Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
1. Why didn't Hood order up Lee's Corps and the artillery sooner? Did Lee's absence affect the eventual outcome?
2. Was a flanking move by Forrest (instead of a frontal attack) likely to succeed or even possible?
3. Did an angry John Bell Hood "punish" Cheatham, Cleburne, and their men for their supposed failings when attacking breastworks?
4. If he didn't punish his men, why DID Hood attack?
5. Why did Wagner decide to stay in an advanced position despite overwhelming odds?
6. Why did the Carter family remain in their house on the front lines?
7. Who broke first, Conrad or Lane?
8. Cockrell's Brigade or Sears': Who attacked first in French's Division?
9. Featherston's Brigade took massive casualties in a railroad cut from enfilading artillery fire. Was there any way to avoid this?
10. How do both authors describe the death of Cleburne? 11. Opdycke suggested after the war that he beat CONFEDERATE soldiers over the head with a pistol, rather than just his own Union stragglers. Was he telling the truth?
12. David Stanley received a painful wound across the back of his neck during the fight. First, did Jacob Cox suggest that Stanley leave the field to get his wound dressed? Second, did Stanley really leave the field? Third, did Stanley deserve a Medal of Honor for his role in the Battle of Franklin?
13. John Adams and his brigade were being slaughtered as they attempted to cross the Osage orange barrier. Adams suddenly spurred his horse to the left, finding an opening in the trees. As he galloped toward the Union line both he and his horse were shot. Where did Adams and his horse fall? Within or without the Union lines?
14. Patrick Dowling, inspector general of Moore's Brigade, gathered together available units including the 101st Ohio to save the 111th Ohio's left flank. How crucial was this move to the final outcome of the battle?
1. The most of the artillery had been left at Columbia and traveled with Lee's advance from Columbia. The arrival of at least 24 guns was made and noted by Cheatham by about 6 p.m. that evening - an hour after dark. Lee's absence likely made no difference in the outcome of the battle. The deployment of the remaining two divisions to the west - northwest may have made a difference, but it is unlikely that they could be got into position prior to nightfall.
2. The likelihood of a successful flanking manuever by Forrest - even reinforced by a brigade of infantry would have been virtually impossible. Not only would a disputed crossing have to be made, but after crossing - a forced march of no less than 6 miles under the guns of Ft. Granger and disputed by ALL of Wilson's cavalry as well as Wood's Division of infantry. All of this would have to be accomplished between 2 pm and 5 pm (EENT). Is it possible that he could have crossed and occupied a position on the north banks throughout the night - yes - but little if nothing would be accomplished.
3. Hood was not punishing Cheatham, nor Cleburne or their men for anything. Since Cheatham's corps was following in rear of Stewart, it was tactically sound to march the leading corps toward the river and the rear corps to the center. Deployment would be completed in a much more timely manner. As it was, the attack did not commence until 4 pm, it is likely that had Cheatham, marching in the rear, been deployed to the right instead of Stewart, that the assault may not have commenced until nearly 5 pm.
4. Hood had three options at Franklin. 1 - Bivouac his men on the slopes of Winstead Hill and allow the Feds to march on to Nashville. Not practicable to Hood, as he knew this was his last chance to prevent the Federals from retreating orderly to the confines of that mega-fortress. 2 - Conduct a flanking manuever in order to cut the enemy's retreat once again as he did the day before, but that had failed miserably - oweing to his subordinates' incompetence, at least in his eyes. With only two and a half hours of daylight he certainly thought it impractical as a similar attempt had just failed with much more detailed planning. 3 - Conduct the frontal assault. This late phase of the war still saw successful frontal assaults, and Hood had experienced success with it before. In fact, as bloody as it was, his assault very nearly succeeded, and did - only temporarily. This was his last opportunity to crush the Feds and it is easy to see how he could rationalize this decision.
5. According to several accounts, orders had been issued, that the brigade commanders were to withdraw the brigades on their own initiative in the event of an emminent attack. The staff officers who delivered the orders were unaware themselves why the order was never accomplished, unless the sudden and rapid approach of the Confederates less than 500 yards in their front was so quick as to render an organized withdrawal impossible and in that instance - they probably should have conducted a disorderly retreat with the intent of just keeping distance and seperation between the opposing lines. Others have insisted that Wagner was all out drunk and that he issued orders for the brigades maintain their posts at all hazards which resulted in their rout and the Confederate breakthrough.
6. The Carter's were informed that the defensive lines were so strong that it was unlikely that an assault would be made and more likely just some skirmishing. They were also informed that if they stayed at the house, security would be posted to protect their valuables, thus with the implication of a mere skirmish, they sought refuge in the cellar - being informed that the Feds would commence their withdrawal around 6 pm under cover of darkness.
7. First, it doesn't really matter. Members of both brigades would insist that the other broke first. In the end, probably more accounts state that Bradley's brigade, commanded by Col. Lane, broke first. Again, it is a moot point, as all the regiments of both brigades suffered the same fate and KNOWING for certain who broke first doesn't help us to understand why any tactical aspect of the battle resulted in the way it did.
8. All the evidence supports that Cockrell's brigade struck the works prior to Sears'. Sears' men halted momentarily at the outer line to realign.
9. It becomes clear after walking the field that Featherston's men were subjected to a horrific enfilading fire, walking the terrain allows one to see that only refusing to make the attack and finding a defilade position was the only was to escape that hell. They were raked by not only Ft. Granger, but two sections of guns firing from the Murfreesboro pike, down the track - only yards in front of friendly infantry positions.
10. He is last seen by Govan disappearing into the smoke and din of battle on foot. It is interpreted that he received an abdominal wound that caused massive blood loss leading to a very rapid death.
11. Probably not.
12. It is likely Cox suggested that Stanley leave the field, but he did not, and he deserved his medal more for his actions at Spring Hill than Franklin.
13. Adams was pinned under his horse whose body lay on the breastwork itself of the main line.
14. Dowling and others are responsible for the collections of many units including the 183rd Ohio, 101st Ohio and 112th Illinois to help plug the gap west of the road and support the 111th Ohio, but it was the 111th whose failure to rout, allowed these later reserves to hold the line, for the mian line was never restored for about two hundred yards west of the pike.
1. The most of the artillery had been left at Columbia and traveled with Lee's advance from Columbia. The arrival of at least 24 guns was made and noted by Cheatham by about 6 p.m. that evening - an hour after dark. Lee's absence likely made no difference in the outcome of the battle. The deployment of the remaining two divisions to the west - northwest may have made a difference, but it is unlikely that they could be got into position prior to nightfall.
2. The likelihood of a successful flanking manuever by Forrest - even reinforced by a brigade of infantry would have been virtually impossible. Not only would a disputed crossing have to be made, but after crossing - a forced march of no less than 6 miles under the guns of Ft. Granger and disputed by ALL of Wilson's cavalry as well as Wood's Division of infantry. All of this would have to be accomplished between 2 pm and 5 pm (EENT). Is it possible that he could have crossed and occupied a position on the north banks throughout the night - yes - but little if nothing would be accomplished.
3. Hood was not punishing Cheatham, nor Cleburne or their men for anything. Since Cheatham's corps was following in rear of Stewart, it was tactically sound to march the leading corps toward the river and the rear corps to the center. Deployment would be completed in a much more timely manner. As it was, the attack did not commence until 4 pm, it is likely that had Cheatham, marching in the rear, been deployed to the right instead of Stewart, that the assault may not have commenced until nearly 5 pm.
4. Hood had three options at Franklin. 1 - Bivouac his men on the slopes of Winstead Hill and allow the Feds to march on to Nashville. Not practicable to Hood, as he knew this was his last chance to prevent the Federals from retreating orderly to the confines of that mega-fortress. 2 - Conduct a flanking manuever in order to cut the enemy's retreat once again as he did the day before, but that had failed miserably - oweing to his subordinates' incompetence, at least in his eyes. With only two and a half hours of daylight he certainly thought it impractical as a similar attempt had just failed with much more detailed planning. 3 - Conduct the frontal assault. This late phase of the war still saw successful frontal assaults, and Hood had experienced success with it before. In fact, as bloody as it was, his assault very nearly succeeded, and did - only temporarily. This was his last opportunity to crush the Feds and it is easy to see how he could rationalize this decision.
5. According to several accounts, orders had been issued, that the brigade commanders were to withdraw the brigades on their own initiative in the event of an emminent attack. The staff officers who delivered the orders were unaware themselves why the order was never accomplished, unless the sudden and rapid approach of the Confederates less than 500 yards in their front was so quick as to render an organized withdrawal impossible and in that instance - they probably should have conducted a disorderly retreat with the intent of just keeping distance and seperation between the opposing lines. Others have insisted that Wagner was all out drunk and that he issued orders for the brigades maintain their posts at all hazards which resulted in their rout and the Confederate breakthrough.
6. The Carter's were informed that the defensive lines were so strong that it was unlikely that an assault would be made and more likely just some skirmishing. They were also informed that if they stayed at the house, security would be posted to protect their valuables, thus with the implication of a mere skirmish, they sought refuge in the cellar - being informed that the Feds would commence their withdrawal around 6 pm under cover of darkness.
7. First, it doesn't really matter. Members of both brigades would insist that the other broke first. In the end, probably more accounts state that Bradley's brigade, commanded by Col. Lane, broke first. Again, it is a moot point, as all the regiments of both brigades suffered the same fate and KNOWING for certain who broke first doesn't help us to understand why any tactical aspect of the battle resulted in the way it did.
8. All the evidence supports that Cockrell's brigade struck the works prior to Sears'. Sears' men halted momentarily at the outer line to realign.
9. It becomes clear after walking the field that Featherston's men were subjected to a horrific enfilading fire, walking the terrain allows one to see that only refusing to make the attack and finding a defilade position was the only was to escape that hell. They were raked by not only Ft. Granger, but two sections of guns firing from the Murfreesboro pike, down the track - only yards in front of friendly infantry positions.
10. He is last seen by Govan disappearing into the smoke and din of battle on foot. It is interpreted that he received an abdominal wound that caused massive blood loss leading to a very rapid death.
11. Probably not.
12. It is likely Cox suggested that Stanley leave the field, but he did not, and he deserved his medal more for his actions at Spring Hill than Franklin.
13. Adams was pinned under his horse whose body lay on the breastwork itself of the main line.
14. Dowling and others are responsible for the collections of many units including the 183rd Ohio, 101st Ohio and 112th Illinois to help plug the gap west of the road and support the 111th Ohio, but it was the 111th whose failure to rout, allowed these later reserves to hold the line, for the mian line was never restored for about two hundred yards west of the pike.
Brett, Gunny just gave you everything you could want on the subject... IMHO the man is one of the premier men on the subject.
In reference to #2 Forrest was as capable as they got and an outright wizard... but as has been mentioned Wilson & his Cav w/ all those Spencers was on the other side of the river and more than capable of giving him a serious bloody nose. Could he have done a succesful flank attack? If he could have crossed unannounced and had the element of suprise w/ him maybe. But he was not likely to accomplish that in a timeily manner... I'm not certain he could have. IIRC there was also some questions about his horses as many were quite spent for the day. He was looking at most of a days march to try for a flanking manuever... much of it would likely have been contested.
#11... it was my understanding that he did indeed break (literally) a pistol over the head of a CS soldier. He was certainly in the middle of one hell of a fight.
__________________ Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
SUVCW Camp Abernethy# 48
Lifetime NRA member
3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
Ironically the man across the Harpeth River from Forrest was Edward Hatch of Maine. This was the same General officer whose cavalry had chased and/or searched for Forrest and Wheeler in north Alabama, reportedly for eight days and nights without success just a few weeks prior. It was Hatch whose men had skirmished with Forrest's men on the march north from Florence. It was to be Edward Hatch whose cavalry broke the left Confederate flank at Nashville and pushed the Army of Tennessee toward retreat. On or about Dec 18 Hatch was on the north bank of the Duck River communicating with Forrest and complying with Forrest's request to cease shelling of Columbia, TN. This same graying officer pushed on to the battle at Sugar Creek before returning to Nashville at Christmas. Forrest and Hatch, adversaries for the better part of a year were not finished with each other. It was Hatch who requested Forrest's surrender in Alabama and accepted same in the spring of 1865. Two armies, same road.
Although some might believe that it was the lore and legend created by southerners in an attempt to glorify the death of General John Adams, two Federal officers wrote their own personal version of Adams' death. Colonel Casement and a Captain in the 65th Indiana wrote letters concerning the General's death.
The Captain was within yards of where Adams' horse literally leapt atop the works and both men stated that it's forelegs were atop the works with it's hindquarters in the ditch itself.
The Captain stated that this particular assault was hardly repulsed before his men leapt over the works to pull Adams' pinned body from beneath the works over to the interior of their line.
The Captain then procured cotton from the nearby ginhouse to rest the General's head. Probably the only romanticized portion of the Captain's statement is that when his men expressed their sorrow for such a gallant officer to be killed in such a way, according to the Captain he replied, "Tis a soldiers duty to die for his country." The letter had been addressed to Mrs. Adams years after the war.
Colonel Casement was brought to his body before he expired, but the critical condition of affairs to his right, at the Columbia pike, required his presence. When he returned the general had already died.
Casement, I believe, further commented that on their return to Franklin two weeks later, the General's horse was still sprawled across the works. This is certainly believeable, as the Carter Family was ot able to move seventeen dead artillery horses from their yard until Christmas Day - twenty-five days after the fight.
Casement's men had also stripped the saddle from the General's horse, a war relic that he kept in his attic until learning of Mrs. Adams' attempt to have it returned - which in turn Casement did.
This saddle is today a the Tennessee State Archives and has several bullet holes through the right skirt of the saddle - further evidence that the general was riding east to west at an angle when he attempted to mount the works.
The Capt. said that he was hit in nine places - the first of which had been a shoulder wound early in the fight. The general had refused to go to the rear saying he would "see my men through."
For Decades Forgotten/Because they were tremendous defeats?
Malvern Hill, Pickett's Charge(heroism advertised over the sheer slaughterhouse) and Franklin.
Each battle had significant destructions of the Confederate army; a good portion from artillery. Little attention is made of the destruction of artillery on troops, that came at each of these battles.
D.H. Hill said of Malvern Hill, that it wasn't war, it was murder. Such staggering loses also came from artillery at Gettysburg and Franklin.
Perhaps historians were afraid of concluding that the Confederate generals could make serious errors in tactics.
The Cheatham quote is a great find, but it only confirms what many have accepted as truth. The Franklin debacle still stirs wonderment.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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Questions & Controversies at the Battle of Franklin 
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