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It wasn't because N.B. Forrest didn't try that the Nashville-Chattanooga survived.
Larry: Yes. He tried a lot and on several occasions succeeded in varying degrees. Unfortunately for Forrest and the CSA, US preparations and readiness were such that, however bad the break, it was quickly repaired and open again.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Two months is an eternity in war time. If Sherman had lost his RR link to Chattanooga and Nashville for two weeks, he'd have been in a world of hurt.
Quote:
Originally Posted by larry_cockerham
It wasn't because N.B. Forrest didn't try that the Nashville-Chattanooga survived.
Forrest did not get the chance to strike at Sherman's supply route until after Atlanta had already fallen. He first moves out against it in late September, then hits it again in October, then is called to join Hood for the Franklin & Nashville Campaign.
Sherman had carefully built up the infrastructure for his supplies before the campaign started. Three separate routes brought supplies to Nashville: the RR from KY, the riverboats on the Cumberland, and the riverboat-RR route down the Tennessee to Johnsonville where they were trans-shipped to RR cars for Nashville. Sherman completed the unfinished RR to Nashville and built the base at Johnsonville for this last one.
From Nashville to Chattanooga, Sherman had 2 RR lines: the eastern route through Murfreesboro and the western route through Franklin and Columbia. The USMRR ran this as a one-way loop, with loaded southbound traffic going through Murfreesboro and returning empties going through Franklin.
South of Chattanooga (really south of Rocky Face), Sherman had a single RR line.
Sherman spent considerable effort on protecting this vital route. Substantial gunboat forces were deployed along the Tennessee River, guardposts and blockhouses were constructed and garrisoned at all vital points, and what would now be called "quick reaction" forces were set up to pursue and attack raiders. Further forces could be called from major strongpoints (like Murfreesboro, Nashville, Chattanooga, etc.), transported by RR or riverboat, to help close in on raiders. Additional strongpoints were established as Sherman's campaign extended southward. He also established major supply dumps at the forward end of the line as he moved to smoothe out interruptions along the line. In short, Sherman managed the supply route the way professional logisticians/soldiers would. (Even the European militaries studied this after the war, amazed at what had been accomplished.)
To keep Forrest away from it, Sherman organized one thrust after another into Mississippi. Since Forrest was the sole defender of the area, he was tied down far from Sherman's vital supply line. No one in the Confederacy had the cold-blooded iron will to order Forrest into Tennessee and leave northern Mississippi to its fate. Forrest may have fought brilliantly from May-to-July against this pressure, but no success he had there would affect the Atlanta Campaign decisively. (He did keep several thousand troops from joining Sherman, but Sherman was willing to accept that to keep Forrest far away.)
Other Confederates did try to hit this, and were unable to have any noticeable effect. Hood sent Wheeler against it in late August and September (much too late, and just when he could have used Wheeler the most back at Atlanta). Wheeler did what he usually did. His raid created some confusion and noise; he had little efffect on Sherman (Sherman actually welcomed his raid and launched the final move that led to the fall of Atlanta); Wheeler barely scratched the RR; and Wheeler's force ended up broken down and useless at the end of the raid.
It was at this point that Forrest came up to raid Sherman's line. Atlanta had already fallen and he passed through Wheeler's worn-out units as he did. Forrest first hit the western side, the route through Columbia and Franklin. Where Wheeler's damage had shut the eastern side down less than a day, Forrest's raid did so much damage the USMRR estimated six weeks to get back in operation. This forced the returning trains to use the eastern route, reducing the capacity of that line.
Forrest then reorganized and hit the Tennessee River route. He seized and sunk Union ships, blockaded the river for a few days, hit Johnsonville. He sank a number of gunboats and reduced the warehouses and wharves at Johnsonville to smouldering ashes. This reduced the flow of supplies into Nashville. In two raids against the targets within his range, Forrest had done significant damage.
This was all much too late. Sherman was already in Atlanta and considering the march across Georgia to Savannah. His troops were living well, foraging on the rich country around Atlanta. This sort of damage, inflicted in May-June-July, would have caused a serious issue for Sherman. In August he was probably well enough established to deal with it for a period of two weeks or more. It became part of the argument for abandoning Atlanta, marching through Georgia, and sending Thomas back to TN to deal with Hood and the rest.
Tim, after reading your last post, it is obvious you've been doing some studying. I can find no flaws. I believe the Nashville-Decatur line through Columbia was utilized a bit less because of easier access by the Confederates and also the fact that the Nashville-Cowan-Stevenson-Chattanooga route was a little more direct and easier to defend. That's where eccentric old Gen. Robert H. Milroy came into play. Crazy as he was, he did his job as provost reasonably well.
Tim, after reading your last post, it is obvious you've been doing some studying. I can find no flaws. I believe the Nashville-Decatur line through Columbia was utilized a bit less because of easier access by the Confederates and also the fact that the Nashville-Cowan-Stevenson-Chattanooga route was a little more direct and easier to defend. That's where eccentric old Gen. Robert H. Milroy came into play. Crazy as he was, he did his job as provost reasonably well.
It wasn't actually being used "less". The USMRR was routing returning cars over it to optimize traffic. As a result, reinforcements and supplies (ammo, food, fodder, medicine, etc.) was generally on the harder to reach eastern side while the cars on the Franklin-Columbia route were generally empty (or carrying wounded, etc.). The eastern route looks more direct from Nashville-Chattanooga, while the western route is probably longer; hauling mostly empty cars, the western route may have taken about the same time.
I would agree one consideration here was that the distance from a major Confederate force made the eastern leg harder to hit. But the western leg required getting over the Tennessee River, which was patroled by Union gunboats and where constant searches were made to destroy any Rebel means of crossing.
If Forrest had been able to come up and hit Sherman's line around June 1, he might have seriously damaged the western line. That in turn would have reduced the carrying capacity from Nashville to Chattanooga, because the empties would have to go back on the track through Murfreesboro, creating scheduling problems. Sherman established forward depots at Chattanooga and beyond to ease such problems, but if continued long enough they would become serious.
That is why Sherman spent so much force and effort keeping Forrest tied up in Mississippi. Sturgis left Memphis with 8300 men and 22 guns on the same day Forrest was leaving to hit Sherman's LOC (May 31), forcing Forrest to return but leading to Forrest's brilliant Brice's Crossroads victory. Sherman then sent A. J. Smith and Mower after him. This led to the bloody repulse at Harrisburg. Smith returned to Memphis and set out on another raid, which Forrest countered by raiding Memphis itself. Then Forrest was sent to Mobile when that point seemed threatened, about as far as he could get from Sherman's LOC. That takes us into September. During all this time, Forrest has been occupied reacting to Federal movements. He did well, but from a grand strategic sense he was taken out of the Atlanta Campaign picture until after the city fell.
Although they could not really catch/beat him in the field, these Union efforts kept Forrest away from the only task that really might have changed the war. Sherman knew what he was doing on that level, and did it well.
That is why Sherman spent so much force and effort keeping Forrest tied up in Mississippi. Sturgis left Memphis with 8300 men and 22 guns on the same day Forrest was leaving to hit Sherman's LOC (May 31), forcing Forrest to return but leading to Forrest's brilliant Brice's Crossroads victory. Sherman then sent A. J. Smith and Mower after him. This led to the bloody repulse at Harrisburg. Smith returned to Memphis and set out on another raid, which Forrest countered by raiding Memphis itself. Then Forrest was sent to Mobile when that point seemed threatened, about as far as he could get from Sherman's LOC. That takes us into September. During all this time, Forrest has been occupied reacting to Federal movements. He did well, but from a grand strategic sense he was taken out of the Atlanta Campaign picture until after the city fell.
Although they could not really catch/beat him in the field, these Union efforts kept Forrest away from the only task that really might have changed the war. Sherman knew what he was doing on that level, and did it well.
Regards,
Tim
Tim; thank you for a succinct explanation as to why Forrest was unable to harrass Shermans supply lines. There is no way I could have explained it so simply.
__________________ Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
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3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
Tim; thank you for a succinct explanation as to why Forrest was unable to harrass Shermans supply lines. There is no way I could have explained it so simply.
Thanks. Lots of other people have followed the same chain of logic, so I can't claim any credit for reasoning it out. Grant and Sherman clearly understood it at the time, without hindsight, which gives them a leg up on the ladder when the praise is passed around.
In many ways this all comes down to soldiers being professional. It is hard to deal with a leader like Forrest (or Stonewall Jackson, etc.) who accomplishes so much with natural talent. Faced with that, the true "professional" does everything he can to minimize the ways he can be hurt, and maximize the ways he can hurt the enemy. (Much like a heavy-hitting boxer faced with a faster fighter cutting down the ring to control the flow of the fight.)
So all the forts/blockhouses/etc. don't make the RR invulnerable -- they make it harder to hit and damage, while the rapid repair crews get the RR back up and running quicker. The garrisons delay and slow the raiders, and the roving patrols and pursuit groups pressure them. The idea is to make sure they don't have the time to do real damage, hound them whenever possible, wear them down, and hopefully get a break that allows you to trap them.
Men like Wheeler were essentially thwarted by such procedures. You can make the argument that most of his raids were negatives for the Confederacy. Forrest, more than anyone else, was successful against all this.
He did it -- without the training -- the way military professionals would do it. He always had good intel before starting. He routinely inspected his command, culled out the sick and the broken-down, before starting. He ensured tactical control over his chosen ground, rarely being surprised because of the screens he maintained. He concentrated his force against smaller segments of the enemy, taking them in bite-sized chunks. Much of his combat success is actually based on his use of artillery -- in particular, he took many of those blockhouses by putting a few 3" shells through the walls after he had the garrison pinned inside.
It is also noteworthy how many of his senior commanders actually had military training in one form or another. Forrest might not have had the education himself, but he exceled at getting talented people to work under him. It is also obvious that he was a top-notch organizer who saw through to the critical aspects of a situation quickly, and learned from his mistakes.
So what Sherman is doing here is true professionalism at work. It stymies the mediocre raiders, and only a phenom like Forrest is a true threat. There Sherman concentrates on running Forrest ragged, keeping him at arm's length, and pressuring him at every opportunity.
Much like what Grant did to Lee, actually. Finding he couldn't outbox Lee, and couldn't quite beat him in a stand-up fight in the trenches, he ties him up while the rest of the Confederacy wasted away under the pressure of the rest of Grant's force. Once again, professionalism at work.
OK. Read the page twice and haven't figured out what is supposed to be there that says McP was decieved into thinking he would have cavalry or that he discussed the situation with Sherman before he set out.I believe you have reference to Sherman's general orders for the movement of his three armies. I was aware of that order, which is why I asked, "specifically for this effort." McP certainly would have been free to bring a wagon with axes, picks and shovels without violating the spirit of the order.
Ole
My eyes may have crossed at this point. Try p. 117.
Don't have McKinney, but Castel and McMurry would be hard put to find anything good to say about Sherman. There are as many other who lean the other way. If your choice is to read only those critical, then there's not much point in pursuing a "what if."Ole
Castel’s and McMurry’s efforts are considered by many as the top contributions in that area. That you dispute their conclusions means little, their scholarship has been proven, unlike yours and mine.
I agree! You make assumptions w/o basis (see quote).
This refers to Sherman's orders made to his three armies at the end of April. My contention is that those orders were not made specifically for McP's move, and that McP could have easily have modified them to include tools while staying within the "rapid movement" spirit of those orders.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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