Nashville, the first decisive battle?

[ole]

Posted by manofreds
By the fall/winter of 1864, I believe that the southern command was really biding for time

By late Autumn, 1864, it had to be apparent to Confederate leadership that it was all over but the shouting. Hood's move into Tennessee was a desparate gamble to do something -- anything -- to post a point on the scoreboard.

Hood's move was almost the apex of stupidity. Even more stupid, however, was allowing him to do it, which makes JD and PGTB the most culpable.

Just a thought.
Ole

[larry_cockerham]

Fred, Hood, or rather his generals, had Scofield cut off and with a little luck or competence, whichever you choose, yes, the disastrous battle of Franklin could have been avoided. Divine Providence apparently had other ideas. As for the Battle of Nashville, that one would have still happened and with the 7,000 Confederates lost at Franklin still functioning, Nashville would have been an even bloodier mess. Thomas, Wilson, Scofield and Hatch were waiting with well fed bellies. Johnston was a competent command general. Hood was more of a loose cannon warrior without much tactical talent. Not the kind of guy one would have wanted to follow up the road.

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by ole

Hood's move was almost the apex of stupidity. Even more stupid, however, was allowing him to do it, which makes JD and PGTB the most culpable.


Ole

Ole,

I think PGTB was pretty much 'out of the loop' on this:

I've been reading Jefferson Davis's Generals, ed. Gabor Boritt, and in one essay which I just read yesterday 'Jeff Davis Rules: General Beauregard and the Sanctity of Civilian Authority in the Confederacy' by T. Michael Parrish I read the following:

"In early October 1864, ... Meeting face-to-face in Augusta, Georgia, Davis and Beauregard ... conversed for several hours, exchanging information and making decisions. .... Widely considered as the likely candidate to take command of the western army prior to Davis's choosing Hood instead, Beauregard gave his willing approval to Hood's planned attempt to lure Sherman northward, away from Atlanta. At the same time, Davis gave Beauregard command of a new Military Division of the West, an area covering five states ... Fully realizing his lack of real authority as an advisor to Hood, who would report directly to Davis, Beauregard accepted his rather strange role and vowed to carry out his assignment."

Parrish cites Alfred Roman's The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War between the States 1861-1865.

As your comments piqued my curiosity, I found a book by that same T. Michael Parrish, Richard Taylor, Soldier Prince of Dixie, in which I found this:

"On September 27 Taylor met Davis in Montgomery. ... They discussed at length the concept of Hood moving the army north into Tennessee to lure Sherman away from Atlanta. Davis considered Hood's force strong enough to warrant the strike, but Taylor disagreed .... Taylor also suggested, as had Hardee and others, that Davis transfer General P.G.T. Beauregard from his duties at Charleston to take command of the army. ... Taylor believed he had persuaded the president to adopt his recommendations. But Davis decide upon only a superficial course of action. Instead of replacing Hood with Beauregard, he set up a new administrative structure called the Military Division of the West, with Beauregard in command. .... Taylor discovered the true ramifications of the arrangement when he met with Beauregard two weeks later at Blue Mountain. Beauregard had not replaced Hood. Instead, he exercised only an uncertain, almost advisory authority. Davis still had ultimate control over Hood's movements. By elevating Beauregard, the president obviously meant to deflect the public outcry against Hood while also leaving him in command of the army. .... when Beauregard conferred with Hood on October 21, he discovered the dauntless Texas had decided that in order to lure Sherman out of Georgia, he would have to seize a new initiative: a diversionary campaign into Tennessee. .... Returning to explain matters to Taylor, Beauregard confessed that, after making a heated protest, he had finally "declined to interfere" in Hood's audacious campaign, especially when no objection came from Davis."

Not to rely on one author, I tore the shrink wrap off my copy of Wiley Sword's The Confederacy's Last Hurrah. Some excerpts:

"Hood outlined a proposal for Davis. ... Hood advocated a bold new plan ... Hood had learned from his earlier close association with Jefferson Davis that the best way to deal with the president was to flatter him and bow to his strong convictions. ... Davis, of course, was desperately looking for an acceptable practical solution. He had long sought to wage offensive warfare, even to carry the war into Tennessee and Kentucky. ... Hood was playing to Davis's most vulnerable side. ....
As for the public outcry for a change in army leadership, Davis would circumvent criticism by a ploy. ... The entire matter would thus be resolved practically and politically. On paper the theater commander would be in control and responsible. Yet in practice there would be little change in the actual operations of the army. ...
When Jefferson Davis summoned him to a conference in Augusta, Georgia, on October 3, 1864, Beauregard hoped to assume again an important field command. ... Davis wanted Beauregard in the role of a theater commander, with little more than supervisory authority. ...
Beauregard began to have serious misgivings about Hood's operational concepts. ... Beauregard thus demanded Hood's concise statement of his plans for future operations. Yet, being well aware of Jefferson Davis's posturing with Beauregard as a defacto commander with little authority, Hood didn't bother to reply for four days.
Thereafter, Hood rarely deigned to with Beauregard or his staff, instead sending his communications directly to Richmond authorities."

Etc., etc., etc.

[ole]

Sam:

Advisory or not, PGTB wears some of the black mantle.

Luring Sherman away from Atlanta ought to have worked. Unfortunately, Sheman didn't cooperate. Whether that is evidence of his superior generalship or his desire to introduce Georgia civilians to the realities of war doesn't really matter. It was a good idea.

But a good idea without the wherewithal to implement it turns quickly into a bad idea. Hood simply didn't have the means to conduct a winter campaign.

PGTB should have thrown a tantrum trying to avert that movement. (Not that it would have done any good.) If he had, I'd think better of him. That he just bent and gave way does not place him in well in my estimation.

Excellent references. You've allowed me to put off reading those. Temporarily.

Thanks for throwing a brighter light on the discussion.
Ole

[larry_cockerham]

Sam, I'd like to join Ole in thanking you for broadening my horizons. This all seems to make sense. No general of Beauregard's experience and caliber could have been dumb enough to send Hood to Nashville. I feel better about him already. Sherman saw what was going on, turned his head and chuckled before moving on to the coast. Sherman was working in tandem with Grant, getting ready to close the pliers in North Carolina or Virginia, whichever was necessary. The nuts were about to be cracked. What the winter didn't get, Wilson was ready to harvest in Tennessee. The winter and Nat Forrest caused a small delay, but that was all it was. Twenty thousand or so Confederates were given a shot at longer lives because of it. I for one was saved a gg grandpa.

[Tennessee Boy]

I never thought I would ever agree with a guy called ‘samgrant’, but hey, first time for everything.
The idea to go north, block the railroad and offer battle to Sherman on your own ground, did almost work, if Hood had not kept running away to find a better bit of ground, after Sherman got bored and went through Georgia, Hood was already to far north to catch up with him anyway, so now Plan B (I think this was Hood’s idea from the beginning), that Confederate myth of invading the North and onto the Ohio River. I think that PGTB was placed in over all command to compensate for Hoods lack of admin skills (co-ordinate railroad building, get supplies up to the front, that boring stuff) and to keep an eye on Hood (words like lunatics, in charge, asylum spring to mind). Jeff Davies, what were you thinking? Thanks for the sterling efforts samgrant.

[larry_cockerham]

If you read closely the reports of Forrest, Hood and Thomas, there is a hint that Hood was actually paying more attention to logistics than most folks credit him. His problem, more than most other flaws, was getting excited just as the battle was about to commence, and sending a few folks to un-needed demise. At Franklin, that amounted to 7,000 young men.

[samgrant]

Found this bit at: http://hometown.aol.com/jweaver301/nc/58ncinf.htm



On the retreat from Nashville, it has been told from oral tradition and contemporary accounts that the Army of Tennessee sang this little song for their Texan General Hood. It was to the tune of the "Yellow Rose of Texas."

And now I'm going southward
For my heart is full of woe,
I'm going back to Georgia
To find my "Uncle Joe"
You may talk about your Beauregard
And sing of General Lee
But that gallant Hood of Texas
Played Hell in Tennessee.

[larry_cockerham]

Thanks for the post Sam. Jeff Weaver is one of my cousins and has a well supplied and maintained website called New River Historical Notes which I highly recommend for civil war (he's written about 25 books) and also detailed history of about 15 New River valley counties, east TN, southwest VA and western NC. jweaver300@aol.com

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by Tennessee Boy

I appreciate that the weather was bad, the roads were almost non-existent and the rivers were swollen (particularly the Duck River), but this was a race to the Tennessee River, if General Thomas had pushed with this infantry from behind and thrown his cavalry around the flanks to get in front of General Hood, as Grant did with Sheridan in Virginia in 1865, he would have bagged the whole army. The Union troops were not operating in an area unknown to them; they knew the roads and fords, they had been in Tennessee long enough.

General Thomas’s pursuit was lack luster; this was the only real chance in the war when a whole field army should have been captured, and he blew it.

Not to change the subject, just to respond to the above; if you add or subtract a half dozen words of the above, change "Hood" to "Lee" and "Thomas" to "Meade", well ............ ?