A problem of supplies

[MKotyk]

I'm currently reading Stephen Woodsworth's "Six Armies in Tennessee" and came across a paragraph regarding supply problems the Confederate Army was having despite being a large agricultural community.

In particular, "One of the Confederacy's chief handicaps was its inefficient supply system. The fact that the region whose only economic strength was its abundant agriculture nevertheless proved unable to supply its armies with food is powerful evidence that the Confederate commissary department was simply incompetent. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was the Confederate's premier army and got the lion's share of the region's manpower and resources, though it certainly had no surplus. The Virginia Army was drawing supplies all the way from the heartland of the South,the very area Bragg's army was defending. The Army of Tennessee was actually prevented by its own government from drawing supplies from the friendly country to its rear. During that spring....from the Atlanta depot, Lee was drawing over half a million pounds of salt meat every week while Bragg received a grand total of sixty thousand pounds...enough to keep his army on 3 day rations."


Considering Tennessee's strategic importance, why do you think that the Confederate commissary department, and the government in general, neglected the western troops so badly? Why did President Davis not address these issues?

Mike Kotyk
Virginia

[johan_steele]

Mike you have struck upon a vital question, Davis never seemed to see the West as anything but a sideshow when compared to the ANV; in all of my readings I've never really found a decent explanation for the rationale. While the AoT was neglected by Davis... the TrandMississippi was all but ignored. I look forward to reasoned argument and explanations from those who might have found a good reason for it.

[ewc]

As you say, fellows, Davis understanding fully the problems of logistics and supply, and being a Westerner to boot, makes one scratch one's head at how the West was neglected by Davis and the administration. I think it begins with that Davis as President felt compelled to stay in Richmond to attend to political issues. He needed his thumb in every pie, and as the war went on and he faced increasing opposition to his policies, he proved even more reluctant to leave unattended his adversaries in Richmond. Not that he neglected the West so much, he was very well aware of its importance, but that he was too far away for his 'thumb in the Western pie' to have any too much effect. He also wanted someone there to oversee things who he could trust. His whole schema for the West was knocked loose when he lost Albert Sidney Johnston, in whom he had complete confidence. It can explain as well why he retained and supported equivocal leaders such as Braxton Bragg, Earl Van Dorn, and John Pemberton past the point of what looks to us like reason, and dithered with leaders in whom he didn't have confidence like JE Johnston, Pierre Beauregard, and Mansfield Lovell or was slow to, like Forrest and Sterling Price. He also sustained Kirby Smith come hockey sticks or high water, in fact granting him as close to presidential authority as he could allow. Smith had his trust, but was simply too far away to coordinate with to any degree.

I think what it comes down to was that the Union had the resources and the means to win in the West whereas the Confederacy did not. AS Johnston saw this from the beginning. Unfortunately for the Rebels, the progression of the war only increased the Union's preponderance.

As to how an army could be underfed and undersupplied in the midst of plenty. It was mostly a matter of the Confederacy's completely inadequate infrastructure made much worse via the usage of war. Remember for how long the South fought before the war against the concept of internal improvements- roads, railroads, canals, etc. Some in the South realized this backwardness in the years leading up to the war and were attempting to rectify these matters, but at the time of the war breaking out, the South was 10- 20 years behind this type of internal development in the North. What's more, the South lacked a quantity of the type of executives to plan, organize, and carry out these types of improvements. The cream of Southern manhood went into the field, and these 'behind the lines' positions were considered secondary, inferior even to field positions, and the trained men went heavily into the field troops, essentially leave these desk departments to fend for themselves.

So an inadequate and worn out road and railroad system, poor planning and execution, little interest in diverting talent to improve the situation, and already being woefully behind the Union in all these considerations, and then also there was the blockade, added up quickly and decisively against the Confederacy.

[r_moody]

Only J. E. Johnston seemed to have the ability to get adequate supplies. He was the Quartermaster General of the Army before the war. He would have understood how to get supplies, how to store and distribute them better than anyone else except Grant who was also in the quartermaster department.

The control of the rivers and modern railroads in the North added immeasurable value to the Union cause.

The steam locomotive, although unreliable by modem standards, was still more dependable than draft animals. Mules, in particular, tended to operate at their own discretion and could not always be relied on. When not in use, the locomotive did not consume any fuel, whereas animals required fodder whether they were working or not. Finally, the manufacture of locomotives could be modified to meet demand. But the mule comes in only two models, Jack and Jenny, and its "design" is governed by nature. Sherman estimated that the rail line from Chattanooga to Atlanta did the work of 36,800 wagons and 220,800 mules!

Two steamboats could haul more than five trains at 1/4th of the cost. The strategic value of St Louis, Vicksburg, Chattanooga and Nashville now become crystal clear in my view.

Rick

[r_moody]

Originally Posted by MKotyk

Considering Tennessee's strategic importance, why do you think that the Confederate commissary department, and the government in general, neglected the western troops so badly? Why did President Davis not address these issues?

Mike Kotyk
Virginia

If I could answer that question I could get a Doctorate at any University in the country. IMO Davis was very poor at delegating responsibility. The Union hired railroad men to run the USMRR and gave them authority over the army’s generals. This act alone likely saved Gettysburg, as the supply lines were right behind the army. That would have been impossible if left up to the Mules.

I wish I knew why he seemed to dismiss Tennessee as at least equal to Virginia in strategic importance to the South. If I was to guess I think that he may have trusted Bragg to handle the situation more than Bragg was capable of. Bragg had pull with Davis. When he wanted reinforcements he got Longstreet. I'll bet that caused Lee a few sleepless nights.

[larry_cockerham]

Part of the answer to the inadequacy of supply for the Army of Tennessee can be found in the geography as it related to infrastructure. Rugged terrain in Tennessee, mostly the Cumberland Mountain range running east west from the vicinity of Chattanooga had greatly impeded the construction of any sort of railroad link. Same was true of the Cumberland plateau in north central and northeastern Tennessee which made east-west transport almost impossible. The Cowan tunnel was not built until early 1850s and the rail line connecting the tunnel to Nashville on the north and Stevenson, Alabama to the south and the line to Chattanooga wasn't completed until just before the war began. This was a very valuable supply route getting cargo off boats at Nashville. Only problem was the fact that this line was controlled for most of the war by the US Army.

[ewc]

Good points all, gentlemen! Yes, Larry, the mountainous terrain of Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia was a logistical nightmare for the generals of both sides throughout the war. Lincoln wanted desparately a Union presence in eastern Tennessee from the earliest possible date, and all the generals from Sherman and Buell on took one look and came down with the heebie jeebies.

Good point about Joe Johnston and Grant, R. Their knowledge of the procurement and dispersement of supplies was a great aid to their ability to move and the making of their strategies. At the siege of Chattanooga, Grant came in and immediate went to work on fixing the supply situation. General Hooker too was a quartermaster in the Old Army. He rescued the Army of the Potomac from the depradations of Burnside, where the Army in the East at Falmouth opposite Fredericksburg that nasty winter was like as to perish in the midst of plenty (full federal warehouses, empty front line stomachs .) This is worse than the Army of Tennessee being plagued by bad equipment and worse roads. While it lasted, that is.

As to Confederate strategy in the West, I would venture to say that President Davis of anyone would know its' true importance. I can't conceive of him minimizing the value of the West to both sides. But I believe he did not understand the value of the rivers. The rivers were highways of invasion in the West and a fairly certain means of moving supplies, men, and providing an avenue for naval arms. The Union generals and river admirals were quick to pick up on this and use the rivers to greatest advantage. They exerted great pressure on the Confederates from the getgo and never let up.

[r_moody]

Originally Posted by ewc

As to Confederate strategy in the West, I would venture to say that President Davis of anyone would know its' true importance. I can't conceive of him minimizing the value of the West to both sides. But I believe he did not understand the value of the rivers. The rivers were highways of invasion in the West and a fairly certain means of moving supplies, men, and providing an avenue for naval arms. The Union generals and river admirals were quick to pick up on this and use the rivers to greatest advantage. They exerted great pressure on the Confederates from the getgo and never let up.

Agreed, the value of the Navy to the Union in the west is largely overlooked. The Navy had much larger guns than the Infantry was able to drag around. The rivers allowed for easy and cheap transportation of both troops and supplies. The Union could move supplies from the east to the Ohio and then down stream to anywhere they wanted.

The South had to move everything over an inadequate and obsolete rail system. Allot of the southern rail system was narrow gauge and of strap iron construction with few sidings. It was designed to move cotton not iron.

Rick

[ole]

Ed:

If Davis had been a Virginian or a Georgian or a South Carolinian, I could understand his lack of concern with rivers and rural railroads. But he lived near Vicksburg and was a cotton planter. How could he not know the value of rivers and railroads (or lack thereof)?

It boggles.
Ole

[samgrant]

It seems to me that both the North and the South gave precedence to the war in the east (Virginia).

Whether this was a matter of strategy, or a reflection of the fact that most of the information (press) was concontrated in the east, or that the respective capitols were so close together, I cannot say.

I do think that when McClellan was at the top he was most concerned that his army would win the war, and consiquently gave the west a short shrift.

I imagine that the Conf. Gvmt. was also loco-centric (my invented term for what I mean but can't manage to find the correct for, you all understand), and that they apportioned resources to maximize the threatened capitol of the Confederacy to the detriment of those poor hard battlng warriors in the west

Certainly both governments knew the importance of the Misssippi River, the Tennesssee River, etc.