Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
I have been listening to SHelby Foote's Civil War Narrative, and he seemed to hint that at the time of his removal that Johnston was actually working to discomfort Sherman. To me also he seemed to understand that his army was what was important, not territory. He did a fairly thourgh job of removing all the important supplies out of Atlanta. I trully think that it was a mistake to remove Johnston. But that is easy to say nearly 150 years later.
Jason, apparently Johnston was moving to do just that- to hit Sherman where a piece of his army was exposed. At the time of his removal, he had zeroed in on McPherson's isolated Army of the Tennessee. Hood, upon stepping in, inherited this plan, which was a good one. Hood's subsequent attacks on Sherman's army, however were not good moves. Johnston all along was doing his best at husbanding his army, hoping Sherman would hit him behind strong works, and looking for opportunities to throw his men at a portion of Sherman's masses and give them a fighting chance at success. To me, this is a winning strategy, or at least the Confederate's best strategy to carry out at the time. Davis may indeed have sustained Johnston if he just knew what Johnston was doing. Johnston was not going to give up Atlanta till thrown out, just like he was not going to give up Richmond to McClellan in '62. Only Davis believed both times that he just might.
Eric- good points. Jump in by all means. Though laying into Hood in the above paragraph, his move north with the Army of Tennessee I believe a good one, or at least the best of bad options. I don't fault him for this at all. Subsequent decisions while on the march of course is another story....
You refer to 'your book' in your post- can you tell us about it or post a link?
regards, ed
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Battalion:
Am currently reading a series of essays on the Atlanta Campaign. One claims that Davis set up his own problems in having no good alternative to Johnston -- including Taylor. Another proposes that Davis' main fault was in not replacing Johnston sooner than he did. It goes on to demonstrate that Johnston had lost the confidence of the Government and many of his subordinates with some convincing arguments.
I've been of the opinion that replacing Johnston was a mistake. Lately, though, I've been shrugging my shoulders at the impossibility of the whole situation. I'm glad I didn't have to make that decision.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Am currently reading a series of essays on the Atlanta Campaign. One claims that Davis set up his own problems in having no good alternative to Johnston -- including Taylor. Another proposes that Davis' main fault was in not replacing Johnston sooner than he did. It goes on to demonstrate that Johnston had lost the confidence of the Government and many of his subordinates with some convincing arguments.
I've been of the opinion that replacing Johnston was a mistake. Lately, though, I've been shrugging my shoulders at the impossibility of the whole situation. I'm glad I didn't have to make that decision.
One of the problems the Confederacy had was they failed to develop a wave of new commanders to step up into independent level commands. They start the war with the two Johnstons, Lee, Beauregard, and Bragg. Jackson and Longstreet showed the promise to come. By 1864 one Johnston is dead, Bragg is in disgrace, Beauregard has shown his flaws and is in disfavor, Lee is tied to Virginia. Jackson is dead, and Longstreet is disabled. The question of who to replace Joe Johnston with is not an easy one, and there is no candidate who stands out from the pack. Hood might have been the one in the public eye, but he had been wracked by wounds and Robert E. Lee gave him a very luke-warm recommendation when asked.
Joe Johnston showed many times what he was capable of. An inspiring leader who was unflappable in a crisis, he also seemed bad at preparations and logistics (odd for a former QM General). Much too sensitive and involved in political infighting to get along with Davis. He seems to me to wait too much for the perfect moment in an attack, and not to have enough of Grant's attitude that the purpose of maneuver was to get at the enemy.
Political issues aside, a living Jackson or a healthy Longstreet would still have had vast difficulties facing Sherman. But I think they would have waged a more active defense than Johnston did in May-June. I think Sherman had a poor confidence level in his offensive abilities at the start of the campaign (justifiably so if you look at his record) and Johnston's passivity bolstered his confidence and success.
I think also that what was needed was a threat to Sherman's LOC from Nashville south. Only forces from AL or MS could do this above Chattanooga. Forces from AL might have done it below there, or Johnston could have detached from his own army before Atlanta. But Sherman had heavily defended the RR, and kept sending thrusts into MS and AL to keep the Rebels on the defensive there. The AL force had gone to join Jackson (14,000) under Polk, and Polk was dead.
I think what is really needed is a small independent corps, say 10-12,000, about 8,000 infantry. This would be powerful enough to smash anything Sherman could concentrate in his rear without stopping his Atlanta offensive. It would be strong enough to close the RR line to Sherman unless someone forced it away, and to do real destruction to a long stretch of track if it wasn't. If you can picture the equivalent of Jackson's Valley Campaign in north GA or Middle TN.
To do it, you need a commander like Jackson or Sheridan, and you need a force of 10-12,000 effective troops. They have to move fast and hit hard and act as a well-disciplined army should. I can't see where the South has the commander or the men in the Spring of 1864 to do it.
and Robert E. Lee gave him a very luke-warm recommendation when asked.
Within that luke-warm recommendation Lee leaned toward appointing Hardee because of Hardee's greater experience in commanding (and taking care of) large numbers of men. Lee advised against changing commanders in the middle of a campaign, he praised Hood as an aggressive commander but doubted his ability to command an army.
Just a minor point.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I think Lee should have been sent to the Westenr Theater (I know...gasps abound). The tide of the war could have been changed but it was that idea of Lee only fighting for/with VA. States rights took the CSA down in this instance. Heck, the Union took Grant from the western area of operations and primarily had him concentrate his efforts in the east....if the south had done that with Lee (to the west) just think of what might have happened. I hate "what ifs" but the idea of Lee going to the west and the south not implementing this resource boggles my mind.
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Hood never had the logistics to sustain a winter campaign in Tennessee. It was total folly. It only points to the absolute desperation of the Confederate States, after the fall of the important logistics supply point in Atlanta.
Worst yet, Hood was leaving Georgia, except Macon and Augusta totally undefended from an attack. Sherman knew that tearing up the railroad, so no logistical supplies could get to Lee from Macon and Alabama was more important than pursuing Hood.
And in Hood's folly to launch an invasion of Tennessee, he destroyed his army at Franklin and Nashville.
Hood never had the logistics to sustain a winter campaign in Tennessee. It was total folly. It only points to the absolute desperation of the Confederate States, after the fall of the important logistics supply point in Atlanta.
True, but Beauregard was aghast at Hood's lack of concern for supply arrangements and unrealistic approach to logistics. This might be more a Hood problem than a Confederate one.
I don't know if Lee would have gone to the west even if he was told to by Jeff Davis. I just don't think that he would. He was not too happy to send Longstreet west in '63.
As far as Hood was concerned, He was looking too far ahead of himself. Just to his north was that hugh stash of supplies in Nashville. All of it was feeding Shermans forces. It was a thousand miles from long and almost all of it by a single railroad. Killing two birds with one stone could have been his thought. Break Shermans supply line and resupply this army at Nashville. What he did not count on was the tremendus losses at Franklin, the weather, and the force that Thomas had assembled at Nashville.
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