Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
I think that the emphasis on the East was natural due to the need to defend the Union Capital, which was in hostile territory. Once the CSA Capital was moved to Richmond it became the primary Union target for two reasons. It was a primary manufacturing center and an accessible port. Making it the seat of the government made it a double target. Virginia and Tennessee were the keys to manufacturing and commerce for the South. I am also of the opinion that without Virginia, the Confederacy would have never gotten off of the ground. A quick defeat of the forces in Virginia and the whole thing would have fallen apart. Had any competent general other than McClelland been in charge it might have happened. Lee has been quoted as saying that the early victories in the East gave the government officials a false sense of invincibility and they did not build the infrastructure needed to win the war.
Rick
__________________ "We made a great mistake in the beginning of our struggle.... We appointed all our worst generals to command our armies, and all our best generals to edit the newspapers"
- Robert E. Lee
The Battle Flag of The Madison Light Artillery (Louisiana) MOODY'S BATTERY - 24 Pound Howitzers
Alexander's Battalion
Longstreets Corps
Part of the answer to the inadequacy of supply for the Army of Tennessee can be found in the geography as it related to infrastructure. Rugged terrain in Tennessee, mostly the Cumberland Mountain range running east west from the vicinity of Chattanooga had greatly impeded the construction of any sort of railroad link. Same was true of the Cumberland plateau in north central and northeastern Tennessee which made east-west transport almost impossible. The Cowan tunnel was not built until early 1850s and the rail line connecting the tunnel to Nashville on the north and Stevenson, Alabama to the south and the line to Chattanooga wasn't completed until just before the war began. This was a very valuable supply route getting cargo off boats at Nashville. Only problem was the fact that this line was controlled for most of the war by the US Army.
I think that one of the biggest errors made by the South was not fighting for Nashville early in the war. It became the Norths major supply depot out west for the rest of the war. It was far more valuable than Chattanooga or Atlanta. Union control of Nashville and the supplies that poured out of there, made the other battles possible.
__________________ "We made a great mistake in the beginning of our struggle.... We appointed all our worst generals to command our armies, and all our best generals to edit the newspapers"
- Robert E. Lee
The Battle Flag of The Madison Light Artillery (Louisiana) MOODY'S BATTERY - 24 Pound Howitzers
Alexander's Battalion
Longstreets Corps
Great points. Politically, the old European concept of seizing the enemy's capitol meant the end of the war. Lincoln knew that the real objective was the opposing army. Get that, and you have the war, nevermind the capital. But, politically, the importance of the capital was foremost -- his support in the prosecution of the war demanded the capital.
He ordered the AoP to concentrate on the acquisition of Richmond while begging his generals to destroy the ANV. Meanwhile, he was advising his western commanders to meet and defeat the opposition -- not too bad for a country boy who only started reading up on military stuff after the war began!
As to supply (apologize for straying from the thread), he had the good sense to let the details be handled by professionals -- and, somehow, he managed to find professionals -- who knew what they were doing. And he gave them all the support he could muster.
Continuing with supply, Davis was handicapped by Davis. He couldn't let anything go by him. Whether that was a lack of trust or a personal quirk can be debated, but there is a vast gulf between the styles of the two chief executives. One sought experts and empowered them; one needed (yes, needed) to direct the process.
Again, I've strayed from the thread. My apologies.
Ole
Ole- yeah, you'd think Davis of all people would understand the value of the rivers and railroads. It could be that he and the agrarian South as a whole just did not grasp yet the true importance of industry and infrastructure to this conflict and the great preponderance of power it was going to give the Union. It could be too that Davis had an inkling but realized he simply did not have the resources to fight the Union in this way in the West. Or even that the Union leaders in the West immediately understood the problems and possibilities and jumped on them at once before the South even grasped there was a significant problem and that they were in serious straits. And things were just going to go downhill from there for the Rebs.
Ole- Lincoln just had an innate feel and comprehension of administration and the handling of men that was absent or sorely lacking in Davis. I don't even want to think what Lincoln's type of nimble leadership would have done for the South (shudder!) ~!
Rick- Sidney Johnston realized almost immediately that he had too few men to cover too vast a territory. He tried some nimble juggling of his own, but do what he might, he could only make one area just a little less weak while greatly weakening everywhere else. He pretty much knew that once the Yanks started to push, he was going to have to start to give. His defense of Nashville depended on Ft Donelson. That is why he invested such a great deal of his strength there. Once Ft Donelson was gone, there was no way of keeping Nashville, he could have fought for it, but he was not going to be able to keep it. He opted therefore for a better defensive position, or at least not so exposed a one. Tough break for the South. But again, Yankee control of the rivers was bound to spell the doom of these Siouthern river cities to the South.
Sam- neat word- loco-centric. Pretty well describes what you want it to say, doesn't it?
regards, ed
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
"Agreed, the value of the Navy to the Union in the west is largely overlooked. The Navy had much larger guns than the Infantry was able to drag around."
Don't tell that to Col. D.C. Kelly of Forrest's command who set up his cannon along the narrow Cumberland during the week of December 6, 1864 to await the arrival of some fine northern naval vessels which he promptly caused to reverse course. Such was also true for a while at Dover when the navy came up the Cumberland only to be greated by some farm boys from central Tennessee with their newly acquired 9 pounders. Two weeks prior preparation and a little practice produced remarkable results. Problem was, when the banks were cleared of a few pesky Confederates, the supplies began rolling into Nashville and the tide turned decisively with a northern wind.
The early steam engines required a draft from the stacks to perform properly. Forrest’s men became very talented at shooting the stacks off of the steamboats. Without the stacks the boats lost so much power they were not able to fight the current and ran aground. Surrender followed because the sailors could not fight in that manner.
The other weakness associated with the gunboats was that they were always exposed and had to fire upward. Those on shore could hide their position, move unnoticed and fire down on the target. Since necessity is the mother of invention, the confederate torpedoes became the sailor’s most feared weapon as just one sunk the Cairo, now on display at Vicksburg.
Most of the gunboats that ran the western rivers had 32# smooth bores. They were short barreled and inaccurate over long ranges but they were floating platforms of artillery that could be used to fire constantly and usually out of range of field cannon. Grant used the Navy when and wherever he could to his advantage.
You guys are keeping me on my toes, thanks for the constructive comments and additions.
Rick
__________________ "We made a great mistake in the beginning of our struggle.... We appointed all our worst generals to command our armies, and all our best generals to edit the newspapers"
- Robert E. Lee
The Battle Flag of The Madison Light Artillery (Louisiana) MOODY'S BATTERY - 24 Pound Howitzers
Alexander's Battalion
Longstreets Corps
... the "Cairo" hit two torpedoes. However, the first was enough to sink her. A fabulous display in Vicksburg. For those who haven't seen it, do put it on your "must see" list -- near the top.
Ole
The line between disorder and order lies in logistics - Sun Tzu
My logisticians are a humorless lot...they know that if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay - Alexander
There is nothing more common than to find considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign and a war - von Clausevitz
Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point - Jomini: Precis de l' Art de la Guerre
Gentlemen, the officer who doesn't know his communications and supply as well as his tactics is totally useless. - General George S. Patton
War has been variously termed a war of production, and a war of machines. Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics - Fleet ADM Ernest J. King, USN
Bitter experience in war has taught the maxim that the art of war is the art of the logistically feasible. - ADM Hyman Rickover, USN
Forget logistics! You lose! - Lt. General Fredrick Franks, Desert Storm
__________________ "We made a great mistake in the beginning of our struggle.... We appointed all our worst generals to command our armies, and all our best generals to edit the newspapers"
- Robert E. Lee
The Battle Flag of The Madison Light Artillery (Louisiana) MOODY'S BATTERY - 24 Pound Howitzers
Alexander's Battalion
Longstreets Corps
Tullahoma: The 1863 Campaign for Control of Middle Tennessee (White Mane Press) has a good description of the supply problems of the AoT in Middle Tennessee for the first six months of 1863. The mountains were not the major problem, Lucias Northrop was. That gentleman ordered all supplies from Chattanooga east to go to the Carolinas and Virginia. There was an adequate rail net for the AoT, the traffic was going in the wrong direction.
The rivers were not a great help to the Union during that particular period because of dry weather and low water. The AoftheCumberland depended largely on a single rail line from Louisville to Nashville to Murfreesboro during that period.
Later in the war a Union supply base was built at Johnsonville, TN, and a rail line constructed to connect it to Nashville. The Tennessee was much more reliable as a supply line than the Cumberland--a small, shallow river in 1860's and not a carrier of much traffic today.
RebProf, the fellow who wrote that book you just mentioned cut his story off in mid 1863. Can you comment on the situation into mid 1864? My great great grandfather Cockerham was caring for horses in Tullahoma about the first of June, 1864 when he was pinned against a tool box and cracked some ribs before being transported via wagon to Pulaski. He was 10th TN US Cav, so the supply line was lost to the Confederacy prior to that time. The Cowan tunnel must have been an asset, one that I'd like to visit if I can figure out how to get in there with a vehicle or by foot? The muscle shoals around Florence must have made the Tennessee also not much of a supply help during the summer months. Lots of material was downloaded at Clifton and Waterloo because of the shoals. That was probably a reason that Wilson's cavalry was massed there at Gravelly Springs in 1865. I've seen photos of Nashville when the Cumberland was little more than a branch during low water.
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