Chickamuga !!!

[pvt gauss]

Mr. r_moody, compliments,

Your Judgement of southern Cavalry ,I Personally find without merit. The western theater was full of "Scouts". You must realize that "out west" was a whole differant war than "Bobby Lees" in the east. These were , and still are people of rugged indiviualism.
If you got the Guts to tell Maj. Gen. Forrest or even Gen. Wheeler that his cavalry is "not up to snuff", I personally would stand back.
Whom both had, and proveable[paper trail], that their "Intelligence was weak"- well good luck.
Let us both remember Forrest`s raid on Memphis,[nov.64] where Gen. Wasburn [the scourge of that place]. was almost "Gobbled up".
So anyway don`t fool with Cav. units in the western theater.Cause ya`ll gunna git in trouble. I won`t even get into the Texas Units. Those cavalry units outa there were completely.

Gauss

[r_moody]

Originally Posted by pvt gauss

Mr. r_moody, compliments,

Your Judgement of southern Cavalry ,I Personally find without merit. The western theater was full of "Scouts". You must realize that "out west" was a whole differant war than "Bobby Lees" in the east. These were , and still are people of rugged indiviualism.
If you got the Guts to tell Maj. Gen. Forrest or even Gen. Wheeler that his cavalry is "not up to snuff", I personally would stand back.
Whom both had, and proveable[paper trail], that their "Intelligence was weak"- well good luck.
Let us both remember Forrest`s raid on Memphis,[nov.64] where Gen. Wasburn [the scourge of that place]. was almost "Gobbled up".
So anyway don`t fool with Cav. units in the western theater.Cause ya`ll gunna git in trouble. I won`t even get into the Texas Units. Those cavalry units outa there were completely.

Gauss

I don't think I said that the units were "not up to snuff". The Cavalry reported to the Army Commander who directed their movements. Forrest, for example, reported to Bragg, JE Johnston and Hood. It was at their direction that he went into motion. He was occasionally given independent command but when his objective was completed he went back and reported to the commander. I am criticizing the command that allowed the units to go away from the army for too long. Losing troopers and horses for minimal gain. The Army would have been much better off with less cavalry and more mounted infantry. They would have kept more horses and lost far fewer troopers. The Confederate Cavalry rode their own horses. When horses were lost the troopers had to go back home and try to replace them. They were not always able to replace the horses and family matters sometimes kept them at home. The time it took to get everyone back to the army and ready to go was far to long.

Thank you for your reply

Rick

[larry_cockerham]

Rick, Forrest reported back to less than brilliant command because there was no other command in the Confederate army after Atlanta in the western theatre. His distruction of New Johnsonville in December 1864 and his noble protection of the Army of Tennessee during their retreat into Alabama later that month are the reasons many SCV members honor this man today without hesitation. Nathan Bedford Forrest was a fightin' man with no equal in the war. (I'm a little biased, but not much?) One exception to my statement about command would have to be Joseph Johnston who re-assumed command before Bentonville. Too little, too late. It was time to go home long before May 1865.

[r_moody]

Originally Posted by larry_cockerham

Rick, Forrest reported back to less than brilliant command because there was no other command in the Confederate army after Atlanta in the western theatre. His distruction of New Johnsonville in December 1864 and his noble protection of the Army of Tennessee during their retreat into Alabama later that month are the reasons many SCV members honor this man today without hesitation. Nathan Bedford Forrest was a fightin' man with no equal in the war. (I'm a little biased, but not much?) One exception to my statement about command would have to be Joseph Johnston who re-assumed command before Bentonville. Too little, too late. It was time to go home long before May 1865.

My point has been that the western command did not use its cavalry force correctly. Cavalry operating independently of the infantry is risky. Sherman said that Forrest was the best General produced on either side of the war. High praise from a man who felt that it was worth it to bankrupt the treasury to get him.

I agree with you on JE Johnston. He knew how to supply an army and preserve it. His cavalry was used in calculated measure to protect and provide intelligence for the main force. Raids are a valuable tool to protect the infantry if used judiciously.

[larry_cockerham]

I agree with you also, Sir. The problem in 1864 in the west after mid summer was that there didn't seem to be a command of the Army of Tennessee aside from Beauregard who meet briefly with Hood before the disastrous hike into Tennessee. (May the general forgive my attempt at spelling.)

[pvt gauss]

Gentlemen, Compliments
The only thing I have a problem with, in the one theory is the definition of "correct". "The west" was not between a mountain range and a sea 200 miles away , but endless miles of almost jungle conditions evolving to desert. Semi or almost indepedant commands {Taylor in La. & elsewhere } were essential. Whether Forrest used his troopers independantly at times would not be a stretch of the truth, yes he was under "General" command but, given the mission, as often or not he was not under "General" control of superiors for weeks/months at a time. by choice and necessity[SP].
All it is, is East Style vs West Style Dictated by situation.

Gauss

Ps. Sir once again my compliments but you and I will never discuss that General named Johnston,J. "An Army is not meant to be preserved ", but Fought.

[Alabaman]

My Compliments Pvt. Gauss & everyone,

Since we have been discussing Chicamauga (the length of time until now) the original armies would have now been facing each other in a seige situation. I've mentally noted the days and it has been a very long time. With this in mind, I've read where the CS AOT was in starvation almost as much as the 'under-seige' Fed army; my source being Pvt. Sam Watkins', Company Aytch & the letters of my ancestor. Food, needed by Gen. Bragg's army was THE main problem, it seems. Of course, the Federal boys were in dire need and were eating anything the could find, which wasn't much. The conditions of both sides during this time must have been horrible.

Would any of you fellows know why the Confederate Commissary was so negligent in sending food/supplies to this 'currently' victorious army?

Is it true (or false) that supplies were aplenty in Atlanta & were held back to supply Gen. Lee's army?

Why wasn't there a concerted effort by confederate commanders to attack the beseiged federals in some manner? There may have been & I am simply unaware of it.

Re: Cavalry. Had Gen. Forrest's command already departed from Gen. Bragg's army by mid Oct., 1863? If Forrest had been present it would seem the Federal "cracker Line" & the other river crossings made by Federal troops would have been detected much earlier & maybe even stopped. I've pondered this thought many times. Cavalry, being capable to arrive quick to detect & cncentrate, and being under an able commander like Gen. Forrest would have been wise, in my humble opinion at least? I'm applying Pvt. Gaus' last reply re: the terrain, to the (then) situation of Gen. Bragg & his army around Chattanooga during Oct. '63. All I have found in regard to picket were CS Infantry dettchments.
Please excuse the numerous questions but I lack good books on the subject. Thank You, Gentlemen!

Yours Sincerely,
Alabaman (Rob Adams)

(edited: ("re: the terrain" was added for clarification)

[johan_steele]

Alabaman, I might suggest any of the following: MOuntains Touched by Fire by Sword, Chickamauga and Chatanooga: the Battles that Doomed the Confederacy by Bowers & Chatanooga a Death Grip on the Confederacy by McDonough also of note is Cozzens work THe Shipwreck of their Hopes which every time I get the initiative to go special order I end up not due to some unforseen circumstance. As it is very highly recomended I would suggest it also.

I think Chatanooga was the campaign the proved Wheeler as over rated. He squandered several opportunities to really put a kabash on Grants relief ops that Forrest would have doubtless have taken advantage of.

To the supply issue, there were literally mountains of supplies at Chickamauga station that never made it just a few miles to the men who needed it. Who exactly is to blame for this I've ever read conclusively yet several of Braggs Commanders were well aware of the situation w/ shortage of food and blankets that pluaged their men as well as the supplies only a few miles away and nothing happened to alleviete the issue.

Atlanta was the supply hub for the region and many supplies that might have helped the AoT at crucial moments were maintained in Atlanta to be forwarded to Lee.

For those of you who are fans of Cleburne his command inflicted the lions share of the 5000 odd casualties on the Union Army. I've never really been able to fathom exactly what happened to the CS soldier that day. One of the strongest defensive positions of the War and yet the AoT practically disintegrated w/ only Cleburnes stubborn action at Ringgold Gap saving it from destruction. My own answer may have come from a letter I read years ago. That intimated that the men on the Ridge heard the frightful fighting on both flanks and then watched as the AoC came at them at the double quick. Not even really slowing down. "As if the devil himself had opened the gates of hell to vomit forward legions of blue devils." THose men weren't beaten on the field. they were beaten in the will. They had had enough and weren't willing to die for a General they despised. I think that Bragg holds the blame, his men didn't trst him and they felt he had squandered the victory they had bought w/ their blood at Chickamauga.

In the same vhein of thought how in Gods name did the AoC carry that Mountain? THey were ****ed and said "it's on!" and that is where it all seems to have come from. Grant didn't win that battle, nor Hooker or Sherman or even THomas; the common soldier of the AoC did.

[ole]

Rob:

When you come up with an answer, let us all know. Johnny Reb seems to have been in a perpetual feast or famine situation. The only answer that makes any sense to me is command and governmental incompetence -- along with having no railroads, roads, or horses.

Apparently, the ground behind Chattanooga was impossible. Rosecrans had attempted to feed his army through it and just couldn't do it. By the same token, it would have been difficult, even for NBF to find a Union wagon train, let alone interdict it, in the unlikely event that there might have been one.

The governors of NC and GA were notoriously uncooperative with the CS government even before the war started. Brown, in Georgia, refused to allow his militia (and it's supplies) to serve with the CS Army. There is a story told and I see no reason to doubt it, that German WWII POWs held in the states were sometimes outfitted with grey, privates' blouses and shoes. These purportedly came from the unissued stores held in NC by NC's governor for NC troops.

Vast stores in Atlanta? I have read where Hood, before leaving the city, gathered darned near every grain of powder and gram of lead existing in the confederacy. Then he left and blew it all up. In accumulating it, he commandeered all the skilled workers from the factories in Augusta, Macon and Selma. So not only did he destroy the ammo, he almost destroyed the Confederacy's ability to make more.

To make a short story longer, the Confederacy's supply problems were apparently more on the distribution end than they were on the production side. During the last year (and maybe a bit longer) the production was beginning to fall off as well. I will propose that ruinous conscription -- including the seizure of skilled hands -- caused as much trouble as Yankee bullets.

Hope this helps.
Ole

[ole]

Shane:

If you'd like, I'd be pleased to send you my books (11 counting pamphlets) with your good as gold promise to return them in the spring.

Ole