Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
On the other hand, Sherman wanted the movement to be quick. Not a word in Thomas' vocabulary. It might not have been Sherman's motivation. It might just be that Sherman was sending his protege off to get some glory to add to his resume. It might be that Sherman preferred his AotT to be the victorious body. It remains, as Tim has pointed out, Sherman's choice and, as it turned out, had disappointing results.
Next question, would a different commander have reached the same conclusion as McP? That the risk of Johnston sweeping down on his left was simply too great?
McP's report to Sherman on the 10th strikes me as an excuse for not breaking the RR. I could've, if ..... He made it through the gap without a division of cavalry; he pulled back into a defensive position with inadequate entrenching tools. Then he justified his action with "could've, if ...." We tend to criticize rashness in a commander. It worked for Lee, and Hood took it to a new level. If ever there was a time for risk, Resaca, May 9, 1864 was that time.
McP may well have been judicious in his caution. I don't know that we can judge it differently. He saw his task and judged that the risk, as he saw it, was too great. It was Sherman's fault in that he should have sent a more seasoned commander with a demonstrated history of 'nads. Shall we say that Sherman pushed favoritism a bit too far with his choice?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
On the other hand, Sherman wanted the movement to be quick. Not a word in Thomas' vocabulary. It might not have been Sherman's motivation. It might just be that Sherman was sending his protege off to get some glory to add to his resume. It might be that Sherman preferred his AotT to be the victorious body. It remains, as Tim has pointed out, Sherman's choice and, as it turned out, had disappointing results.
Next question, would a different commander have reached the same conclusion as McP? That the risk of Johnston sweeping down on his left was simply too great?
McP's report to Sherman on the 10th strikes me as an excuse for not breaking the RR. I could've, if ..... He made it through the gap without a division of cavalry; he pulled back into a defensive position with inadequate entrenching tools. Then he justified his action with "could've, if ...." We tend to criticize rashness in a commander. It worked for Lee, and Hood took it to a new level. If ever there was a time for risk, Resaca, May 9, 1864 was that time.
McP may well have been judicious in his caution. I don't know that we can judge it differently. He saw his task and judged that the risk, as he saw it, was too great. It was Sherman's fault in that he should have sent a more seasoned commander with a demonstrated history of 'nads. Shall we say that Sherman pushed favoritism a bit too far with his choice?
Ole
Ole brings up an excellent point, why didn't Sherman use Thomas and the AoC? First I believe Sherman knew that the AoT could move further faster than the AoC as they proved in the Vicksburg campaign. And I believe he thought the AoT a far tougher outfit than the AoC... I believe he had reason to believe such as Shiloh, the Vicksburg campaign etc had proven to him. The AoC could hold when attacked as they had shown at Stones River and somewhat at Chickamauga etc.
Both Grant & Sherman believed that McP was the brightedt rising star in the war... what bassis is their for such a belief? I don't know and far brighter minds than I have questioned such a belief.
McP was certainly not rash, he might be called steady and dependable instead.
__________________ Few take the trouble to understand or to view the American scene with perspective. And we Americans love to find ourselves guilty of something. However, it is never I who am guilty, but those other Americans, the past or present government or the other political party. Americans almost never find other countries guilty. It is always ourselves or our fancied influence in other countries. Louis L'amour
On the other hand, Sherman wanted the movement to be quick. Not a word in Thomas' vocabulary. It might not have been Sherman's motivation. It might just be that Sherman was sending his protege off to get some glory to add to his resume. It might be that Sherman preferred his AotT to be the victorious body. It remains, as Tim has pointed out, Sherman's choice and, as it turned out, had disappointing results.
Next question, would a different commander have reached the same conclusion as McP? That the risk of Johnston sweeping down on his left was simply too great?
McP's report to Sherman on the 10th strikes me as an excuse for not breaking the RR. I could've, if ..... He made it through the gap without a division of cavalry; he pulled back into a defensive position with inadequate entrenching tools. Then he justified his action with "could've, if ...." We tend to criticize rashness in a commander. It worked for Lee, and Hood took it to a new level. If ever there was a time for risk, Resaca, May 9, 1864 was that time.
McP may well have been judicious in his caution. I don't know that we can judge it differently. He saw his task and judged that the risk, as he saw it, was too great. It was Sherman's fault in that he should have sent a more seasoned commander with a demonstrated history of 'nads. Shall we say that Sherman pushed favoritism a bit too far with his choice?
Ole
This sounds pretty reasonable to me.
McPherson's conduct is OK. It just isn't spectacular or bold, and towards the end leans well into prudence and caution. The problem is that he could have done so much more with the opportunity.
On "taking care of his command", he'd get an A. On "carrying out his mission", probably a C+ or B-. On "initiative and boldness", probably a C or less. I see the man as a mixed bag. I can see the good parts, what Sherman & Grant saw: a very competent, solid officer. What I miss is the exceptional part they saw in him. Maybe I would have seen it if he lived longer.
Ole brings up an excellent point, why didn't Sherman use Thomas and the AoC? First I believe Sherman knew that the AoT could move further faster than the AoC as they proved in the Vicksburg campaign. And I believe he thought the AoT a far tougher outfit than the AoC... I believe he had reason to believe such as Shiloh, the Vicksburg campaign etc had proven to him. The AoC could hold when attacked as they had shown at Stones River and somewhat at Chickamauga etc.
Why didn’t Sherman use Thomas? Remember what happened at Missionary Ridge? First Sherman was slow getting to Chattanooga because of his marching orders (mixed infantry, trains and arty together and slowed down the march), For which he apologized to Grant profusely. Then he more of less sat out the Battle of MR. Thomas got the headlines and Sherman had to beg for recognition. Secondly (although this gives him credit for recognizing a brilliant battle plan, something he never conceived himself), he apparently thought GHT’s plan a winner. He may have recognized that such a plan may have ended the war in the west in a week. He may also have recognized that he would win more headlines and plaudits for his audacity. At any rate he bought it, then screwed it up. Additionally, he no doubt knew that GHT received buckets of headlines for his stand at Snodgrass Hill, while he, Sherman had never won a battle. Also, many people remembered his exploits in Kentucky and the spell he went thru. We now know that you don’t cure mental illness by rest. This may have been a lingering symptom of his affliction with this decision. Remember later, when McPherson was killed, Sherman let the AOT fight unaided (except for some arty help from Schofield), because they might get jealous if assisted by another unit. This is another of his juvenile actions (similar to sending Mac thru the SNG instead of GHT) that might have defeated the Rebels and ended the war in the west. In other words I believe WTS was jealous of GHT and didn’t want to give him a chance at more glory!
I don’t understand how the AOTC can be called slow by you guys other than as in mimicry of others. The AOP, AOTT and the ANV were larger than the AOTC. Were they commensurately slower? Why are there no criticisms of their being slow?
Lastly, why do you imply that the AOTC held ‘somewhat’ at Chickamauga? Isn’t that where GHT was nicknamed “The Rock”
Why didn’t Sherman use Thomas? Remember what happened at Missionary Ridge? First Sherman was slow getting to Chattanooga because of his marching orders (mixed infantry, trains and arty together and slowed down the march), For which he apologized to Grant profusely. Then he more of less sat out the Battle of MR. Thomas got the headlines and Sherman had to beg for recognition. Secondly (although this gives him credit for recognizing a brilliant battle plan, something he never conceived himself), he apparently thought GHT’s plan a winner. He may have recognized that such a plan may have ended the war in the west in a week. He may also have recognized that he would win more headlines and plaudits for his audacity. At any rate he bought it, then screwed it up. Additionally, he no doubt knew that GHT received buckets of headlines for his stand at Snodgrass Hill, while he, Sherman had never won a battle. Also, many people remembered his exploits in Kentucky and the spell he went thru. We now know that you don’t cure mental illness by rest. This may have been a lingering symptom of his affliction with this decision. Remember later, when McPherson was killed, Sherman let the AOT fight unaided (except for some arty help from Schofield), because they might get jealous if assisted by another unit. This is another of his juvenile actions (similar to sending Mac thru the SNG instead of GHT) that might have defeated the Rebels and ended the war in the west. In other words I believe WTS was jealous of GHT and didn’t want to give him a chance at more glory!...
...Lastly, why do you imply that the AOTC held ‘somewhat’ at Chickamauga? Isn’t that where GHT was nicknamed “The Rock”
Don
Some very good insight into the Sherman / Thomas relationship. Thank you, Don.
However to your last question regarding Thomas at Snodgrass Hill allow me to offer an opinion. First, I will acknowledge Thomas's performance was above and beyond and to stay where and when he did took big cajones. But, although I have not gone back to look, it seems that I remember that Thomas's position was only pressed by those Confederate troops already there when the Federal line broke that day, that no more troops were called from the Confederate center and left to move against Thomas. Thomas's position was located where, by holding it, he was able to effectively cover the Federal retreat. But since there was no organized pursuit of the Federal retreat (which would have brought a goodly portion of the available portion of the AOT through or near Thomas's position heading for Rossville Gap) how hard was he actually and eventually pressed? Confeds all over the field pretty much stopped and dropped where they were when the fighting stopped in their front.
Again, please don't take this as a knock against Thomas because it took a lot of courage, control and loyalty for he and his men to stay there. (And Thomas is one of my favorites in blue.) But the action on Snodgrass Hill was not nearly as bad as it could have been and I think a lot of people see it for what it could have been and not as what actually occurred.
Some very good insight into the Sherman / Thomas relationship. Thank you, Don.
However to your last question regarding Thomas at Snodgrass Hill allow me to offer an opinion. First, I will acknowledge Thomas's performance was above and beyond and to stay where and when he did took big cajones. But, although I have not gone back to look, it seems that I remember that Thomas's position was only pressed by those Confederate troops already there when the Federal line broke that day, that no more troops were called from the Confederate center and left to move against Thomas. Thomas's position was located where, by holding it, he was able to effectively cover the Federal retreat. But since there was no organized pursuit of the Federal retreat (which would have brought a goodly portion of the available portion of the AOT through or near Thomas's position heading for Rossville Gap) how hard was he actually and eventually pressed? Confeds all over the field pretty much stopped and dropped where they were when the fighting stopped in their front.
Again, please don't take this as a knock against Thomas because it took a lot of courage, control and loyalty for he and his men to stay there. (And Thomas is one of my favorites in blue.) But the action on Snodgrass Hill was not nearly as bad as it could have been and I think a lot of people see it for what it could have been and not as what actually occurred.
I’m not sure I differ with your assessment of the Snodgrass situation. Polk’s troops had beat themselves out on Thomas’s barricades and according to Bragg at least, were not of much use. Once Granger and Steedman were in position, all Thomas had to worry about was the gap to Brannan’s right. If he could maintain that he was OK. Longstreet never saw the gap or at least never attempted to employ it. So along with the big cajones, the old man got a little lucky.
Things apparently looked so rosy Granger suggested an attack on the Rebels in the morning. Not sure if Garfield seconded that idea. But, some of the other AOTC commanders got to feeling their oats in Granger’s fashion. GHT, prudent as ever, started moving his troops out at dark.
Don’t worry about my taking knocks against GHT, I’ve been arguing for his generalship for about 15 years and am convinced he was THE best in the war. In fact, I think had he accepted leadership of the AOP, he might have made Bobby Lee dance a little faster.
By the way, I prefer your analyses, instead of cuts and pastes of the O.R.’s.
I don’t understand how the AOTC can be called slow by you guys other than as in mimicry of others. The AOP, AOTT and the ANV were larger than the AOTC. Were they commensurately slower? Why are there no criticisms of their being slow?
Lastly, why do you imply that the AOTC held ‘somewhat’ at Chickamauga? Isn’t that where GHT was nicknamed “The Rock”
Don
I do think the AoP to have been too slow on numerous occasions but they were plagued by poor leadership for at least half the war.
It has been argued by Woodworth and others that the AoT US was the finest Army of the War... I'm not 100% sure I agree w/ such an assessment but I can see where such an idea came from. Compare the mileage marched as just one measurement of accomplishment... AoP doesn't hold a candle. In my own opinion both the AoT & AoC were heads and shoulder above the AoP.
Thomas held w/ over half of the AoC skedaddling from the field along w/ it's CO and if Granger hadn't marched to the sounds of the guns Thomas likely would have had a hell of a problem. But it was Thomas that earned the nickname "Rock" that day. His men fought like lions and those men who fell in w/ his regiments... wow. I'm not certain another army, on either side, could have accomplished what Thomas and his men did that day on Snodgrass hill. I like Thomas and think him a capable commander; though he was cautious... too cautious; not in my view.
__________________ Few take the trouble to understand or to view the American scene with perspective. And we Americans love to find ourselves guilty of something. However, it is never I who am guilty, but those other Americans, the past or present government or the other political party. Americans almost never find other countries guilty. It is always ourselves or our fancied influence in other countries. Louis L'amour
Why didn’t Sherman use Thomas? Remember what happened at Missionary Ridge? First Sherman was slow getting to Chattanooga because of his marching orders (mixed infantry, trains and arty together and slowed down the march), For which he apologized to Grant profusely. Then he more of less sat out the Battle of MR. Thomas got the headlines and Sherman had to beg for recognition. Secondly (although this gives him credit for recognizing a brilliant battle plan, something he never conceived himself), he apparently thought GHT’s plan a winner. He may have recognized that such a plan may have ended the war in the west in a week. He may also have recognized that he would win more headlines and plaudits for his audacity. At any rate he bought it, then screwed it up. Additionally, he no doubt knew that GHT received buckets of headlines for his stand at Snodgrass Hill, while he, Sherman had never won a battle. Also, many people remembered his exploits in Kentucky and the spell he went thru. We now know that you don’t cure mental illness by rest. This may have been a lingering symptom of his affliction with this decision. Remember later, when McPherson was killed, Sherman let the AOT fight unaided (except for some arty help from Schofield), because they might get jealous if assisted by another unit. This is another of his juvenile actions (similar to sending Mac thru the SNG instead of GHT) that might have defeated the Rebels and ended the war in the west. In other words I believe WTS was jealous of GHT and didn’t want to give him a chance at more glory!
Sherman considered himself a friend of Thomas, or at least he said so. They were both Class of 1840 at West Point (Sherman 6th and Thomas 12th in a class of 42). In early 1864, Sherman told Grant it didn't matter which one of them he put in charge because they would each give whole-hearted co-operation to the other.
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
I don’t understand how the AOTC can be called slow by you guys other than as in mimicry of others. The AOP, AOTT and the ANV were larger than the AOTC. Were they commensurately slower? Why are there no criticisms of their being slow?
Plenty of criticisms exist of the AoP for being slow, and the AotT was more disjointed and paralyzed by the commanders than slow. Hard to find examples of ANV slowness causing a problem.
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
Lastly, why do you imply that the AOTC held ‘somewhat’ at Chickamauga? Isn’t that where GHT was nicknamed “The Rock”
Since the entire right wing had been smashed and was fleeing the field -- including the commander Rosecrans and Sheridan, among others -- it seems reasonable to say "somewhat".
I do think the AoP to have been too slow on numerous occasions but they were plagued by poor leadership for at least half the war.
It has been argued by Woodworth and others that the AoT US was the finest Army of the War... I'm not 100% sure I agree w/ such an assessment but I can see where such an idea came from. Compare the mileage marched as just one measurement of accomplishment... AoP doesn't hold a candle. In my own opinion both the AoT & AoC were heads and shoulder above the AoP.
Thomas held w/ over half of the AoC skedaddling from the field along w/ it's CO and if Granger hadn't marched to the sounds of the guns Thomas likely would have had a hell of a problem. But it was Thomas that earned the nickname "Rock" that day. His men fought like lions and those men who fell in w/ his regiments... wow. I'm not certain another army, on either side, could have accomplished what Thomas and his men did that day on Snodgrass hill. I like Thomas and think him a capable commander; though he was cautious... too cautious; not in my view.
Shane! Lets discuss your first statement. I gather that you think the AOP was slow until Grant arrived. Is that correct? If the army were slow before his appearance, they should have remained slow after he arrived. He didn’t take control of the army but left it in Meade’s hands. That should mean it was as slow as it ever was.
My argument is that armies are not slow because of size. In the chain of command the army commander gives the order of battle to his corps commanders in a meeting or via written orders. Those orders are passed on to the division commanders, then to the brigade commanders, then to the regimental commanders, to the company commander and then the men. If the army has one, two or three corps the orders arrive at the same time, I think.
Now the only way I see to speed up the army is to eliminate some of the chain of command. The AOTC and the AOT had the same chain of commands. If distances are the same, how then would one be slower than the other? They all usually marched at the same cadence.
Where do I go wrong?
I agree! Granger saved ole Pap’s buns. A magnificent decision. GHT’s right was caving to Longstreet’s persistent attacks (he claimed after the war he made 25 separate attacks against Thomas’ right). Granger and that old Toledo, Ohio Sheriff, Jim Steedman, the stragglers and the rest of the AOTC made him. Thomas said at the grand parade in Washington as the XIV corps strode by that “they made the Rock, not I!” The old man spread the glory around.
Since I’m an newcomer here, I’d like to join your “Thomas Battalion.”
Shane! Lets discuss your first statement. I gather that you think the AOP was slow until Grant arrived. Is that correct? If the army were slow before his appearance, they should have remained slow after he arrived. He didn’t take control of the army but left it in Meade’s hands. That should mean it was as slow as it ever was. I think it stems from a practice of taking orders as "suggestions" there were numerous occasions where Generals were told to attack at a set time and they delayed for whatever reason... Meade was competant which is far more than can be claimed by several of his predecessors. I think the AoP had improved dramatically by early 63, well prior to Grant. You are basically correct on chain of orders; though it rarely reached so low into the chain as Company Commanders. Both the AoC (under Thomas) and the AoT under almost all of their commanders reacted to orders considerably quicker than the AoP and others.
Now the only way I see to speed up the army is to eliminate some of the chain of command. The AOTC and the AOT had the same chain of commands. If distances are the same, how then would one be slower than the other? They all usually marched at the same cadence. THe pace of march the Western troops set was considerably faster. IIRC the AoP only once came close to the pace set at Vicksburg or the March to the Sea and that was the holy **** moment of converging upon Gettysburg.
Sherman screwed up on a couple occasions, royally. However his movement crossing the TN was brilliant, his actions throughout the Vicksburg Campaign and others were not only competant but bordered on the brilliant. I'm not one that calls his actions in N Georgia brilliant but I have been over that terrain and Johnston did everything he could. And Sherman made no mistakes that cost him an army. "Lil Mac," Pope, Hooker, Burnside etc of the AoP could not have done what Sherman did against Johnston.
Where do I go wrong? Not intended as a slight... have you read alot on the western campaigns? I admit that has been my concentration for several years now and I have sorely neglected the Eastern sideshow as put on by the AoP & AoJ boys. They did most of their fighting in the papers anyway.
I agree! Granger saved ole Pap’s buns. A magnificent decision. GHT’s right was caving to Longstreet’s persistent attacks (he claimed after the war he made 25 separate attacks against Thomas’ right). Granger and that old Toledo, Ohio Sheriff, Jim Steedman, the stragglers and the rest of the AOTC made him. Thomas said at the grand parade in Washington as the XIV corps strode by that “they made the Rock, not I!” The old man spread the glory around. Thomas was not a braggart or glory seeker... he gave credit where credit was due. The number of stragglers and men who reformed on their own to fall in beside Thomas always interested me. A large portion of Brannon's unit made it to Thomas's flank and fought on. In fact IIRC the 2nd MN VI was the last unit to withdraw from the field in order; they did it w/ bayonets fixed as they were all but out of ammo. ****ed fine fighting men on both sides. Was it Longstreet that commented: "We would have crushed the AoP..." I've always liked Thomas, though he was far more of a spit and polish man than either Grant or Sherman; I'm nt quite sold on the idea that he would have suceeded where McPherson failed at Snake Creek Gap. That said, my only reason for saying such is my beliefe that Thomas really didn't like to take chances.Since I’m an newcomer here, I’d like to join your “Thomas Battalion.”
Don
As Ole would say Velkomonnen (sp?) and I would say... Hmmm, is that Cognac or Scotch in that bottle beside you?
I will warn you, us westerners have converted a few people to the dark side, wholeheartedly believing the war was won or lost in the west depending upon outlook.
__________________ Few take the trouble to understand or to view the American scene with perspective. And we Americans love to find ourselves guilty of something. However, it is never I who am guilty, but those other Americans, the past or present government or the other political party. Americans almost never find other countries guilty. It is always ourselves or our fancied influence in other countries. Louis L'amour
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