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Unlike McClellan, Johnston seldom decieved himself concerning the exact odds for or against him.
Is it possible that Johnston would have been a more (relatively speaking) aggressive commander, if he had stayed true to the Old Flag and campaigned in the knowledge than he had the bigger battalions? (I, sometimes think it Might have been so.)
Johnston's original plan for Peachtree Creek, is to hit the enemy as he is crossing, but he also states that (should the enemy cross before preparations for that attack are made) they would attack the enemy in flank - as Hood actually did.
In his official report, I believe dated Oct. 20, 1864, he reveals his plan and his alternate plan.
Johnston's original plan for Peachtree Creek, is to hit the enemy as he is crossing, but he also states that (should the enemy cross before preparations for that attack are made) they would attack the enemy in flank - as Hood actually did.
In his official report, I believe dated Oct. 20, 1864, he reveals his plan and his alternate plan.
On october 20th 1864 he could even claim that he could won the battle of Gettysburg and take Washington if he was given command of ANV.
Facts are that on the 17th July 1864 Johnston had NO plan (or he was lieing to president when he has asked about his plans), he has also written nothing about it. Everyone are very clever.....after the facts. Johnston is one of the cleverest guys, just read his memories.
__________________ Nico, Maréchal d'Empire
Last edited by Nico_Davout; 10-23-2006 at 05:58 PM.
See #45 above. Lets see! 10 battles in 2.5 months equals 4 battles per month or one per week. That's not enough for you? There 10 battles listed in msessage #45 above. Which were not all out?
Do you expect Johnston to fight a battle a day? Even Grant didn't do that. Nor Lee.
What You call battles, soldiers and officers of ANV would call - skirmishes. If I had not know records of general Johnston I would expect J.Johnston to fight. But from J.Johnston we could only expect: "passivity, overcaution, fear of failure, uncommunicativeness. Because of this qualities, Johnston had (fairly or unfairly, and even to this day) been branded as a retreater. Truth to tell, he did very little to rub out this unfortunate reputation. The general`s visit to inspect Atlatna fortifications in March, two month before campaign even opened, says as much about his predisposition to retreat as does his unimpressive performance on the Peninsula, east of Richmond, in spring 1862, when he showed no fight till the enemy was at the gates of the praze city. One might add to his list of unflattereing attributes a determination to pin on others (especially those in civil authority) the blame for the military reverses that he felt himself powerless to avert." - 'Atlanta Will Fall' by S.Davis
And I agree with this author.
I want to be clear. I do not put whole blame for fall of Atlanta on J.Johnston shoulders. Part of blame, if not bigger part, lays on shoulder of president J.Davis. It is he who has put J.Johnston in command of AoT, altough he has known his (poor) war records very good. Because his personal feelings hasn`t allowed him to give AoT to far better general - P.G.T.Beauregard - only that he has disliked P.G.T.Beauregard more then J.Johnston.
__________________ Nico, Maréchal d'Empire
Last edited by Nico_Davout; 10-23-2006 at 06:24 PM.
Below are the battles that Grant fought against Lee during the same time period. I even tossed in the "Battles of the Crater and Lynchburg" so it wouldn't make Johnston look too good.
May 8-21 Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, Va.
May 23-26 Battle of North Anna River, Va.
May 31-Jun 12 Battle of Cold Harbor, Va.
Jun 15-18 Battle of Petersburg, Va.
Jun 17-18 Battle of Lynchburg, Va.
Jun 18-Dec 31 Siege of Petersburg, Va.
Jul 30 Battle of the Crater
All-in-all, it looks to me that the caricature of Johnston not wanting to fight is one of those Civil War "myths" that the "Lost Causers" were so good at spreading around.
Also it wouldn't do to have Lee's tactics described as "Fabian," would it?
J.Johnston - general who has lost Atlanta before campaign has even started
"On the 21st, Atlanta`s leading newspaper, the Intelligencer, ran a column in which General Lee`s successes in Virginia were contrasted with General Johnston`s lack of success against Sherman in Georgia. (...) 'The great secret of their success (Lee`s army) seems to be in the fact that General Lee always fight the enemy when he gets the opportunity, and never permits his men to become dispirited by the disorganizing influences of retreat - a movement, however, which that great General [Johnston] does not seem to understand." - Atlanta Will Fall by S.Davis
Johnston was waiting for perfect situation, where everything would suit him - then he would have attacked. Well, war is somewhat different, You never have perfect situation. "Here we are reminded of the story of Joe Johnston on the prewar hunt, of how he never fired because the birds where always too hight or too low, even while his companions were filling their bags to the limit." - same book
Just to add to Lee`s list. When he was besieged in Petersburg, he was still able to sent his whole corps north under J.Early and threaten Union capital !! Yet he was outnumbered, outgunned by Grant. He was not crying to Mr.Davis to sent Forrest to Grant`s rear or otherwise he wont win....
__________________ Nico, Maréchal d'Empire
Last edited by Nico_Davout; 10-23-2006 at 06:53 PM.
Forget what authors have to say about the campaign.
Authors, or historians, interpret history.
Whatever they interpret does not mean it is right.
Look at Johnston's report - that is written on Oct. 20. He does not attack Hood in any way - yet Hood's report dated in, I believe Feb. of '65 - does attack Johnston.
Now, if we were to talk about memory loss or lieing, I would venture to say it was Hood, as other commanders agreed that the attack should be led by Johnston and not Hood under the (then) present circumstances.
I think the key to understanding this campaign, as well as many others, is not paying attention to what authors have to say - but the principle characters themselves - then formulate your own opinion. Authors and MANY historians have a very subjective nature to them - because that is their nature.
You read - then evaluate on your own behalf.
What do the records themselves have to say about this campaign?
If I remember correctly, Bentonville was a typical Johnston battle. Initial local success, followed by Johnston's retreating.
The question of Johnston's generalship, has seldom concerned whether he could attack, merely whether he was capable (for what ever reasons) of fighting an all-out battle and IF so, under what circumstances. As far as Johnston was concerned, those circumstances were few and far between.
Neither Johnston nor Sherman was known for committing their entire force to a battle. Sherman, in particular, seems to have doubted his ability as an offensive tactician (and, off his wartime record, to have been wise to do so).
I would say there were only three battles where you can say Johnston really committed his force to battle: 1st Bull Run, Seven Pines, and Bentonville.
At 1st Bull Run, I don't think he had much choice. Failure to support Beauregard would have resulted in defeat. Even after that victory, neither Johnston nor Beauregard wanted to take responsibility for an aggressive pursuit.
At Seven Pines, Johnston's forces were disorganized and poorly handled. Johnston might have done better if he had not been wounded, but there is really little reason to think so, and Johnston & Longstreet conspired to shift the blame for the mess after it was over. Not a very encouraging example.
Bentonville (1st day) was a very nice battle that comes about largely through excellent performance by Hardee and Hampton in carrying out Johnston's design. The battle itself failed (according to Johnston) because he never should have left Bragg in command of the right wing; IMHO, some excellent Union fighting in extremity had a lot to do with their survival as well. But after that, Johnston left his troops in position with a flooded river at their backs and only a single bridge on his far left to retreat across. He deserved to be smashed and wiped out for that; he almost was by a weak Union attack that came close to taking the bridge, saved only by a desperate counterattack. If Sherman had been the sort to man Grant was, that would have been an attack in force, and Johnston's army would have been no more.
None of that should lead anyone to believe that Joe Johnston was the sort of driving battlefield general that Benedict Arnold, Sheridan, Jackson, Grant, Lee, MacArthur or Patton was. He was competent in many ways, brave as could be (and a magnet for bullets in combat), solid in an unexpected crisis, a respected leader of men. There is little indication that he would ever lead an effort like Jackson's Valley Campaign, Lee's Seven Days-2nd Manassas-Antietam campaigns, or the battle of Chancellorsville.
Grant would later make a comment that he thought Johnston was the best general he faced in the war, but that was after a very chilled relationship with Lee developed after the surrender. In 1864, at the Battle of the Wilderness, Grant had something different to say. Looking out over the burning field, seeing Lee's ANV waiting for him to come on again, he declared Joe Johnston would have retreated after two such days. In that moment, I believe Grant saw the difference between the two.
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