Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
Jkeith, a Confederate success any sooner might have drawn Washington's attention to the Chick/Chat area sooner, with subsequent sooner reinforcement, removal of the hapless Rosecrans (who seems doomed to failure whatever might have happened) and promotion of Thomas or arrival of Grant. I see the same sort of scenario being played as actually happened, just a couple months sooner on the timeline. (All just speculation)
But who knows what might have happened if the Feds had had two months more to push into Georgia...?
Anything could happen if "X" hadn't have happened. I was just trying to point out some of Bragg's many missed opportunities... just at Chickamauga. Stones River/Murfreesboro is another story as well.
...and Shiloh
...and Perryville
...and Missionary Ridge........
To quote my grandfather, "If a frog had wings he would have to bump his butt everytime he hopped."
Don,
Tim : I disagree. It is not enough to sit around and criticize the generals, claiming they were all a bunch of dunderheads. While I think some were, that doesn't mean the problem they faced was easy to solve.
Tim: It is easy to believe that the last great opportunity of the war for the Confederacy slipped away on the field at Chickamauga and in the aftermath at Chattanooga. I believe it myself. I feel that Bragg (bright enough, but overly rigid and not the man for a battlefield command in a changing situation) was largely responsible for the failure through his inadequacy, and that of the Army he built and led.
Regards,
Tim
Tim:
"Don,
I disagree. It is not enough to sit around and criticize the generals, claiming they were all a bunch of dunderheads. While I think some were, that doesn't mean the problem they faced was easy to solve."
Don: "I agree with your argument! I don’t think Bragg was that bad a general. Apparently he needed help fostering the growth of interpersonal relationships. By the same token, I disagree with most other opinions that Joe Johnston was a failure. On July 17th he turned over about 60,000 men to Hood who in about three weeks aggressively whittled them down to roughly 40,000, prompting Jefferson Davis to telegraph him to stop the suicide attacks on the Yankees. Which was the reason he was promoted to command and Johnston demoted. My thinking is that since Johnston was always outnumbered, his Fabian tactics, were exactly what was needed. He kept a well armed, well fed, highly motivated army on the field. What happened when Thomas destroyed the remainder of the AOT at Nashville? The war ended in a bit more than 3 months. If Johnston was able to face Sherman in front of Atlanta and hold him off for another couple months, wither by a rigid defense or a planned retreat, would Lincoln have been elected? Castel, in an article thinks he may not have been. The popular votes were very thin in several key states."
Don: "Not all the mistakes can be attributed to the commanders in the field. Davis’ made a number in assignments and organization that affected field commanders planning."
Tim: "It is easy to believe that the last great opportunity of the war for the Confederacy slipped away on the field at Chickamauga and in the aftermath at Chattanooga. I believe it myself. I feel that Bragg (bright enough, but overly rigid and not the man for a battlefield command in a changing situation) was largely responsible for the failure through his inadequacy, and that of the Army he built and led."
Don: "You lay none of the blame on subordinates like Hindman, and Hill? Who ignored orders at McLemore’s Cove, or Pope’s dalliance at breakfast, delaying an attack that Bragg had scheduled at daylight on the 13th to about 2:00PM?"
Don: While it’s nice to be able to judge events with the advantage of hindsight, I don’t hold with your belief that Chickamauga was the last great opportunity for the Confederacy. While Thomas was preparing the death blow for the AOT at Nashville, Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck and Grant were all in a quiver worrying Hood would march to the Ohio, or further. My belief is that despite Davis, the Rebels had a chance to draw out the war until the North grew tired of it. There were already riots and violent disturbances in several cities in the North demonstrating against the butchery on Grant’s front, who was stalled in front of Petersburg by Lee. Grant by this time had written Sherman that he need not try and hold the AOT from sending reinforcements to Lee. In effect he was saying, “I can’t win it."
You lay none of the blame on subordinates like Hindman, and Hill? Who ignored orders at McLemore’s Cove, or Pope’s dalliance at breakfast, delaying an attack that Bragg had scheduled at daylight on the 13th to about 2:00PM?
Certainly they have to answer for their own actions. But a commander must answer for what he has done as well. Bragg had created the AoT, had commanded it almost exactly as long as Robert E. Lee had commanded the ANV. Lee created (with a bunch of fractious individualistic generals) an army that worked together; Bragg created one that tended to shoot itself in the foot.
This was not due to courage or intelligence in the men. It was the result of a command atmosphere that fought itself as much as the enemy and maybe more. The litany of lost opportunity in those days in September is shocking. The reasons are usually the spirit in the high command, where commanders moved hesitantly because they were sure they'd be blamed for anything that went wrong, and where antagonism seemed the motivating force.
Bragg, I think, must answer for that. His subordinates deserve their own condemnations, individually and as a group. Bragg, being in charge, needs to answer for what he brought about.
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
While it’s nice to be able to judge events with the advantage of hindsight, ...
It sure is!
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
... I don’t hold with your belief that Chickamauga was the last great opportunity for the Confederacy. While Thomas was preparing the death blow for the AOT at Nashville, Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck and Grant were all in a quiver worrying Hood would march to the Ohio, or further. My belief is that despite Davis, the Rebels had a chance to draw out the war until the North grew tired of it. There were already riots and violent disturbances in several cities in the North demonstrating against the butchery on Grant’s front, who was stalled in front of Petersburg by Lee. Grant by this time had written Sherman that he need not try and hold the AOT from sending reinforcements to Lee. In effect he was saying, “I can’t win it."
Oh, I think there was a chance for Confederate political victory in 1864 by creating a stalemate. In about August, Lincoln was pretty sure he was going to lose. Then Atlanta fell, and Farragut steamed into Mobile Bay, and Sheridan sliced up Early in the Shenandoah. Suddenly everyone could see the war was being won. I am not sure McClellan would have won in any case without those victories for the Union, but it would have been a near-run thing.
But I also think that Chickamauga is the last chance for a Confederate military victory by decisive battle. There is no realistic chance I can see for any of the battles of the Atlanta or Overland Campaigns to turn into such a result in 1864.
In the wilds of north Georgia in Spetember of 1863, that opportunity was clear for both sides.
Rosecrans maneuver to cross the Tennessee and force the abandonment of Chattanooga was brilliant (as was the earlier Tullahoma movement). Knoxville was falling as a result, and the opportunity for a thrust towards Atlanta was opening. Rosecrans overstepped, the Confederacy struck, and all that evaporated. But if Burnside had co-operated more, if Rosecrans had kept his head, you'd have seen an 80,000 man Union force with a secure base threatening Georgia in October.
Bragg's attempts to strike Rosecrans are good in concept, poor in execution. This is typical of Bragg in the Civil War. Partly that was because of the crippled command structure he led; partly due to Bragg's inability to be flexible in combat. The old adage that no plan survives contact with the enemy epitomizes his problem. Once the plan started to come apart, he could not adjust, IMHO.
Somewhere in there, a smiling battlefield god would have let the Confederates smash the AoC on the field. There are several places that might have happened, from McClemore's cove on through Longstreet's assault. None did, largely because the AoT stumbled about, fighting bravely and clumsily. I lay all this to Bragg and his senior commanders.
If they do smash the AoC (and I am taking about a mighty whupping, far worse than actually happened), then the Confederacy can roll back into Middle Tennessee. I doubt they could take Nashville, but Bragg's army might be sitting in Murfreesboro again as the year ended. Union forces would have to be sent from everywhere, plans readjusted, and there could be no realistic threat to Atlanta in 1864. Odds of a Lincoln electoral defeat would be way up. Only a truly brilliant campaign in 1864 would save him -- but maybe this would have been enough to give Grant more power, so that Butler and Banks were not commanding field forces, too.
That's what slipped away at Chickamauga, none of it ever quite in Confederate hands, but always tantalizingly in the air.
When the battle did end, with Thomas slipping off intact, most of that is already gone. Now the only hope is in a pursuit that can somehow wreck the AoC or cause it to capitulate. This did not happen -- but it is hard to see where it was a good shot. It is the next 24 hours that count. Bragg's army was never known for speed and dash, many of the reinforcements that arrived had no transport. Still, you never know unless you try, and Bragg didn't try very hard.
As to the siege of Chickamauga, I find it very difficult to see how the Confederates can act to isolate Rosecrans completely. They had supply problems of their own, their army was small, and I don't think they could have crossed to seal the north bank. That left them with the slow means of a partial siege. With Union relief forces gathering, that implies they will need to fight another battle to gain the fruits of their victory.
At that point, things turn bad. The siege of Chattanooga is lifted the day Brown's Ferry is taken. The AoC is saved that day, and what follows is merely the slow buildup to another Confederate defeat. That didn't have to be, if the Confederacy could find a way to smash the relief force as it arrived. But in all the reading I have ever done, I have never seen any realistic attempts at a Confederate plan for doing so.
I really cannot see a moment in 1864 where any similar success lay there for the taking for the Confederacy. If we were to look at Lee and Grant in Virginia, we'd find several such for the Union (Butler and the RR, maybe the Mule Shoe, early on at Cold Harbor, Petersburg) where a bit of luck or better performance would have smashed Lee. Johnston might have been able to find an opportunity to strike and throw back Sherman, but I see no real opportunity for crushing his force. By 1864, the Confederacy is reduced to attrition in the trenches, hoping to wear out the Union. At Chickamauga, they might have produced a stunning victory that removed an entire Union army from the board.
“Certainly they have to answer for their own actions. But a commander must answer for what he has done as well. Bragg had created the AoT, had commanded it almost exactly as long as Robert E. Lee had commanded the ANV. Lee created (with a bunch of fractious individualistic generals) an army that worked together; Bragg created one that tended to shoot itself in the foot.”
Don: Lee, because of his relationship with Davis, and his string of eastern victories was given much more leeway with the ANV than Bragg was ever given with the AOT. Polk, a friend of Davis, was untouchable until after Chickamauga. Hill, booted west by Lee, despite his brilliance earlier in east did nothing for Bragg. There were a couple more whose names I can’t remember that Lee passed off to Bragg, with the concurrence of Davis, that foundered. Lastly was Longstreet, whose failures in the west surprised everybody, and who contributed mightily to the dissension in Bragg’s command structure. Bragg, given the same license as Lee, might have formed a better structure. Also, Bragg did not “create” the AOT he reorganized the 40,000 men he was given command of and Johnston named it “The Army of Tennessee.”
“This was not due to courage or intelligence in the men. It was the result of a command atmosphere that fought itself as much as the enemy and maybe more.”
Don: And who helped create that command structure? The way I see’s it, Lee and Davis!
“The litany of lost opportunity in those days in September is shocking. The reasons are usually the spirit in the high command, where commanders moved hesitantly because they were sure they'd be blamed for anything that went wrong, and where antagonism seemed the motivating force.”
Don: “I’m Shocked, Shocked!” Are you saying that Lee’s and Davis’ little darlings shouldn’t be blamed for their failings, they could screw up with impunity and only Bragg deserves condemnation? Only the commander of the army must answer? Then shouldn’t we be looking at the real commander - Davis?
Don: By the way, how does one define "lost opportunity, "spirit of High Command, and "antagonism seemed the motivating force?" These rather nebulous terms are not defining nor provable. Can you define how and show provable instances of their contributions to defeats, Bragg's poor performance, etc?
“Bragg, I think, must answer for that. His subordinates deserve their own condemnations, individually and as a group. Bragg, being in charge, needs to answer for what he brought about.”
Don: Ah! But you see, Bragg was not necessarily in control. You want to point at him and say the only failures of his subordinates (who he could not control) were his alone. Lee was allowed to cast off his recalcitrant and non-performing failures while Bragg had to receive and keep them. Davis also put himself in the position of directing western troop movements over the heads of Bragg and of newly appointed Joe Johnston, now Theater Commander over Pemberton and Bragg. At Stones River, Jefferson Davis's orders to send Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson's division (10,000 troops) to the defense of Vicksburg no doubt contributed to Bragg’s problem. This while General Samuel Holmes sat in Arkansas with 30,000 men doing NOTHING.
Now, because of your arguments I find myself in the position of defending Bragg. While I don’t think Bragg was as bad as most make him out to be, I do think he was a fairly decent organizer and disciplinarian. I think he also was miscast as a battlefield commander. I do think Davis contributed mightily to his poor reputation and performance and think he kept Bragg on after Chattanooga as an advisor, as partial recognition of his (Davis’) prior interferences.
Bragg and the AOT missed at least 4 good chances to turn the tide here.
Rosecrans, advancing on Chattanooga and in pursuit of Bragg (who Rosecrans thought was head for Rome Georgia which is about 50 miles south of Chattanooga), sent Crittenden's corps into Chattanooga. Thomas was 20 miles south and west advancing eastward through Lookout Mountain at Stevens Gap towards McLemore's Cove and then to Lafayette. McCook was another 20 miles south and west of Thomas was passing eastward through the gap through the Lookout Mountain ridge also headed east toward Alpine Alabama. Rosecrans 60K+ army was now roughly divided into thirds and widely separated.
Bragg with the addition of Buckner's, Breckenridge's and Walker's men now had 44-45K men. Bragg had a chance to take them on individually.
Bragg chose to take the center first, Thomas. Hindman was to hit from the northeast, Hill was to hit from the east on the 10th. It didn't happen. Hill explained the roads were blocked and one of his key men was sick. -STRIKE ONE.
Bragg ordered the attack for the next day with Buckner and Hindman. Buckner and Hindman met, didn't like the plan... so they didn't attack and missed the chance. - STRIKE TWO
Bragg then chose to hit Crittenden advancing from Chattanooga toward LaFayette. He chose Polk who was the closest to hit Crittenden at Lee & Gordon's Mill on the 13th. Polk arrived and sent word back to Bragg that he'd set up a defensive position and thought he could hold it if Bragg sent him more men. Bragg said he'd send him Buckner... but he had to make the attack. Polk chose to stay where he was. - STRIKE THREE.
On the 18th he missed another chance to hit an exposed federal left flank by not being able to get his own troops in position in time.
Then after the battle, he did not pursue Rosecran's retreat. - STRIKE FOUR (or more, if you count many other blunders and refusals during the battle.)
All are "what if's" but if any had been successfully executed... well, who know?
Your analysis is excellent.
And in your opinion, as with Tim, it is all Bragg's fault?
I know what my reaction would have been. I would have cashiered all these fools, particularly Polk or resigned my commission.
Your analysis is excellent.
And in your opinion, as with Tim, it is all Bragg's fault?
I know what my reaction would have been. I would have cashiered all these fools, particularly Polk or resigned my commission.
I don't think it was "all Bragg's fault". I would also level great criticism at Polk, Hardee, Cheatham and a host of others. But Bragg was there form the moment when all these forces were thrown together at Shiloh, was elevated to Beauregard's command, and integrated Kirby Smith's force into this army. This was his army as much as the ANV was Lee's army. It was also a fractious, dysfunctional army. I believe much of the responsibility for that was Bragg's lifelong trouble in working co-operatively with others.
Bragg had just as much opportunity to handle those people as Lee did. He just didn't do it as well, and he managed to create a divisive atmosphere where Lee created a harmonius one.
BTW, I am not sure Bragg was always aware of the impact of his actions on relationships with others. Known throughout his career as a martinet and strict disciplinarian, he seems not to have realized his rigid, harsh methods had consequences. When an angry soldier in his battery exploded a howitzer shell in Bragg's tent one night in Mexico, the stunned, bleeding and miraculously surviving Bragg was heard to exclaim that he had not believed he had an enemy in the world.
Gentlemen:
You've been describing one of those fortuitous accidents of history. What would this country look like without the initial influence of a small group of great men (especially Washington) who happened to be there at the same time as the opportunity?
The combination formed by Lincoln, Grant, and a few others could not be overthrown by a combination of Lee and a quarrelsome bag of extraordinarily ordinary nebbishes. Braxton Bragg who, by all accounts, would have made himself a very comfortable living without the war -- having only his wife and employees to quarrel with -- gets far more than his share of blame
The Union had some luck; the Confederacy did not. Praise the Lord!
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Lee, because of his relationship with Davis, and his string of eastern victories was given much more leeway with the ANV than Bragg was ever given with the AOT.
In the Confederacy, people assumed Bragg was a close friend of Davis (he was not, having feuded with then-Secretary of War Davis in the 1850s). Davis consistently supported Bragg (against the criticism after the failure of the invasion of Kentucky, against the criticism after the flop at Murfreesboro, against the criticism following Chickamauga), then appointed him a top aid when Bragg was finally relieved/resigned from his AoT command. Like Lincoln, Davis gave too much hearing to complaints from subordinates about superiors (but Lincoln seems to have learned not to do it anymore by 1864).
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
Polk, a friend of Davis, was untouchable until after Chickamauga. Hill, booted west by Lee, despite his brilliance earlier in east did nothing for Bragg. There were a couple more whose names I can’t remember that Lee passed off to Bragg, with the concurrence of Davis, that foundered. Lastly was Longstreet, whose failures in the west surprised everybody, and who contributed mightily to the dissension in Bragg’s command structure.
DH Hill was friendly with Bragg, having served under him in Mexico and being eager to join him at Chattanooga in 1863. Bragg alienated him in record time. Hill had been stuck in NC for a year.
I agree Polk was a problem. Lee managed to avoid such a problem for the most part. But partly that was because Lee handled Davis magnificently, and partly that was because Lee had Longstreet and Jackson and Stuart(even there, we can find issues to point to if we wish -- they just usually involved lesser commanders and Lee handled them better.)
Longstreet had his moments, and some people think he was politicking for Lee's command at one point. In fact, Longstreet really has few good moments when he is not under Lee.
I don't object to saying that the AoT commanders were a fractious lot with decided drawbacks. I do think Bragg failed to handle them well, and certainly failed to get them pulling together. One aspect of this was that Bragg's constant criticism and "blame game" style led to a lack of initiative in the field -- wrecking plans when commanders paused to wait for guidance from HQ.
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
Bragg, given the same license as Lee, might have formed a better structure.
But we have no sign that he did or would. Take, for example, the Kentucky troops and Breckenridge.
They were stuck in LA while Bragg moved on Kentucky. They desperately wanted to join the return to their home state, but had to fight through the paperwork and the bureaucracy and the transport problems. By the time they joined up, Bragg was back in TN. There they found Bragg had conceived the idea that they hadn't tried to join, and that he now lumped them, their commander, and all Kentuckians together as having failed to support him in his campaign. Another Bragg feud starts. Can you picture Lee doing this?
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
Also, Bragg did not “create” the AOT he reorganized the 40,000 men he was given command of and Johnston named it “The Army of Tennessee.”
Bragg moved the various forces from Missippi to Chattanooga to invade KY and merged it with the Army of East Tennessee/Army of Kentucky("Smith's Corps") This was all considered the Army of Mississippi. By November 20, 1862 Braxton Bragg is the commander of the Army of Tennessee (the renamed force). Two weeks later, Joe Johnston was commander of the Department of the West.
I think there is a strong case that Bragg commanded/created the AoT from the beginning of it's existence. A large part of the original core was trained by him at Pensacola and commanded by him at Shiloh. He was in command of the Army of Mississippi shortly after Shiloh and remained in command of those men (with accessions from elsewhere) from May 7 1862 until after the battle of Chattanooga. (He was chief of staff of the Army of Mississippi before Shiloh.)
The choice of Joe Wheeler as cavalry commander was a Bragg choice. Kirby Smith clashed with him, and Smith ended up West of the Mississippi. He three times took Forrest's cavalry away from that officer to give to another commander. He ran Breckenridge out. He was not without his own political backing and support, although Polk and Hardee had much of their own to counterbalance it.
Just purchased (for $6.00 including shipping) and read:
"Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History" by Richard M. McMurry
It deals with the differences between the ANV and AOT.
McMurry gets into the deferential and almost fawning treatment given to Lee and his crowd as opposed to treatment of Bragg, Johnston, Hood and Johnston again.
I really enjoyed it, particularly in view of it's relation to our current discussion.
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Linear Mode
