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Why did the breakout attempt at Fort Donelson fail?
I'm unclear why the breakout attempt on Saturday, Feb. 15 failed. According to Wallace, "The country was once more open to Floyd. Why did he not avail himself of the dearly bought opportunity, and march his army out?"
You're not alone with being unclear. I have yet to read a good explanation of why everyibe was marched back into the fort.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Is this not the same incident where Forrest simply left the fort with anyone who chose to follow? If I recall correctly (and you guys know the odds of that happening) Forrest reported there was faulty field reconnaisance which the commanders followed rather than Forrest's advice. That sounds familiar.
It is indeed the same Larry. The Confederates actually broke through, then lost heart and withdrew. About the time they lost heart, Grant ordered a counterattack.
From memory (scary), Forrest wrote that he had a couple of days or so to make his decision to withdraw. Must have been a general (no pun) lack of command sharpness on the Confederate front.
I'm unclear why the breakout attempt on Saturday, Feb. 15 failed. According to Wallace, "The country was once more open to Floyd. Why did he not avail himself of the dearly bought opportunity, and march his army out?"
Why indeed?
In general, confusion, uncertainty, and a strong Union counterattack turned the day.
Grant's right had been thrown back, his center pulled into the fighting his left untouched. The Confederates had cleared the way for a pullout, but had weakened their right (opposite Grant's left) to get this accomplished.
This is the situation when Grant arrives at the front, back from his conference on the gunboat. The Rebel leadership faltered here, a lull was developing. The lack of decisive command on the Southern side shines through: if the plan was to evacuate then wagons, animals, and men should have started through the gap immediately after it was secured while the combat force fought to protect the evacuation of the wounded and rear-area types. But instead we have this:
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FEBRUARY 12-16, 1862.--Siege and Capture of Fort Donelson, Tennessee.
No. 48. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd, C. S. Army.
The Kentucky troops, under Brigadier-General Buckner, advanced from their position behind the intrenchments upon the Wynn's Ferry road, but not until the enemy had been driven in a great measure from the position he occupied in the morning.
I had ordered on the night before that the two regiments stationed in Fort Donelson should occupy the trenches vacated by Brigadier-General Buckner's forces, which, together with the men whom he detached to assist in this purpose, I thought sufficient to hold them. My intention was to hold with Brigadier-General Buckner's command the Wynn's Ferry road, and thus to prevent the enemy during the night from occupying the position on our left which he occupied in the morning. I gave him orders upon the field to that effect.
Leaving him in position, then, I started for the right of our command, to see that all was secure there, my intention being, if things could be held in the condition that they then were, to move the whole army, if possible, to the open country lying southward beyond the Randolph Forge. During my absence, and from some misapprehension, I presume, of the previous order given, Brigadier-General Pillow ordered Brigadier-General Buckner to leave his position on the Wynn's Ferry road and to resume his place in his trenches on the right. This movement was nearly executed before I was aware of it.. As the enemy were pressing upon the trenches, I deemed that the execution of this last order was all that was left to be done. The enemy, in fact, succeeded in occupying an angle of the trenches on the extreme right of Brigadier-General Buckner's command; and, as the fresh forces of the enemy had begun already to move towards our left to occupy the position they held in the morning, and as we had no force adequate to oppose their progress, we had to submit to the mortification of seeing the ground which we had won by such a severe conflict in the morning reoccupied by the enemy before midnight.
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Grant, by contrast, arrived on the field in the middle of the action and immediately decided the day would go to the one who next took decisive action. He ordered his line forward; the Confederates -- fighting -- moved back into their entrenchments.
I'm unclear why the breakout attempt on Saturday, Feb. 15 failed. According to Wallace, "The country was once more open to Floyd. Why did he not avail himself of the dearly bought opportunity, and march his army out?"
Why indeed?
Grant's account of the action, from his Personal Memoirs:
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When I left the National line to visit Flag-officer Foote I had no idea that there would be any engagement on land unless I brought it on myself. The conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than they had been for the first two days of the investment. From the 12th to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. Now we had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of troops under General L. Wallace and 2,500 men brought over from Fort Henry belonging to the division of C. F. Smith. The enemy, however, had taken the initiative. Just as I landed I met Captain Hillyer of my staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety of the National troops. He said the enemy had come out of his lines in full force and attacked and scattered McClernand’s division, which was in full retreat. The roads, as I have said, were unfit for making fast time, but I got to my command as soon as possible. The attack had been made on the National right. I was some four or five miles north of our left. The line was about three miles long. In reaching the point where the disaster had occurred I had to pass the divisions of Smith and Wallace. I saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by Smith; Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in it. He had, at an opportune time, sent Thayer’s brigade to the support of McClernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his lines.
I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre. When I came to the right appearances were different. The enemy had come out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. McClernand’s division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. His men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their cartridge-boxes gave out. There was abundance of ammunition near by lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement. When the men found themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who seemed to have plenty of it. The division broke and a portion fled, but most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range of the fire of the enemy. It must have been about this time that Thayer pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that were without ammunition. At all events the enemy fell back within his intrenchments and was there when I got on the field.
I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. No officer seemed to be giving any directions. The soldiers had their muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with rations. They seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out. I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: “Some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me.” I determined to make the assault at once on our left. It was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis. I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed: “Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so.” This acted like a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command. We rode rapidly to Smith’s quarters, when I explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy’s works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with. The general was off in an incredibly short time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they were working their way through the abatis intervening between them and the enemy. The outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of the 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the lines of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that the Confederates must surrender or be captured the next day.
There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in Dover during the night of the 15th. General Floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did not possess the elements of one. He was further unfitted for command, for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him afraid. As Secretary of War he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the Constitution of the United States and to uphold the same against all its enemies. He had betrayed that trust. As Secretary of War he was reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when secession occurred. About a year before leaving the Cabinet he had removed arms from northern to southern arsenals. He continued in the Cabinet of President Buchanan until about the 1st of January, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy made out of United States territory. Well may he have been afraid to fall into the hands of National troops. He would no doubt have been tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he been captured. General Pillow, next in command, was conceited, and prided himself much on his services in the Mexican war. He telegraphed to General Johnston, at Nashville, after our men were within the rebel rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the Southern troops had had great success all day. Johnston forwarded the dispatch to Richmond. While the authorities at the capital were reading it Floyd and Pillow were fugitives.
A council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would be impossible to hold out longer. General Buckner, who was third in rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the department, A. S. Johnston, should get back to his headquarters at Nashville. Buckner’s report shows, however, that he considered Donelson lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the sacrifice of the command. Being assured that Johnston was already in Nashville, Buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing. Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it. It then devolved upon Buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position. Floyd and Pillow took possession of all the river transports at Dover and before morning both were on their way to Nashville, with the brigade formerly commanded by Floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000. Some marched up the east bank of the Cumberland; others went on the steamers. During the night Forrest also, with his cavalry and some other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing between our right and the river. They had to ford or swim over the back-water in the little creek just south of Dover.
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Regards,
Tim
During my absence, and from some misapprehension, I presume, of the previous order given, Brigadier-General Pillow ordered Brigadier-General Buckner to leave his position on the Wynn's Ferry road and to resume his place in his trenches on the right. This movement was nearly executed before I was aware of it.
I didn't do it! Nobody saw me do it! You can't prove a thing!
Quote:
There was abundance of ammunition near by lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement.
He was really, really close to naming McClernand there, wasn't he.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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Why did the breakout attempt at Fort Donelson fail? 
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