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The myth of the unordered charge up the Missionary Ridge was given impetus by Dana's messianic claim that it was a miracle.
I have done some research and come to the conclusion that the battle was won due to the fact that Thomas was a stickler for training. From November 8th until November 25th Grant issued several variations of his battle plan. In all but the last (orders Thomas to charge the Ridge and take the fortifications at the foot), Thomas’ was to connect with Sherman’s right as he pursued the Rebels south on the Ridge and join the chase.
Of course we know that never happened. However, orders had to be given to the troops from the beginning, as to their duties during the battle. Whether that was repeated after each new Grant iteration is not known, yet. What is known is that Granger left a record of attendance of at least two meetings where the Army of The Cumberland. assignments were given and explained. As you may know if you have had any military training, orders come from the top down. From Grant the CinC to Thomas, to the Corps commander, Granger to the Divisional commanders down to the platoon and squad leaders. What units will be in the "Line of Battle" who will precede them as "skirmishers." Their position and order in the line of battle, their rate of march, whether to attach bayonets and load their weapons, their final goal, etc. In an important battle such as this, nothing should be left to chance, all must know their duty. I’m sure Thomas, known as an exacting task master made sure these instructions were given and understood.
The "final goal" in all of Grants plans except the last, was to "take the Ridge." So, the troops from November 8th until November 25th had to be cognizant of this final goal. Now, all the various Grant orders of battle were written as was normally the case, except the last, which as you remember was a verbal order to Thomas. This was passed on to Granger who passed it on the divisional commanders verbally, by aides. Some made it, (Baird as I recall had two variations, one to take the Ridge and the other to take the rifle pits), Sheridan who got verbal orders but asked for a clarification he never got. Wood (3rd Division, 4th Corps, Granger) apparently received orders from Grant to take the rifle pits at the foot of the Ridge (no orders to advance further were given) and Johnston (Brigadier General Richard W. Johnston 1st Division, 14th Corps, (Palmer) apparently never received orders, and gives no indication that his goal was anything other than the top of Missionary Ridge. There seem to be as many variations of the final plan as there were commanders.
What the commanders and troops had drilled into them, until that day, was that at some point they were to charge to the top of Missionary Ridge, join with Sherman and sweep the Rebels off the top. Given the order that’s what they did. There was no ‘miracle,’ they just obeyed orders.
According to Gen William B. Hazen in his biography, he stated that their was some question about the order. However, he stated that most of the men resented the order that put the in a subserviant role of getting themselves out of their current problem. Some thought that Grant did not have any confidence in them, so they kept right on charging after the lower rifle pits were cleared. Others he said saw the rebels retreating up the ridge and just followed them on up while they had the chance. He seemed to think that many commanders had lost control of their men and just went along with the flow.
The myth of the unordered charge up the Missionary Ridge was given impetus by Dana's messianic claim that it was a miracle.
I have done some research and come to the conclusion that the battle was won due to the fact that Thomas was a stickler for training. From November 8th until November 25th Grant issued several variations of his battle plan. In all but the last (orders Thomas to charge the Ridge and take the fortifications at the foot), Thomas’ was to connect with Sherman’s right as he pursued the Rebels south on the Ridge and join the chase....
Don
Just FYI in case you're not familiar with the ground...
Missionary Ridge runs north/south. Federals were facing east. Sherman was on the Federal left, stranded. He'd climbed the wrong hill that morning and was cut off from the ridge. To sweep the Ridge from the Federal left, the first obstacle (besides getting off the hilltop and to the Ridge) for Sherman, and later Thomas would have been Cleburne's entrenched division on the Confederate right. Wouldn't have happened. There was no way to get to him except from the rear. In fact, Cleburne still held his ground after Federal troops had crested the Ridge.
Bragg knew his right was secure. He was worried about his left and the threat from Hooker, et al from Lookout. Plus, Breckenridge, on the Confederate left, was on the "physically unable to perform" list that morning and Bragg had had to pull Bate from his brigade to take Breckenridge's division and left Bate's Brigade (just below the ridgeline in the center/right) in command of a Colonel. And during the morning Bragg further repositioned troops from the center toward the left leaving the center much thinned. (Oddly enough, although the Confederate left was expected to be the big problem and did get rolled back a bit, it too still held the ground after battle.)
It is my opinion that the battle pretty much evolved as told over the last hundred and forty-two years. Thomas hit the center, the center broke and rolled back up the ridge clearing a path for the advancing Feds, gun emplacements on the ridgeline were too far back to be able to cover the advance up the face of the ridge.
Maybe not a miracle... maybe just an unexpected opportunity. Maybe the planning and training better prepared Thomas and his men to take advantage of the opportunity presented at the center. But by all accounts, the info is fairly clear that nobody expected what happened or had planned for it to occur in the fashion that it did.
Bragg knew his right was secure. He was worried about his left and the threat from Hooker, et al from Lookout. Plus, Breckenridge, on the Confederate left, was on the "physically unable to perform" list that morning and Bragg had had to pull Bate from his brigade to take Breckenridge's division and left Bate's Brigade (just below the ridgeline in the center/right) in command of a Colonel. And during the morning Bragg further repositioned troops from the center toward the left leaving the center much thinned. (Oddly enough, although the Confederate left was expected to be the big problem and did get rolled back a bit, it too still held the ground after battle.)
I differ with your statement in parentheses. Hooker ran them off the ridge and his three divisions captured most of them. What he didn’t get, Johnston of the XIV corps did.
I’ve been over Missionary Ridge twice in the past few years and will probably visit again. The last time I visited I took pictures of all the plaques posted along the ridge. The one I was most interested in was the plaque designating the location of Hookers furthest advance. It was placed about fifty yards west and south of the obelisk designating Bragg’s HQ. It was substantially further north than shown on Grant’s maps. From Hookers report:
"The enemy had selected for his advance line of defense the breastworks thrown up by our army on its return from Chickamauga, but such was the impetuosity of our advance that his front line was routed before an opportunity was afforded him to prepare for a determined resistance. Many of the fugitives, to escape, ran down the east slope to the lines of Osterhaus, a few to the west, and were picked up by Geary. The bulk of them, however, sought refuge behind the second line, and they, in their turn, were soon routed, and the fight became almost a running one. Whenever the accidents of the ground enabled the rebels to make an advantageous stand, Geary and Osterhaus, always in the right place, would pour a withering fire into their flanks, and again the race was renewed. This continued until near sunset, when those of the enemy who had not been killed or captured gave way, and in attempting to escape along the ridge, ran into the arms of Johnson's division, of the Fourteenth Corps, and were captured.
Our enemy, the prisoners stated, was Stewart's division. But few escaped. Osterhaus alone captured 2,000 of them"
It is my opinion that the battle pretty much evolved as told over the last hundred and forty-two years. Thomas hit the center, the center broke and rolled back up the ridge clearing a path for the advancing Feds, gun emplacements on the ridgeline were too far back to be able to cover the advance up the face of the ridge.
Maybe not a miracle... maybe just an unexpected opportunity. Maybe the planning and training better prepared Thomas and his men to take advantage of the opportunity presented at the center. But by all accounts, the info is fairly clear that nobody expected what happened or had planned for it to occur in the fashion that it did.
I don’t disagree with your last two paragraphs. My point is that to award the results to the almighty rather than to the well trained and prepared troops was wrong.
Bragg knew his right was secure. He was worried about his left and the threat from Hooker, et al from Lookout. Plus, Breckenridge, on the Confederate left, was on the "physically unable to perform" list that morning and Bragg had had to pull Bate from his brigade to take Breckenridge's division and left Bate's Brigade (just below the ridgeline in the center/right) in command of a Colonel. And during the morning Bragg further repositioned troops from the center toward the left leaving the center much thinned. (Oddly enough, although the Confederate left was expected to be the big problem and did get rolled back a bit, it too still held the ground after battle.)
I differ with your statement in parentheses. Hooker ran them off the ridge and his three divisions captured most of them. What he didn’t get, Johnston of the XIV corps did.
I’ve been over Missionary Ridge twice in the past few years and will probably visit again. The last time I visited I took pictures of all the plaques posted along the ridge. The one I was most interested in was the plaque designating the location of Hookers furthest advance. It was placed about fifty yards west and south of the obelisk designating Bragg’s HQ......
Don
From Braxton Bragg's report in the OR regarding Bate on the left - see bold:
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"About this time I learned that our extreme left had also given way, and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the rear, where, by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been formed upon which to rally. Lieutenant-General Hardee, leaving Major-General Cleburne in command on the extreme right, moved toward the left when he heard the heavy firing in that direction. He reached the right of Anderson's division just in time to find it had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its left, where the enemy had first crowned the ridge. By a prompt and judicious movement he threw a portion of Cheatham's division directly across the ridge facing the enemy, who was now moving a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided stand here the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion of our force to the right remained intact.
All to the left, however, except that portion of Bate's division, was entirely routed and in rapid flight, nearly all the artillery having been shamefully abandoned by its infantry support. Every effort which could be made by myself and staff and by many other mounted officers availed but little. A panic which I had never before witnessed seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character. In this distressing and alarming state of affairs, General Bate was ordered to hold his position, covering the road for the retreat of Breckinridge's command, and orders were immediately sent to Generals Hardee and Breckinridge to retire their forces upon the depot at Chickamauga."
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From Bate's report... note he only comments on forces on his right and from his rear which would be those Federals who breached the center. He'd been pressed on the left during the day but had not broken.:
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"...My infantry was again advanced to the verge of the ridge and opened a spirited fire, which was constantly replied to. During this charge my attention was called to some scattered troops a few hundred yards to my right, making their way, apparently without resistance, to the top of the hill. Believing them to be Confederates falling back from the trenches, I forbade my right firing upon them, and sent a staff officer to ascertain who they were. Upon receiving the answer, I directed upon them a right-oblique fire of infantry and artillery from the right of Tyler’s command. It drove him to his left, but did not check his ascent of the ridge. In a few moments I saw a flag waving at the point in the line of General Anderson’s division, beyond the depression in the ridge, where a section of artillery of Dent’s battery had been firing and was then located. I thought it a Confederate flag, but on a nearer approach and more minute inspection I soon detected the United States colors. The line in my front had recoiled a second time, but was rallied and was advancing up the hill in such numbers as to forbid the displacing of any of my command. I was ordered by General Bragg to withdraw a portion of my command and dislodge him if possible; but upon suggesting that I was without reserves, and the danger of withdrawing when so hard pressed on the front, which would necessarily cause a gap in my line, he directed me to take such as could be best spared. I at once took the command under Major Weaver, which had come from the ditches and were aligned across the Crutchfield road, it being disengaged, and moved it at a double-quick some 500 or 600 yards to the elevation on the right and rear of where the enemy had formed near his flag. I was unable notwithstanding the assistance of Major Weaver, to get this command ****her, and could only form it on the hill at right angles to my line, protecting that flank, and seek to dislodge him by a well-directed fire or hold him in check until the repulsed brigade in Anderson’s line could be rallied and retake their lost ground. Having made this disposition and opened fire, I left Lieutenant Blanchard, of my staff, to report the result and returned to my own line, which was being dangerously pressed. It was but a few moments until the second and third flags were on the ridge near the same spot, and the enemy in such numbers as to drive away the command under Major Weaver. This command, upon the advance of the enemy, broke and retired in disorder. The enemy turned our guns upon us and opened a fire of musketry from our right and rear. This advantage gained caused my right to give back.
In seeking to rally the right I did not see the exact time when the flag went up at the left of General Bragg’s headquarters, but refer to the reports of Brigadier-General Finley, Lieutenant-Colonel Turner (who subsequently commanded Bate’s brigade), and Colonel Mashburn, Lieutenant-Colonel McLean, of Florida brigade, and Major O’Neill, commanding Tenth Tennessee.
The enemy formed a line of battle and moved down upon our right at right angles with that flank. Dent’s battery was turned upon us, sweeping our lines from right to left, and, among other effects produced, destroyed two of Slocomb’s limbers. Our men of the extreme right gave back in some confusion, and in gallantly seeking to rally them Col. R. C. Tyler was dangerously wounded. Meanwhile the enemy had gained the summit of the ridge on our left and subjected us to a fire from that source. He was rapidly enveloping the division, and yet the larger portion of it was on the front line with the artillery. I then moved the command, which was in much confusion, to the rear, ordering the batteries and that portion still remaining on the front of the ridge to retire to the line on which we were rallying. There was much difficulty in stopping the debris which had sloughed off from the first line, but through the personal exertions of General Bragg and staff and many subaltern officers, we formed a line about 1,000 yards from the one just abandoned in a most eligible position across the road leading from General Bragg’s quarters to the pontoon bridge at Bird’s Mill. During the process of its formation General Bragg ordered me to hold the position as long as tenable, and then cross the Chickamauga and report to him at Chickamauga Station. This line was soon molded into proper shape and organized to resist the assault then threatened by an exultant foe. Skirmishers were thrown forward, under Major Wall, Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee, on the right, and Major Austin, of Adams sharpshooters (who was there with a part of this command), on my left. Artillery was planted near the road. I sent officers to push the artillery and ordnance .across the bridge and to stop all stragglers. I withdrew from this line the Sixth Florida, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel McLean, and moved it back as a nucleus for another line. I then placed this main (now front) line under command of Brigadier-General Finley, with instructions to hold it as long as possible; when forced, to fall back on the next line. Colonel Rudler was ordered to take command in Tyler’s place, but was soon badly wounded and taken from the field. I remained with this line until the sharpshooters were driven in and it became well and successfully engaged.
It was now nearly dark, and I repaired to a field near the junction of the roads leading to Bird’s Mill from Missionary Ridge and established a line, with the field in front, under supervision of Lieutenant-Colonel McLean; this line was formed across the roads. Having thrown out skirmishers along the front and flanks, I proceeded to join General Finley’s line, which meantime was hotly engaged, not only checking, but causing the enemy to recede, thus enabling a quiet and orderly withdrawal of that line. This fight was made by a retreating force against an advancing and victorious one. It lasted for nearly an hour after night, and staid the onward movement which was pressing us back to the bridge. For further particulars of this fight, I refer to report of General Finley.
I met the head of this column with Major-General Breckinridge, at whose order it had retired. Not having seen the general since in the earlier part of the evening, when he left General Bragg’s quarters to look after the left, I informed him of General Bragg’s last order to me and the locality of my next line. He bade me carry out those orders, and with some additional instructions then delivered he proceeded to join General Bragg. Not pursued by the enemy, I leisurely moved the command to the pontoon bridge, leaving the third line under Lieutenant-Colonel McLean, with instructions to hold it until ordered to retire. I saw Major-General Stewart at the bridge, and reported to him my instructions from General Bragg. My command being in good order, I moved it to the east bank of Chickamauga and bivouacked, meantime ordering Lieutenant-Colonel McLean to join me, of which withdrawal I notified General Stewart. I reported to General Bragg as ordered, and in two hours moved my command on the Ringgold road, running east of the railroad; thence through that place and to Tunnel Hill next day, and the succeeding one to Dalton, where I was joined by Mebane’s battery and subsequently by Lewis’ brigade. Lewis’ brigade being separated from the command during the fight and retreat, I respectfully refer to his report for the operations of that command. The service of the artillery, under command of Captain Cobb, was fought successfully and gallantly.
My accomplished assistant adjutant-general, Maj. George W. Winchester to whom I feel much indebted for his efficiency and gallantry on this as well as other fields—in seeking to extricate a part of the command as the enemy enveloped us, lost his liberty if not his life, no tidings of his fate having since reached me. CoL R. C. Tyler, commanding brigade, who bore himself as became his reputation won on other and more fortunate fields, was dangerously wounded in discharging his duty. Col. A. F. Rudler succeeded him in command. He, too, fell a victim to a severe and disabling wound in the fight after dark.
Lieut. Col. J. J. Turner, of the Thirtieth Tennessee, as ranking officer, then assumed command of this brigade. His coolness and courage was marked throughout.
I cannot, in justice to the generous and brave, consistently close this without expressing my thanks to Brigadier-General Finley for his gallant bearing and prompt assistance in every emergency.
I take the liberty of mentioning Lieut. Col. Joseph T. Smith, of the Thirty-seventh Georgia, and Maj. J. M. Wall, Fifteenth and Thirty- seventh Tennessee, for special gallantry on this occasion.
To the members of my staff—Capt. G. W. McCawley, Lieuts. T. E. Blanchard and James H. Bate—I also make my acknowledgements for promptness and gallantry on the field.
The casualties of this command were: Killed, 43; wounded, 224; missing, 590. Most of the latter were Floridians who were in the trenches.
For further particulars I respectfully refer to the reports of subaltern officers.
I am, colonel, very respectfully,
Wm. B. Bate, Brigadier-General, Commanding.
I think this is a most provocotive post regarding the command structure at Chattanooga. I'd love more comments on this issue - the asault on Missionary Ridge, etc. while I ponder.
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Forgot which book, but I found which regiment led the charge up Missionary Ridge and since it was against orders, their captain swore them to secrecy. Initially they drove out the Confederates from their rifle pits but in so doing, found themselves exposed to fire from above. It was either wait to be killed or take the initiative and drive the Confederates out. They chose the latter and it soon spread to adjacent units until the entire ridge was swept of the Confederates. I'm looking for the book now.
Gary:
One of the greatest and least understood actions in the whole dang war. Personally, I like the idea that the Western Boys just got a little over-excited and went ahead. I am quite likely wrong in that interpretation, but I do hold fondly to it. Sounds like something they would do.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Gary:
One of the greatest and least understood actions in the whole dang war. Personally, I like the idea that the Western Boys just got a little over-excited and went ahead. I am quite likely wrong in that interpretation, but I do hold fondly to it. Sounds like something they would do.
Ole
From what I have read that Gen Hazen wrote that is pretty much what happened. His main arragument about the battle was who got to the top first him or Sheridan.
Missionary Ridge runs north/south. Federals were facing east. Sherman was on the Federal left, stranded. He'd climbed the wrong hill that morning and was cut off from the ridge. To sweep the Ridge from the Federal left, the first obstacle (besides getting off the hilltop and to the Ridge) for Sherman, and later Thomas would have been Cleburne's entrenched division on the Confederate right. Wouldn't have happened. There was no way to get to him except from the rear. In fact, Cleburne still held his ground after Federal troops had crested the Ridge.
Bragg knew his right was secure. He was worried about his left and the threat from Hooker, et al from Lookout. Plus, Breckenridge, on the Confederate left, was on the "physically unable to perform" list that morning and Bragg had had to pull Bate from his brigade to take Breckenridge's division and left Bate's Brigade (just below the ridgeline in the center/right) in command of a Colonel. And during the morning Bragg further repositioned troops from the center toward the left leaving the center much thinned. (Oddly enough, although the Confederate left was expected to be the big problem and did get rolled back a bit, it too still held the ground after battle.)
Maybe not a miracle... maybe just an unexpected opportunity. Maybe the planning and training better prepared Thomas and his men to take advantage of the opportunity presented at the center. But by all accounts, the info is fairly clear that nobody expected what happened or had planned for it to occur in the fashion that it did.
As regards your 1st para. Sherman climbed the wrong hill the afternoon of the 24th. He had his guys entrench and wrapped it up for that day. He wrote to Grant at 4:00 PM that he was on Tunnel Hill (wrong)! On this misinformation Grant laid his plans for the next day. Sherman conducted no reconnaissance until the morning of the 25th, then recognizing that he was one hill too short he attacked but failed to dent Cleburne’s defenses. I believe that Sherman would have been able to flank Cleburne on the Confederate right. This might have worked because Chickamauga Station (?), the big Confederate supply depot was just down the road and might have drawn troops from Cleburne to protect (conjecture).
I disagree with your last sentence.
As Thomas ascended the Ridge he met one of his Cumberlanders and congratulated him on his performance and was answered that “Well General, that’s what you been training us for during the last three weeks, ain’t it?” Perhaps this rejoinder may be a bit apocryphal, we do know that Woods and another commander mentioned the two meetings held to discuss their assignments in the coming battle. These being in every one of the several Grant plans, except the last, to ascend the ridge and hook up with Sherman’s right and head south. Seems to me that is exactly what they planned and trained for, they already had orders! Once Slowtrot gottum moving they knew what to do!
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