Cassville

[nbforrest]

If there are any Hood fans out there, can you offer me an explanation as to why Hood would cancel his attack at Cassville on account of some cavalry?

Now, I fully realize that running into cavalry where there shouldn't have been any is cause for deliberation. But, in my opinion, halting the forward movement of an entire corps and turning around is just inexcusable. Hood knew the part he was to play in the attack and he screwed up.

Respectfully

[Admiral_Porter]

Johnston's big chance to pull a Seven Pines in Georgia and Wooden Head screwed up as usual.

I'm starting to think that Hood was as poor a corps commander as Polk.

[nbforrest]

The thing that led me to discover how poor a corps commander he was was his interactions with Davis. He wasn't promoted beyond his ability to command by happenstance. He aggresively promoted himself in Richmond and apparantly lied all day long to Davis to supersede Johnston. Being thrust into a position he was not suited for his one thing, but blind ambition at another man's expense is reprehensible.


Respectfully

[Admiral_Porter]

The whole Cassville episode is so ironic isn't it?

Here is Hood, who for months had sent secret telegrams to Davis saying that Johnston is not being aggressive, finally gets his chance to launch an offensive and blows it.

[r_moody]

According to General Cox;
"Johnston concluded that his army would retreat on Cassville and Kingston, hoping that Sherman's columns would be so separated that he could concentrate upon one of them, and so fight his adversary in detail."

Absolutely the correct strategy when you are out numbered two to one.

"Johnston had followed the railroad to Kingston, where he was joined by French's division coming to Polk's corps from Rome, and still stuck to the general line of the railway to Cassville, though this led him by a considerable detour to the east. His manifest policy was to make the largest use of the railroad to move his baggage and supply his troops, for wagon trains were not over-abundant with the Confederates."

Another correct move by Johnston.

"The position on the hills behind the village of Cassville was so strong a one, and Johnston so much desired to offer battle at an early day, that he resolved to retreat no further and to try conclusions with Sherman here. He signified this in an unusually formal manner by issuing a brief and stirring address to his troops, in which he said that as their communications were now secure, they would turn and meet our advancing columns. "Fully confiding in the conduct of the officers and the courage of the soldiers," he said, "I lead you to battle" But when our left flank crossed Two Run Creek and partly turned the right of his position, his corps commanders, Hood and Polk, became so uneasy that they protested against giving battle there, and induced Johnston to continue the retreat through Cartersville across the Etowah River. He saw the mistake he had made as soon as it was done, and never ceased to regret it. The Richmond government had been disappointed at his retreat from Dalton and Resaca and its continuation through Adairsville. His strained relations with Mr. Davis were rapidly tending toward his deprivation of command. But more strictly military reasons made his change of purpose very undesirable. Hardly anything is more destructive of the confidence of an army than vacillation. The order to fight had been published, and even a defeat might be less mischievous than the sudden retreat in the night without joining the battle which had been so formally announced. Either the order had been an error or the retreat was one. Every soldier in the army knew this, and the morale of the whole was necessarily affected by it."

Since the battle was never fought its hard to say what would have happened but the "Johnston won't fight" is proven wrong here, at Kennesaw Mountain and Bentonville.
Rick

[Admiral_Porter]

Hood and Polk should have been canned. From a military standpoint Polk's death was a good thing for the AOT.

Joe Johnston
Hardee
Cleburne
AP Stewart
Wheeler

That's how I think the army should have been organized. One hell of a force.

[johan_steele]

I've had a lot of thought lately on Johnston, the prevailing thought among many is that he wouldn't fight. But I can think of not a single letter I've read by one of his men that is anything short of full of adoration of the man. I think he handled Sherman pretty skillfully making only one mistake that McPherson failed to capitalize upon.

In short... I just don't know. I've always liked Johnston for the simple reason that he made every effort to conserve his men and his men adored him.

[Admiral_Porter]

The Red Clay Minuet as Shelby Foote called it.

I don't think Johnston is as bad as I once thought. I am beginning to think that his Nathaniel Greene like strategy was the correct course of action for the south.

[elektratig]

Admiral,

I know this isn't a Joe Johnston thread, but since you've raised it . . .

My big problem with him is his insubordination. I'm no fan of Jefferson Davis, but for better or worse he was the Commander in Chief. Johnston kept pulling surprises on him (by withdrawing with informing Davis), refused to communicate, joined forces with Senator Wigfall, etc. In mid-July 1864, Davis was begging Joe for information about the latter's intentions concerning Atlanta and couldn't get a meaningful answer.

As a Northern sympathizer, I suppose I'm grateful that both of them were such inflexible characters.

At to Hood, I can only conclude that it was one of those fog-of-war type things. The presence of any troops, mounted or unmounted, coming from that particular direction was utterly unexpected and disconcerting. Either Hood couldn't tell they were cavalry, or assumed they were the advance guard for a larger infantry group. He presumably concluded that, if he guessed wrong, the consequences of a force hitting him in the flank or rear would be catastrophic, and he just wasn't willing to take the chance.

[nbforrest]

At to Hood, I can only conclude that it was one of those fog-of-war type things. The presence of any troops, mounted or unmounted, coming from that particular direction was utterly unexpected and disconcerting. Either Hood couldn't tell they were cavalry, or assumed they were the advance guard for a larger infantry group. He presumably concluded that, if he guessed wrong, the consequences of a force hitting him in the flank or rear would be catastrophic, and he just wasn't willing to take the chance.

To some extent, I suppose that is true. Union cavalry just showing up should have given Hood pause. But reversing his entire corps to disperse it without orders was extremly foolish.



It is true that Johnston should share the blame with Davis for their poor relationship.

Respectfully