Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
I think Bragg's sending troops to Knoxville contributed to the defeat because that left few reserves to throw into the fray where needed. Because of the terrain, lateral movement along the crest was difficult; the ridge is miles long and there were just not enough troops in the right place at the right time to repel the Union advance.
Bragg sent Longstreet & Buckner to Knoxville didn't he? Don't remember the headcount but I believe it was 3 - 7 thousand, maybe more. Plus, I think Bragg had several times during the day pulled from the center to reinforce the left, or had extended to the left leaving the center dangerously thinned. Yeah... he sure could have used the extra help.
However, if Bragg had taken all of the troops in the center that he'd put on the face of the ridge and instead had deployed them back up on the military crest, its highly unlikely the Federals would have ever reached their line, much less broken it. Especially if he'd correctly positioned his artillery at that point, too. - How's that for Monday morning quarterbacking?
Don’t know how many of you served in the armed forces but, being drilled to obey orders is one of the basic tenets of the military.
You don’t ask "why?" You don’t say "wait a minute!" You don’t ask directions. You don’t say, "I’ll think about it!" You don’t claim you heard different. You don’t ask for further information. When those sergeants and officers behind you on the line of battle started waving their swords and started screaming “CHARGE.” You do nothing except ---- “OBEY!”
Having been drilled for the last two weeks that their main function was to “join Sherman’s right and sweep the Rebels off Missionary Ridge, what was left of the AOTC did just that.
Some one said on this board that they like busting myths. That’s a task I enjoy also. Besides, that myth was started by a newspaper man and you know the media lied then, just as it does today.
From what I've read, Sherman's Army was to sweep the Confederate left and in doing so, help rescue the Union Army of Tennessee. Sherman bumped into Cleburne's men and stalled. Frustrated, Grant ordered Thomas forward to support Sherman. Specifically, they were to take the Confederate rifle pits in front of Missionary Ridge. The men did, then they didn't stop. Grant observed the men going forward and asked Thomas if he gave the order to go beyond the pits. Thomas denied it. Then Grant asked Granger and Granger also denied it. There was no plan.
One problem Bragg had was that the topography of Missionary Ridge worked against him in keeping tabs on what was happening all along the line. The western face is not straight; it is wavy...there are many shallow coves, as well as dips in the elevation of the crest, that interfere with one's line-of-sight from any one point along the crest.
On the other hand, Grant, on Orchard Knob, had a comprehensive view of the battlefield, except that the terrain would have obscured his view of where Sherman was supposed to have been before the assault began.
From what I've read, Sherman's Army was to sweep the Confederate left and in doing so, help rescue the Union Army of Tennessee. Sherman bumped into Cleburne's men and stalled.
Gary,
It was the Confederate right (at the north end of the ridge) that Sherman was to attack.
From what I've read, Sherman's Army was to sweep the Confederate left No! the Confederate right.
and in doing so, help rescue the Union Army of Tennessee. Sherman's Army WAS the Union "Army of THE Tennessee." The Rebels named their Armies for states or areas and the Union named theirs for nearby rivers.
Sherman bumped into Cleburne's men and stalled. Frustrated, Grant ordered Thomas forward to support Sherman. Specifically, they were to take the Confederate rifle pits in front of Missionary Ridge. The men did, then they didn't stop. Grant observed the men going forward and asked Thomas if he gave the order to go beyond the pits. Thomas denied it. Then Grant asked Granger and Granger also denied it. There was no plan.
I'm not sure you understand my point. Grant started generating plans to take MR on the 18th in a letter to Burnside. In this initial plan Thomas was to charge up the hill when Sherman appeared, connect with his (Sherman's) right and sweep the Rebels off the Ridge. There were several iterrations of that plan during the next few weeks, with Thomas's assignment the same in each. "Charge to the top of the ridge, connect with Sherman's right and sweep the Rebels off the top." So, I'm saying he had two weeks to get the plan across to his troops and at the crucial moment (at the base of Missionary) they just reacted to the plan they had been practising and went up the hill.
Thomas was to charge up the hill when Sherman appeared, connect with his (Sherman's) right and sweep the Rebels off the Ridge.
Don
For most people, the term "charge" conjures up the vision of soldiers running toward the enemy. At Missionary Ridge, however, there was very little running up the hill, not for far anyway. Having climbed Missionary Ridge countless times, I know for a fact that no one can run up that hill, even on the paved roads that traverse it today. In 1863, it would have been a slow, grueling task, especially with people shooting at you from above.
No doubt, many Confederates held their fire for fear of hitting their own men below, as Union and Confederate troops became co-mingled on the slopes. In any event, it had to be slow and painful to get to the top.
According to Gen Hazen the men just had there blood up and just kept going. This happened when they say the confederates retreating up the hill.
Also the men were safer on the side of the ridge, than they were at the bottom. The trenches at the top were improperly sited. The soilders could not shoot at the ones coming up the hill, all they could do is roll rocks down the hill.
One of the things that is very yhard to grasp about the attack on Missionary Ridge at Chatanooga is just how poorly prepared the Confederate Army was. Another is that Missionary Ridge is too steep, broken, and rugged to conduct a defense from easily, especially from the top.
This is not obvious now, and it was not obvious in 1863.
Whatever he might or might not have felt about the AoC troops under Thomas, Grant was not a man who needlessly ordered suicidal frontal attacks. Looking up from the city, Grant, his staff, Thomas, his staff, and everyone else considered that a frontal assault on the ridge would end in bloody failure. Bragg and the Confederates, sitting atop the ridge, apparently felt the same.
As a result, Bragg and his army truly didn't do much to fortify the position properly, and they didn't think the issue through very well. Cleburne, brought back to defend the northern end at the last minute, showed what was possible with a determined and aggressive defense. Bragg and the rest showed what the lack of preparation could do.
One indication of Bragg's failure is that suddenly, on the eve of Grant's attack, AoT engineer officers show up to lay out entrenchments along the top of the ridge. This is, mind you, after Bragg was in position up there for two months straight, besieging the place, and watching Union troops gather for the breakout attempt. It is as if Bragg, his staff, the Corps and division commanders had spent all their energy on political squabling and none on thinking about what the enemy might do, how to prepare for it ... oh, right, this was Bragg and the Army of Tennessee. That IS what they spent their time on.
As a natural defensive position, Missionary Ridge is really too steep. There are too many covered ways for troops to approach the top under cover, out of the line-of-fire, and not enough had been done to block them off and find ways to cover them with fire. As a result, Thomas' troops were actually safer advancing up the slope than they would have ben by staying in place at the bottom. If the slope had been less steep, this would not be the case.
Also, if the Union attack ever breeches the line and deploys at the top of the ridge, the position is doomed. By wheeling north and south, the Union units immediately outflank the defenders. If they try to stay in line facing West, they will be enfiladed from both the front and rear slopes. The only alternative then is to try to deploy by a wheel to the left or right to face the Yankees -- which means abandoning your own line and scrambling into awkward positions at least on the rear slope, and probably on the front slope -- which is suicidal if there are still more Yankees coming up the slope from the front.
This last holds true for Hooker's men as well. If they ever get atop the ridge and turn south[as Will Posey pointed out, this should be north], they will automatically be on the flank of the Confederate line as they move and should sweep all before them. Hooker's men did accomplish this, although many judge they were slow in getting it done. Even if Thomas had never attacked, Hooker's movement onto the top of the ridge late that day would most probably have forced Bragg to retreat during the night.
That was, in effect, the purpose of Sherman's movement (although his usual offensive tactical failings blew that, IMHO). If Sherman gets on the north end of Missionary Ridge, Bragg's position becomes hopeless and he must withdraw or counterattack.
In short, any such position (a high, long, narrow-topped ridge with steep slopes) is probably doomed if the enemy ever gets atop it and can deploy to move along it.
If you were sitting down in Chattanooga looking up at Missionary Ridge, you'd have to assume the Confederates had prepared it competently in the last two months, and that any assault would be a disaster. That's why the success was regarded as a "miracle".
OTOH, if you are looking at the Confederate AoT military performance in the siege, you would have to consider it an incredible example of incompetence and wasted opportunity, which you have to lay largely at the doors of Bragg, Davis, and the Corps commanders. Negligence is obvious. The back-stabbing politics that led to the command confusion is truly inexcusable. Lack of knowledge at lower levels of the principles of military engineering might be excused, but with two months in place the trained soldiers in the Army could have overseen the entrenchments personally if they needed to do so.
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