Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
If you are unfamiliar with it, it would seem a waste of time to ask if anyone has any information. However, I'll wager in our legion of lurkers, there would be at least one with some detail on the skirmish. Perhaps you'll draw one of them out to help.
Larry: Does crow go better with mustard or bbq sauce?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Larry, I think your question is: Does the marker on state road 11 mark the actual spot of the action or is the actual site some miles west of the marker. If that is what it is, you will be better served by contacting one of the local historians. The Giles county historical society has been a major help to me in a lot of the questions that I had.
Good Luck
__________________ Located near Indianapolis, home of Col. Eli Lilly and the Eli Lilly Civil War Museum
Gentlemen, thanks very much for your input. I had not seen Chalmers' report. As all of you know, one has to sort of take these things and do some averaging and considering of the source. Mr. Brent Lokey claims that the battle occurred quite a distance upstream from the current highway bridge and apparently some of the local folks agree with him. Looking at topozone.com (USGS) mapping of the area where highway 11 today crosses the creek, the road that Brent described is shown leaving the highway and curving back to the creek to the northwest. Creek configuration on the mapping suggests that might well have been an area likely to have a sandbar. The thing that is missing, of course, from current mapping is the alignment of what road if any might have been there in 1864. That valley along the south side of the rather large stream is a very calm, beautiful place. Good site for a slaughter. Forrest knew how to set up a good fight. My gg grandfather was likely firing that morning from the dense fog, so I had a dog in the fight. Walking along the creek last fall, I could feel a presence. Maybe the General was saying hello. Could have been my earlier lunch or my trusty collie Duke who helps with my research.
Well when Hood's army was destroyed at Franklin and Nashville, for all intents and purposes, as an army, I guess one might tend to look at a short two hour rear-guard action by the Confederates, as some sort of great success.
Rear guard actions can be a success for a short period, as the defense is ready and the lead unit of the following army usually stumbles into the defensive position.
But no small holding action can cover and hide the utter destruction that occurred to Hood's army.
At the time, Gen. Thomas estimated that Hood had lost 6,000 in killed, wounded and captured at Franklin. At Nashville, Thomas estimated the Confederate losses at some 4,500, together with the loss of 53 pieces of artillery and 3000 stands of muskets.
On the retreat from Nashville, Confederates lost 15 cannon and up to 2,000 captured.
What remained of Hood's army passed through Pulaski, a completely disorganized army, except for the rear guard of some 5,000.
The action at Sugar Creek was a successful delaying action by NB Forrest. But it hardly accounted for what had passed in Tennessee, the destruction of the Army of the Tennessee as a serious fighting army.
About the same time, MG James H. Wilson, USA sent General Hood a dispatch informing him that Sherman had just captured Savannah.
Hood's campaign in Tennessee had been totally in vain.
Well when Hood's army was destroyed at Franklin and Nashville, for all intents and purposes, as an army, I guess one might tend to look at a short two hour rear-guard action by the Confederates, as some sort of great success.
Who was claiming it to be a "great" success?
Quote:
Originally Posted by whit
But no small holding action can cover and hide the utter destruction that occurred to Hood's army.
Who was trying to hide anything?
Quote:
Originally Posted by whit
At the time, Gen. Thomas estimated that Hood had lost 6,000...at Franklin. At Nashville, Thomas estimated the Confederate losses...4,500...loss of 53 pieces of artillery...3000 stands of muskets....15 cannon...2,000 captured...completely disorganized army...the destruction of the Army of the Tennessee...etc...etc...
What's the point of re-hashing the campaign...the details of which most (if not all) the folks on this board already know?
(The discussion is about the skirmish at Sugar Creek.)
Quote:
Originally Posted by whit
About the same time, MG James H. Wilson, USA sent General Hood a dispatch informing him that Sherman had just captured Savannah.
Irritatibilities aside for a moment, please allow me to attempt to make a point. Many of us, believe it or not had ancestors in both armies, north and south. I had one in both armies, same guy. Once the us against them syndrome wears off, we are left with an interest in the civil war as an event, one that is forever tied to the land on which it was fought. I know our focus on the landscape and battlesite particulars might sometimes be a bit boring, but it's a way to get in touch with the past and help us understand the present. Most of Whitworth's comments, though sometimes a bit slanted in attitude, are essentially correct. The land, however, is lying there in a continued state of neutrality, have been walked on by all who came that way.
Well I can understand someone getting into a small action in Tennessee because of some ancestor who was there. What first intrigued me was calling it a battle, one I never heard of, and one which was called an action, a two hour rear guard fight. . Of course it was somewhat similar to a Picketts Mill, a little larger fight, in Georgia, in overall effect. The Confederate army lost Atlanta; the Confederate army was destroyed in Tennessee.
Frankly my sympathies are with the common Confederate soldier, who got led into Tennessee in the first place. There should never have been a Sugar Creek; never should have been a Franklin or Nashville.
If I would title this campaign it would be
- The Winter War of the Confederates - The Campaign of a Maniac.
There is no military logic for the Confederate government to approve a winter campaign so far away from the Confederate supply lines. The Confederacy had real trouble conducting summer campaigns, even by R. E. Lee, to think Hood's winter campaign into Tennessee had much chance of success.
Not only was the operation folly, the campaign opened up Georgia to attack, with virtually no defense. The huge loss in Tennessee, meant that the interior of Alabama was easily open to attack in the Spring of 1865.
Yes the Confederate private was brave. The problem was Hood killed them by the "casket load" in Tennessee, in a war that was already strategically lost. Too many Confederate generals were prepared to fight on until the death of the last Confederate soldier.
Whitworth:
My compliments, sir. Very well said. Sugar Creek was a moment of brightness in an otherwise dark situation. Authorizing and encouraging such a campaign -- and actually trying it -- was a desperate act of a drowning idea. From our comfortable chairs we can see it for what it was: Vince Lombardi's second effort -- the calling of the last bit of remaining energy to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Could they have done otherwise?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Frankly my sympathies are with the common Confederate soldier, who got led into Tennessee in the first place. There should never have been a Sugar Creek; never should have been a Franklin or Nashville.
If I would title this campaign it would be
- The Winter War of the Confederates - The Campaign of a Maniac.
There is no military logic for the Confederate government to approve a winter campaign so far away from the Confederate supply lines. The Confederacy had real trouble conducting summer campaigns, even by R. E. Lee, to think Hood's winter campaign into Tennessee had much chance of success.
Depends on how it was handled...
If the Confeds could have crossed the Harpeth River instead of making the attack at Franklin then....
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