Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
I didn't do it! Nobody saw me do it! You can't prove a thing!He was really, really close to naming McClernand there, wasn't he.
Ole
The record of both Floyd and Pillow during the war is rather bad, and their record on this particular night (as they managed to find reasons they should leave and someone else should be stuck surrendering) is particularly unappetizing.
At this point, Floyd had charges brought against him by a grand jury in Washington under the Buchanan adminsitration, well before Ft. Sumter and the start of the war, but they had not been prosecuted. He appears to have believed that, if he surrendered, he would be tried for treason and hung. I am not sure what Pillow's excuse for his behavior was, but in the conference that night he said he agreed with Floyd that "there were no two persons in the Confederacy whom the Yankees would prefer to capture than himself and General Floyd."
I didn't do it! Nobody saw me do it! You can't prove a thing!He was really, really close to naming McClernand there, wasn't he.
Ole
Well, yes, but Grant had actually had a cordial enough relationship with McClernand in 1861. His problems with McClernand came in late 1862 (when he and Halleck conspired to hijack McClernands troops after McClernand's politicking with Lincoln) and at Vicksburg in 1863.
I do think there is a little of the professional soldier criticizing the amateur here. Men like Grant who had fought through Mexico would have taken care of many of these issues routinely. The newly elevated amateur soldiers didn't necessarily have the background to think of this type of solution automatically, or the discipline to manage the chaos of battle. Probably much the same problem for the Confederates.
Well, yes, but Grant had actually had a cordial enough relationship with McClernand in 1861. His problems with McClernand came in late 1862 (when he and Halleck conspired to hijack McClernands troops after McClernand's politicking with Lincoln) and at Vicksburg in 1863.
I do think there is a little of the professional soldier criticizing the amateur here. Men like Grant who had fought through Mexico would have taken care of many of these issues routinely. The newly elevated amateur soldiers didn't necessarily have the background to think of this type of solution automatically, or the discipline to manage the chaos of battle. Probably much the same problem for the Confederates.
Regards,
Tim
It was much more of a problem for the Confederates. Not only were there a lot of new young officers, some with military training, but many like Forrest who had been "elected" Colonel only because they could raise or finance a regiment.
It was much more of a problem for the Confederates. Not only were there a lot of new young officers, some with military training, but many like Forrest who had been "elected" Colonel only because they could raise or finance a regiment.
I haven't looked at in any detail, but I think you'd probably find western Union troops about the same as western Confederate troops at that point. McClernand was a politician, for example.
Generally, about 30% of the serving US Army officers "went South" at the start of the war. Grant had a subordinate he greatly respected in C. F. Smith and a few others, but Buckner and Bushrod Johnson were West Pointers as well. Pillow had been wounded twice as a Brigadier in the Mexican War, and Floyd had been US Secretary of War (no military service, but still should have understood more than he did.) Both sides lacked trained officers, and lots of newbies were reading Hardee's Tactics and learning as they went.
One of the reasons given for the excellence of the ANV when compared to the AoT in the Confederacy, though, is the large number of trained officers in the ANV, whether from West Point, VMI, or elsewhere. I don't think the AoT had as good a trained base to work with when compared to Johnston/Lee's ANV in 1862. I think also the emphasis on Virginia as the decisive (i.e., glamorous) theater probably led to many experienced officers being assigned there (or lobbying to go there).
The Confederates probably did have fewer trained officers. I just don't think it was a large difference at this point.
The Confederates probably did have fewer trained officers. I just don't think it was a large difference at this point.
At Donelson, the CSA could have had all the West Points there were for the last 10 years and it wouldn't have made a difference so long as Floyd and Pillow were in command.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
This has been an interesting discussion for me, since one of my ancestors was at Ft. Donelson. He was a Virginian so he was one of them who got out.
I always laugh when I see the noble Mort Kunstler painting of Forrest beating a retreat from Ft. Donelson, and I hum a few bars of "Brave Sir Robin!" Brave Sir Nathan ran away, bravely bravely ran away!
At Donelson, the CSA could have had all the West Points there were for the last 10 years and it wouldn't have made a difference so long as Floyd and Pillow were in command.
In many ways, Ft. Donelson demonstrates what is meant by the old aphorism attributed to Naopleon: "In war, men are nothing, a man is everything."
The Union gunboats had taken a drubbing the previous day. The Confederate attack had thrown back the Union right and opened the way for either a further assault or an evacuation of the post. When Grant arrives on the scene, he immediately grasps that the victory is hanging in the balance, that whoever strikes now will likely win, and determines he will be the one striking. Pillow/Floyd/et al never seemed firmly in charge and sure of their purpose here, and were easily discouraged. Had they acted decisively, they might have largely been successful in evacuating the post -- or struck the Federals harder and driven them from the field.
Drop Grant on the Rebel side and Pillow/Floyd on the Union: you probably have a Confederate victory here, maybe a rollback of the entire operation. Keep Grant where he is and you have a Union triumph that shatters the entire defensive line for the South.
If you believe in the key man theory of history, where a single individual changes everything, Henry & Donelson are a great example. What the South needed that day was another commander: Benedict Arnold, Winfield Scott, Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, Grant, Sheridan, Longstreet, or one or another of a long series of American soldiers of brilliance. Instead they had Pillow and Floyd and the unlucky Buckner.
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