Shiloh

[8thvacav]

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v2...icturemisc.jpg
Shiloh Church

[FSPowers]

This battle could have ended either way.
When A.S. Johnston went down, command and control was temporary lost.
There were reports that the Union pickets' warnings about approaching Confederates were at first ignored because it did not match the current intellengence (they were still in Corinth accotding to the reports).
Hungry Confederates looted the Union camps, killing most of the momentum, allowing Grant to regroup. That regrouping, along with Buell's arrival and the gunboat support, halted any chance for Confederate victory. If the AOTO had not arrived, it may have been Grant who would surrender.

[ole]

Originally Posted by FSPowers

This battle could have ended either way.
When A.S. Johnston went down, command and control was temporary lost.
There were reports that the Union pickets' warnings about approaching Confederates were at first ignored because it did not match the current intellengence (they were still in Corinth accotding to the reports).
Hungry Confederates looted the Union camps, killing most of the momentum, allowing Grant to regroup. That regrouping, along with Buell's arrival and the gunboat support, halted any chance for Confederate victory. If the AOTO had not arrived, it may have been Grant who would surrender.

Mostly true, Mr. Powers. I expect, however, you'll get some arguments.

Comand and control was long gone by the time Johnston went down. There were pockets of cohesion, but few involved more than individual divisions. The looting of camps contributed much to the melee. Also contributing were the ridiculous marching orders in which corps and division fell over each other, separating and scattering commands.

The looting of camps during the attack did slow the momentum. Without that breakdown in discipline, there might well have been a different conclusion. The Confederates swept both flanks back. The center was the primary delaying factor. The piecemeal attacks at the center gave Hurlbut and W.H.L. Wallace time to reinforce the center delaying Confederate movement until well past the time an attack on Grant's "Last Line" was possible.

When the center fell, there was no cohesion in the Confederate command structure. Had the desire to attack existed, the wherewithal did not.

Now we get deeper into opinion. Grant had assembled every available gun on the high ground above the landing. He had concentrated the remnants of Sherman's, McClernand's, Wallaces, Prentiss's, and Hurlbut's divisions into a small area which, you might imagine, fairly bristled with the rifle-muskets of 10s of thousands of rather angry Yanks. Lew Wallace's fresh division arrived, and Nelson got the best part of 2 fresh brigades across the river.

That final line and its concentrated fire-power were more than formidible. If Nelson and Lew Wallace had not arrived that night, it would have withstood any assault the Confederates could have assembled and launched, and that at night, in the rain. Grant may not have attacked the following day, but waited for Beauregard to head back to Corinth.

An assault on that last line would have cost Beauregard more than the entire first day, and that's assuming he could have rounded up enough men to make the attempt. The Johnnies might have been up to a try, but Beau wasn't up to it and likely couldn't have done it in either event.

Regards,
Ole

[FSPowers]

If I read this correctly, even if Beau managed to get enough forces to continue the assault, it would not have cracked Grant's line.

If that had happened, Grant might have been able to destroy the Confederates. However, Beau retreated to Corinth and the Yankees were too exhausted and disorganized to persue.

[ole]

Originally Posted by FSPowers

If I read this correctly, even if Beau managed to get enough forces to continue the assault, it would not have cracked Grant's line.

If that had happened, Grant might have been able to destroy the Confederates. However, Beau retreated to Corinth and the Yankees were too exhausted and disorganized to persue.

That is my belief. The weakest part of my arguement is that he would not have cracked the line -- that's a leapt to conclusion, at best. The strongest part is that he could not have assembled a force sufficient to try. Cases in point: a good many Confederates went way back to the overrun Yankee camps where they had shelter and food; another good many started back to Corinth. The rest slept where they were and were available, if they could be found, for concentration. But Forrest couldn't find Beauregard, and Beau didn't know where his commanders were, and his commanders didn't know where their troops were.

I 'spect that Grant would have welcomed an assault on his line, but that couldn't happen that night and wouldn't the next morning.

The Yanks were exhausted and disorganized, but not so badly they couldn't pursue. My guess is that Grant had no wagons or supplies sufficient to make an extended movement in time to catch Beauregard on the road. Have you noticed how few times a pursuit was conducted? Small actions, not involving armies, aimed to keep the pursuers within returning distance. And, with NBF covering the rear, I see ample reason to be cautions in pursuit.

Regards,
Ole