The Atlanta Campaign

[oneplez]

Originally Posted by trice

This sounds pretty reasonable to me.

McPherson's conduct is OK. It just isn't spectacular or bold, and towards the end leans well into prudence and caution. The problem is that he could have done so much more with the opportunity.

On "taking care of his command", he'd get an A. On "carrying out his mission", probably a C+ or B-. On "initiative and boldness", probably a C or less. I see the man as a mixed bag. I can see the good parts, what Sherman & Grant saw: a very competent, solid officer. What I miss is the exceptional part they saw in him. Maybe I would have seen it if he lived longer.

Regards,
Tim

OK. Lets try this!

Put yourself into a N.Y. city sized room.

I. Mac had no cavalry to see what was around him. He had never been near this room, of course didn’t know what was in it.

II. He knew that somewhere out there were friendly forces but, didn’t know where, couldn’t see them and couldn’t contact them.

III. He knew there were large enemy forces to his north and had to leave almost half of his combat force to guard his supplies and rear. He may also have know there was a large enemy for approaching from the south (Polk).

IV. With the other section of his army he moved to the east to find and attack and possibly destroy Rebel railroad tracks. As he passed through the east entrance to the gap, he was immediately attacked by a small detachment of mounted Rebels. He handily beat them off and proceeded east.

V. He discovered roads leading north on his right. He left half of his strike force to guard these roads.

VI. With the rest of the strike force he proceeded east again. He came to the town of Resaca, which he had never seen before and saw lines of entrenchments.

VII. He sent 18 of his Mounted Infantry to find the railroad. He sent his Corps commander (Dodge) to scout the town. Dodge selects Veach with two brigades to scout the area. Dodge, personally leading Veach’s detail, comes within a mile and half. Mac surveying the area and unaware of the details recalls them. Per orders they retreat to the eastern mouth of the gap and entrench.

VIII. “Your orders (from Sherman) are to pass through SNG, destroy the railroad, return to the mouth of the gap and be ready to pounce on Johnston’s flank as he retreats south to establish his Atlanta connections” (Castel, p. 138-139). If I were Mac, I’d do the same. He is following Sherman’s nebulous orders of which there are no actual copies. The orders as we receive them are from O.R.’s, letters to others etc. Mac was correct and as usual Sherman was wrong.

I totally agree with your last statement. “What I miss is the exceptional part they saw in him.” From my studies he was a competent, engineering type commander, But, no more.


Don

[trice]

Originally Posted by oneplez

OK. Lets try this!

Put yourself into a N.Y. city sized room.

I. Mac had no cavalry to see what was around him. He had never been near this room, of course didn’t know what was in it.

II. He knew that somewhere out there were friendly forces but, didn’t know where, couldn’t see them and couldn’t contact them.

III. He knew there were large enemy forces to his north and had to leave almost half of his combat force to guard his supplies and rear. He may also have know there was a large enemy for approaching from the south (Polk).

IV. With the other section of his army he moved to the east to find and attack and possibly destroy Rebel railroad tracks. As he passed through the east entrance to the gap, he was immediately attacked by a small detachment of mounted Rebels. He handily beat them off and proceeded east.

V. He discovered roads leading north on his right. He left half of his strike force to guard these roads.

VI. With the rest of the strike force he proceeded east again. He came to the town of Resaca, which he had never seen before and saw lines of entrenchments.

VII. He sent 18 of his Mounted Infantry to find the railroad. He sent his Corps commander (Dodge) to scout the town. Dodge selects Veach with two brigades to scout the area. Dodge, personally leading Veach’s detail, comes within a mile and half. Mac surveying the area and unaware of the details recalls them. Per orders they retreat to the eastern mouth of the gap and entrench.

VIII. “Your orders (from Sherman) are to pass through SNG, destroy the railroad, return to the mouth of the gap and be ready to pounce on Johnston’s flank as he retreats south to establish his Atlanta connections” (Castel, p. 138-139). If I were Mac, I’d do the same. He is following Sherman’s nebulous orders of which there are no actual copies. The orders as we receive them are from O.R.’s, letters to others etc. Mac was correct and as usual Sherman was wrong.

Most of the above, however is simply the normal things that would be expected for an officer commanding such a force. But if that statement out of Castel is really the orders McPherson was trying to carry out, he certainly did not destory the RR before retreating to the Gap.

One thing I have seen said is that McPherson had a talent for smoothing out quarrels between "professionals" and "amateurs". I think you will find Sherman mentioning this as one of the reasons he could not give McPherson a long leave in early 1864.

Regards,
Tim

[oneplez]

Well, let’s get the important things out of the way. At the moment I have 0 bottles of cognac or scotch at my elbow. I will shortly tho. Normally, I drink scotch, Johnny Walker Black, When occasions arise, sometimes they don’t even have to arise, I drink Hennessy VSOP. My favorite pre-dinner drink however, is a Tanqueray/Noilly Prat Martini, made by my wife. She can only mix that drink and only in one size but it is nectar. When asked for a shorter or larger version, she asks “do you want to make it?” I always answer No.

Reading about the Western Theater? That’s all I read about.

I originally read Catton’s works and became interested in this guy called the “Rock of Chickamauga.” I continued to read what there was about him and gradually started reading about the war in the west. You can’t read about GHT w/o exploring the West War. They are so intertwined. I found the existing historiography about both GHT and the WW wanting. There are somewhere near 2,000 books written about Grant and about 5 about Thomas. There is one book on the battle of Nashville, which battle is disparaged by Simpson, Grant’s votary or groupie, as able to have been fought by any capable commander. I am ambivalent about Grant as a commander and downright absolute in my low regard of Sherman as anything but.

I am pretty well convinced there are few “historians” out there. Mostly, I feel they are there for the money. I wrote to Morningside Books once asking why they don’t re-print more of the GHT books? Their answer “ we only print stuff that sells.” Ipso facto. Grant must sell. However, it beats the hell out of me that after 2,000+ books, what there is left to say about Grant. $$$$$$$

Tim: “I'm not quite sold on the idea that he would have suceeded where McPherson failed at Snake Creek Gap. That said, my only reason for saying such is my beliefe that Thomas really didn't like to take chances.”

I know Thomas would have succeeded. He always planned his battles to destroy his opponent. He didn’t like the halfway measures Sherman employed. With partial victories guaranteeing another battle to be fought.


Don


Originally Posted by oneplez
Shane! Lets discuss your first statement. I gather that you think the AOP was slow until Grant arrived. Is that correct? If the army were slow before his appearance, they should have remained slow after he arrived. He didn’t take control of the army but left it in Meade’s hands. That should mean it was as slow as it ever was. I think it stems from a practice of taking orders as "suggestions" there were numerous occasions where Generals were told to attack at a set time and they delayed for whatever reason... Meade was competant which is far more than can be claimed by several of his predecessors. I think the AoP had improved dramatically by early 63, well prior to Grant. You are basically correct on chain of orders; though it rarely reached so low into the chain as Company Commanders. Both the AoC (under Thomas) and the AoT under almost all of their commanders reacted to orders considerably quicker than the AoP and others.

Now the only way I see to speed up the army is to eliminate some of the chain of command. The AOTC and the AOT had the same chain of commands. If distances are the same, how then would one be slower than the other? They all usually marched at the same cadence. THe pace of march the Western troops set was considerably faster. IIRC the AoP only once came close to the pace set at Vicksburg or the March to the Sea and that was the holy **** moment of converging upon Gettysburg.

Sherman screwed up on a couple occasions, royally. However his movement crossing the TN was brilliant, his actions throughout the Vicksburg Campaign and others were not only competant but bordered on the brilliant. I'm not one that calls his actions in N Georgia brilliant but I have been over that terrain and Johnston did everything he could. And Sherman made no mistakes that cost him an army. "Lil Mac," Pope, Hooker, Burnside etc of the AoP could not have done what Sherman did against Johnston.

Where do I go wrong? Not intended as a slight... have you read alot on the western campaigns? I admit that has been my concentration for several years now and I have sorely neglected the Eastern sideshow as put on by the AoP & AoJ boys. They did most of their fighting in the papers anyway.

I agree! Granger saved ole Pap’s buns. A magnificent decision. GHT’s right was caving to Longstreet’s persistent attacks (he claimed after the war he made 25 separate attacks against Thomas’ right). Granger and that old Toledo, Ohio Sheriff, Jim Steedman, the stragglers and the rest of the AOTC made him. Thomas said at the grand parade in Washington as the XIV corps strode by that “they made the Rock, not I!” The old man spread the glory around. Thomas was not a braggart or glory seeker... he gave credit where credit was due. The number of stragglers and men who reformed on their own to fall in beside Thomas always interested me. A large portion of Brannon's unit made it to Thomas's flank and fought on. In fact IIRC the 2nd MN VI was the last unit to withdraw from the field in order; they did it w/ bayonets fixed as they were all but out of ammo. ****ed fine fighting men on both sides. Was it Longstreet that commented: "We would have crushed the AoP..." I've always liked Thomas, though he was far more of a spit and polish man than either Grant or Sherman; I'm nt quite sold on the idea that he would have suceeded where McPherson failed at Snake Creek Gap. That said, my only reason for saying such is my beliefe that Thomas really didn't like to take chances. Since I’m an newcomer here, I’d like to join your “Thomas Battalion.”

[johan_steele]

Originally Posted by oneplez

Well, let’s get the important things out of the way. At the moment I have 0 bottles of cognac or scotch at my elbow. I will shortly tho. Normally, I drink scotch, Johnny Walker Black, When occasions arise, sometimes they don’t even have to arise, I drink Hennessy VSOP. My favorite pre-dinner drink however, is a Tanqueray/Noilly Prat Martini, made by my wife. She can only mix that drink and only in one size but it is nectar. When asked for a shorter or larger version, she asks “do you want to make it?” I always answer No. I envy you... my wife won't even pour my drinks, I too prefer Hennessy & a good bottle of Black Label when the sin arises in me. In fact my better half has a tendency of stealing my liquor to GASP cook w/!!! A sin if I ever heard of one, no matter how good the food turns out being. Women eh?

Reading about the Western Theater? That’s all I read about. I'm working my way through a pair of Iowa diaries from Vicksburg and the Alabama Slave Narratives. What do you think of Upton?

I originally read Catton’s works and became interested in this guy called the “Rock of Chickamauga.” I continued to read what there was about him and gradually started reading about the war in the west. You can’t read about GHT w/o exploring the West War. They are so intertwined. I found the existing historiography about both GHT and the WW wanting. There are somewhere near 2,000 books written about Grant and about 5 about Thomas. There is one book on the battle of Nashville, which battle is disparaged by Simpson, Grant’s votary or groupie, as able to have been fought by any capable commander. I am ambivalent about Grant as a commander and downright absolute in my low regard of Sherman as anything but. I got started w/ my reading on Iowa & Wisconsin in the CW and later expanded it to include Minnesota & Illinois. I can't help but think back and I have a hard time recalling anything but praise for Sherman from enlisted men who served under his command. He had a tendency to avoid the pitched bloodbaths so common in the East preffering to manuever... Thomas was very calculating and very careful; Hood never had a chance against him. Sherman knew this which is why he wasn't concerned leaving Thomas in charge of TN... oh what a whipping he delivered Hood. In defense of Grant, I like the mans calm, something he shared w/ Thomas... you just couldn't rattle either man... no matter how bad the situation. As a note I am also a fan of Logan... a very intriguing fella.
I am pretty well convinced there are few “historians” out there. Mostly, I feel they are there for the money. I wrote to Morningside Books once asking why they don’t re-print more of the GHT books? Their answer “ we only print stuff that sells.” Ipso facto. Grant must sell. However, it beats the hell out of me that after 2,000+ books, what there is left to say about Grant. $$$$$$$ I tend to agree... same about Lee & Jackson.

I know Thomas would have succeeded. He always planned his battles to destroy his opponent. He didn’t like the halfway measures Sherman employed. With partial victories guaranteeing another battle to be fought. Thomas was one of those old reliable western generals that the CS couldn't adequetly deal w/. Thomas never realy had a chance to shine... though he did a number on Hood not once but several times... then again Hood was like a rabid dog in that he attacked w/ no thought of the lives of his men.


Don

I'm e thinking you a bottle of Hennessey I expect it to be drunk w/ appreciation soldier. Btw; welcome to the site.

[ole]

I. Mac had no cavalry to see what was around him. He had never been near this room, of course didn’t know what was in it.

Nor did any commander have a magic picture box that showed the enemy's intentions clearly (except McClellan before Antietam, but that's another thread.)

II. He knew that somewhere out there were friendly forces but, didn’t know where, couldn’t see them and couldn’t contact them.

The most usual condition for a commander. However, he was in contact with Hooker, at least one of whose divisions was available for call up.

III. He knew there were large enemy forces to his north and had to leave almost half of his combat force to guard his supplies and rear. He may also have know there was a large enemy for approaching from the south (Polk).

His suppies and rear were already covered by Geary's troops at Dug Gap. There was no danger of someone threatening that sector. If your can show one, I would very much appreciate it.

IV. With the other section of his army he moved to the east to find and attack and possibly destroy Rebel railroad tracks. As he passed through the east entrance to the gap, he was immediately attacked by a small detachment of mounted Rebels. He handily beat them off and proceeded east.

They were few and, of course, he sent them away. That force was, as it happened, belatedly sent to close the gap, and they could have if they had gotten there before McP. This, in its turn, demonstrates McP's rapidity of movement.

V. He discovered roads leading north on his right. He left half of his strike force to guard these roads.

These roads were built and/or improved by Johnston for enhacing movement upon the interior lines between Resaca and Dalton. They were, indeed, a threat to McP, but only if he took an entire day to get to the RR and destroy it. Of course, he couldn't know if reinforcements were on the way, but the access was certainly there for a force to come from the north and whale the tar out of him.

VI. With the rest of the strike force he proceeded east again. He came to the town of Resaca, which he had never seen before and saw lines of entrenchments.

Given that he didn't have the force necessary to resist a couple of divisions coming down the roads, it would seem that leaving a large force, that would be overwhelmed anyway, seems excessive. Mounted troops could have been posted to give an early-enough warning to pull back to the gap.

VII. He sent 18 of his Mounted Infantry to find the railroad. He sent his Corps commander (Dodge) to scout the town. Dodge selects Veach with two brigades to scout the area. Dodge, personally leading Veach’s detail, comes within a mile and half. Mac surveying the area and unaware of the details recalls them. Per orders they retreat to the eastern mouth of the gap and entrench.

Now here's a rub. His assigned objective was not Resaca but the RR north of it. I suppose the RR bridge would have come close to tearing up the track, but a single bridge does not equate with tearing up a mile or two of track.

VIII. “Your orders (from Sherman) are to pass through SNG, destroy the railroad, return to the mouth of the gap and be ready to pounce on Johnston’s flank as he retreats south to establish his Atlanta connections” (Castel, p. 138-139). If I were Mac, I’d do the same. He is following Sherman’s nebulous orders of which there are no actual copies. The orders as we receive them are from O.R.’s, letters to others etc. Mac was correct and as usual Sherman was wrong.

If you are going to cite a site and quote it, you could at least do it verbatum. Perhaps our edititions are at variance. "Nebulous orders" and "as usual[,] Sherman was wrong" are quite indicative of your approach to the subject.

I totally agree with your last statement. “What I miss is the exceptional part they saw in him.” From my studies he was a competent, engineering type commander, But, no more.

Here, we are in complete agreement. He was a golden boy. Why? There's got to be a big story in there.
Ole

[ole]

Hey, oneplez! Happened upon some interesting stuff. In the Savas/Woodbury book, The Atlanta Campaign, Volumes One and Two, an engineering type named Shiman drops the information that Dodge's Corps and Sweeney's Division (as well as others in McP's Corps) had brigade-level pioneer companies! Apparently, these companies were in existence during SNG, but I can't confirm that from the infiromation he had. (He does mention that record-keeping among Sherman's three armies was most notably lax in the AotT.)

It raises a whole bunch of new questions about that particular action.
Ole

These companies had their tools hauled in the brigade wagons unless on active campaign, during which they carried them. Have you got that book? A fascinating study of pioneers and their work. If you don't, you really should move it up a notch or two on your "must have" list. In fact, anyone interested in the Atlanta Campaign should have access to it.

[richard]

On July 9th, a party of First Tennessee Union Cavalry crossed the Chattahoochee river at Cochran's Ford. The party was lead by a young Tennessee Colonel Brownlow. He led his men on foot to the other side and into the woods. After traveling about 400 yards they reached a road and were able ot get behind a Rebel out post that was firing on a group of Union men trying to reach that side of the river. Forming a line, Brownlow"s men moved with in about 25 yards of the outpost and then charged.

The Rebels, at the site of seeing 10 men charging them wearing nothing but there cartridge boxes, becamed so unnerved that that most of them fled under "heavy fire".

from "Sherman's Horsemen" page 27

[ole]

The Rebels, at the site of seeing 10 men charging them wearing nothing but there cartridge boxes, becamed so unnerved that that most of them fled under "heavy fire".

Are you leaving something out here?
Ole

Miracle number one: I found the book within 30 seconds. (Number two I will convert my Squirt into a fine Rheinhessen.) The guys were quite naked. They had piled their clothing and accoutrements into a canoe they guided across the water, being themselves in the water. (Which doesn't explain how they happened to charge wearing nothing but cartridge boxes -- guess you hadda been there -- but it is funnier with the addition of "nothing but cartridge boxes.") Three of the 12 or 9 Confederates were captured and were said to have complained, "Taint fair to come at us that way."

[johan_steele]

Originally Posted by ole

Are you leaving something out here?
Ole

Miracle number one: I found the book within 30 seconds. (Number two I will convert my Squirt into a fine Rheinhessen.) The guys were quite naked. They had piled their clothing and accoutrements into a canoe they guided across the water, being themselves in the water. (Which doesn't explain how they happened to charge wearing nothing but cartridge boxes -- guess you hadda been there -- but it is funnier with the addition of "nothing but cartridge boxes.") Three of the 12 or 9 Confederates were captured and were said to have complained, "Taint fair to come at us that way."

Similar to the charge of the Naked Norsemen... only no CS soldier in his right mind was going to let himself get captured by a bunch of naked Norwegians.... that would be outright crazy!

[oneplez]

I. Mac had no cavalry to see what was around him. He had never been near this room, of course didn’t know what was in it.

Ole: Nor did any commander have a magic picture box that showed the enemy's intentions clearly

Don: That's not what I said. Normally commanders tried to find out what was happening on their flanks. If they couldn’t they “refused” their lines to prevent surprise attacks on that sector. It was not possible for Mac to refuse his fluid lines so he did the next best thing, he posted units to guard the obvious points of attack on his flank by the Rebels.

Quote:
II. He knew that somewhere out there were friendly forces but, didn’t know where, couldn’t see them and couldn’t contact them.

Ole: The most usual condition for a commander. However, he was in contact with Hooker, at least one of whose divisions was available for call up.

Don: He was not in contact with Hooker until after noon. He wrote a note to Sherman, then to Hooker, requesting Hooker cover his trains and the SNG entrance. Williams was sent that nite around 8:00PM and was in position as directed by Mac at 10:00AM.

Quote:
III. He knew there were large enemy forces to his north and had to leave almost half of his combat force to guard his supplies and rear. He may also have known there was a large enemy for approaching from the south (Polk).

Ole: His supplies and rear were already covered by Geary's troops at Dug Gap. There was no danger of someone threatening that sector. If your can show one, I would very much appreciate it.

Don: Not hardly! On the 8th, Geary was under orders to take Dug Gap by Thomas as a diversion for McPherson at roughly 4:00PM. He charged and was engaged in a nite attack that tied him up until he was notified Mac was in possession of SNG on the 9th.

Quote:
IV. With the other section of his army he moved to the east to find and attack and possibly destroy Rebel railroad tracks. As he passed through the east entrance to the gap, he was immediately attacked by a small detachment of mounted Rebels. He handily beat them off and proceeded east.

Ole: They were few and, of course, he sent them away. That force was, as it happened, belatedly sent to close the gap, and they could have if they had gotten there before McP. This, in its turn, demonstrates McP's rapidity of movement.

Don: “Rapidity?” He entered the Gap “Early on the morning of the 9th, and reached the vicinity of Resaca at 2:00PM, if we say “early” was 8:00AM it took Mac 6 hours to march 5 - 6 miles. And you guys wanto call Thomas “Slow?”

Quote:
V. He discovered roads leading north on his right. He left half of his strike force to guard these roads.

Ole: These roads were built and/or improved by Johnston for enhacing movement upon the interior lines between Resaca and Dalton. They were, indeed, a threat to McP, but only if he took an entire day to get to the RR and destroy it. Of course, he couldn't know if reinforcements were on the way, but the access was certainly there for a force to come from the north and whale the tar out of him.

Don: How does he know how much time is available to destroy the RR?

Quote:
VI. With the rest of the strike force he proceeded east again. He came to the town of Resaca, which he had never seen before and saw lines of entrenchments.

Ole: Given that he didn't have the force necessary to resist a couple of divisions coming down the roads, it would seem that leaving a large force, that would be overwhelmed anyway, seems excessive. Mounted troops could have been posted to give an early-enough warning to pull back to the gap.

Don: I can’t understand your statement?

Quote:
VII. He sent 18 of his Mounted Infantry to find the railroad. He sent his Corps commander (Dodge) to scout the town. Dodge selects Veach with two brigades to scout the area. Dodge, personally leading Veach’s detail, comes within a mile and half. Mac surveying the area and unaware of the details recalls them. Per orders they retreat to the eastern mouth of the gap and entrench.

Ole: Now here's a rub. His assigned objective was not Resaca but the RR north of it. I suppose the RR bridge would have come close to tearing up the track, but a single bridge does not equate with tearing up a mile or two of track.

Don: The single bridge would have also stopped Polk’s troops from reinforcing Johnston. Destroying both bridges would have doomed Johnston.

Quote:
VIII. “Your orders (from Sherman) are to pass through SNG, destroy the railroad, return to the mouth of the gap and be ready to pounce on Johnston’s flank as he retreats south to establish his Atlanta connections” (Castel, p. 138-139). If I were Mac, I’d do the same. He is following Sherman’s nebulous orders of which there are no actual copies. The orders as we receive them are from O.R.’s, letters to others etc. Mac was correct and as usual Sherman was wrong.

Ole: If you are going to cite a site and quote it, you could at least do it verbatum. Perhaps our edititions are at variance. "Nebulous orders" and "as usual[,] Sherman was wrong" are quite indicative of your approach to the subject.

Don: My! Pickey, Pickey, Pickey. Since several people have been quoting Castel on and off I saw no reason to give the full cite. Besides, this is supposed to be a discussion not a formal paper. Are you saying I have no right to an opinion? The fact that it disagrees with your sounds a little intolerant to me. Are you in charge of free speech here?

Quote:
I totally agree with your last statement. “What I miss is the exceptional part they saw in him.” From my studies he was a competent, engineering type commander, But, no more.

Ole: Here, we are in complete agreement. He was a golden boy. Why? There's got to be a big story in there.

Don: There are bigger and better stories to investigate than Mac’s incompetence. Such as why Sherman is ever purported to be a “Great general.” Tell me, what battles did he ever win? Even the battle we discuss here is not his creation. Then when he recognized it's merits, he screwed it up - royally. His piece de resistance, his magnum opus, the “March to the Sea,” was derived from his subordinate Thomas. How is recognizing failure “intolerant?”