The Atlanta Campaign

[ole]

By Ole: Would it be up to Sherman to tell McP that if he needed cavalry, he should ask for it?

By oneplez: 1. Why do you assume he didn’t? You imply Mac was stupid as well as ‘timid.’ His almost total lack of cavalry must have been broached. My assumption is that Mac got a pat on the back and was told he’d get some. When it finally dawned on Sherman (May 7th) that Mac had no cavalry, he frantically tried to line up Garrard (too far away). Kilpatrick (same thing) and failed.

I assume he didn't because I have found no record pro or con. I do not imply that McP was stupid nor do I say that he was timid -- just in this case. You assume McP was deceived into thinking he would have cavalry. If you provide some evidence for the basis of that assumption, I might agree.

2. Well, Since I can’t find anything in the O. R.‘S about what discussion took place between Sherman and Mac about whether he needed cavalry we’ll have to assume that, that discussion took place. There is mention in Castel’s book that in discussion Mac and Willy apparently discussed the numbers of Rebels he might find. Missing cavalry must have been also.

Why will we have to assume that either discussion took place? I'm not aware if or when Willy and McP even had a conversation about it.

By ole: McP could have used more entrenching tools. He might have known that before he set out as his orders were to break the railroad and then pull back to the gap and entrench. Should Sherman's orders have included, "By the way, you'll need entrenching tools; oh yes, and axes."

1. Entrenching tools and axes were a normal part of military equipment. Much as wagons, mules, ammunition and rifles. They were issued according to X number per regiment I believe. Sherman ordered that number (X) decreased, as well as the wagons to carry them. You want Mac to tell Sherman he’s wrong? If you’ll remember, Cump and Ullys liked Mac immensely. You think he developed that feeling by telling them their plans were all wet?

You'll have to show me where Sherman ordered that number decreased, specifically for this effort,before I'll accept that McP wasn't free to modify Sherman's much earlier strictures on impediments. And you are implying that McP gained favor by being a synchophant. That casts a pall on Sherman and Grant as well as McP.

By ole: That one brigade of Dodge's corps was all there was left to press Resaca should be ascribed more to McP's disposition of his forces than to his lack thereof. He left a division at the head of the gap -- a couple of regiments could have done that. He left Logan's corps at the mouth of the gap. There was no reason to leave that many man idle. He covered a crossroads outside of Resaca with another division. Why? Apparently because he feared Johnston would move down that road. Then he strung out the rest of Dodge's corps until there was only a brigade left to make the smashing thrust he was instructed to make.

by oneplez: 1. Maybe you can make troop dispositions from the safety of your keyboard, but it’s a lot different when you have to stand in the commanders shoes.

He was an army commander and I am not. I question McP's performance with the same authority you have to blame Sherman.

(snip -- repetitive, obvious)

by ole: The ferocity with which he did his best is proved by his casualties: 6k, 23w, 12m. (Or something like that.) Not even Castel -- the famous cumpophobe -- blames Sherman for McPherson's failure.

by oneplez: 1. Ah! I see, casualties are the measure of success. Since he had only one slight engagement I wouldn’t expect to see a lot of blood shed. Your right, I think, Castel didn’t blame Sherman but Sherman did an excellent job of blaming McPherson, didn’t he?

Casualties are evidence not of success but of effort. And I will ask for the basis of "Sherman did an excellent job of blaming McPherson, didn't he"?

By

: He needed to rest the next day to provision his men as his wagons had not arrived. I suppose that's Sherman's fault as well. Can you imagine how delayed would be the train of a much larger force? Heck, the army would still be filing out of the gap and stepping all over each other.

by oneplez: 1. How do you know this?

How do I know what? About waiting for his wagons, I read it in at least three sources. About the time involved? Extrapolation. If McP moved 20,000 men (forget the wagons) through the gap in X hours, how long would it have taken to move 40,000 men? Add an extra factor for getting messages from one end to the other. This is one reason Sherman wanted McP to make the move -- smaller, faster, and more nimble, a quick strike, ruined LoC for Joe.

by oneplez: 2. Um, I think while moving his infantry to the front Mac stripped out his train and artillery (?) So as not to impede the troopers (normal Army SOP at that time).. This is an item that Sherman failed to do when ordered by Grant to move ASAP to Chattanooga. He combined his trains and Infantry and artillery and as a consequence was very late getting to the front.

I'd prefer to keep this discussion on Snake Creek Gap.

by oneplez: 1. McClellan wasn’t all that bad. Didn’t he win a couple battles? That’s more than you can say for Sherman. 2. Remember the old army saying: "S*** flows downhill." I’m sure some of our older recruits remember that.

McP also won battles. Sherman won campaigns. Relevancy of the effects of gravity on doodoo?

Ole

[johan_steele]

Originally Posted by oneplez

I noted your and Larry's comments above after I put together a response. Since I'm a newcomer to this board are we required to cite all our utterances?


Don

I for one will ask for consistancy; be prepared to cite a source if someone questions where info came from. Some are quick to cry foul or accuse individuals of inventing stuff (regardless of the source cited)... curiously he has stayed off this thread.

I for one do not expect footnotes unless I believe the source is suspect in which case I might ask for a specific page #. But for credability purposes leave off sources such as customer reviews on Amazon, blatantly partisan websites or other equally ridiculous references.

I have a tendency to list what books I got ideas or info from but probably couldn't give a page number w/out rereading half the book. This is a discussion board; no grades are given out.

Keep it civil and polite and don't worry about it. If you have an opinion you will eventually offend someone here.

As a note I am staying away from this thread... due to a lack of time. The Georgia campaign is a favorite of mine and Shermans AoT as well & I wish I had more time...

Woodworths Nothing But Victory is a splendid source as is Cox's, Campaigns of the Civil War.-IX. Atlanta. I'm fond of both Castel & Cannan's work on the subject as well.

I believe McPherson made a mistake at Snake Creek Gap, not Sherman but I don't fault the man. He was cautious in an environment where caution was warrented and I don't believe Sherman faulted him overly for his caution. That said that was one of very few mistakes Sherman's command had an opportunity to take advantage of when dealing w/ Johnston.

[ole]

I noted your and Larry's comments above after I put together a response. Since I'm a newcomer to this board are we required to cite all our utterances?

Only if asked, Don. My latest is overlong only because you had so many points to answer. So, in deference to those who are following, I quoted mine and yours and then added mine. Nothing required in that. It just makes things easier to follow. I appreciate it when others do it, particularly in those discussions that land somewhere over my head. I try to follow them and am helped in that when I am shown specifically to what the response is directed.

Some subjects just naturally generate short back-and-forth discussion. Others tend to create a maze from which it's difficult to extricate oneself. Just play it the way it feels right to you. The only real rule is to play nice, put back what you take out, always say please, and use your inside voice.

Ole

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by ole

Only if asked, Don. My latest is overlong only because you had so many points to answer. So, in deference to those who are following, I quoted mine and yours and then added mine. Nothing required in that. It just makes things easier to follow. I appreciate it when others do it, particularly in those discussions that land somewhere over my head. I try to follow them and am helped in that when I am shown specifically to what the response is directed.

Some subjects just naturally generate short back-and-forth discussion. Others tend to create a maze from which it's difficult to extricate oneself. Just play it the way it feels right to you. The only real rule is to play nice, put back what you take out, always say please, and use your inside voice.

Ole

Ole sometimes approaches eloquence, as you will see, Don. His sentiments are usually similar to my own. Please continue to teach us your views and enjoy yourself in the process. We welcome a new perspective and an eager mind.

[samgrant]

Posted this before, someplace:

Prolific military historian, Mark Grimsley, has an interesting 7 part series addressing and analyzing the Snake Creek Gap issue:

See 'Snake Bite' Part 1, here and follow the links:


http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index....y050822-182206
__________________

[ole]

Excellent link, Sam. Enjoyed it immensely.
Ole

[oneplez]

By Ole: Would it be up to Sherman to tell McP that if he needed cavalry, he should ask for it?

oneplez: Why do you assume he didn’t? You imply Mac was stupid as well as ‘timid.’ His almost total lack of cavalry must have been broached. My assumption is that Mac got a pat on the back and was told he’d get some. When it finally dawned on Sherman (May 7th) that Mac had no cavalry, he frantically tried to line up Garrard (too far away). Kilpatrick (same thing) and failed.

ole: I assume he didn't because I have found no record pro or con. I do not imply that McP was stupid nor do I say that he was timid -- just in this case. You assume McP was deceived into thinking he would have cavalry. If you provide some evidence for the basis of that assumption, I might agree.

Castel, Albert, "Decision in the West," p. 116


Don: Well, Since I can’t find anything in the O. R.‘S about what discussion took place between Sherman and Mac about whether he needed cavalry we’ll have to assume that, that discussion took place. There is mention in Castel’s book that in discussion Mac and Willy apparently discussed the numbers of Rebels he might find. There was also the train ride that Mac an Sherman took to Chattanooga. Cavalry assignments must have been discussed also.

ole: Why will we have to assume that either discussion took place? I'm not aware if or when Willy and McP even had a conversation about it.




By ole: McP could have used more entrenching tools. He might have known that before he set out as his orders were to break the railroad and then pull back to the gap and entrench. Should Sherman's orders have included, "By the way, you'll need entrenching tools; oh yes, and axes."
Don: Entrenching tools and axes were a normal part of military equipment. Much as wagons, mules, ammunition and rifles. They were issued according to X number per regiment I believe. Sherman ordered that number (X) decreased, as well as the wagons to carry them. You want Mac to tell Sherman he’s wrong? If you’ll remember, Cump and Ullys liked Mac immensely. You think he developed that feeling by telling them their plans were all wet?

Sherman Memoirs " . . . . .to make these troops as mobile as possible, I made the strictest possible orders in relation to wagons and all species of incumbrances and impedimenta whatever. Each officer and soldier was required to carry on his horse or person food and clothing enough for five days. To each regiment was allowed but one wagon and one ambulance, and to the officers of each company one pack horse or mule.
Each division and brigade was provided a fair proportion of wagons for a supply train, and these were limited in their loads to carry food, ammunition, and clothing. Tents were forbidden to all save the sick and wounded, and one tent only was allowed to each headquarters for use as an office."

Ole: You'll have to show me where Sherman ordered that number decreased, specifically for this effort, before I'll accept that McP wasn't free to modify Sherman's much earlier strictures on impediments.

McKinney, Francis F., "Education in Violence", p. 322, Americana House, Inc. Chicago, Illinois, 1991.

Sherman’s Memoirs, vol. II, Chapter XVI

Castel, Albert, "Decision in the West," p. 117


By ole: That one brigade of Dodge's corps was all there was left to press Resaca should be ascribed more to McP's disposition of his forces than to his lack thereof. He left a division at the head of the gap -- a couple of regiments could have done that. He left Logan's corps at the mouth of the gap. There was no reason to leave that many man idle. He covered a crossroads outside of Resaca with another division. Why? Apparently because he feared Johnston would move down that road. Then he strung out the rest of Dodge's corps until there was only a brigade left to make the smashing thrust he was instructed to make.


oneplez: Maybe you can make troop dispositions from the safety of your keyboard, but it’s a lot different when you have to stand in the commanders shoes.

ole: He was an army commander and I am not. I question McP's performance with the same authority you have to blame Sherman.

DonL I have a lot of help questioning Sherman’s incompetancy

McKinney, Francis F., "Education in Violence", p. 324, Americana House, Inc. Chicago, Illinois, 1991.

McMurray, Richard M., "Atlanta, 1864," pp-65, University of Nebraska Press, 2000

Castel, Albert, "Decision in the West," p. 181-2


by ole: The ferocity with which he did his best is proved by his casualties: 6k, 23w, 12m. (Or something like that.) Not even Castel -- the famous cumpophobe -- blames Sherman for McPherson's failure.


oneplez: Ah! I see, casualties are the measure of success. Since he had only one slight engagement I wouldn’t expect to see a lot of blood shed. Your right, I think, Castel didn’t blame Sherman but Sherman did an excellent job of blaming McPherson, didn’t he?

Ole: Casualties are evidence not of success but of effort. And I will ask for the basis of "Sherman did an excellent job of blaming McPherson, didn't he"?

Don: Sherman to Halleck: "Mac was timid."

O.R and Memoirs.

McMurray, Richard M., "Atlanta, 1864," pp-65, University of Nebraska Press, 2000


ole: He needed to rest the next day to provision his men as his wagons had not arrived. I suppose that's Sherman's fault as well.


oneplez: How do you know this?
"Mid-morning of the 10th, . . . Sherman ordered McPherson to dig in and wait reinforcements . . . ."
Davis, Stephen, "Atlanta will Fall." p.44


Ole: How do I know what? About waiting for his wagons, I read it in at least three sources.


Oneplez: What sources?


About the time involved? Extrapolation. If McP moved 20,000 men (forget the wagons) through the gap in X hours, how long would it have taken to move 40,000 men? Add an extra factor for getting messages from one end to the other. This is one reason Sherman wanted McP to make the move -- smaller, faster, and more nimble, a quick strike, ruined LoC for Joe.


Don: Didn’t work did it?


Don : In addition by your definition, if size is a measure of slowness, then the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Va. Were slower than the AOTC right?

Don :. Um, I think while moving his infantry to the front Mac stripped out his train and artillery (?) So as not to impede the troopers (normal Army SOP at that time).. This is an item that Sherman failed to do when ordered by Grant to move ASAP to Chattanooga. He combined his trains and Infantry and artillery and as a consequence was very late getting to the front.

Ole: McP also won battles. Sherman won campaigns.

Don: What battles did Mac win?

Don: What campaigns did Sherman win? If you think the "Atlanta Campaign" was a win, why did Sherman have to chase Hood all over middle Tennessee after Atlanta was taken and why was Hood around to fight at Nashville? All Sherman won was hollow headlines. That and $3.50 will get you a cup of Starbucks. All he did was chase Hood out of Atlanta and helped Lincoln win the PR war. The win was done at Nashville.

If you think the *******n trip was a campaign won by Sherman the object, to destroy the Rebel
rr's, failed. *******n was up and running within 2 months.


Don

[ole]

Castel, Albert, "Decision in the West," p. 116

OK. Read the page twice and haven't figured out what is supposed to be there that says McP was decieved into thinking he would have cavalry or that he discussed the situation with Sherman before he set out.

Ole: You'll have to show me where Sherman ordered that number decreased, specifically for this effort, before I'll accept that McP wasn't free to modify Sherman's much earlier strictures on impediments. And you gave me references: McKinney, Francis F., "Education in Violence", p. 322, Americana House, Inc. Chicago, Illinois, 1991; Sherman’s Memoirs, vol. II, Chapter XVI; Castel, Albert, "Decision in the West," p. 117

I believe you have reference to Sherman's general orders for the movement of his three armies. I was aware of that order, which is why I asked, "specifically for this effort." McP certainly would have been free to bring a wagon with axes, picks and shovels without violating the spirit of the order.

Hmmm. Seems I have backed myself into a corner by trying to get fancy by "going advanced."
Will continue in another post.
Ole

[ole]

I have a lot of help questioning Sherman’s incompetancy.

Don't have McKinney, but Castel and McMurry would be hard put to find anything good to say about Sherman. There are as many other who lean the other way. If your choice is to read only those critical, then there's not much point in pursuing a "what if."

"Mid-morning of the 10th, . . . Sherman ordered McPherson to dig in and wait reinforcements . . . ." Davis, Stephen, "Atlanta will Fall." p.44

And that was after McP didn't break the railroad on the 9th. McP's original orders were to emerge from the gap, break the railroad at some point north of Resaca, and return to the gap to wait for Johnston to evacuate Dalton.

Oneplez: What sources?

Fellman, Lewis, Castel, McMurry, Woodworth.

Don: Didn’t work did it?

Only because McP chose that moment to exercise more caution than the situation warranted.

Don: What battles did Mac win?

Champion Hill comes to mind.

Don: What campaigns did Sherman win? If you think the "Atlanta Campaign" was a win, why did Sherman have to chase Hood all over middle Tennessee after Atlanta was taken and why was Hood around to fight at Nashville? All Sherman won was hollow headlines. That and $3.50 will get you a cup of Starbucks. All he did was chase Hood out of Atlanta and helped Lincoln win the PR war. The win was done at Nashville.

Perhaps a little more unbiased reading will help you around that mental block.

If you think the *******n trip was a campaign won by Sherman the object, to destroy the Rebel rr's, failed. *******n was up and running within 2 months.

Two months is an eternity in war time. If Sherman had lost his RR link to Chattanooga and Nashville for two weeks, he'd have been in a world of hurt.

Ole

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by ole

Two months is an eternity in war time. If Sherman had lost his RR link to Chattanooga and Nashville for two weeks, he'd have been in a world of hurt.

Ole

It wasn't because N.B. Forrest didn't try that the Nashville-Chattanooga survived.