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Forget what authors have to say about the campaign.
Authors, or historians, interpret history.
Whatever they interpret does not mean it is right.
Look at Johnston's report - that is written on Oct. 20. He does not attack Hood in any way - yet Hood's report dated in, I believe Feb. of '65 - does attack Johnston.
Now, if we were to talk about memory loss or lieing, I would venture to say it was Hood, as other commanders agreed that the attack should be led by Johnston and not Hood under the (then) present circumstances.
I think the key to understanding this campaign, as well as many others, is not paying attention to what authors have to say - but the principle characters themselves - then formulate your own opinion. Authors and MANY historians have a very subjective nature to them - because that is their nature.
You read - then evaluate on your own behalf.
What do the records themselves have to say about this campaign?
Records are also written by people with axes to grind.
Hood had, of course, been maneuvering for Johnston's job throughout the campaign, seeing himself in a conflict with Hardee to get the spot -- and politicking with Davis' representative Bragg (who already had a grudge against Hardee) to get it. If you only look at records and reports, you'll find out little about that -- you must look to the research of historians and authors or you will be blind to it. If you don't know about it, you will see Hood's reports in the early part of the campaign one way; if you do, you'll look at his slant differently.
When Johnston was relieved, he and his chief of staff took the HQ records of the army with them, ostensibly to assist in preparing Johnston's report (intended as a defense of his actions and so a bit biased). This left a bit of chaos behind them as Hood came in, and leads to gaps in the knowledge of what Johnston's plan actually was. As a result, you only have Johnston's word for what he was going to do -- and that comes in a report written after the battles were fought and lost, after the city had fallen, and after Johnston had time to see what did not work. In the days before he was relieved, no one could get Johnston to tell them what he actually planned to do -- including Jefferson Davis and Braxton Bragg, it seems. You won't know about this much if you rely only on what the records show, but you will if you look at the research of the historians who have studied this over the last 140 years.
Also, naturally enough, there is little you will find in the official reports about the snake-pit of intrigue and backstabbing in the high command of the Army of Tennessee. Some, yes -- these people needed some help with the concept of plausible deniability, they wrote too openly and much of it did end up filed away somewhere. But it took decades of work to reveal much that was not recorded officially.
You are right that it pays to go to original sources on most matters. My point is that taking original sources at face value has its' own pitfalls and blind alleys.
As a result, you only have Johnston's word for what he was going to do -- and that comes in a report written after the battles were fought and lost, after the city had fallen, and after Johnston had time to see what did not work. In the days before he was relieved, no one could get Johnston to tell them what he actually planned to do
Great post Trice, nothing to add except other interesting 'flowers' from great, seld-defending autobiography of J.Johnston.
He claims that AoT under his command has lost 9,972 soldiers (according to medical directoer of AoT A.J.Foard). Very nice picture. "Great" J.Johnston has lost 9,972 during his command and this "medicore" J.B.Hood has lost more then that in three battles! Of couse we would got such picture if we had rely only on records.
But we can rely on historians who can and do researches. After that we can easily find that "great" J.Johnston 'forgot' to mention that this casaulties do not include soldiers lost during July 10-17, do not include any killed and wounded in one brigade of infantry (BG R.C.Tyler`s brigade, Bate`s division). Nor do they include the men lost as prisoners or any casaulties in the Georgia militia or in either Wheeler`s or Jackson`s cavalry.
Of course when J.Johnston was counting losses during Hood`s command of AoT he would`t forget about missing, prisoners and losses in cavalry or militia, would he ? And beginning with J.Johnston auto-bio, the famous myth about 'great' J.Johnston 'who would have held Atlanta' and 'medicore' Hood, 'who has lost AoT in stupid frontal attacks', was built. For our luck, recent historians writing about this campaign can give us clear picture about this campaign - A.Castel, S.Davis, R.M.McMurry or D.Coffey. And they too rely on official records, memories etc.
__________________ Nico, Maréchal d'Empire
Last edited by Nico_Davout; 10-24-2006 at 10:25 AM.
Great post Trice, nothing to add except other interesting 'flowers' from great, seld-defending autobiography of J.Johnston.
He claims that AoT under his command has lost 9,972 soldiers (according to medical directoer of AoT A.J.Foard). Very nice picture. "Great" J.Johnston has lost 9,972 during his command and this "medicore" J.B.Hood has lost more then that in three battles! Of couse we would got such picture if we had rely only on records.
But we can rely on historians who can and do researches. After that we can easily find that "great" J.Johnston 'forgot' to mention that this casaulties do not include soldiers lost during July 10-17, do not include any killed and wounded in one brigade of infantry (BG R.C.Tyler`s brigade, Bate`s division). Nor do they include the men lost as prisoners or any casaulties in the Georgia militia or in either Wheeler`s or Jackson`s cavalry.
Of course when J.Johnston was counting losses during Hood`s command of AoT he would`t forget about missing, prisoners and losses in cavalry or militia, would he ? And beginning with J.Johnston auto-bio, the famous myth about 'great' J.Johnston 'who would have held Atlanta' and 'medicore' Hood, 'who has lost AoT in stupid frontal attacks', was built. For our luck, recent historians writing about this campaign can give us clear picture about this campaign - A.Castel, S.Davis, R.M.McMurry or D.Coffey. And they too rely on official records, memories etc.
Well, as gunny pointed out, we should always be skeptical of what people say. It is hard for them to be objective. Hood's biography is about as unreliable a work as you can find, for example, but it is interesting and probably important to read. Anyone who relied on that as a worthy primary source would be very far off in their slant on what really happened.
Even a relative paragon of auto-biography like Grant has points to take with a grain of salt. For example, Grant was very sensitive to criticism about Shiloh or Chattanooga. His descriptions of those struggles are not "lies" but they certainly put the best face on it for Grant.
Not all historians and authors are searching for objective truth, and often they show their biases in what they write. Some are merely handicapped by what they had access to at the time. There is a notable change in histories of the Civil War as relevant volumes of the Official Records came out, for example. The veterans poured over them intently. Vague recollections, one-sided accounts and rumor-based stories of the 1870s were contradicted and discredited as the OR volumes provided documentation for events.
Forget what authors have to say about the campaign.
I’d like to. Unfortunately there are too many fools alleging their literary scrivenery as history, when in fact they are unstudied collections of previously asserted myths. Sort of Civil War Brothers Grimm. See Dimitri Rotov comment below:-
“Please take a close look, also at his posting http://civilwarriors.net/wordpress/?p=121 on the persistence of a certain quote ("I can't spare this man") in Grant/Lincoln folklore. The key point here, if I can chip in, is that the phony Lincoln saying in question serves a literary purpose and is therefore irresistible to storytellers. Its use in advancing a storyline trumps historical truth. And this is one problem with Civil War history today - the story drives "fact."”
Brooks Simpson, whom I have disagreed with often in the past, hits poor old Peret on Lincoln See: http://civilwarriors.net/wordpress/?p=121
Authors, or historians, interpret history.
Um, OK!
Whatever they interpret does not mean it is right.
Agreed!
Look at Johnston's report - that is written on Oct. 20. He does not attack Hood in any way - yet Hood's report dated in, I believe Feb. of '65 - does attack Johnston.
Now, if we were to talk about memory loss or lieing, I would venture to say it was Hood, as other commanders agreed that the attack should be led by Johnston and not Hood under the (then) present circumstances.
I think the key to understanding this campaign, as well as many others, is not paying attention to what authors have to say - but the principle characters themselves - then formulate your own opinion. Authors and MANY historians have a very subjective nature to them - because that is their nature.
You read - then evaluate on your own behalf.
What do the records themselves have to say about this campaign?
Unfortunately not everyone has access to “the records,” they must rely on the honesty and veracity of the various “Hysterians.”
It’s encouraging to see guys like Rotov and Simpson assuming a role of “Myth-Busters.” Simpson concentrates primarily on busting Grant myths, which is his field of concentration. Unfortunately, there are no such champions for Johnston or Thomas or Halleck et al. Hopefully web sites like this may be the start of some de-mythification.
You may ahve missed an earlier message I sent. Here's a copy with an additional battle and 'casualties' appended.
May 8 Fighting begins along Rocky Face Ridge west of Dalton, specifically at Mill Creek and Dug Gap. Fighting along this spine of high mountains will continue until May 11. Casualties - Unknown
May 14 Battle of Resaca, Day1 - Almost 100,000 men poured out of Snake Creek Gap west of the tiny Georgia town of Resaca. Fighting occurred along the entire line although the heaviest fighting occurred to the north of the city. - Estimated Casualties: 5,547 total (US 2,747; CS 2,800)
May 15 Battle of Resaca, Day 2 - Engagements continued along lines around Resaca. Hood's Corps [CS] and "Fighting Joe" Hooker's XX Corps [US] bore the brunt of today's fighting, north of the city. Reports of Union troops at Lay's Ferry (Oostanaula River) force Johnston to withdraw.
May 19 Johnston withdraws to the Allatoona Mountains south of the Etowah River after an attack at Cassville, Georgia is cancelled (Hood & Polk were nervous). Sherman decides to regroup in Kingston. Union IV Corps and Hardee’s Corps engaged - Casualties unknown
May 25 Battle of New Hope Church-- Johnston, forced by Sherman to abandon his stronghold in the Allatoona Mountains, moves to block the Union advance on Atlanta meeting Sherman's Army at a small church some 25 miles northwest of Atlanta. - Estimated Casualties: Total unknown (US 1,600; CS unknown)
May 26 Battle of Dallas - Estimated Casualties: 5,400 total (US 2,400; CS 3,000)
May27 Spreading their respective lines east from New Hope Church, Sherman and Johnston battled at Pickett's Mill. - Estimated Casualties: 2,100 total (US 1,600; CS 500)
May 28 After 2 defeats in three days Sherman realized that fighting here was a mistake and moves east towards the railroad. Johnston tries to take advantage of this move by testing Sherman's right flank. Confederate General William Bates runs headlong into McPherson's regulars at Dallas after misunderstanding a signal from his cavalry.
June 19 Fighting begins at Kennesaw Mountain. - Estimated Casualties: 4,000 total (US 3,000; CS 1,000)
June 22 Hood attacks at Kolb’s Farm, halting Sherman's attempt to bypass Kennesaw. - Estimated Casualties: 1,350 total (US 350; CS 1,000)
July 4 Intense fighting at Ruff's Mill turns Johnston's left flank. Johnston pulls back to the so-called Chattahoochee Line starting late today.
July 20 Hood attacks and loses at Peachtree Creek. Battle planned by Johnston, Hood screwed it up. - Estimated Casualties: 6,506 total (US 1,710; CS 4,796)
Of course Johnston never matched Hood's casualty totals. But, when the casualties hit the thousands, some serious fighting took place.
July 20 Hood attacks and loses at Peachtree Creek.
Battle planned by Johnston - no evidence on that date, no witness. Only Johnston`s claim AFTER Atlanta campaign. Sorry.
Hood did not conduct Johnston`s plan. "Hood`s plan differs markedly from the one Johnston states he intended to implement. That was to attack Federals WHILE they were crossing Peachtree, whereas Hood`s calls for attacking them AFTER they had crossed it." - A.Castel
Hood screwed it up - Hardee did.
"I cannont but think," Stewart maintained in his report, "had the plan of the battle, as I understood it, been carried out fully, we would have achieved a great succes."
General Stewart, one of the best Hood`s commander had other opinion. His performance at Peachtree Creek was great.
Estimated Casualties: 6,506 total (US 1,710; CS 4,796) - (CS 2,500) researched by A.Castel, S.Davis, D.Coffey and R.M.McMurry.
__________________ Nico, Maréchal d'Empire
Last edited by Nico_Davout; 10-24-2006 at 08:14 PM.
July 20 Hood attacks and loses at Peachtree Creek.
Battle planned by Johnston - no evidence on that date, no witness. Only Johnston`s claim AFTER Atlanta campaign. Sorry.
Hood did not conduct Johnston`s plan. "Hood`s plan differs markedly from the one Johnston states he intended to implement. That was to attack Federals WHILE they were crossing Peachtree, whereas Hood`s calls for attacking them AFTER they had crossed it." - A.Castel
Undoubtedly, Johnston had some thought on what he would do beforehand. He was not the sort of man who developed detailed operational plans ahead of time. At any rate, Hood had some idea that Johnston had a plan when he took over, and actually seems to have been reluctant to take over, indicating Johnston should have a chance to execute it, whatever it was.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Nico_Davout
Hood screwed it up - Hardee did.
"I cannont but think," Stewart maintained in his report, "had the plan of the battle, as I understood it, been carried out fully, we would have achieved a great succes."
General Stewart, one of the best Hood`s commander had other opinion. His performance at Peachtree Creek was great.
Estimated Casualties: 6,506 total (US 1,710; CS 4,796) - (CS 2,500) researched by A.Castel, S.Davis, D.Coffey and R.M.McMurry.
Hood stayed too far from the scene of the action in these three battles. He thought he was imitating Lee, but Lee had better subordinates and also became more and more hands-on as the war continued. The opportunity for inflicting a very bloody nose on Sherman was there at Peachtree Creek, but Hooker also performed very well here, and Thomas, and the men of the AoC. Victory here was far from a sure thing, even if the "plan" Stewart was working from had been faithfully carried out.
While all this was going on, of course, Schofield was moving slowly on Atlanta. Had he moved aggressively instead, he might have taken the eastern defenses easily -- and then Hood would have been in very bad shape indeed.
That is true, at Peachtree Creek, there were two top AoT corps commanders. Stewart was untested, but he has proved to be good and Hardee`s war records were very good. Why Hood could not rely on "Old Reliable", his expierence in commanding corps can be compared to general J.Longstreet (and even longer). Why Hood should has doubts about Hardee`s skills? He has proved many times that he can handle troops well. But in this one battle Hardee fought like Jackson during 7th Days Battle. Without energy.
Quote:
While all this was going on, of course, Schofield was moving slowly on Atlanta. Had he moved aggressively instead, he might have taken the eastern defenses easily -- and then Hood would have been in very bad shape indeed.
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? And beginning with J.Johnston auto-bio, the famous myth about 'great' J.Johnston 'who would have held Atlanta' and 'medicore' Hood, 'who has lost AoT in stupid frontal attacks', was built. For our luck, recent historians writing about this campaign can give us clear picture about this campaign - A.Castel, S.Davis, R.M.McMurry or D.Coffey. And they too rely on official records, memories etc.
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