia.'" - J.B.Hood and the Struggle for Confederacy.
Who is telling the truth is impossible to say, but it makes no difference from a historical standpoint. Johnston wanted to attack while they were crossing the river, Hood when after they had crossed it. Huge difference. Johnston was aiming to beat several brigades, Hood to beat whole or most of Thomas army.
Also date is from October 20th. Long after campaign, long after facts.
In his memories Johnston was claiming that he would held Atlanta "forever" and was blaming Hood for Caseville & other stuff. He was doing everything he could to defend himself and to put Hood in worst light. He was best in writing in fact only, he has done nothing from may to july to prove otherwise.
Quote:
Thats one of Hood's biggest failures - his lack of supervision. If he felt he had been let down after the first battle, why not be more of a participant in the second, third or fourth engagement to ensure success?!!
At the commencement of the campaign Johnston states he had about 43,000 and faced - according to Sherman - 99,000 Federal troops. Anumber that Sherman contends maintained itself throughout the campaign owing to new units, returning sick and wounded and furloghed troops.
Lee at the Wilderness faced 115,000 Fed troops against his 60,000 Confederate troops. The troop disparity was 56,000 for Johnston and 55,000 for Lee. But those numbers are skewed as well, for Johnston's force made up only about 40% of the force confronting him, while Lee's force made up about 55% of the force confronting himself.
These numbers are about right, but they don't take into account all the pre-planned reinforcements Johnston received immediately after the campaign started. These were even more than planned, because Polk stripped his department and arrived with some 14,000 men. Johnston's force was rapidly built up to approximately 75,000 troops.
Lee, OTOH, had no truly available reinforcements at the start of the campaign.
When Breckenridge smashed Sigel at New Market, he was then able to move over the Blue Ridge to assist the ANV with 5000 men. (Breckenridge eventually saved the ANV's bacon at Cold Harbor as a result.)
Meanwhile, Grant had Butler's Army of the James pushing against Petersburg-Richmond. Once the Confederates sealed them up at Bermuda Hundred, some small reinforcements became available as well. But I've never seen any evidence that Lee's ANV was built up to 75,000 men at any point in 1864.
Perhaps Lee was first by about 25 days to use heavily fortified positions to repulse an assualt, but thats only because Grant got impatient before Sherman did at Kennesaw Mountain.
Both Lee and Johnston had utilized fortified defensive positions as early as 1861-62. Lee had earned the nickname "King of Spades" before he ever took over the ANV, and he fought from entrenchments (Longstreet's) at Fredricksburg. Lee also set up behind them during the retreat from Gettysburg and at Mine Run in 1863.
[quote]Thats one of Hood's biggest failures - his lack of supervision. If he felt he had been let down after the first battle, why not be more of a participant in the second, third or fourth engagement to ensure success?!![quote]
After sleep, I have something to add. Let us say tha Hood would go to Jonesboro with Hardee and S.D.Lee (that would not change too much). What would have happened if Sherman was in real bluffing and had attack Atlanta then. Everybody would accuse Hood of being out where the army commander should be. Same at Atlatna on 22nd. He had to be in Atlanta to order Cheatham to make support attack, to see how situation is developing.
From his actions and writings During the war, a rational argument can be made that Johnston was fighting a different war, than that of Lee.
It is entirely possible that Johnston had concluded that the Western Theater was a side show to the real fulcrum of the war in Va. where the survival of the Confederacy would be decided and it was his duty to conserve Southern manpower for the future of the South whether the Confederacy survived or not. That his main job was to attract and hold as many Northern troops from reinforcing the main theater of war in the East. That meant that he would Never attempt a full blooded offensive against Sherman.
Lee was fighting for the future of the Confederacy, Johnston was maneuvering for the future of the South.
It is entirely possible that Johnston had concluded that the Western Theater was a side show to the real fulcrum of the war in Va. where the survival of the Confederacy would be decided
But in reality the Western Theater was as much as important as the Eastern theater. In 1864 it was even more important.
But in reality the Western Theater was as much as important as the Eastern theater. In 1864 it was even more important.
We can say that today; in '64 it was not so apparent. War is as much a part of citizen perception and support as it is about military accomplishments; hence, the symbolic value of an objective is often as important, if not more so, as the military value of another.
Atlanta was both symbolically and militarily valuable. Petersburg/Richmond was its equal. Troops from either side at either location had to be held in place lest some slip away to make an overwhelming force at the other. Atlanta's fall ('64 elections aside) severely wounded Confederate confidence and placed out of Lee's reach a significant supply line. Richmond's fall would put Lee out of his fortifications and supply lines, and the government effectively out of touch with its armies -- not mentioning the blow to CSA morale.
Was Atlanta as important as Richmond? I tend to think so. Was it more important? One can make that argument. We often agree that the war was won in the West. I'd add that it was won in the West over the three years of fighting -- not just Atlanta.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Sometimes perception is more important than reality. War is fluid, what was true in 1861 thru 1863 may not have been true in 1864 or 1865. The fact that the center of the war move to Va. or not, isn't as important as what Johnston Percieved to be 'The' Reality of the War.
It can be argued that the war was won in the West by the North, but was that argument equally true for the South? Did Johnston, believe that? Historians and history buffs have argued that Johnston really wanted to be back in command in Va. where the real war was to be fought.
Looking at the History Books, Grant won the war by defeating Lee in Va, with no significant reinforcement from the West (other than the psychological effect of knowing Sherman was approaching). Before the South could reinforce Lee from the West, Sherman and later Thomas had to be defeated and/or rendered ineffective, so as to allow effective reinforcement of Lee, IF Davis so chose.
Davis was one of those who clung to the notion that the war could be won, or at least, Lost in the West, whether Johnston believed that, is the question to be answered.
Historians and history buffs have argued that Johnston really wanted to be back in command in Va. where the real war was to be fought.
Looking at the History Books, Grant won the war by defeating Lee in Va, with no significant reinforcement from the West (other than the psychological effect of knowing Sherman was approaching).
You have got to be kidding.
The war was won solely in the west.
Donelson, Nashville, Franklin, Missionary Ridge, Murfreesboro, etc., etc.
If you put that to a board vote, I think most would agree. The same vote in '65 might very well yield a different result. Logic aside, emotion has it that the war isn't over until the opposition's government is toppled and its leaders captured (and, at one time, its population slaughtered or dispersed). For a current example, consider the fixation on Osama -- "the War on Terror will be won when he is captured."
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
.
.
Linear Mode
