Missionary Ridge

[samgrant]

How can we reconcile all the accounts, then, that when Grant asked who ordered those soldiers up the ridge, that Thomas denied that it was by his order?

Or did he just shrug his shoulders in a "who knows?" kind of white lie?

[oneplez]

Originally Posted by samgrant

How can we reconcile all the accounts, then, that when Grant asked who ordered those soldiers up the ridge, that Thomas denied that it was by his order?

Or did he just shrug his shoulders in a "who knows?" kind of white lie?

Sam! as you probably have gathered from your accumulated readings, there were many versions of what was said to the different commanders leading the charge. Baird, I believe was given the orders, charge to the base, but, if you see a chance head for the top. Never could find out who said that. But, I think it came from Granger who might have gotten it from....... who was his boss?

Do you think old Pap was above white lies?


Don

[jkeith21]

Originally Posted by gary

...they drove out the Confederates from their rifle pits but in so doing, found themselves exposed to fire from above. It was either wait to be killed or take the initiative and drive the Confederates out. They chose the latter and it soon spread to adjacent units until the entire ridge was swept of the Confederates...

Gary touches on one of the key points to the fight at Missionary Ridge.

For the Federals charged with taking the rifle pits, once they got there they found they could not stay there, nor could they easliy return to their lines. The area of the pits and back to the Federal lines was well covered by Confederate artillery positioned near the crest of the Ridge. However, Confederate artillery had been incorrectly positioned behind the actual crest of the Ridge.

Therefore the area from the foot of the Ridge all the way up the face of the Ridge was left uncovered.

The guns, positioned so far behind the crest, could only cover that ground 30-50 yard in their immediate front and the ground from the foot of the ridge outward to their maximum range. So for the Federals at the foot it was safer to move further up the face of the Ridge than to stay at the foot or head back across the field toward the Knob.

This was made a bit easier in that some of the Confederates in the pits had orders to fall back to positions on the face of the ridge when pressed in the pits. So, when pressed, those with orders to do so fell back. Those not knowing of those orders, saw the retreat and not wishing to be left, they hurriedly joined the retreat. As those Confederates in the pits and at the foot of the ridge broke for the rear they were, more or less, running "interference" for the advancing Federals who quickly took advantage of the opportunity. Confederates in position higher up the ridge were reluctant to fire at the advancing Federals fearing hitting the retreating Confederates and as the movement evolved the forces became comingled (sp?) making it impossible to draw any definitive line of where the Reb's lines stopped and the Fed's started. Momentum went to the Feds. And as they continued to move up, the Rebs moved back or aside. It was not a line facing a line... both armies were mixed within the same space,

It was not an act of God, not a secret plan, etc... just another of those cosmic accidents or chains of coincidence that so often happened.


Excerpts from synopsis of battle by Mark Boatner below touches the major points:
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"...Grant had intended that the troops halt after taking the first line, and reorganize. Much to his consternation, Grant saw the troops capture the first line and then press on immediately for the summit. The attackers had found out that lingering in the initial position would subject them to murderous fire from the crest, and that the safest thing was to charge up the hill. This they did on their own initiative, turning it into a "SOLDIERS' BATTLE." Grant is reported to have asked Thomas and Granger: "Who ordered those men up the hill?" Unable to find the answer he said: "Someone will suffer for it, if it turns out badly." (Alexander; B. & L., III, 725.) The commanders actually tried to stop this advance. Turchin's brigade (1, 3, XIV) was halted; Wagner's brigade (2, 2, IV) was called back from an advanced position (Van Horne).

...Bragg had made several mistakes in his defensive dispositions. He had split his forces, putting half at the bottom of the hill with secret orders to fire a volley when the enemy got to within 200 yards, and then to withdraw up the slopes (Alexander). Many men apparently were not informed of this plan, and defended the first line even when others had pulled back. A Confederate engineer had taken his instructions literally when told to put the final line on the highest ground. This line was along the geographic or topographic crest instead of the "military crest" (the highest place from which you can see and fire on an approaching enemy). The attackers, therefore, found "dead space" through which they could advance under cover, and came forward in about six separate lines of approach. Footholds were established at various places, and enfilade fire from these penetrations destroyed the Confederate strong points that had been able to resist the frontal assault....

...The final assault had lasted about an hour..."

...Using Livermore's system of comparing the relative effectiveness of opposing troops, the Federals killed or wounded 44 of the enemy for every 1,000 of their own troops engaged; the Confederates killed or wounded 118 for every 1,000 of their own troops engaged.

Source: "The Civil War Dictionary" by Mark M. Boatner III

[richard]

Back in the mid 60's, while attending the UC, I was fortunate to live on the Ridge. If you have never been there, it would be hard to see why the Union had such an easy time sending Braggs men running. The face of the ridge to the west is quit steep. The only good approaches to the ridge is from where Sherman was located and the southern end at Rossville. Sherman could not move because of the shallow slope in front of him made his movments easy to attack. The other end which is closer to where Braggs headquarters was located was defended but Union forces had not made it to that location until later.

The Back side of the ridge or the eastern side, is not near as steep as the west face. Thus Bragg made his escape with some ease. There are not too many natural obstructions between the eastern side of the ridge and Ringold, Ga.

[ole]

A thousand thanks for the discussion, gentlemen! So much scholarship in one place!

A nagging question some will certainly be able to answer. It must have been obvious to someone that taking the first line of CSA rifle pits and then reforming and waiting for further orders would leave the US troops in a rather tenuous position as there were quite a number of muskets above them. There must be another explanation. Any opinions?
Ole

[jkeith21]

Originally Posted by ole

A thousand thanks for the discussion, gentlemen! So much scholarship in one place!

A nagging question some will certainly be able to answer. It must have been obvious to someone that taking the first line of CSA rifle pits and then reforming and waiting for further orders would leave the US troops in a rather tenuous position as there were quite a number of muskets above them. There must be another explanation. Any opinions?
Ole

Grant had never intended to take the Ridge with the attack on the face of the Ridge, the center of the Confederate line. The natural advantages of the position pretty much convinced both Bragg and Grant that that would not be possible. Grant wanted to roll up the flanks, Sherman on the Fed left and Hooker, et al on the right but needed to move against the center to hold the Rebs there from being able to reinforce the flanks.

Perhaps it was thought that the rifle pits if taken would offer some protection. But in any case, the fact that troops advancing on the center would be under musket fire was probably weighted no more there than it was anywhere else on the field as where ever the Feds advanced, it was going to be uphill. The front, of course was broader and deeper in the center but infantry on the three center lines, due to the terrain, did not have a clear field of fire across the whole front nor the equipment to take advantage of it even if they had. And the elevation/depth offered no real advantage to any of the defenders except those on the immediate front as those behind would have to shoot thru those in front to hit their targets.

Confeds (infantry & artillery) on the face in the center, in 20/20 hindsight, were poorly deployed. But resting assured that nobody was going to be able to successfully attack there, there was probably precious little time spent thinking it through.

[30th_il]

It is all about the troops position in this battle...I suppose it pretty much comes down to the (ahem) "Missionary position" of the troops. (Sorry...I just had to do that)

[jkeith21]

Originally Posted by 30th_il

It is all about the troops position in this battle...I suppose it pretty much comes down to the (ahem) "Missionary position" of the troops. (Sorry...I just had to do that)

D#mn 30th.... that was bad punning. Apology was necessary and accepted knowing that once it came to mind, it was impossible not to type.

[Will Posey]

I grew up within walking distance of Missionary Ridge and later lived on the actual battlefield. As boys do, we spent many a day refighting the battle.

All these years, I have struggled to understand how the rout of the Confederate forces happened as it did. From atop Missionary Ridge, the Confederate advantage is apparent. From the valley, Missionary Ridge seems a formidable challenge to an advancing army under fire.

I think Bragg's sending troops to Knoxville contributed to the defeat because that left few reserves to throw into the fray where needed.
Because of the terrain, lateral movement along the crest was difficult; the ridge is miles long and there were just not enough troops in the right place at the right time to repel the Union advance.

[gary]

Being a Narrative of the Service of the Second Regiment Minnesota Veteran Volunteer Infantry In the Civil War of 1861 to 1865" by Judson W. Bishop. From pages 8-9:

"It was at once evident to the Union soldiers who had won that entrenchment that they could not stay there. They were without protection from the fire of the other works, still held by the Confederates higher up the slope. The Union troops must either relinquish what they had won or they must go forward to the rest of the rebel position.

In this emergency, Captain [John Reed] Beatty, without authority from his superior officers, ordered a bugler to sound the call for advance. It was done, and, in response to that call, the long line of blue moved up the hill in a complete and overwhelming victory."

See pages 139-140 for more info.

It took some while to find the book as it was in the lowest shelf of the most difficult bookcase to access. Buy it cheap on EPay.