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Just what was Johnston capable of, in reference to turning the war around in the West? Even those of us blessed with 21st Century hindsight, cannot say for certain Leaving Johnston in command would have saved Atlanta OR even delayed it capture.
What was really needed in the West, was more men, transportation, mateiale and food And a shake up in the command of the AoT
The war was essentially lost when Lee decided to invade Pa. instead reinforcing Bragg in Tn.
I am sorry but Johnston has a history all through the Civil War and nothing in that history indicates he would have fought any differently even If he had a slight superiority in numbers (and with maximum effort, the difference could only have been slight)
Just what was Johnston capable of, in reference to turning the war around in the West? Even those of us blessed with 21st Century hindsight, cannot say for certain Leaving Johnston in command would have saved Atlanta OR even delayed it capture.
What was really needed in the West, was more men, transportation, mateiale and food And a shake up in the command of the AoT
What are you trying to establish here? You ask a question then answer it.
How can you maintain that speculation? Beginning on May 9th, Johnston kept Sherman at bay for three months, while keeping his force (AOT) intact and viable. From the same date, Lee only kept Grant from the Richmond/Petersburg region for about two months. They both retreated.
Lee retreats - good, Johnston retreats - bad?
The war was essentially lost when Lee decided to invade Pa. instead reinforcing Bragg in Tn.
I am sorry but Johnston has a history all through the Civil War and nothing in that history indicates he would have fought any differently even If he had a slight superiority in numbers (and with maximum effort, the difference could only have been slight)
Let’s see, Johnston attacked the Union troops at Bentonville with an inferior force and were it not for Bragg’s and Hardee’s miscues, might have defeated that segment of Sherman’s force. That's substantially different from his earlier fabian tactics. Isn't it?
In theory, Johnston's style of maneuver and retreat and look for an opportunity to punish a part of his pursuer's army seems to be his only viable alternative. Therefore, he was a better alternative than Hood, whose style was to curse the torpedoes and steam full ahead.
In the cold light of reality, however, there is little but theory behind the idea that Johnston did or would fulfill that promised leap upon his opponent's mistake and deal a damaging blow. There's lots of good things to say about his style and intent; there is nothing to show that he would have lived up to that promise.
There's an essay in, I believe, Ted Savas' book on the Atlanta Campaign in which the writer contends that Johnston's aversion to any kind of failure kept him from attempting anything at all. The implication being that, even had an opportunity presented itself, Johnston would have, for fear of failing, done nothing.
An interesting, telling anecdote was related in that essay. Johnston, apparently an excellent shot, would be bird hunting and, at the end of the day, would have nothing to show for it. He waited for the perfect opportunity to down a bird. He wouldn't take the difficult shot, he wouldn't take a shot at all if there were a chance of missing -- failing.
He did the same thing during the Atlanta Campaign; he waited for the chance to take advantage of a situation in which he could not fail. Unless he caught Sherman squatting in the bushes by himself, hundreds of yards away from the nearest sentry, that perfect opportunity was not going to be. So Davis replaced him with a man who showed some fight.
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
In theory, Johnston's style of maneuver and retreat and look for an opportunity to punish a part of his pursuer's army seems to be his only viable alternative. Therefore, he was a better alternative than Hood, whose style was to curse the torpedoes and steam full ahead.
In the cold light of reality, however, there is little but theory behind the idea that Johnston did or would fulfill that promised leap upon his opponent's mistake and deal a damaging blow. There's lots of good things to say about his style and intent; there is nothing to show that he would have lived up to that promise.
There's an essay in, I believe, Ted Savas' book on the Atlanta Campaign in which the writer contends that Johnston's aversion to any kind of failure kept him from attempting anything at all. The implication being that, even had an opportunity presented itself, Johnston would have, for fear of failing, done nothing.
An interesting, telling anecdote was related in that essay. Johnston, apparently an excellent shot, would be bird hunting and, at the end of the day, would have nothing to show for it. He waited for the perfect opportunity to down a bird. He wouldn't take the difficult shot, he wouldn't take a shot at all if there were a chance of missing -- failing.
He did the same thing during the Atlanta Campaign; he waited for the chance to take advantage of a situation in which he could not fail. Unless he caught Sherman squatting in the bushes by himself, hundreds of yards away from the nearest sentry, that perfect opportunity was not going to be. So Davis replaced him with a man who showed some fight.
I agree with a lot of that (and liked the book you are referring to when I read it, assuming it is the old Savas-Woodbury one I remember). I think Johnston would have eventually attacked. I see his actions in the Atlanta Campaign as similar to the Peninsula Campaign in 1862.
However, I have real doubts about the effectiveness of the attack when he launched it. Johnston was not real good at detailed preparations for an action; IMHO, he was more the sort who depended on handling things in the midst of battle (where his calm and control of himself was a strong asset). But I think his attack outside Atlanta, assuming he launched it, might well have resembled the earlier botched one with Hood in May, or the Seven Pines battle against McClellan. Neither of those would make me feel Johnston was going to bash Sherman particularly well. The near-miss at Bentonville in 1865 (which Johnston laid on Bragg) does not fill me with confidence for a hypothetical battle outside Atlanta, either.
In theory, Johnston's style of maneuver and retreat and look for an opportunity to punish a part of his pursuer's army seems to be his only viable alternative. Therefore, he was a better alternative than Hood, whose style was to curse the torpedoes and steam full ahead.
Agreed! I think you described it in the proverbial nutshell. On receiving command from Johnston July 18th, Hood’s tactics destroyed the AOT in 5 months. From roughly 50,000 - 60,000 men he reduced it to almost 10,000 and lost the war in the west.
In the cold light of reality, however, there is little but theory behind the idea that Johnston did or would fulfill that promised leap upon his opponent's mistake and deal a damaging blow. There's lots of good things to say about his style and intent; there is nothing to show that he would have lived up to that promise.
As I recall he did that a number of times:
May 8 Fighting begins along Rocky Face Ridge west of Dalton, specifically at Mill Creek and Dug Gap. Fighting along this spine of high mountains will continue until May 11.
May 14 Battle of Resaca, Day1 - Almost 100,000 men poured out of Snake Creek Gap west of the tiny Georgia town of Resaca. Fighting occurred along the entire line although the heaviest fighting occurred to the north of the city.
May 15 Battle of Resaca, Day 2 - Engagements continued along lines around Resaca. Hood's Corps [CS] and "Fighting Joe" Hooker's XX Corps [US] bore the brunt of today's fighting, north of the city. Reports of Union troops at Lay's Ferry (Oostanaula River) force Johnston to withdraw.
May 19 Johnston withdraws to the Allatoona Mountains south of the Etowah River after an attack at Cassville, Georgia is cancelled (Hood & Polk were nervous). Sherman decides to regroup in Kingston.
May 25 Battle of New Hope Church-- Johnston, forced by Sherman to abandon his stronghold in the Allatoona Mountains, moves to block the Union advance on Atlanta meeting Sherman's Army at a small church some 25 miles northwest of Atlanta.
May27 Spreading their respective lines east from New Hope Church, Sherman and Johnston battled at Pickett's Mill.
May 28 After 2 defeats in three days Sherman realized that fighting here was a mistake and moves east towards the railroad. Johnston tries to take advantage of this move by testing Sherman's right flank. Confederate General William Bates runs headlong into McPherson's regulars at Dallas after misunderstanding a signal from his cavalry.
June 19 Fighting begins at Kennesaw Mountain.
June 22 Hood attacks at Kolb’s Farm, halting Sherman's attempt to bypass Kennesaw.
July 4 Intense fighting at Ruff's Mill turns Johnston's left flank. Johnston pulls back to the so-called Chattahoochee Line starting late today.
July 20 Hood attacks and loses at Peachtree Creek. Battle planned by Johnston, Hood srewed it up.
There's an essay in, I believe, Ted Savas' book on the Atlanta Campaign in which the writer contends that Johnston's aversion to any kind of failure kept him from attempting anything at all. The implication being that, even had an opportunity presented itself, Johnston would have, for fear of failing, done nothing.
Do you really believe that a psychological analysis made 150 years later and w/o benefit of meeting with the one analyzed, is conclusive? This is really rather an opinion, isn’t it. And you know what $5 and an opinion get you - - - - A Starbucks Cappuccino!
An interesting, telling anecdote was related in that essay. Johnston, apparently an excellent shot, would be bird hunting and, at the end of the day, would have nothing to show for it. He waited for the perfect opportunity to down a bird. He wouldn't take the difficult shot, he wouldn't take a shot at all if there were a chance of missing -- failing.
See Above!
He did the same thing during the Atlanta Campaign; he waited for the chance to take advantage of a situation in which he could not fail.
Does anyone choose a situation in which to fail? How many times have you done that? I’ll confess, I never have. I always try to win.
Unless he caught Sherman squatting in the bushes by himself, hundreds of yards away from the nearest sentry, that perfect opportunity was not going to be. So Davis replaced him with a man who showed some fight.
Seems to me that he caught old Cump in the bushes about 11 times. Unless you don’t want to count the list above as battles? And as to showing some fight, After three battles with Sherman and about 15,000 Confederate casualties, Davis telegraphed Hood to knock it off. "We can't afford those casualties."
This is a portion of an article by Brooks Simpson on Mark Grimsley’s Blog. I’m not usually in agreement with Simpson, but this time, I agree 100%!
“Don’t Tell Me What I Don’t Want to Know
One of the more interesting moments in historical research is when one comes across information that challenges a long-cherished account that has been accepted as unchallenged truth. For me, one of those moments happened in the early 1990s. I was starting work on several articles that helped to establish the foundation for my biography of Ulysses S. Grant: one concerned the Lincoln-Grant relationship. I’ve always found it useful to return to original accounts whenever possible, instead of relying upon filtered versions of the accounts, and it was with that in mind that I revisited Alexander McClure’s account of a conversation he had with Abraham Lincoln in the aftermath of Shiloh. Here is the key portion:
“I appealed to Lincoln for his own sake to remove Grant at once, and, in giving my reasons for it, I simply voiced the admittedly overwhelming protest from the loyal people of the land against Grant’s continuance in command. I could form no judgment during the conversation as to what effect my arguments had upon him beyond the fact that he was greatly distressed at this new complication. When I had said everything that could be said from my standpoint, we lapsed into silence. Lincoln remained silent for what seemed a very long time. He then gathered himself up in his chair and said in a tone of earnestness that I shall never forget: ‘I can’t spare this man; he fights.’”
If I remember correctly, Bentonville was a typical Johnston battle. Initial local success, followed by Johnston's retreating.
The question of Johnston's generalship, has seldom concerned whether he could attack, merely whether he was capable (for what ever reasons) of fighting an all-out battle and IF so, under what circumstances. As far as Johnston was concerned, those circumstances were few and far between.
He did the same thing during the Atlanta Campaign; he waited for the chance to take advantage of a situation in which he could not fail.
Does anyone choose a situation in which to fail? How many times have you done that? I’ll confess, I never have. I always try to win.
Applicable emphasis now in place.
Great post, by the way.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
July 20 Hood attacks and loses at Peachtree Creek. Battle planned by Johnston. You didn't mention the difference between Johnston's plan (attack while they're crossing) and Hood's plan (attack after they've crossed and before they're entrenched).
There's an essay in, I believe, Ted Savas' book on the Atlanta Campaign in which the writer contends that Johnston's aversion to any kind of failure kept him from attempting anything at all. The implication being that, even had an opportunity presented itself, Johnston would have, for fear of failing, done nothing.
Do you really believe that a psychological analysis made 150 years later and w/o benefit of meeting with the one analyzed, is conclusive? This is really rather an opinion, isn’t it. And you know what $5 and an opinion get you - - - - A Starbucks Cappuccino!
It's an anecdote, not a psychological analysis. Everyone is invited to take it or leave it.
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
The question of Johnston's generalship, has seldom concerned whether he could attack, merely whether he was capable (for what ever reasons) of fighting an all-out battle and IF so, under what circumstances. As far as Johnston was concerned, those circumstances were few and far between.
You said it better.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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