Civil War History - The South & Western TheatersCheck this forum for all South and Western Theater Questions. Included are the Western, Pacific, Trans-Mississippi, & Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach Theaters.
Does anyone want to nitpick the details leading up to and including April 8, 1862 at Pittsburg Landing?
There's a wealth of detail in the battle that's not covered in the history books. And there are "what ifs" galore.
One might start with the contention that Grant ordered Confederates buried where they fell, but there are no mass graves near the Hornet's Nest. Observations?
Or that A. S. Johnston wanted to peel the Federal army away from the river and force them into the swamps west and north of the battlefield, but the actions of the army appeared to be focused on driving the Federals into the river. Observations?
Ole,
I'm very interested, I don't have a lot of my references on me, but i'll round them up (as I prefer not to spout theories without references), this should be a very interesting and informitive topic!
James.
Check out abebooks.com. There are many member/booksellers in the Down Under, and I'll bet one or two of them will have either Wiley Sword's or Larry Daniel's works on the event. Both are good reads. Either will give you the detailed essence of the battle. Both are not exactly redundant. It's nuance.
Until you've visited, you can't appreciate the massive scope of the engagement. Awesome.
I'm no Shiloh expert, but the "what ifs" go both ways. The mystery I love is, What on Earth happened to Lew Wallace (later of "Ben Hur" fame)? I gather that he was never able to provide a comprehensible explanation.
I've understood that the confusion in the Confederate plans was attributable to a disconnect between A.S. Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard. Johnston's general idea was to drive the Federals away from the river and landing, but he delegated the planning to Beauregard, who came up with an overly complex order of march and plan aimed at driving the Union forces into the river. If I recall correctly, Johnston saw Beauregard's orders but didn't change them -- why not, nobody knows.
Beauregard's plan obviously didn't work, but I guess the interesting question is whether Johnston's would have succeeded. The area by the river was lightly defended but, I gather, swampy, overgrown and cut. Could the Confederates have crossed that terrain and overwhelmed the Union left, cutting them off from the landing? An even bigger "what if" is whether Johnston's plan would have worked if the Confederates had been in a position to attack two days, or even one day, earlier, as originally planned. Again, I understand that primary responsibility for the delay lies with Beauregard, weather and "friction". What's your view?
I must confess I know nothing of the lack of Confederate graves around the Hornets' Nest. What does it mean? Is there some suggestion that they didn't take large casualties there? If so, I've never heard that.
True enough. Sherman in particular should have recognized the threat, since his troops were closest to the Confederates. If I recall correctly, the speculation is that he didn't want to appear to be overly excited about reports of of Confederate troops in the woods because he had previously been called "insane" by the press after overestimating the enemy in Kentucky and suffering a breakdown.
Can't say if Johnston's plan would have worked, but I figure there was a better chance for them if the plan had been followed. He couldn't have known it, but his plan would have attacked the weakest part of the Federal line. When a limited attack was brought to bear on that point, it helped close the loop on Prentiss and got him killed.
I say limited because troops were fed into the center and right flank of the Federal line leaving precious little for Johnston to lead against the left.
"called "insane" by the press after overestimating the enemy".
Actually he was called insane because of the number of men he thought it would take to "hold' Tenn, KY, and upper Miss. after it had been captured by the Union. And when the numbers of troops that had to be kept on a line between Memphis and Corinth, and Nashville-Atlanta, and Nashville north just to protect the railroad lines, he wasn't all that far from wrong. I have a Illinois relative that served most of the war, but only saw skirmishes for the most part as his unit did guard duty at various towns in Tenn.
The same goes for a lot of western troops.
Ole,
I've read a few of books/articles on shiloh and read Grant and Sherman's memoirs, I meant I would need to round up the few on shiloh I have so I can quote them, but I should buy aleast a couple more I guess to help give me a stronger picture. The battle field guide of shiloh by the Kansas Press is a great reference piece.
Elektragit,
The Kansas press "US army college battle field guide to the battle shiloh" covers the LEW Wallace events very well, I have lent it out to a friend but when I get it back I will reread then knock up as summary of the events.
I believe Beauregard and Johnson did not work extensively together on the plans for the attack at Shiloh, but both did agree on driving the federals away from the landing, the plan that Beauregard came up with was far too complex for a realistic plan of what the Confederate army at the time could achieve, and the main reason for Johnston not changing the plan of attack has been said to have been because it was over his head due the complexity, and not wanting to look the fool the did ask many questions, Johnston was a great man on the field but not a great man for the bigger picture (the loss of Nashville gives us some insight, also his conduct during the battle shiloh gave him little command control.)
Interesting thinking about the what if of the confederate concentrating on the federal left to force them from the landing, if I had my battle field guide I could see the starting deployment, roads and terrain, to see how it could have evolved. I do remember the terrain being ugly as elektragit stated, also the gun boats could have caused some greif.