Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
Wha? You woke me up for that? I'm eventually pleased when anyone interrupts the chain of repeating unsubstantiated "facts." I say, "eventually," because something cherished is questioned, if not demolished. But, in the end, the noble quote, the gesture, the deep revelation, must yield to the base: under all the good stuff said and quoted, we're examining humans with dirty feet and untrimmed nails. We can at least be grateful that things worked out in the end. Or maybe not?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
You may ahve missed an earlier message I sent. Here's a copy with an additional battle and 'casualties' appended.
Don,
Not sure if this was intended for me, but if you look at them in small pieces, there are undobtedly more battles in Virginia. It is more about naming than anything else. You can find reference to several different battles generally lumped together as "The Wilderness", "Spotsylvania Court House", "North Anna", "Cold Harbor", etc. if you look for them.
The fighting in Virginia simply took far more lives on both sides than what happened in Georgia.
Not sure if this was intended for me, but if you look at them in small pieces, there are undobtedly more battles in Virginia. It is more about naming than anything else. You can find reference to several different battles generally lumped together as "The Wilderness", "Spotsylvania Court House", "North Anna", "Cold Harbor", etc. if you look for them.
The fighting in Virginia simply took far more lives on both sides than what happened in Georgia.
Regards,
Tim
I don't remember who it was directed at but your answer surprises me. More lives mean better battles? I'd say any battle with casualties in excess of 1000/side was a major conflict.
Tennessee was second to Virginia in battles fought.
The casualty rates in Virginia gave Grant the Nickname "Butcher" and while Lee garnered no similar title many have pointed out he was no slacker in demolishing his own forces.
I recognized that a few battles were fought under the same or similar names and I tried to lump the casualties under the main title. That was easier to do in Tennessee because Grant, in Virginia had Lee under seige for over nine months. Don't think I counted eastern casualties.
My purpose is to show some of our apparently unenlighted contributors that Johnston fought more battles than they are willing to give him credit for. And that I believe Johnston's Fabian reputation is correct, Hood's performance showed the correctness of the strategy.
I don't remember who it was directed at but your answer surprises me. More lives mean better battles? I'd say any battle with casualties in excess of 1000/side was a major conflict.
...
I recognized that a few battles were fought under the same or similar names and I tried to lump the casualties under the main title. That was easier to do in Tennessee because Grant, in Virginia had Lee under seige for over nine months. Don't think I counted eastern casualties.
My purpose is to show some of our apparently unenlighted contributors that Johnston fought more battles than they are willing to give him credit for. And that I believe Johnston's Fabian reputation is correct, Hood's performance showed the correctness of the strategy.
Your posts #45, #55, and #57 engage in "battle counting". My point was that this is a subject to lots of ways to slice the pie, and generally will prove nothing. For example, your post #57 says in part:
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
Below are the battles that Grant fought against Lee during the same time period. I even tossed in the "Battles of the Crater and Lynchburg" so it wouldn't make Johnston look too good.
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
May 8-21 Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, Va.
You seem to have skipped the Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-7. The Wilderness can be further subdivided down to Parker's Store, the Brock Road, Craig's Meeting House, the Furnaces, Todd's Tavern, etc. if you want. Total casualties here for the Union in a few days are about equivalent to what Sherman lost in May and June combined.
What you list as a single Battle of Spotsylvania can also be seen as Corbin's Bridge, Alsop's Farm, and Laurel Hill (8th); the Ny River and the Po River (10th); the Angle/the Salient/the "Mule Shoe" (12th); Piney Branch Church (15th); Harris' Farm (19th); Stanard's Mill and Guiney's Station (21st) and some other, smaller actions
Also left off the discussion is Sheridan's expedition May 9-24 including Davenport (9th); Beaver Dam Station, North Anna, and Davenport Ford (9th and 10th); Ground Squirrel Bridge or Church, Glen Allen Station, Ashland, and Yellow Tavern (11th); Meadow Bridges, Mechanicsville, Strawberry Hill, Brook Church or Richmond Fortifications (12th); and skirmishes en route at Mattapony Church, Jones' Bridge, Haxall's, White House Landing, Hanover Court-House, etc.
Quote:
Originally Posted by oneplez
May 23-26 Battle of North Anna River, Va.
Sometimes seen separately as Quarles' Mills, Ox Ford, and Jericho Bridge, or Ford, or Mills, on the North Anna (May 23-26)
Skipped over:
May 27: Hanover Junction, Sexton's Station, Mount Carmel Church, Dabney's Ferry, Hanovertown, Little River, Pole Cat Creek, and Salem Church
May 28: Aenon Church, Jones' Farm, Crump's Creek, and Haw's Shop
May 28-31: Totopotomoy River
May 30: Matadequin Creek, Old Church, Shady Grove, and Armstrong's Farm
May 31: Mechump's Creek, Shallow Creek, Turner's Farm, and Bethesda Church
June 1: Ashland
May 31-Jun 12 Battle of Cold Harbor, Va.
Several different actions here, with the battles of Cold Harbor and Bethesda Church (see above) often lumped in.
Skipped:
June 7-24: Sheridan's Trevillian Raid to include combats at Trevilian Station and Newark or Mallory's Cross-Roads (11th and 12th); King and Queen Court-House (18th and 20th); White House or Saint Peter's Church, and Black Creek or Tunstall's Station (21st); Jones' Bridge (23d); and Saint Mary's Church (24th)
Now it seems to me that you have been trying to show that Johnston fought hard, and was more effective in his approach than Lee was. It is interesting to look at, but numbers of battles by themselves will do nothing to support it.
Neither Johnston nor Sherman was a particularly aggressive tactical battlefield commander. That is simply a matter of style (and in Sherman's case, probably an acknowledgement that he just was not that good as an offensive tactician).
The fact is that Joe Johnston -- whatever his undoubted ability as a leader of men/brave/knowledgable soldier and his unflappable nature -- was not good at detailed, meticulous preparation and planning, nor organization, nor co-operation/communication with superiors. He did a very good job at some things and a bad one at others. While I am sure he had all the skills to do any particular task he needed to do, his personality kept him from doing them on a routine basis.
When Johnston says he had a "plan" to do this or that, I think he meant he intended to do such-and-such at some time, had a vague concept of how he was going to do it, and would more-or-less do it on the fly when it seemed like a good idea. He is not talking about detailed operations orders, pre-planned objectives and meetings with subordinates, etc. The other side of that would be someone like George Thomas, who could have produced a detailed briefing on any operation he intended to execute, and would have had all his subordinates in the loop well in advance. They just are not the same soldiers.
What Johnston really needed, I suppose, was the Prussian General Staff system or something like it to optimize what he could do very well. That would entail a very detail oriented chief-of-staff with a lot of power, who could tell Corps commanders what to do and make it stick. Some Union forces did develop something like that, but you don't really find it in Confederate forces (Longstreet being the best example of where it did happen at the Corps level).
Johnston did fall back in a very skilled fashion. Sherman was rarely able to inflict a major blow. But without inflicting major damage, Johnston retreated quite rapidly. He never inflicted a major setback on Sherman, never stopped or slowed his advance significantly, and abandoned his best defensive terrain in the process. With Sherman constantly moving through difficult mountain terrain on a narrow front (3 days haul by wagon from the RR), Johnston was constantly outflanked and maneuvered out of one position after another.
The other side of that is that Sherman was able to build up a lot of success and confidence at a low cost while gaining a great deal of territory and room to maneuver because of the way Johnston chose to fight. Another commander might have blooded Sherman pretty well up in the mountains, fought harder before withdrawing, struck at his flanks with fast-moving columns, and stalled the advance in the barren hills instead of letting him out of the mountains so quickly. Given Sherman's temperment, I think Johnston made a big mistake.
In Virginia, Lee fought one offensive battle, The Wilderness. After that, he was essentially conducting the same sort of defense Johnston carried out in Georgia. The difference is that Lee was more active and aggressive in his methods, more threatening to his opponent. Johnston was very passive and defensive for the most part, usually allowing his opponent to set the pace.
Essentially, when Sherman attempted to flank Johnston, Johnston pulled back to another position. When Grant attempted to flank Lee, Lee was more likely to block the attempt and fight it out.
But if the whole idea was to bleed the Union and make peace-sentiment in the North defeat Lincoln, Lee's method (and the much greater casualties he inflicted) probably had a greater impact.
Was 'Bleeding' Union armies even a part of Johnston's plan? Johnston, seemed more interested in keeping Sherman from any significant battle success over the AoT.
Was Johnston's plan really to keep Atlanta in southern hands until after the November elections in the North or was his plan to keep the AoT intact and as strong as possible (rather than just holding Atlanta), as the 'Real' sign to Northern voters that the Union War effort in the West was a failure?
The above questions are, in a sense, pointless because it does not matter why he fought his campaign the way he did. His campaign strategy, was flawed. His retreats toward Atlanta was reinforcing the appearance of Union success, that Atlanta would be taken sooner or later and with the speed of Johnstons retreat, it could be anticipated sooner rather than later.
In any case it can be (and has been) argued that the Northern Depression over the success of the war seems much darker (at the time) than reality, due to brightness of the spectacular successes that soon followed, Atlanta, Mobile Bay, Sheridan's victories in the Shenandoah Valley. After all even with Atlanta only besieged, by election time (there was little chance of an out right defeat of Sherman), there would have still been Mobile Bay and the Shenandoah Valley.
Considering Shermans tactical deficiencies, it was unfortunate that he was opposed by a General with equal tactical deficiencies, as well as a less well developed strategic sense of what was required of the AoT in helping to gain southern independence.
-- you must look to the research of historians and authors or you will be blind to it. If you don't know about it, you will see Hood's reports in the early part of the campaign one way; if you do, you'll look at his slant differently.
When Johnston was relieved, he and his chief of staff took the HQ records of the army with them, ostensibly to assist in preparing Johnston's report (intended as a defense of his actions and so a bit biased). This left a bit of chaos behind them as Hood came in, and leads to gaps in the knowledge of what Johnston's plan actually was. As a result, you only have Johnston's word for what he was going to do -- and that comes in a report written after the battles were fought and lost, after the city had fallen, and after Johnston had time to see what did not work. In the days before he was relieved, no one could get Johnston to tell them what he actually planned to do -- including Jefferson Davis and Braxton Bragg, it seems. You won't know about this much if you rely only on what the records show, but you will if you look at the research of the historians who have studied this over the last 140 years.
From “Autumn of Glory, Connelly, Thomas L., LSU Press, 1994, pp. 424 - 425
“Hood claimed that he did not learn Johnston had left until someone told him that he had gone to Macon. Moreover, Hood denied that Johnston described any detailed plans to him, though he admitted that "he may have said somewhat to me in regard to his plans." 94
Johnston's version is different. He makes no mention of any promise to stay and give assistance. But he maintains that Hood stayed at his headquarters throughout the eighteenth from early morning until nightfall and that Johnston explained in detail his Peachtree Creek strategy
Moreover, at Hood's request, Johnston throughout the day continued to issue orders aligning the three corps for a possible attack on Sherman while his force was divided crossing Peachtree Creek.95
The truth probably falls somewhere between these two versions. Hood's version contains several errors. It is doubtful that Johnston made any such promise to return to the army and then deserted Hood. One of Hood's aides and a friend of the Johnston family, Lieutenant Halsey Wigfall, recalled a few days later that he rode into Atlanta on the evening of July 18 specifically to say goodbye to Johnston. Wigfall had been with Hood during the day, and would have known of such a plan. Too. Johnston probably did describe his Peachtree plan to Hood. The following month. Hood's aide and former Richmond envoy, Colonel George Brewster, told the Confederacy's chief gossip, Mrs. James Chesnut, that Hood asked Johnston for all his views and plans and that "they were freely given." 96 Also, there was too much similarity between Johnston's Peachtree plan and that which Hood utilized, for the new commander not to have known what Johnston intended.
Footnotes:
93 Diary of Captain Alfred Fielder, I2th Tennessee, July 18, 1864, in Confederate Collection, Tennessee; William E. Sloan Diary, July 23, 1864, ibid.; Joel Murphree to wife, July 19, 1864, in H. E. Sterkx (ed.), "Autobiography and Civil War Letters of Joel Murphree of Troy, Alabama 1864-1865," Alabama Historical Quarterly, XIX (Spring, 1947), 184; Watkins, "Co. Aytch," 174; Kirwan (ed.), Orphan Brigade, 142; Hagan to wife, July 19, 1864, in Hagan, Confederate Letters, 51; Official Records, XXXVIII, Pt. 5, pp. 890-91.
94 Hood, Advance and Retreat, 141, see also pp. 127-28, 143.
96 Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 430; see also Halsey Wigfall to mother, July 31, 1864, in Wigfall Papers, DLC.
Johnston's account also contains some discrepancies. Hood was not at his headquarters from early morning until nightfall. Johnston did not remain with the army that long. Probably he left in the late afternoon, after having two separate conversations with Hood. His most recent biographers speculate that he may have left for Atlanta as early as the late morning.97
Even if Johnston did spend the entire day in consultation with Hood on battle plans, which seems doubtful, there was cause for Hood's bitterness. Johnston was obviously angry at Richmond's decision. This was obvious in his telegram that morning to Cooper in which he acknowledged
that he had turned over the command to Hood. Referring to the "alleged causes of my removal," 98 Johnston bitterly made one of his favorite comparisons, the treatment afforded him with that given to Lee. He contended that Sherman was much stronger in comparison to the size of
Johnston's army than Grant's force was to Lee's army. Also, Lee had retreated much more quickly to the vicinity of Richmond than Johnston had to Atlanta, and Grant had penetrated much deeper into Virginia than Sherman had into Georgia. Then Johnston closed with the stinging comment that confident language by a general "is not usually regarded as evidence of competency." 99
Johnston could have put aside his anger and injured pride and remained to assist Hood through the Atlanta crisis. Even Bragg, in December of 1863, had offered to stay on as his chief of staff under similar circumstances.
The most experienced commander would have required time to organize a staff, open proper channels of communications with his subordinates, and orient himself with the general situation. Hood had two months' experience in combat as a corps leader and none as an army general.” (Seems like this is Davis' problem not Johnston's!)
97 Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, 323.
88 Johnston to Cooper, July 18, 1864, in Joseph E. Johnston Letters, United States Military Academy Library; see also Cooper to Johnston, July 17, 1864, ibid.
99 Johnston to Cooper, July 18, 1864, in ibid. A Johnston friend who conversed with him that day remarked that while he appeared outwardly calm, it must have been at the cost of much exertion. See Halsey Wigfall to mother, July 31, 1864, in Wigfall Papers, DLC. Howell Cobb, who met with Johnston immediately after his arrival in Macon, remarked that while "he indulges in no spirit of complaint" and he spoke kindly of Hood, "he evidently feels his present unpleasant situation in being relieved from the command of the army." See Cobb to wife, July 20, 1864, in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911: The Correspondence of Robert Tombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, ed. Ulrich B. Phillips (Washington, D.C., 1913), II. 647.
My real intent in the thread was to suggest that when someone reads an author's interpretation of an event, if possible, they should refer to the footnoted material and compare the author's conclusion with their own.
Few can write true objective history, as it is literally boring. I know because I did it. People love controversy and argument. And lord knows that people could argue all day long about Johnston and Hood until they are blue in the face and never make any REAL headway in their argument for several reasons.
First, Johnston turned over command of the army to Hood and Atlanta was lost in about 45 days. Thats fact. We know Atlanta fell and the results, but we don't know what would have happened had Johnston retained command.
Sure, we can speculate - both ways, but the fact is, is we will never know - thus to person's who support Johnston and his tactics - they can continue to argue that he could have held Atlanta through the election and possibly altered the course of the war in the west. On the other hand, those who see Johnston as a failure - will forever continue to argue that his tactics would have withdrawn the army to the Keys without a fight in perhaps shorter time than it took Hood to lose Atlanta.
In reference to #59 again, The most valuable thing historians and authors can do is gather the original source material for us - whether it be letters, diaries, reports, correspondence - whatever, but as most authors are subjective in nature, they can then use their slant to utilize parts of the evidence to support their theory and leave objectionable material out.
It happens all the time.
So, if you read a book by Castel, Connelly, whomever. Don't take anything as scripture. Re-research yourself for your own conclusions and use their conclusions as a starting point. You may find that their conclusions are confirmed or the other way around.
Just to point out one thing however for the argumentist opposing Johnston and in favor of Hood in the great controversy conmprising the Atlanta campaign. Please note that both men had SOME corroborating testimony on their behalf, but BOTH men state much of their arguments after the fact and in hindsight. Niether is better than the other in thier arguments.
I might add that a Johnston enthusiast will never be altered in his or her opinion that he fought the right fight in the right manner - just as a Hood enthusiast will never be altered in their belief that Hood fought the right fight in the right manner.
These are the only facts:
Johnston conducted an organized retreat - snipping at his opponent and stretching his supply lines over 100 miles in 2 months and 10 days, gave up ground but maintained army cohesiveness in a less than aggressive manner.
Hood conducted aggressive offensive operations against a superior force with considerable loss to his own force and yielded the objective in about 45 days.
Which strategy was right? Who's to say - both were conducted with the best intentions by both commanders, one in a conservative manner and the other very aggressively.
My real intent in the thread was to suggest that when someone reads an author's interpretation of an event, if possible, they should refer to the footnoted material and compare the author's conclusion with their own.
Few can write true objective history, as it is literally boring. I know because I did it. People love controversy and argument. And lord knows that people could argue all day long about Johnston and Hood until they are blue in the face and never make any REAL headway in their argument for several reasons.
Perhaps your right - to an extent. I like to present facts, as I know them, and draw conclusions. Your first sentence below is a fact! I try not to argue most pointless statements, theories, speculations as in your second sentence. Occasionally I lapse, as in Sherman’s absurd move of sending McPherson through Snake Creek Gap rather than Thomas.
First, Johnston turned over command of the army to Hood and Atlanta was lost in about 45 days. That’s fact. We know Atlanta fell and the results, but we don't know what would have happened had Johnston retained command.
Sure, we can speculate - both ways, but the fact is, is we will never know - thus to person's who support Johnston and his tactics - they can continue to argue that he could have held Atlanta through the election and possibly altered the course of the war in the west. On the other hand, those who see Johnston as a failure - will forever continue to argue that his tactics would have withdrawn the army to the Keys without a fight in perhaps shorter time than it took Hood to lose Atlanta.
Don’t think I could speculate about your paragraph above. Johnston only felt confident of holding Sherman at Resaca and Kennesaw, however, once flanked he had to move. How he would perform at Atlanta I wouldn’t guess. There was some speculation in the Confederate Cabinet that he planned to withdraw to Cuba.
In reference to #59 again, The most valuable thing historians and authors can do is gather the original source material for us - whether it be letters, diaries, reports, correspondence - whatever, but as most authors are subjective in nature, they can then use their slant to utilize parts of the evidence to support their theory and leave objectionable material out.
It happens all the time.
So, if you read a book by Castel, Connelly, whomever. Don't take anything as scripture. Re-research yourself for your own conclusions and use their conclusions as a starting point. You may find that their conclusions are confirmed or the other way around.
Just to point out one thing however for the argumentist opposing Johnston and in favor of Hood in the great controversy conmprising the Atlanta campaign. Please note that both men had SOME corroborating testimony on their behalf, but BOTH men state much of their arguments after the fact and in hindsight. Niether is better than the other in thier arguments.
Didn’t Hood make most of his anti-Johnston accusations after he was relieved and after the war? Wasn’t Johnston’s rejoinder his version of events? Wasn’t Hood cutting Johnston up while his subordinate? Was this known to Johnston? If the answer is yes to all these questions, then I’d put more faith in Johnston’s arguments.
I might add that a Johnston enthusiast will never be altered in his or her opinion that he fought the right fight in the right manner - just as a Hood enthusiast will never be altered in their belief that Hood fought the right fight in the right manner.
Your probably correct.
These are the only facts:
Johnston conducted an organized retreat - snipping at his opponent and stretching his supply lines over 100 miles in 2 months and 10 days, gave up ground but maintained army cohesiveness in a less than aggressive manner.
Certainly less aggressive than Hood and maybe less than Lee but the number of Union casualties implies an aggressiveness unsatisfactory to some and acceptable to others. I have my own gauges to measure that, as most of us do. George Thomas’ casualty lists were always lower than say a Grant or Hood. Does that place him in a Johnston Category?
Hood conducted aggressive offensive operations against a superior force with considerable loss to his own force and yielded the objective in about 45 days.
Which strategy was right? Who's to say - both were conducted with the best intentions by both commanders, one in a conservative manner and the other very aggressively.
The fact that Johnston withstood the Northern hoards for a month more than Hood did, and turned over a well fed, well armed, fighting army of about 50,000 to Hood, who destroyed it in five or six months suggests that Johnston’s strategy was correct. After all, when Hood crossed the Tennessee after Nashville, the war was over in four months.
What was the needs of the Confederacy and was the AoT, under Johnston, fulfilling those needs?
How much was keeping the AoT out of harms way, contributing to the souths' gaining its independence? Was the existence of the AoT the main reason for the Atlanta Campaign?
Was prolonging the war, in a hopeless cause, the reason for the existence of the AoNV or AoT?
The south was visibly failing, if saving what one could from the debacle of defeat was Johnstons plan (he apparently, was not campaigning to defeat Sherman), then it was not in consonance with the thinking o Davis, the Confederate Congress Nor Lee and for that very reason, if not everything else, he should have been replaced.
Johnston, for whatever reasons, was not (in the eyes of his superiors, at least) fighting to win the war.
The fact that Hood lost sooner than Johnston, is not proof that Johnstons strategy answered the needs of the Confederacy.
Without going in harms way, the AoT (and the Confederacy) was lost anyway, in which case the sooner the war ended the better, not draw out the agony by hopeless maneuverings.
Arguably,Hood more nearly answered his countrys call than did Johnston.
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Linear Mode
