Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
Castel’s and McMurry’s efforts are considered by many as the top contributions in that area. That you dispute their conclusions means little, their scholarship has been proven, unlike yours and mine.
I agree that their scholarship is considered among the best available. Although their opinions and interpretations may be based on more facts than you and I have, their opinions and interpretation are no better than those of other historians nor, for that matter, yours or mine.
Quote:
I agree! You make assumptions w/o basis (see quote).
What assumption did I make without basis?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Don:
I have no idea what books you have read on Sherman. My inference was that you seem to have accepted the anti-Sherman ones as opposed to the pro-Sherman ones. To me, that indicates a bias.
I am more than willing to accept an anti-Sherman attitude or bias -- he had his weaknesses and obvious mistakes. But I do object to carrying that attitude to an extreme that he did not earn.
Some objectively thinking, sincere scholars have assigned Sherman the fault for McPherson's failure at Resaca. As you've obviously noted, I do not share that view. The reasoning is my own, uninfluenced by far better historians than I. I have yet to understand why Sherman should be held culpable for the inaction of a subordinate army commander. McPherson could have done it if ... McPherson was in charge of the if. He was, as we now know, overly cautious. (Note: Just read in Ted Savas' Atlanta Campaign, a statement by McMurry in a short essay on Johnston, that an "overly cautious commander" stood in the way of Johnston's destruction. How 'bout that? In his book, Atlanta, 1864, he says it was Sherman's fault.
The facts are: Sherman sent McP through Snake Creek Gap to break the railroad connection from Atlanta to Dalton. McP did not. McP explained why he did not. Beyond that, we're playing paddly-whacks. Should McP have risked an assault? Was he justified in his caution? Had he been Grant or Sherman, what would he have done? All opinion. It didn't happen. Sherman was disappointed but he took it in stride and moved on, revising his plans for the new situation. Where is the problem? "*it happens. Sometimes the magic works; sometimes it doesn't. Sherman moved on. Perhaps we should, as well?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
... The facts are: Sherman sent McP through Snake Creek Gap to break the railroad connection from Atlanta to Dalton. McP did not. McP explained why he did not. Beyond that, we're playing paddly-whacks. Should McP have risked an assault? Was he justified in his caution? Had he been Grant or Sherman, what would he have done? All opinion. It didn't happen. Sherman was disappointed but he took it in stride and moved on, revising his plans for the new situation. Where is the problem? "*it happens. Sometimes the magic works; sometimes it doesn't. Sherman moved on. Perhaps we should, as well?
Ole
My feeling on this is that McPherson's later failure before Atlanta in similar circumstances reinforces the case for criticizing him here. In either case, aggressive action by McP might have resulted in the smashing of Confederate resistance and a quick end to the campaign, probably/possibly shortening the war. Either one alone can be chalked up to bad luck and the fortunes of war, to a new Army level commander feeling his way, etc. Both together within two months or so indicates McP lacked something, and his record should be examined for it.
Sherman, OTOH, is the one who chose McPherson to lead the flank movement at Snake Creek Gap. The original idea came from Thomas' AoC, and featured Thomas moving down there with a stronger force, IIRR, than McPherson had. Sherman is rarely examined for that choice. I find it hard to believe that Thomas would have pulled back as McPherson did if he had been the one leading that thrust.
Sherman also blew another chance to smash the rebel AoT at the end of August. If you look at the fighting around Jonesborough, you'll find Sherman blaming one of his Corps commanders for being late to get in position. If they had come up, he might have smashed 2/3rds of Hood's army to splinters. But the reason they did not come up was that Sherman had ordered them to destroy the RR as they went -- a RR that was already cut by their presence and which could be ripped up at leisure if the rebel army was beaten. Sherman seemed far too concerned with RRs and the city of Atlanta when the opportunity to destroy a major Confederate field army was at hand.
Sherman, OTOH, is the one who chose McPherson to lead the flank movement at Snake Creek Gap. The original idea came from Thomas' AoC, and featured Thomas moving down there with a stronger force, IIRR, than McPherson had. Sherman is rarely examined for that choice. I find it hard to believe that Thomas would have pulled back as McPherson did if he had been the one leading that thrust.
Sherman also blew another chance to smash the rebel AoT at the end of August. If you look at the fighting around Jonesborough, you'll find Sherman blaming one of his Corps commanders for being late to get in position. If they had come up, he might have smashed 2/3rds of Hood's army to splinters. But the reason they did not come up was that Sherman had ordered them to destroy the RR as they went -- a RR that was already cut by their presence and which could be ripped up at leisure if the rebel army was beaten. Sherman seemed far too concerned with RRs and the city of Atlanta when the opportunity to destroy a major Confederate field army was at hand.
Regards,
Tim
You are right as rain! So did the idea of a move to Atlanta. Mentioned to Grant in Feb. (See OR’s)
Tim, there’s a lot of good reading in McKinney and Castel, Stanley (Personal Memoirs of Major-General David S. Stanley), also the general you mentioned above. Kerksis, “The Atlanta Papers,” Boynton’s “Sherman’s Historical Raid. The Memoirs In Light of the Record.” There are others, but these came to mind. Many writers feel this was the first of many mistakes by Sherman.
Tim, you skipped right over a dozen or more lost opportunities by Sherman that occurred between Snake Creek Gap and Jonesboro. One occurred during the battle for Resaca. He had both the RR and wagon bridges within range of Logan’s arty, and did nothing to interdict their use by Johnston. We know this was true because Logan commented, in the O.R.’s I believe, that ‘his boys threw a few rounds at the bridges and caused the Reb’s some discomfiture.’ Another possibility was that by someone’s foresight Sweeny’s division crossed the Oostanaula at Lay’s Ferry, just south of the Resaca bridges. But no one ever gave him orders to attack or destroy the bridges from the south or hit Johnston’s column as it came by. During the battle of Resaca Sherman first ordered Hooker to hit Johnston’s right (JEJ’s right extended north of Resaca, his left south and east of the Bridges), a move that would have driven the Confederates south toward the bridges and Atlanta. Had he ordered McPherson and whoever was lined up on his left east to block off the bridges he would have had JEJ trapped. I think this amounts to almost a mistake a day.
Gentlemen:
To say Sherman was responsible for McP's failure at Resaca is the same as saying that Davis was responsible for Bragg and Hood and......... nevermind.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Gentlemen:
To say Sherman was responsible for McP's failure at Resaca is the same as saying that Davis was responsible for Bragg and Hood and......... nevermind.
Ole
Sherman is responsible for what he was responsible for. So is McPherson.
If McPherson thought he needed more cavalry, or entrenching tools, or troops of any kind, or anything else, he had more than enough time to work through the details before he started. He could have supplied deficiencies on his own, or appealed to Sherman for what he needed. It is unlikely that Sherman would have denied him any reasonable request, if well presented.
Sherman was the man making the decisions -- in practical terms the one who was in ultimate command (Grant being too far away to have any real say in the practical details of the campaign). He was the one who approved McPherson's operation -- heck, he was the one who assigned McPherson to it when the original plan was for Thomas to make the move. As such, he is responsible for the choice of commander and supplying whatever was needed to make that operation/commander successful. If McPherson was not bold enough for this risky venture, Sherman is the one who chose him for it.
McPherson's failure, IMHO, is that he is not aggressive enough when faced with a huge opportunity. He seems to feel the pressure of the clouded tactical situation too much; he pulls back under too little pressure; as Grant would charge of AoP commanders, he was too worried about what the enemy might do to him and not concerned enough with what he might do to the enemy. I feel that his actions before Atlanta at the time of Peachtree Creek show the same tendency.
Sherman's failure, I think, was rooted in his lack of confidence in his own tactical/offensive ability. He almost never made determined efforts that involved his whole force -- and when he did they turned out badly. His skill lay in non-tactical areas. He undertsood the strategic and operational importance of RRs, rivers, and industrial/agricultural production, of the morale of the populace, as well or better than anyone else. But tactically, he was a poor offensive leader and only a good one defensively because of his courage and determination under pressure (see Shiloh).
In the case of Snake Creek Gap, Sherman is responsible for the overall preparation for the operation, and the overall operation of all three armies. This includes the choice of McPherson for command of the crucial operation, so any failure by McPherson reflects upwards to him to some extent. If reinforcements did not arrive in time, if needed material was not in place and the need could reasonably have been anticipated by Sherman, then Sherman bears some of the responsibility.
IMHO, McPherson's failure at Resaca is caused by his personality/temperment/mindset. He saw himself as out on a limb (which he was). He saw danger from gathering Confederate forces (which did exist). He saw the possibility that his support might not arrive in time (which was possible). When he began to meet resistance, the weight of these doubts caused him to be more and more cautious, and eventually influenced him to take the course of withdrawing to the gap and entrenching in strong defensive position. In hindsight, it is easy to see this was exactly the wrong thing to do.
McPherson's conduct is very good up until he is through the Gap, mediocre afterwards. He is like a skater who had the gold within his grasp, got conservative in the last minute of his long program, fell, and ended up fourth.
It is easy to be too hard on the man -- but Grant and Sherman both thought he was something special and I can't see it. I could probably name a dozen or more senior commanders, Union and Confederate, who would have done worse. Heck, we can probably find a half-dozen or more examples of worse performances just by looking at Chickamauga. What makes Snake Creek Gap so remarkable is the size of the lost opportunity: if Resaca falls, Johnston's AoT is either destroyed by Sherman or forced to retreat across the mountains towards the Carolinas.
To look at the other side of it, though, I can also picture a handful of generals who might have won the war in an afternoon here. Drop Grant, or Sheridan, or Hancock, or Robert E. Lee, or Stonewall Jackson, or Forrest, or Stuart, even Longtreet or Thomas in McPherson's place and I think the Atlanta Campaign is won for the Union that day. All of those are exceptional leaders who demonstrated they had the particular skill for independent command needed (Longstreet least of them). Possibly Rosecrans would have done better as well; maybe a healthy Hood. At the most critical moments, McPherson seems to come up just short of that standard on the tactical battlefield.
But what no one ever seems to wonder about is the lacksadasical preparation by J. E. Johnston that allowed all this to happen in the first place. With four months in command, with no active campaigning and plenty of time to study and map and anticipate every alternative, how could he possibly have been surprised like this?
Johnston was one of the better CSA generals, but he is, by some partisans, overrated. His failure to block the gap (a brigade with artillery could have stopped it up against any number sent through it -- the bigger the force, the better) begs credulity. What he did send to block it, upon becoming aware of McP's movement, was too little and too late.
Sherman's troops vastly outnumbered Johnston but Johnston's desire for a situation in which he could triumph (but which never seemed to occur) led to his strategic withdrawal strategy. With a great deal of hindsight, we seem to have determined that there were many CSA leaders who might have done a better job, but they were stuck with Johnston.
Just a thought.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Sherman is responsible for what he was responsible for. So is McPherson.
If McPherson thought he needed more cavalry, or entrenching tools, or troops of any kind, or anything else, he had more than enough time to work through the details before he started. He could have supplied deficiencies on his own, or appealed to Sherman for what he needed. It is unlikely that Sherman would have denied him any reasonable request, if well presented.
Sherman was the man making the decisions -- in practical terms the one who was in ultimate command (Grant being too far away to have any real say in the practical details of the campaign). He was the one who approved McPherson's operation -- heck, he was the one who assigned McPherson to it when the original plan was for Thomas to make the move. As such, he is responsible for the choice of commander and supplying whatever was needed to make that operation/commander successful. If McPherson was not bold enough for this risky venture, Sherman is the one who chose him for it. Regards,
Tim
Therefore resonsible for the outcome. I pointed out that Sherman finally recognized on May 7th that Mac needed some cavalry. He tried to get Garrard and Fitzpatrick (?) to him but, they were too far away. This is not Mac's fault but it was his problem.
Mac may not have been as bold as us armchair generals but going into an uncharted, unknown (He had never seen this place before) and little travelled area, I think he did the best he could. He had no cavalry, (thanks, Cump), he had few entrenching tools, (Thanks, Cump), his Infantry dwindled to probably less than one division to attack over 4,000 Rebels at Resaca (thanks, Cump). You'll remember he let half of Dodges Corps go and fight with Banks and let all of Blairs Corps back in Huntsville or Memphis on veterans furlough or re-fitting. One of Logans divisions was left in Alabama. All these items beyond his control, but not Shermans. His original manpower count was in the 40,000's. He wound up with around 20,000 and no cavalry. Do you really think he never mentioned these problems to Cumpy?
Sherman, OTOH, is the one who chose McPherson to lead the flank movement at Snake Creek Gap. The original idea came from Thomas' AoC, and featured Thomas moving down there with a stronger force, IIRR, than McPherson had. Sherman is rarely examined for that choice. I find it hard to believe that Thomas would have pulled back as McPherson did if he had been the one leading that thrust.
Regards,
Tim
Uh Tim! I've been examining Sherman for that choice and more. I also don't find it hard to believe that the "Rock of Chickamauga" would have pulled back for anything.
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