The Atlanta Campaign

[oneplez]

Why did McPherson fail at Snake Creek Gap? Or did he? Were his Army supplies and manpower short-changed before he started from Memphis?

On the 18th of March 1864, William Tecumseh Sherman officially replaced Ulysses S. Grant as commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Major General James Birdeye McPherson then replaced Sherman as commander of the Army of the Tennessee.

Sherman at once turned to the task of organization and preparation of the area embraced by that organization. Along with the security and supply of that area he began organizing a large army to invade Georgia. At the end of March, the four Armies commanders (Sherman, Thomas, McPherson and Schofield), had a counsel of war in Chattanooga.

Sherman knew McPherson's command was short about 20,000 Infantry. Sherman and Grant had lent two of his divisions from one Corps to Banks in March, for one month and two divisions from another Corps were on ‘Veterans Furlough.' (Veterans Furlough is a 30 day furlough "in his state" and a bounty of $300, awarded to those who re-enlisted for the duration of the war). In addition, a division of cavalry was short its full complement. In a letter to Grant, dated April 4th, he reported McPherson would have only 30,000 men. Sherman could have detached and sent adequate troops with him from the Military Division of Mississippi. There were also 700 + ‘Unassigned’ Cavalry attached to Thomas’ AOTC. Why didn’t he do this? In his letter to Grant dated 10 April, 1864, he stated that he ‘gave’ McPherson one of Thomas’s cavalry Divisions (Garrard), to McPherson. They did not join McPherson until later in June, having been sent to reorganize and re-fit. Why didn’t Sherman know this. Did McPherson fail to notify him? On the 22nd of April, Sherman received a note from Grant telling him that he would not be receiving the men lent to Banks and "Do not let this delay or embarrass" your plans.1 Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland and Shofield’s XXIII Corps had no problems. Only Sherman’s former (now McPherson’s) Army of Tennessee was unprepared. In view of Sherman’s recent embarrassments at "Tunnel Hill," any delay after this warning might irreparably damage his reputation

Sherman apparently recognized the shortages but rather than correct them, he modified McPherson's original task. Originally the plan was to cut Johnston's rail link at Rome, Georgia, North of his supply base in Atlanta. Sherman felt that McPherson’s Army with its full complement of Infantry and Cavalry could make that move by itself. Now, however, with about 40% of his manpower missing, Sherman changed the assignment to connect with Thomas and Schofield, then attack Resaca.

Sherman claims, "I therefore, in my mind, aimed to prepare out of these three armies, by the 1st of May 1864, a compact army for active operations in Georgia, and, to make these troops as mobile as possible, I made the strictest possible orders in relation to wagons and all species of incumbrances and impedimenta whatever. Each officer and soldier was required to carry on his horse or person food and clothing enough for five days. To each regiment (500 - 700 men) was allowed but one wagon and one ambulance, and to the officers of each company one pack-horse or mule.

Each division and brigade was provided a fair proportion of wagons for a supply-train, and these were limited in their loads to carry food, ammunition, and clothing. Tents were forbidden to all save the sick and wounded, and one tent only was allowed to each headquarters for use as an office."

McPherson states "Between this point and Resaca there are a half dozen good roads leading north toward Dalton down which a column of the enemy could march, making our advanced position a very exposed one." He is worried about his left flank. He did not know what was happening on his flanks coming thru the gap. The lack of cavalry eyes also slowed down his advance. Infantrymen had to stop and send out skirmishers to perform scouting duties routinely handled by mounted units. A division of cavalry would have helped in many ways. There were two cavalry units north of Villanow and located on Hookers right that Sherman could have joined McPherson’s force to perform the scouting duties McPherson needed.
Additionally, McPherson complains "the road is narrow and the country on either side is densely wooded." Adding "I had no cavalry except Phillips mounted men (a Regiment, about 600 men) to feel out on the flanks. If I could have had a division of good cavalry, I could have broken the railroad at some point."

Then, "Early this morning I sent out my engineer officers and selected a line which I think a good one, and have been fortifying it all day. The work has not progressed as satisfactorily as I could have wished, for want of intrenching tools in sufficient quantity, though we get along very well."

He complains that he was short of entrenching tools. This must have included the axes about which Thomas allegedly asked. Another logistical staff miscue?

Are these complaints really indictments of a lack of proper staff work and because of Sherman's desire to d o away with all the ‘impedimenta’?

Grant gave Sherman orders to be ready to start the campaign against Johnston by May 5. He had wanted an earlier April 27th start, but changed it to the 30th due to inclement weather in the east. So they changed the date to the fifth. McPherson was unable to get into position on the 5th because of his initial starting point (Huntsville, AL) and reached Snake Creek Gap on the evening of the 8th. Three days after Schofield and Thomas were already in place. Was Sherman uneasy about being late? Did he think his delay would upset Grant? After all, only five months ago (November 25th, 1863) Grant had to order Sherman ‘to attack’ Tunnel Hill, in no uncertain terms, after his failure to take the hill on November 24th, 1863.

So, Sherman, nervous about embarrassing himself in front of Grant and doing poorly, again, set the campaign in motion without: –

1. Properly manning his main strike force.

2. McPherson’s Infantry was undermanned by 20,000 and had virtually no cavalry.
His cavalry (a Regiment of Mounted Infantry 600 men) was augmented by Kilpatrick’s division, which, did not reach McPherson in time to scout either Snake Creek Gap or later the area around Resaca.

3. Therefore, no cavalry to scout the roads to the north leading to Dalton and none to break the railroad and scout the southern troop positions. Schofield had about 1,500 cavalry but had his left connected to Thomas’ his right was uncovered but, Thomas cavalry could have shifted to Schofield’s left and covered both Armies flank.

4. In the name of ‘mobility,’ Sherman did not permit enough equipment to be taken for McPherson’s use in entrenching and cutting through the woods thus slowing him.
Thus, no axes to clear the woods and too few entrenching tools to build fortification rapidly.
Because he was late, McPherson marched from Huntsville, Alabama to Snake Creek Gap in Georgia and arrived at the Gap the evening of the 8th. He entered the Gap the morning of the 9th and began his attempt to cut Johnston’s line to Atlanta. At 2:00PM he was a mile and a half from the railroad at Resaca.

5. But, the force that McPherson marched to Resaca was handicapped by a lack of combat power (roughly 20,000 men). As he entered the Snake Creek Gap, Mac posted Logan’s XV Corps at the north end of the gap to guard his trains and protect his rear and flank. Grenville M. Dodge’s XVI Corps (two divisions) was ordered to advance to Resaca and cut the Railroad if possible. This unit was weakened further by Dodges posting of one of the divisions as a left flank protection at a crossroads two miles west of Resaca. The final force available to Dodge to attack the (3000-4000) Rebels was thus only a division, which in those days was three brigades or about 3,000 men and some mounted infantry. As he moved on Resaca McPherson began to feel edgy about the forces he had seen there. He also began to entertain thoughts about what lay to his left or north . Without proper cavalry he was more or less blind to the possibilities. Although Dodge was within a 200 yards of the railroad, McPherson recalled him and retreated to the entrance of the gap.

6. On the 10th Sherman sent another division of Hookers Corp to widen the road to Resaca. Had McPherson had the proper compliment of men and tools he could have done this while advancing.

7.Sherman did not move his Army through the Gap until the 12th.

8. On the 13th Joe Johnston had his army entrenched around and north of Resaca.


9.It was Sherman’s poor planning and not McPherson’s "timidity’ that cost him the opportunity to trap Joe Johnston at Dalton and the chance to end the war in the west.

[ole]

McPherson's move was to have been a rapidly moving strike force designed to appear in Johnston's rear and destroy his line of communications with Atlanta. Virtually within a stone's throw of that railroad, he started imagining disaster. He saw troops and they looked more numerous than they were. He noted the fine roads to Dalton over which troops could be rushed to aid the Resaca defense and cut him off from the gap. He saw emplacements and earthworks behind which many more Confederates could be concealed. He determined that completing his assignment would be too risky.

Good, bad or indifferent, Sherman's planning had less to do with McPherson's failure than McPherson's quite reasonable reticence. He had an opportunity and with a bold move, could have changed the course of the war. It wasn't the first time such a circumstance presented itself, and it wasn't the last.

Ole

[samgrant]

McPherson was just riding down the road on the way to the sound of guns, when he was shot out of his saddle. He was not in the midst of the battle. It was, perhaps, a freak incident surrounding that battle.

[johan_steele]

Originally Posted by samgrant

McPherson was just riding down the road on the way to the sound of guns, when he was shot out of his saddle. He was not in the midst of the battle. It was, perhaps, a freak incident surrounding that battle.

McPherson was killed in the July Battle for Atlanta, not at Snake Creek.

I agree w/ Ole, he was cautious, some might say too cautious.

[oneplez]

"McPherson's move was to have been a rapidly moving strike force designed to appear in Johnston's rear and destroy his line of communications with Atlanta. Virtually within a stone's throw of that railroad, he started imagining disaster. He saw troops and they looked more numerous than they were. He noted the fine roads to Dalton over which troops could be rushed to aid the Resaca defense and cut him off from the gap. He saw emplacements and earthworks behind which many more Confederates could be concealed. He determined that completing his assignment would be too risky.
Good, bad or indifferent, Sherman's planning had less to do with McPherson's failure than McPherson's quite reasonable reticence. He had an opportunity and with a bold move, could have changed the course of the war. It wasn't the first time such a circumstance presented itself, and it wasn't the last."

I beg to differ with your last paragraph.

1. It was Sherman’s decision to change Thomas’ plan and substitute McPherson’s undermanned force for the Army of the Cumberland who numbered 65,000 troops. A force if not the same, was numerically larger than Johnston’s.

2. McPherson complained that he was in essence blind with out cavalry. This had to be with Sherman’s knowledge.

3. While he saw an number of Rebel troops and I believe engaged them at one point, he had no means of ascertaining how many they were and if there were others and how many. The fine roads he noted and left a division to guard while he moved on with his other division to connect with the railroad at Resaca. Now, Dodge with a force of around 3,000 men advanced on Resaca. He noted the entrenchments around the town. Of that force he sent 18 mounted Infantry to reconnoiter the area north of Resaca and break the line if possible. They managed to cut the telegraph lines and burned a structure near the railroad but did no damage to the railroad. Dodge was left with about 3,000 men to advance on and attack the Rebels in the entrenchments at Resaca.

4. In his message McPherson noted the need for a division of cavalry. He also noted the need for more entrenching tools. In an aside, when Thomas was told of McPherson’s complaint about the thickly wooded area he was advancing through as slowing him tremendously, Thomas asked "where were their axes?" A question he should have addressed to Sherman who had cut the number of tools allowed the armies to enhance their mobility.

5. McPherson left his other division under "Black Jack" Logan at the entrance of the Snake Creek Gap to guard his rear. Sherman ordered McPherson to break the railroad and return to the eastern outlet of the Gap and hit Johnston on the flank as he moved to Resaca. Now, with over half his force guarding the western Gap, no reinforcements that he knew of, unable to establish communications because of the wilderness he was in, he was ordered to hit the flank with about 9,000 men and no reserves, of Johnston’s Army of 60,000+ and Polk coming up from the south.

Sorry Ole, Mac did the best he could with what he had.
Not only were Sherman’s orders incredibly foolish, they were given with his knowledge and complicity


Don

[ole]

Not ignoring you Don, just trying to put the pieces together. Lots of opinions out there and very few facts.
Ole

[larry_cockerham]

Ole, lot's of facts, just not easy to find!

[ole]

How much blame for McPherson's timidity should Sherman get? Next to none.

It might be noted that McPherson made good time through Snake Creek Gap with only his regiment of Illinois Mounted Infantry (the 9th, I think). A larger force could have been useful to fan out from Sugar Valley to check north and south. Now shall we note that McP was an army commander. Would it be up to Sherman to tell McP that if he needed cavalry, he should ask for it?

McP could have used more entrenching tools. He might have known that before he set out as his orders were to break the railroad and then pull back to the gap and entrench. Should Sherman's orders have included, "By the way, you'll need entrenching tools; oh yes, and axes."

That one brigade of Dodge's corps was all there was left to press Resaca should be ascribed more to McP's disposition of his forces than to his lack thereof. He left a division at the head of the gap -- a couple of regiments could have done that. He left Logan's corps at the mouth of the gap. There was no reason to leave that many man idle. He covered a crossroads outside of Resaca with another division. Why? Apparently because he feared Johnston would move down that road. Then he strung out the rest of Dodge's corps until there was only a brigade left to make the smashing thrust he was instructed to make.

The ferocity with which he did his best is proved by his casualties: 6k, 23w, 12m. (Or something like that.) Not even Castel -- the famous cumpophobe -- blames Sherman for McPherson's failure.

He needed to rest the next day to provision his men as his wagons had not arrived. I suppose that's Sherman's fault as well. Can you imagine how delayed would be the train of a much larger force? Heck, the army would still be filing out of the gap and stepping all over each other.

Nope. He quite simply pulled a McClellan.
Ole

[oneplez]

It might be noted that McPherson made good time through Snake Creek Gap with only his regiment of Illinois Mounted Infantry (the 9th, I think). A larger force could have been useful to fan out from Sugar Valley to check north and south. Now shall we note that McP was an army commander. Would it be up to Sherman to tell McP that if he needed cavalry, he should ask for it?

1. Why do you assume he didn’t? You imply Mac was stupid as well as ‘timid.’ His almost total lack of cavalry must have been broached. My assumption is that Mac got a pat on the back and was told he’d get some. When it finally dawned on Sherman (May 7th) that Mac had no cavalry, he frantically tried to line up Garrard (too far away). Kilpatrick (same thing) and failed.

2. Well, Since I can’t find anything in the O. R.‘S about what discussion took place between Sherman and Mac about whether he needed cavalry we’ll have to assume that, that discussion took place. There is mention in Castel’s book that in discussion Mac and Willy apparently discussed the numbers of Rebels he might find. Missing cavalry must have been also.

McP could have used more entrenching tools. He might have known that before he set out as his orders were to break the railroad and then pull back to the gap and entrench. Should Sherman's orders have included, "By the way, you'll need entrenching tools; oh yes, and axes."

1. Entrenching tools and axes were a normal part of military equipment. Much as wagons, mules, ammunition and rifles. They were issued according to X number per regiment I believe. Sherman ordered that number (X) decreased, as well as the wagons to carry them. You want Mac to tell Sherman he’s wrong? If you’ll remember, Cump and Ullys liked Mac immensely. You think he developed that feeling by telling them their plans were all wet?

That one brigade of Dodge's corps was all there was left to press Resaca should be ascribed more to McP's disposition of his forces than to his lack thereof. He left a division at the head of the gap -- a couple of regiments could have done that. He left Logan's corps at the mouth of the gap. There was no reason to leave that many man idle. He covered a crossroads outside of Resaca with another division. Why? Apparently because he feared Johnston would move down that road. Then he strung out the rest of Dodge's corps until there was only a brigade left to make the smashing thrust he was instructed to make.

1. Maybe you can make troop dispositions from the safety of your keyboard, but it’s a lot different when you have to stand in the commanders shoes.

2. When he reached the mouth of the gap he had no idea of the situation around him. He could not communicate with Sherman or Thomas because he didn’t know their where abouts. Knowing he was in hostile territory, not knowing who surrounded him, because of lack of cavalry, he made his disposition based on his past experience. I can’t say with your certainty how many men are sufficient for those tasks. He had to rely on his prior experience.

The ferocity with which he did his best is proved by his casualties: 6k, 23w, 12m. (Or something like that.) Not even Castel -- the famous cumpophobe -- blames Sherman for McPherson's failure.

1. Ah! I see, casualties are the measure of success. Since he had only one slight engagement I wouldn’t expect to see a lot of blood shed. Your right, I think, Castel didn’t blame Sherman but Sherman did an excellent job of blaming McPherson, didn’t he?

He needed to rest the next day to provision his men as his wagons had not arrived. I suppose that's Sherman's fault as well. Can you imagine how delayed would be the train of a much larger force? Heck, the army would still be filing out of the gap and stepping all over each other.

1. How do you know this?

2. Um, I think while moving his infantry to the front Mac stripped out his train and artillery (?) So as not to impede the troopers (normal Army SOP at that time).. This is an item that Sherman failed to do when ordered by Grant to move ASAP to Chattanooga. He combined his trains and Infantry and artillery and as a consequence was very late getting to the front.

Nope. He quite simply pulled a McClellan.

1. McClellan wasn’t all that bad. Didn’t he win a couple battles? That’s more than you can say for Sherman.

2. Remember the old army saying: "S*** flows downhill." I’m sure some of our older recruits remember that.


Don

[oneplez]

Originally Posted by ole

Not ignoring you Don, just trying to put the pieces together. Lots of opinions out there and very few facts.
Ole

I noted your and Larry's comments above after I put together a response. Since I'm a newcomer to this board are we required to cite all our utterances?


Don